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This thesis examines the impact of regime transitions on the military, and the likelihood of a 
military coup. This examination is conducted within the context of the fall of Communism in 
the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. The thesis examines the 1985 to 
1996 period, and seeks to determine how the transition from Communism impacted upon the 
military. It then attempts to explain why the Russian military did not stage a coup from 1992 
to 1996, despite it being apparent that many personnel held grievances. 
To explain the absence of a Russian military coup I focus on three key determinants that I 
believe are most important in determining whether the military intervenes in politics. These 
factors are the capacity to intervene, the disposition to intervene, and the opportunity to 
intervene. Within these broad determinants are various factors that I examine in the context of 
coups throughout this century to determine their importance. I then assess whether they were 
strong enough to have encouraged intervention in Russia. 
I conclude that the collapse of Communism had a wide-ranging impact on the Soviet and 
Russian military, and that this was overwhelmingly negative. However, despite the grievances 
of personnel, I believe that a coup was not launched because the coup determinants did not 
encourage intervention. This is because the military lacked the capacity to intervene, did not 
have a strong interventionist dis•position, and did not have the opportunity to intervene. These 




Regime transitions have a dramatic impact throughout the world and require in-depth sh1dy. 
As political scientists often study the continuities of politics, transitions provide an ideal 
opportunity to assess dramatic change. The changes that occur with transitions can have a far-
reaching impact that warrants comprehensive study. At one level, the succession of a new 
regime can have a major impact on global relations. For instance, the new regime might 
aggressively promote its interests, which can lead to war. This is a particularly dangerous 
scenario if the new regime is nuclear armed. The regime might also change the balance of 
international power. This is shown by the 1917 Russian transition to Communism, a 
development that encouraged the Cold War. Similarly, the break-up of alliances and treaties 
can occur with transitions, as new regimes pursue their objectives, and renounce the 
agreements made by previous regimes. Apmi from the security aspect, a transition can have a 
major impact on the global economy. For example, a transition can affect trade agreements, 
the supply ofresources, and business confidence throughout the world. 
A transition can likewise have a major impact on regional and domestic developments. A new 
regime might pursue and protect its interests aggressively, and this can have a major impact on 
regional stability and security. For example, after the 1949 transition to Communism in China 
the new regime believed that US forces fighting in Korea posed a threat and deployed its 
forces. This led to an escalation of the conflict. In addition, the transition can change the 
regional balance of power, and can encourage regional instability if the new regime cannot 
swiftly consolidate its power. Apart from the regional consequences, domestic politics can 
change significantly. The new regime might move from a democratic to a totalitarian system. 
This fundamentally alters the role of political structures and of the electorate. It can also 
fundamentally change the economic system, possibly from a capitalist to Communist system 
or vis-a visa. The new regime's policies can decisively impact on various groups like ethnic 
groups, as it reallocates power and resources. This can lead to civil war, and influence regional 
and global security. 
In addition to the general consequences of transitions, changes can have a major impact on the 
military. Transitional changes can be wide-ranging and can alter significantly the military's 
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purpose, its performance, and composition. Transitional changes might include those to the 
roles of the military, the level of support the military receives, and the size of the military. 
These changes are examined in greater depth below. The potential for such change increases 
the difficulty of applying a theoretical framework to transitions. This is because the dynamic 
nature of transitions can swiftly make redundant the propositions that the framework is based 
upon. This is particularly likely when the framework pre-dates the transition. This is because 
the context within which the framework was developed can differ significantly to the context 
within which the military operates during the transition. Transitions thus can significantly 
reduce the accuracy of existing frameworks, and those developed during the transition that 
cannot adequately explain the continuing change. 
Militaries are not isolated from modern civilian society. Although a military might strive to 
maintain a division between itself and civilian society, and might achieve a degree of 
isolation, it is unlikely that personnel can be entirely isolated. There are many avenues by 
which societal attitudes can reach personnel. These include the right of personnel to take leave 
and their access to the media, particularly in the modern information age. Interaction with the 
military is particularly likely when it is deployed among civilians. Isolation can also be 
difficult to ensure when the military is drawn from the draft, as this facilitates the systematic 
intake of civilians and civilian attitudes. Many scholars have argued that although the level of 
civil-military contact might vary, the military and society are inter-connected. 1 Samuel 
Huntington also argued that the military might influence the outcome of a regime transition 
according to whether it supported the existing regime, the new regime, or remained inactive. 2 
This lack of isolation is evident when vanous militaries are examined. Divisions can be 
particularly weak when the military has traditionally been recrnited through conscription, and 
been assigned roles not strictly related to the protection of the state from security threats. 
Illustrative of such weak divisions is the Israel Defence Force. The Israeli military has been 
1 Amos Perlmutter, The Militmy And Politics In Modern Times: On Professionals Praetorians, and 
Revolutionmy Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p21. See also p281. With regard to other 
scholars see: Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1960), p234; and Martin Edmonds, Armed Services And Society (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1988), p 1 
2 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centu,y (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), pl 50. 
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manned predominantly by conscripts and has been deployed domestically.3 It also shows that 
civil-military interaction is influenced by the security environment.4 Similarly, Communist 
militaries have traditionally been closely associated with civilian society because of their 
domestic roles, dependence on conscripts, and close relationship with the civilian elite. Bruce 
Porter argued "Communist annies are influenced by the same social forces affecting their 
country as a whole."5 Moreover it is clear that militaries externally oriented, and not recruited 
through conscription, are not isolated from civilian society. John Gates concluded that officers 
of the US army had traditionally not been isolated from civilian influences, or from political 
concen1s. 6 
This lack of isolation is very important because it follows that the military will not be able to 
avoid transitional changes that occur throughout society. A transition can have a wide-ranging 
impact on all facets of the military. This is paiiicularly likely when the new regime believes 
that changes are required to ensure that the military is loyal, and confonns to its policies. 
Indeed a new military might replace the existing military, as occurred after the transition to 
Communism in Russia. Here the Imperial Army was replaced by the Communist Workers and 
Peasants Red A1111y (Red Anny). In line with this, the military's composition can change with 
the re-assignment of personnel according to the new regime's goals. The 1917 transition is 
again relevant as the new regime moved to guarantee the military's loyalty, and replaced 
officers closely associated with the Tsar Nicholas II. Similarly, the new regime's goals and 
perceptions will influence the operations that the military is assigned, and its level of support. 
This might lead to the military being externally, or domestically deployed, depending on the 
threat perceptions of the new leaders. The changes that impact on the military are significant 
because it can be the largest and most effective institution. It also has the ability to directly 
influence the outcome of domestic developments by deploying its forces. Indeed the 
3 With regard to the h·aditional characteristics of the Israeli Defence Forces see Stuart Cohen, "The Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF): From a "People's Army" to a- "Professional Military"-Causes and Implications," Armed 
Forces and Society (AFS) 21, no.2 (Winter 1995): pp237-54. 
4 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' 
Connection in Israel," AFS 22, no.3 (Spring 1996): p412. 
5 Bruce Porter, Red Armies In Crisis, Creating The Post-Communist Order, with a forward by Stephen 
Sestanovich, (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), pXIII. With regard to the 
structure of Conmmnist civil-military relations see also Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in 
Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civilian-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," The American 
Political Science Review (APSR) 76, no.4 (December 1982): pp778-89; and Eva Busza, "Transition and Civil-
Military Relations in Poland and Russia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies (CPCS) 29, no.2 (June 
1996): ppl72-4. 
6 John Gates, "The "New" Milita1y Professionalism," AFS 11, no.3 (Spring 1985): p433. 
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military's actions can have a direct impact on a global scale, particularly if it controls nuclear 
weapons. 
The potential impact of a transition is clearly shown by the Russian transition to Communism. 
The fall of Communism had similarly dramatic effects. The structure of the civil-military 
relationship changed after the October 1917 revolution, as the Bolsheviks rather than the Tsar 
headed the civil-military structure, they established controls to ensure the military's loyalty. 
The most imp01iant of these was the use of commissars, or political officers, to monitor 
personnel and to promote Communism. Changes to the composition of the military occurred 
too. By 1930 ex-Tsarist officers comprised only 10.6 percent of officers, and 56.6 percent 
belonged to the Communist party and Komsomol (Young Communist League), up from 20 
percent in 1920.7 Similarly, major changes occurred to the military's cohesion and size. The 
transition had a disastrous impact on cohesion as divisions arose along political, rank, and 
regional lines. 8 With regard to the military's size, the Red Army was established by decree in 
January 1918 and replaced the Imperial army. However few volunteered to serve and mass 
mobilisation was initiated. Thus, the atmy grew rapidly from 520,160 personnel in January 
1919, to 5.5 million in October 1920.9 Moves were also made to increase the expertise of 
personnel, the principles of training Red Commanders being laid down in February 1918. 
Contemporary Transitions and the Military 
I shall now focus on the more specific effects that a transition might have on the military, and 
shall use the 1989 fall of Communism in East Europe to illustrate these effects. I shall first 
examine the potential impact of a transition on the structure of the civil-military relationship, 
followed by the impact on the military's roles. These are examined first because the impact on 
these has potentially the most wide-ranging consequences. The impact on the military budget 
and perception of the military is then examined. Accompanying the assessment of changes in 
civilian perceptions is an examination of mil_itary morale, as they are closely related. Finally, I 
shall focus on changes to the military's cohesion, size, and expertise. The East European 
transitions are patiicularly important because they represent a defining moment in 
7 Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Militmy Politics 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1979), Table 6, p49. 
8 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Militmy-political Hist01y 1918- I 941 (London: Macmillan and 
Co Ltd; New York: St Martin's Press, 1962), pp3-22. 
9 Ibid., General Appendix, p763. 
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international security, as they brought to an end the East-West division of Europe. This had a 
significant impact on global security, as it encouraged the demise of the Cold War. The 
transitions also led to the emergence of new security challenges, such as those presented by 
the break-up of states. Apart from the global repercussions they led to dramatic domestic 
changes, as political systems moved toward democracy, and free-market principles were 
adopted. 
Structure of the civil-military relationshi~ 
Transitional changes to the structure of the civil-military relationship will have a potentially 
significant impact on both the new regime and the military. This structure provides the 
framework within which civilian and military leaders inter-act, and decisions are made. The 
civil-military structure is important for two key reasons. First, the structure directly 
detennines the level of control the new regime has over the military. This is because the 
effectiveness of the control methods used to monitor personnel will play a key role in 
detennining the degree of control leaders can exercise. The extent of this control will in tum 
influence the strength of the new regime, as it shapes its ability to survive within the 
transitional security enviromnent. For example, if control is tenuous it is harder for the new 
regime to ensure that its orders are obeyed. The degtee of control will also have an important 
impact on the military, as the level of control directly shapes the military's influence and 
independence relative to the new regime. Furthermore, the new regime's decisions, made in 
accordance with its goals and security perceptions and passed on via this structure, can impact 
on all facets of the military. The impact of such changes and the military response play an 
important role in detennining whether the civil-military relationship is one of cooperation, or 
one of conflict. 
The structure of the civil-military relationship can change with a regime transition. The 
structure of the relationship will ultimately be influenced as transitions entail changes to the 
state leadership. The relationship between. control structures and the previous regime is 
particularly important. If control structures are closely associated with the previous regime, it 
is more likely that they will change as the new leaders realign military loyalty. Eva Busza 
argued that transitional changes could disturb the civil-military relationship. This was because 
the methods which civilians use to maintain their control are closely linked to the operation of 
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the existing political and economic system. 10 Another key factor that is influential m 
detennining the new regime's moves is the perception the new elite have toward whether they 
can control the military via the existing structure, and whether they are in a position to change 
it. 
Past transitions illustrate the magnitude of potential change. The military's political role 
during the actual transition is likely to vary according to the state, as is shown by the East 
European transitions. Here the military roles ranged from actively facilitating the transition to 
inaction. For example, the Romanian military actively supported the overthrow of Nicolae 
Ceausescu. Contrasting this is Czechoslovakia. Here the military supported the Communist 
party. Indeed on the day before the regime fell, the supreme command publicly supported the 
party. 11 
Structural changes are primarily motivated by the new regime moving to ensure that the 
structure best accomplishes its goals and that its supremacy is guaranteed. In fo1mer 
Communist states the order of priorities for the new regimes has been similar. Reka 
Szemerkenyi argued that the 'first order reforms' involved moves to change the relationship 
between civilian and military officials, and the removal of both the Communist party's control 
and its presence within the military. Following this, 'second order reforms' were undertaken. 
These involved changes in the defence budget reflective of the boundary between civilian and 
military authority. 'Third order refom1S' were then executed. These entailed adjustments in 
accordance with the new regime's priorities and to increase efficiency. 12 
The changes that occurred with the fall of Communism have been far-reaching. The close 
relationship between officers and Communist leaders, and the resultant suspicions of the new 
leaders, has encouraged these. Stephen Sestanovich argued that post-1985 political changes in 
Communist states led to a critical reassessment of the pmiy-military relationship. 13 During 
these transitions the military's role as a Con~munist controlled institution changed as the new 
10 Busza, pl 74. 
11 Moscow Domestic Service, 24 November 1989, as carried by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): 
Eastern Europe, quoted in Porter, Red Armies, p 11. 
12 Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Militmy Reforms At Risk, ADELPHI Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) December 1996), p7. 
13 Porter, Red Armies, pVII. 
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regime moved to take control. 14 This entailed the new leaders weakening military ties with the 
Communist party, and moving to limit the military's political role. Such moves ranged from 
gradual reform to a more swift removal of political organs within the military. In Bulgaria the 
military was slow to act and it was only in late 1990, nearly a year after the fall of 
Communism, that many senior officers openly supported the banning of political parties in the 
militmy. More dramatically, less than two weeks after the fall of Communism the 
Czechoslovak military announced that all references to the leading role of the party would be 
removed, and that personnel would no longer be indoctrinated with Marxism-Leninism. 
Moreover in December 1989 all Communist party organisations were abolished from the 
military. Thus, de-communisation of the military only took about 3 weeks. 15 
Similarly, post-Communist regimes made significant changes to the composition of the 
militmy through replacing high-ranking officers and defence ministry officials, as they sought 
to ensure military loyalty. In Czechoslovakia all high officers at the Ministly of National 
Defence were appointed in January or Febrnary 1990. By 1992 all Generals over the age of 
60 had been forcibly retired. Similarly, moves were made to replace Communist personnel 
with civilians at the Ministry of Defence. By 1996, 30-40 percent of staff at the Czech 
Republic's Ministiy of Defence were civilian, and·the first post-Communist government in 
Hungary ensured that 4 of the 5 deputy state secretaries in the Ministry of Defence's 
consultative body were civilian. 16 
Institutional roles 
A transition can impact on the military's roles with maJor consequences. The most 
fundamental change may be to the military' s role to protect, and to promote the interests of 
the state, as the structure of the political system changes. Associated with this is the prospect 
of a fundamental change in the civilian elite's security goals, and the security enviromnent. 
Such a change occurs as the new regime's goals change in accordance with its perceptions of 
the security environment. Apart from the se~urity environn1ent, the goals of new regimes will 
14 See Zoltan Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern 
Europe," Political Studies XLI, no.4 (December 1993): p604; and Condoleezza Rice, "The Military Under 
Democracy," Joumal of Democracy 3, no.2 (April 1992): p35. 
15 See Dale Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Potential for 
Praetorianism," Studies In Comparative Communism XXV, no.2 (June 1992): pl06; and Porter, Red Armies, 
pl 1. 
16 Szemerkenyi, pl3. 
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differ from those of the old regime, at least to some degree, given the fundamental changes 
that occur with a transition. Such differences will entail a re-evaluation of the military's roles. 
The impact of a transition on the military's roles is important for four reasons. First, the roles 
allocated to the military shape its strnctural characteristics; the military is often strnctured to 
optimise its ability to perform those tasks it is set. Second, the roles assigned influence the 
military's level of support, both in terms of its budget and public support. For example, when 
a new regime believes that the military is performing a role that is fundamental to its survival 
it is more likely to place a priority on suppotiing it. Similarly, the roles allocated impact on 
public support. This is shown by the potential variation in support of a military assigned the 
role of policing the population, and one with the primary role of protecting the state from the 
threat posed by a widely vilified group. Third, the type and the level of expertise required by 
personnel will be influenced by the demands placed on them during a transition to perform 
their allocated roles. Finally, the military's roles influence the civil-military relationship, as 
change shapes the perception personnel have of the new regime. 
Past transitions indicate that civilian goals and the security envirol1111ent often change and that 
this can have a major impact on the military's roles: Huntington wrote that a challenge facing 
new leaders was that of redefining the roles and missions of the military to align them with 
the new environment within which they operate. 17 The changing of the security environment 
is shown by the collapse of Communism with the decline of the Cold War, and the move to 
counter the resultant security challenges like regional instability. 18 New regimes have sought 
to adapt to the new security environment, and to establish closer ties with their former 
adversaries when this corresponds with their goals. This has meant that the military's roles 
changed decisively. The fom1er Warsaw Treaty Organisation militaries experienced a shift 
away from their focus on a war with the West to new roles involving humanitarian, 
17 Samuel Huntington, "Recent Years Show Much Progress in Civil-Military Relations," (paper presented at 
Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy conference, place of conference not known, 13-14 
March 1995), available from 
http://pdq2.usia.gov/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ ... _ VIEW=l&CQSUBMIT=VIEW&CQRETURN=&CQPAGE=l,Inter 
-net, accessed on 15 August 1998, p3 of 4. 
18 With regard to transitional challenges see Regina Karp "The challenge of transition," in Central and Eastem 
Europe: The Challenge of Transition, ed. Regina Karp (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1993), pp 3-14. A summary of security policy changes in East Europe is 
also provided by Andrew Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994). 
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peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement and observer missions. 19 For instance, the Hungarian 
military contributed a medical unit to the United Nation forces in the Persian Gulf during the 
1990-1991 war. Similarly, many have moved to integrate themselves with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), given their greater focus on cooperation with the West. For 
example, the Hungarian military joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program in February 
1994, and cut the size of the military and streamlined the command structure to comply with 
NATO requirements. 20 
Contrasting this, the military's roles often change when they fail to correspond with the new 
regime's goals. Developments in Central Europe are relevant as new regimes eliminated, or 
reduced, the military's many non-security roles originating from the Communist era. This is 
shown by the transition in Czechoslovakia. Whereas the Czechoslovak military in 1989 is 
estimated to have spent 10,000,000 hours undertaking economic work, in the Czech Republic 
non-military activities, with the exception of military aid during natural disasters, are 
forbidden. 21 The transitions also indicate how policy changes impact on how threats are 
addressed. This is shown by a move away from perceiving the military as an instrument of 
maintaining domestic law and order. The only legal ambiguity is in Slovakia where the 
military doctrine allows the use of the military to counter internal threats, in contrast to its 
Constitution. 22 
13udgetary support 
Other fundamental changes to the military that can occur are those to the resources it is 
allocated. Though the consequences of such changes are not necessarily as far-reaching, they 
remain important. Budgetary support is important to the operation of the military as it 
influences the level of pay that personnel receive and their service conditions, the quantity and 
quality of equipment purchased, and the ability of the military to deploy its forces. Thus, the 
level of expenditure influences the military's capacity and the reaction of personnel to the 
new regime. The level of budgetary suppo~ for the military is evaluated within the structure 
19 Institute of International Relations, Democrntic Control Over Security Policy and Armed Forces (Prague: 
Institute oflnternational Relations, 1995), p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, p43. 
20 See Kitty McKinsey, "Hungary: The Military Strive To Comply With NATO Criteria," Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Features, 2 December 1997, available from 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971202142825.htm Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, ppl-3 
of3. 
21 Szemerkenyi, p46. 
22 Ibid. 
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of the civil-military relationship, and will depend on the new regime's threat perceptions, 
priorities, and the resources available. 
The fall of Communism clearly illustrates the factors that might impact on the new regime's 
evaluation of budgetary supp011. The poor state of the economy is one factor that might have a 
decisive impact, as military expenditure becomes a contentious issue. The Czechoslovak 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from US$123.1 billion in 1989, to US$98.02 billion in 
1991, the Hungarian GDP fell from US$64.50 billion, to US$53.90, and the Polish GDP fell 
from US$172.8 billion, to US$102.40 billion.23 This encouraged opposition to high defence 
expenditure. For instance, in 1991, 66 percent of Hungarians indicated that less should be 
spent on the military. 24 
It was in this context that defence expenditure declined. In 1989 Hungarian defence 
expenditure fell from US$1.81 billion, to US$1.24 billion in 1991, and Polish expenditure fell 
from US$3.23 billion in 1989, to US$1.93 billion in 1992.25 This decline meant that arms 
procurement declined too. The number of Hungarian main battle tanks decreased from 1,516 
in 1990, to 1,482 in 1991, and in Poland from 2,900 in 1990, to 2,850 in 1991.26 Furthennore, 
transitions in the fonner Warsaw Treaty states show that changes to the actual resource 
allotment system can occur when new regimes link such changes with the need to adjust to 
the new security environment. For example, the states actively sought closer ties with the 
West by adopting similar budget systems.27 
Popular support for the militaiy and militaiy morale. 
Popular suppmi for the military and the morale of personnel are closely inter-connected. The 
civilian perception of the military is important because it can influence the morale of 
personnel, and in tum their self-confidence and their determination to counter a threat. 
Changes to the level of support might also influence the willingness of people to serve, as a 
high level of support can equate with a g~eater willingness to serve. This support in tum 
23 IISS, The Militmy Balance /991-1992 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1991), pp86-90; and IISS, The 
Militmy Balance 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's for the USS, 1992), pp74-80. 
24 Ferenc Molnar, A Magyar Honvedseg Civil Kontrolljanak Helyzete es lehetosegei (Budapest: Zrinyi Miklos 
Military Academy, 1996), p 16, quoted in Szemerkenyi, pp26-7. 
25 The Milita,y Balance J 99 /-/ 992, pp86-90; and IISS, The Militm)' Balance J 993-1994 (London: Brassey's for 
the IISS, 1993 ), pp8 l, 84. 
26 IISS, The Mi/ita,y Balance 1990-/991 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1990), pp47, 50-1; and The Milita1y 
Balance 199/-1992, pp87, 89, 91. 
27 See Szemerkenyi, pp27-36. 
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influences the emphasis the military can place on entry requirements, and the credibility of its 
demands and grievances. Support is especially likely to change within the context of changes 
to the military's capacity, militaiy actions during the transition, and its treatment by the new 
regime. This is shown by the possibly positive impact on support if the military facilitated a 
popular transition, and is held in gratitude by the new leaders and the general population. 
Similarly, the military's popularity will be influenced by the roles it is allocated by the new 
regime, and whether the new leaders seek to protect the integrity of the military. 
Past transitions illustrate the impact that a transition can have on popular support. Most 
generally, the impact of the transition on the military's capacity can influence attitudes. The 
Czech military found it difficult to realign with the West and this, together with negative 
stereotypes, provided the background to a fall in suppmi. The number of people who believed 
that the military had the public's support fell from 46 percent in 1991, to 22 percent in 1994.28 
The fall of Communism further indicates that the military' s role in the transition can influence 
the level of support, as the Romanian military's active backing of a popular transition 
increased suppoii. 29 Similarly, popular transitions to independence may influence attitudes, as 
the military becomes linked with this achievement. The Slovak military enjoyed a high level 
of support after independence was achieved in 1993', as support increased from 65 percent in 
March 1995, to 72 percent in January 1996.3° Furthermore, a new regime's reforms can 
facilitate a change in the treatment of the military. This is shown by the greater freedom of the 
media in former Warsaw Treaty states leading to more critical coverage of the military. For 
example, polls of Polish officers supplied by the Ministry of Defence in 1996 indicated that 
60 percent felt the media had a negative influence on the military's image. 31 This might 
indeed have influenced attitudes, as 41 percent of Poles in 199 5 did not condemn the refusal 
to serve in the military.32 
28 See Jolyon Naegele, "Czech Republic: Transformation Of Military Progresses At Leisurely Pace," RFE/Rl 
Features, 2 December 1997, available from 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997 /12/F.RU.971202143035.html, Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, pp 1-3 
of 3; and Democratic Control Over Security Policy, p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, Table 6, p57. 
29 See Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p 117. 
30 Interview with Colonel Vladimir Kmec, Ministiy of Defence, Bratislava, May 1996, interview by 
Szemerkenyi, Szemerkenyi p55. 
31 Polish Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 1996, quoted in Szemerkenyi, pp61-2. 
32 Polish dailies, 11 and 14 August, quoted in Jakub Karpinski, "Opinion Poll Shows What Poles Condemn," 
RFEIRL Daily Report, Newsline System Search (NSS), available from http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/cgi-
bin/friends/omri/select-rec.pl, Internet, (all subsequent reports are available here), 15 August 1995, accessed 18 
March 1998. NSS reports are not provided with a no. or vol. 
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Associated with changes to the level of support are those to the level of morale. The state of 
morale is influenced by the new regime's goals as these determine the military's roles, and 
thus level of support. The East European transitions illustrate the potential for morale to 
change according to how the military is influenced by the new regime's goals. For instance, 
morale in the Czechoslovak military declined with the major changes like the fall in 
budgetary support.33 Indeed only 29 percent of the public felt that the military had good 
morale and discipline in 1991, and this dropped to 18 percent in 1992.34 
Military cohesion and size 
A transition can also have a major impact on the cohesion and the size of the military. Most 
important is the military's cohesion, as changes that influence this can have a direct impact on 
the capacity of the military to perform the roles the new regime assigns it. The level of 
cohesion impacts upon the military's capacity because the threat of personnel refusing to obey 
orders can make the military hierarchy reluctant to undertake potentially divisive tasks. 
Changes to the level of cohesion might also have a major impact on the goals of the new 
regime, as they influence the decision-making process. For instance, signs of disunity can 
influence the roles assigned. Another potential consequence of a transition is a change in the 
military's size. Although the militaiy's size does not necessarily equate with a greater 
capacity to operate, it can be influential. The military's size might influence the diversity and 
number of tasks that it can effectively perform, particularly those that are demanding on 
resources. 
Transitions can impact on cohesion because of the dramatic nature of their impact on both 
civilians and personnel. A transition is likely to encourage divergent attitudes to arise over the 
new regime, and whether or not the transition should be supported. The goals of the new 
regime and the new security environment have the potential to cause serious divisions too. 
Changes in these areas can have an important impact on the roles assigned to the military, and 
the prospect arises of divisions among personnel. This is a particularly likely prospect if the 
military has no tradition of fulfilling roles that the new regime allocates. Moreover. changes to 
the structure of the civil-military relationship can weaken the ability of the new leaders to 
ensure that the military unites behind civilian authority. This is especially likely if a new 
33 Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," p109. 
34 Democratic Control, p49, quoted in Szemerkenyi, Table 6, p57. 
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regime is unable to swiftly entrench itself, and the control structures are damaged or removed 
during the transition. 
The impact on military cohesion is shown by the East European transitions. One dramatic 
result has been the fragmentation of Communist states and the military. This occurred to the 
Czechoslovak military, as it was divided between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Other 
divisions can also arise among personnel over the desirability of changes. For example, in the 
Czech Republic older officers tended to support left wing parties, as they blamed the post-
1989 centre/right-oriented governments for the decline in support, whereas younger officers 
were more likely to support right wing parties. 35 Indeed Dale Herspring argued that the 
cumulative effect of the actions of the new regimes was "to undercut military cohesion and 
corporate identity."36 
The effect of a transition on the military's size depends on the new regime's goals, and its 
perception of the security environment. Changes to the military's size are detennined by the 
importance the new regime attaches to the military, and whether it perceives that the 
military's size best reflects its goals. Of direct relevance is the security environment. This is 
because changes to the size of the military will be ihfluenced by the new regime's perception 
of threats. For example, the down-sizing of the military will be discouraged if the new regime 
believes that serious security threats exist which are best countered by the military. Moreover, 
transitional changes have the potential to determine the level of resources available. Changes 
to the composition of the state, and the human and material resources available to the new 
leaders, impact on the level of Stlpport they can provide the military. 
Major changes occurred in East Europe as new regimes moved to ensure that the military 
complied with their goals and the roles they allocated. The decline of traditional threat 
perceptions, such as the perceived threat of the West, and economic constraints provided the 
context within which reductions occurred:. For example, the Czechoslovak anny declined 
from 148,600 personnel in 1989, to 87,300 in 1991.37 It then fell from 72,000 in 1992, to 
41,900 with the state's break-up and the birth of the Czech Republic's anny. 38 The influence 
35 Szemerkenyi, pp5 l-3. 
JD Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," pl03. 
37 IISS, The Militmy Balance 1989-1990 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1989), p46; and The Militmy Balance 
199/-1992, p86. 
38 The lvlilitmy Balance J 992-1993, p74; and The Militmy Balance 1993-1994, p78. 
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of the new regime's goals and perception of security is again evident, as changes to the 
military's size were encouraged by the need to comply with transitional goals. For instance, 
Central European armies were restrnctured to be smaller and more professional in accordance 
with the goal of closer ties with NATO.39 In contrast to such reductions are those changes that 
occur when a large military does not violate the new regime's goals. Such changes are evident 
in Romania where the a1111y initially increased from 128,000 personnel in 1989, to 161,800 in 
1991.40 Herspring argued that this is attributable to the army's active support of the transition, 
the more important goal of removing Ceausescu rather than the Communist party, and the 
continued power of many who served the previous regime. 41 
Military expertise 
Finally, a transition can impact on the level and the type of expertise the military requires. 
Most importantly, changes in the military's roles will necessitate changes in the expe1tise 
personnel require to effectively perfonn their tasks. Moreove1; the new regime's perception of 
the military influences whether it wishes to replace officers with those it feels are more 
suitable. This will influence the level of expe1tise, as the removal of personnel because of 
their service under the previous regime may reduce experience. In line with this, changes in 
the level of budgetary support influence the level of expe1tise. This is because the changes 
influence the level of training that can be afforded. 
In East Europe expertise became increasingly inadequate as the new regimes changed the 
level of expertise and the fields within which expe1tise was required. This is evident in 
Central Europe where expertise fell as skilled persom1el left because of the loss of suppoit.42 
For example, the Czech Republic lost 28,000 professional soldiers, mainly young officers and 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), leaving 66.7 percent of personnel over 30.43 Changes in 
the expertise needed to effectively meet the new regime's goals, and to operate within the 
transitional security environment, are also apparent. This is illustrated by a lack of fluency in 
English that hindered the Polish realignment with NATO.44 
39 Szemerkenyi, p43. 
40 The Militmy Balance 1989-1990, p51; and The Militmy Balance 1991-1992, p92. 
41 Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations," pl 17. 
42 Szemerkenyi, p47. 
43 Marie Vlahova and Stefan Sarvas, "Fostering Civil-Military Relations: The Case of the Czech Republic," 
(paper presented at a joint SOWI-Inter-University Seminar Conference, Strausberg, Germany, 8-12 June 1996), 
quoted in Szemerkenyi, p48. 
44 See Jan de Weydenthal and Bogdan Turek, "Poland: Language Problems Create Obstacles In NATO 
Preparations," RFEIRL Features, 2 December 1997, available from 
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More specifically, all these changes can impact on the likelihood of a coup, as I argue in the 
following chapter. The study of coups is important because the coup leaders might implement 
drastic policy changes, and an intervention might facilitate much opposition, and hence 
instability. Moreover coups might be aimed at overthrowing a new regime, thereby having a 
major impact on the outcome of the transition. The frequency and global nature of coups 
reinforce the impo1iance of studying them. William Thompson calculated that 274 coups in 
59 states occurred from 1946 to 1970.45 
To smmnarise, I believe that a regime transition can have a major impact on the military. The 
most important changes are to the structure of the civil-militaiy relationship. and to the roles of 
the military. In addition, the level of support for the military, the morale of personnel, military 
cohesion and size, and the expertise of personnel are all likely to change. 
Definitions and Hypotheses 
As I have outlined the significance of regime transitions and their impact on the military I 
shall now define key tenns that are used throughout this thesis and the hypotheses I shall 
evaluate. 
• Regime: The structure that dete1mines how the state is governed, policy is made and 
implemented, and the economy operates. Thus, the leaders, the process by which the leaders 
are chosen, the process by which policies are fomrnlated and enacted, the structure of the 
economy, and the context within which the general population can and does express its 
attitudes are key components. 
• Regime transition: A change in the above structure, that at least involves fundamental 
changes not just of individuals but the composition of the leaders and the structure which 
dete1111ines how the state is governed, and the way policy is made and implemented. 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971202142710.html, Internet, accessed 23 January 1998, pl of 
2. 
45 William Thompson, The Grievances of Militmy Coup-Makers, Comparative Politics Series volume 4 (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 1973), pp6-7. Thompson defined a milita1y coup as "the removal or the attempted 
removal of a state's chief executive by the regular armed forces through the use or the tlu·eat of force," p52. 
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• Coup: The removal or attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or 
threat of violence, during which active service regular military persmmel play a leading role 
in the planning and execution of the operation. The tenn 'military' relates to the armed 
services of the state, namely the army, air force, and navy. I focus on the military because 
although the overthrow of regimes might be committed by other armed forces, such as a 
militia, the milita1y is most likely to have the means to stage a coup. The "large majority" of 
coups are staged by the military.46 I assume throughout this thesis that the coup leaders wish 
to execute a successful coup. 
• Successful coup: The removal by the use of or threat of violence of a state's chief 
executive, during which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the 
planning and execution of the operation. The definition is based on the premise that the 
militaiy, at least initially after removing a state's chief executive, will hold power. I do not 
place a time limit on how long the military holds power after removing the state's chief 
executive for two reasons. First, a time limit can be irrelevant, as the military might not wish 
to govern after removing a state's chief executive. Second, there is no consensus among 
scholars as to how long the militaiy must exercise power before a coup can be defined as 
successful. 47 
• Intervention: The intervention in politics by the military, primarily via a coup. 
Given the transitional impact on the military I have decided to assess its nature and how it 
influences the likelihood of a coup. It is in this context then that I assess the validity of four 
hypotheses. 
I. A regime transition can have the potential to negatively impact upon the militaiy. 
This impact can change the: 




Military cohesion and size 
46 Harvey Kebschull, "Operation "Just Missed": Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts," AFS 20, no.4 (Summer 
1994): p565. 
47 Ibid., pp566-7. 
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Military expertise (See model 1) 
2. Various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup, and their importance can vary. 
These factors are detailed in the following chapter and in the order of their importance are: 
The capacity to intervene: 
Presence of potential coup leaders 
Participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites 
Pa1iicipation of effectively armed and trained personnel 
Cohesion of the coup forces 
Number of personnel 
Military's mood 





Manifest destiny and national interest 
External actors 
The Opportunity to intervene: 
Regime attachment 
Civilian Dependence on the military and the domestic situation 
Military popularity 
Intervention inhibitors are derived from these three key factors and are: 
Acceptance of civilian supremacy 
Lack of capacity to intervene 
Lack of disposition to intervene 
Lack of opportunity to intervene 
Professionalism 
3. A regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. 
4. A regime transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to intervene. 
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The Soviet and Post-Soviet Transition 
As I have outlined past transitions, I shall now focus on my case study, the transition from 
Communism that occurred in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The collapse of a 
superpower and the largest country in the world had profound repercussions on a global scale 
that require in-depth analysis. The collapse of the Soviet Union, an empire covering one-sixth 
of the world landmass, and the resultant emergence of the Russian Federation changed the 
fundamental strncture of international relations. The Soviet Union had been one of the two 
superpowers that dominated the bipolar security system and with its demise the Cold War 
finally concluded, and a unipolar system dominated by the US emerged. This had a major 
impact on global security. The tlu·eat of a nuclear war between the superpowers declined and 
new security threats, such as instability in the post-Soviet states, had to be addressed. On a 
more regional level the Soviet changes facilitated the collapse of Communist regimes in East 
Europe. Indeed Mild1ail Gorbachev believed that his reforms led to changes that constituted a 
"new revolution. "48 
The transition from Communism had a similarly spectacular impact on the Soviet Union. The 
Communist paiiy that had seized power in 1917 lost power just as dramatically, as 
Gorbachev's refonns encouraged the rise of opposition to the party. This opposition became 
increasingly open, paiiicularly in the Soviet republics where nationalism grew, and ultimately 
led to the pa1iy's loss of authority and the break-up of the Soviet Union. As the party's 
auth01ity fell other major changes occurred too, such as the development of rival political 
paiiies and groups that I examine in chapter 7. Economic changes also occurred as 
Gorbachev's reforms dramatically moved the state-controlled economy toward a free-market. 
Few predicted that the Soviet Union would experience changes so wide-ranging. 
The transition likewise provides an ideal opp01iunity to examine how a large military and the 
likelihood of a coup change. The case study is paiiicularly interesting because the impact has 
been so spectacular. The militaiy once most feared by the West has become incapable of 
winning a war against 11,000 to 12,000 Checlmyan rebels.49 Furthe1more, the dramatic nature 
of the transition provides an ideal opp01iunity to assess whether theoretical models fonnulated 
prior to transitions remain relevant. Similarly, the case study provides an opportunity to 
48 Mikhail Gorbachev, The August Coup: The Truth And The Lessons (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 
plOl. 
49 Timothy TI1omas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II. Military Activities 11-31 December 
1994," Journal of Slavic Milita,y Studies (JSMS) 8, no. 2 (June 1995): p265. 
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examine why a coup might not be staged despite the grievances of personnel. Regardless of a 
coup's outcome, the potential for instability, and indeed civil war, is a threat to global security 
given Russia's size and nuclear capabilities. Likewise, a coup could have a major impact upon 
the global economy. For instance, doubts could arise over the continued availability of vital 
resources such as oil. Moreover many of the explanations for the failure of the military to 
intervene are inadequate. Indeed Kimberly Zisk argued in early 1993 that "with each passing 
day, the mystery of why there has not yet been a coup deepens."50 
The impmiance of studying why the military did not intervene is clearly shown by the impact 
of the August 1991 coup. Although the coup failed, its impact was felt throughout the world. 
For instance, concern arose over who controlled the nuclear weapons, and states like the US 
desperately sought to understand what was happening. 51 Similarly, the coup prompted 
discussions on the implications for Western security. NATO Foreign Ministers held an 
emergency meeting during the coup to assess its implications, and Germany feared that the 
outbreak of a Soviet civil war could encourage troops stationed in Gennany to dese1i and seek 
asyhun.52 Moreover the coup facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Connnunism was 
fmiher discredited and Moscow was unable to prevent republics wim1ing independence. The 
coup impacted upon the global economy too. This is shown by the dramatic plunge of 
financial markets throughout the world. 53 Indeed Gorbachev termed the event a "turning-point 
of history. "54 Likewise, Yeltsin wrote that "history will record the twentieth centmy 
essentially ended August 19 through 21, 1991." 55 
The fall of C01mnunism and the Soviet Union confonn to my definition of regime transitions 
primarily for tln·ee reasons. First, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Communist paiiy General Secretary 
and Soviet President, lost power to Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President and a former 
5° Kimberly Zisk, Civil-Militmy Relations in the New Russia, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Centre at the Ohio 
State University, 1993), p8. 
51 "Where Was The Black Box?" Time, 138, no.35, 2 September 1991, p33. With regard to the US see Don 
Oberdorfer and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Aides Saw Coup Unraveling," The Washington Post, 23 August 1991, 
ppA21, A27. 
52 See Francine Kiefer, "Soviet Coup Prompts Rethinking Of Security Arrangements In Europe," Reuters, 23 
August 1991; and Fillancial Times, 21 August 1991, p3, quoted in "Coup Against Gorbachev-Threat of Troop 
Desertion Worries Bonn," Reuters, 21 August 1991. 
53 Bill Jamieson, Sunday Telegraph, 25 August 1991, p33, quoted in "Harsh Economic Reality Lies Beyond The 
Coup," Reuters, 25 August 1991. With regard to the coup's impact upon the Russian economy see Izvestia, 26 
August 1991, pl quoted in "Brief Survey of the Economy Post-Coup," Reuters, 26 August 1991. 
54 Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p626; and Gorbachev, The August 
Coup, p41. See also p31. 
55 Boris Yeltsin, The View From The Kremlin, translated by Catherine Fitzpatrick (London: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1994), p41. 
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Communist. Second, the political system changed significantly from a one party Communist 
system to a multi-party system with competitive elections. Third, the party controlled 
economy changed significantly to a free market. 
The time period focused upon is from the succession of Gorbachev in March 1985 to the 
second inauguration of Yeltsin in August 1996. This period is focused upon because it was 
after Gorbachev's succession that dramatic change occurred, and this continued during 
Yeltsin' s first term. The time period includes the most important Soviet and Russian events in 
recent times. For example, the first competitive elections, the 1991 coup, the collapse of the 
Communist regime and Soviet Union, the 1993 parliamentary revolt, the Chechnyan war, and 
the Duma and presidential elections are included (see appendix 1). More specifically, I have 
divided the transition into two periods according to the dominant trend that is evident during 
the years. Thus, the first period I label is that from 1985 to 1991, as the decline and the 
collapse of the Communist party and the Soviet Union dominated. The second period is from 
1992 to 1996 and is dominated by the development of the new post-Communist Russian 
regime. These trends are shown by my brief outline of Soviet and post-Soviet history below. 
Likewise, I have placed my definition of coups into the Soviet and post-Soviet context. With 
regard to the attempt to seize power from the 18th to 21st of August 1991, this conforms to my 
definition of a coup. This is because it entailed an attempt to remove Gorbachev through the 
use of violence, and military personnel played a leading role in its plaiming and execution. 
However the attempt is not classified as a successful coup. This is because Gorbachev was not 
successfully removed, he remained the President and exercised the powers of this office 
immediately after the coup leaders were arrested. With regard to the post-Soviet period, I 
refer to a Russian military coup because the Soviet military ceased to exist after the 
emergence of the Russian Federation. 
• Russian militaiy coup: The removal or attempted removal of Yeltsin by the use of or 
threat of violence, during which active service militaiy (Ministry of Defence) personnel play a 
leading role in the planning and execution of the operation. I use the term 'military' rather 
than 'anned forces' to avoid confusion, as there were numerous armed forces not under the 
jurisdiction of the Minist1y of Defence. 
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• Successful Russian military coup: The removal of Yeltsin by the use of or threat of 
violenceJ during which active service military (Russian Ministly of Defence) personnel play a 
leading role in the platming and execution of the operation, and at least initially hold power in 
Russia. 
I also use the tenn 'political quiescence' in the context of the Russian military, and this relates 
to the militmy's reluctance to intervene in politics, primarily through a coup. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union: 1985 to 1991 
I shall now outline key developments that occurred in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. It is 
important to have some lrnowledge of such developments because they impacted decisively 
on the milita1y. They also provide the context within which the military's actions can be 
placed, and thus better understood. Gorbachev moved immediately to change the composition 
of the party leadership when he took office. By March 1986 the average age of full members 
of the Politburo was 59 compared to 67 in July 1983, and 39 percent of members had been 
first elected under Gorbachev. 56 As Gorbachev consolidated his position he initiated wide-
ranging refo1111s. One such refo1111 was the instigation of 'glasnost' (openness). This removed 
many of the restrictions on the media and freedom of speech. Gorbachev in January 1987 also 
called for greater participation in the party decision-making process through upgrading the 
role of party meetings and cmmnittees, and introduced competitive secret ballot elections for 
positions. He fmiher called for the promotion of skilled non-paiiy members into senior state 
positions. In addition, economic refonns were initiated, and Gorbachev placed greater 
importance on a more i1movative and independent-minded approach to industrial 
management. Apart from these domestic changes Gorbachev sought to ease international 
tensions. He thus signed the Intennediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty in 1987. 
Refom1s accelerated as the Gorbachev era progressed and Communist authority declined. 
With the Nineteenth Patiy Conference of 1988 attempts were made to modernise the entire 
political system, within the framework of a one party state. In December 1988 the Supreme 
Soviet, the state parliament, adopted legislation for the establishment of a Congress of 
People's Deputies. This became part of a cumbrous two-tier legislature and parliamenta1y 
system that selected the members of the Supreme Soviet. Two of the Congress's three 
56 Ian Derbyshire, Politics In The Soviet Union From Brezhnev To Gorbachev (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers 
Ltd, 1987), Tables 3 and 4, pp40, 53. 
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chambers were chosen tln·ough competitive elections. These elections were held in March 
1989 with 1,931 Communists and 319 non-Communists elected.57 The first session of the 
Congress was held from May to June 1989 with vigorous debate, and legislation increasing 
religious and press freedoms was passed. However the economy continued to perform poorly 
and demands for freedom increased, particularly in the republics. It was in this context that 
Yeltsin, who had openly criticised members of the Communist paiiy, won 89 percent of the 
vote in Moscow against the candidate of the old paiiy system during the March 1989 
elections. 58 Paiiy conservatives also opposed greater reform and paiiy splits became 
increasingly apparent. 
Changes became more rapid from 1990, and the Communist paiiy's authority was 
increasingly challenged. In early March, Russian Congress elections were held with fewer 
restrictions and democrats won 20 percent of the seats. 59 That same month Aiiicle 6 of the 
1977 Constitution ensln·ining the Communist party's 'leading role' in politics was abolished, 
and though Gorbachev was elected Soviet President by Congress delegates his authority was 
increasingly challenged. In March 1991 a referendum asked whether the Soviet Union should 
be preserved "as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics," and in Russia people 
were asked if the President should be directly elected. Throughout the Soviet Union, 75.4 
percent supp01ied the preservation of the union. With regard to the supplementary question, 
69.85 percent of Russians suppmied the direct election of the President.60 The following 
month Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and leaders of the other republics agreed that a new union treaty 
was required that would provide the republics greater autonomy. This treaty was to be signed 
on the 20th of August. Yeltsin's winning of 57.3 percent of the vote in the first elections for 
the President of Russia held in June 1991 further illustrates the party's declining authority.61 
The following month he bam1ed political parties from state organisations and enterprises. 
It was against this background that the August 1991 coup was launched. I shall detail specific 
aspects of the intervention in the following chapters, but shall outline the event now given its 
57 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, second edition (London: Routledge, 1996), Appendix 2.1, p389. 
58 Ibid., p7. 
59 V. Vorotnikov, Pravda, 26 March 1990, p2, quoted in Sakwa, p7. 
60 Izvestiya, 26 March 1991, p2; Pravda, 27 March 1991, n.p.; and Mikhail Gorbachev, Soyuz mozhno bylo 
sokhranit' (Moscow: izd. 'Aprel'-85', 1995), pp148-9, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.2, pp389-90. Because of 
the number of sources referred to by Sakwa in his appendixes on electoral results, I refer to the original sources 
when each appendix is first used before confining references to the appendix number and the page number. 
61 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR,' Izvestiya, 20 June 1991, no 
page (n.p.); Pravda, 20 June 1991, n.p., both quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.3, p390. 
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importance. The coup was launched on the 18th of August with the seizure and isolation of 
Gorbachev in the Crimea. With this achieved, coup participants demanded that Gorbachev 
sign a decree declaring a state of emergency or resign, but he refused. The coup leaders then 
aimounced that Gorbachev had been relieved of his duties, and that power was being 
transferred to Geimadii Y anaev, the Vice-President who headed a State Cmrunittee on the 
State of Emergency (GKChP). This Committee included Valentin Pavlov, the Prime Minister, 
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Chairperson of the KGB (Committee of State Secmity), Boris Pugo, 
the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Dmitri Yazov, the Minister of Defence. That day moves 
were made to control the media, and troops were deployed in Moscow to support the coup. 
However the coup leaders did not seize Yeltsin, who actively opposed the coup. Yeltsin and 
his supporters resided in the White House, the Parliament buildings in Moscow, and feared 
that the coup forces would attempt to seize the building. The coup leaders though swiftly 
became isolated and were reluctant to cause bloodshed, their mTest facilitating Gorbachev's 
return to Moscow on the 22nd ,62 
The 1991 coup facilitated the transition from Communism as its failure discredited the party 
institutions. Inm1ediately after the coup Gorbachev resigned as General Secretaiy, and the 
USSR Supreme Soviet voted itself out of existence. Similarly, in October the KGB was 
abolished, and the following month Yeltsin baimed the Communist party in Russia and signed 
decrees accelerating the transition to a market economy. The Communist pmiy' s decline 
facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Republics declared themselves independent and in 
December the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus condemned the 1922 Union Treaty and 
signed the Belovezha Accords. These stated "the USSR as a subject of international law and 
as a geographical entity has ceased to exist" and aimounced the fo1mation of a 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 63 This was to provide a framework through 
which fonner Soviet republics could cooperate. Following this, on 25th December the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic became the Russian Federation, and Gorbachev resigned 
as President. On 31st December 1991 the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist. 
These developments had major repercussions for the military that I shall briefly outline to put 
them in the context of the above developments. The Soviet military was not isolated from 
Gorbachev's refonns as he sought to make the military more accountable. The military was 
62 For Gorbachev's account of the coup see Gorbachev, The August Coup. With regard to Yeltsin's account see 
Yeltsin, The View, pp41-103. 
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widely criticised for the first time, and the growing restlessness of Soviet republics led to a 
dramatic rise in draft evasion. In mid-1987 Gorbachev suddenly removed the top officers, and 
in December 1988 committed the Soviet Union to unilateral arms reductions and made major 
cuts to the military. This was despite growing opposition within the military, by 1989 his 
views had been abandoned by many senior officers. The magnitude of change is best shown 
by the severity of cuts to the number of military personnel. Whereas the transition to 
Communism led to a dramatic increase in the number of personnel, its fall led to an 
unprecedented decrease. For instance, the munber of Soviet ground forces personnel fell from 
1,995,000 in 1985, to 1,400,000 in 1991.64 The severity of this cut is clearly apparent when it 
is compared to the cuts in East Europe from 1985 to 1991. Whereas the number of Soviet 
ground forces personnel fell by 29.8 percent, the average decline for the am1ies of the Warsaw 
Treaty was 17.3 percent. 65 It was within this context of dramatic change and growing civil-
military tensions that officers supp01ied the 1991 coup. 
The consolidating of the new regime: 1992 to 1996 
Major changes continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the transition from 
Communism progressed under Yeltsin. Yeltsin liberalised prices in January 1992 and in 
November the Constitutional Court, the comi established to deal with the main questions 
regarding constitutionality, upheld Yeltsin's decrees bam1ing the Communist party. The Court 
did however rule that rank-and-file organisations had the right to exist. The following year 7 
out of 10 members of the CIS approved its charter, and a Coordinating and Consultative 
Committee was established to provide a rndimentary permanent executive body. However the 
tension between the parliamentary system of the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet grew 
as parliament opposed Yeltsin's reforms. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Supreme Soviet speaker, 
attacked Yeltsin' s economic refonns and relations became particularly tense after December 
1992. During this month parliament refused to confinn Gyegor Gaidar as Yeltsin's Prime 
Minister, and Yeltsin called for a referendum in Januaiy 1993 to decide whether the president 
or parliament should hold power. Congress reacted by passing a Constitutional amendment 
banning any plebiscite that could lead to a vote of no confidence in any high state body, or 
which could lead to its dissolution before its te1m of office expired. 
63 Sakwa, p23. 
64 IISS, The Milita,y Balance 1985-1986 (London: IISS, 1985), p22; and The Militmy Balance 1991-1992, p37. 
65 This is based on the change in the number of perso1mel in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. The Militmy Balance 1985-1986, pp22, 31-6; and The Milita,y Balance 1991-1992, pp37, 84-93. All 
percentage calculations made by the author are rounded up one decimal point (eg. 25.55 becomes 25.6 and 25.66 
becomes 25.7). 
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The first year of the new regime set the scene for the climax of tensions between Yeltsin and 
the parliament in 1993, as both fought over the path of change. In March 1993 parliament 
stripped Yeltsin of many of the powers he had been granted to implement economic reform, 
and the government was granted the right to submit legislation directly to the parliament, thus 
bypassing Yeltsin. The following month a referendum found that S 8. 7 percent of voters had 
confidence in Yeltsin and 53 percent approved of his socioeconomic policies.66 Yeltsin 
interpreted these results as a renewed popular mandate and sought to speed up the transition 
from the Communist era political strnctures. Yeltsin suspended Alexander Rutskoi, the Vice-
President, on 1st September, and dissolved the Supreme Soviet and the Congress on 21st 
September, their powers going to a new Federation Assembly. This assembly was to comprise 
of the Federation Council, the chamber that provides direct representation for the components 
of Russia, and the State Duma, the chamber that drafts and endorses laws and issues 
resolutions. 67 It was against this background that the parliament called for the masses to 
defend the White House, and on the 3rd of October violent demonstrations were superseded by 
an insurrection, which I refer to as the parliamentru.y revolt, or 1993 revolt. 
The parliamentary revolt was the only real threat to the new regime's consolidation. Like the 
1991 coup, I shall examine specific details of the event later so only outline it here. On the 
afternoon of October 3rd a pro-parliament crowd of 10,000 people overwhelmed the 5,000 
police and Ministry of Interior personnel surrounding the White House. Rutskoi then ordered 
the crowd to fo1m into fighting detachments and to storm the Moscow Mayor's office. Some 
100 armed and up to 4,000 unarmed demonstrators also attacked the Ostankino Television 
Tower. Here they encountered strong resistance from members of the Interior Ministry. On 
the same day, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and deployed the military around the 
White House, where pro-parliament supporters led by Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had 
baiTicaded themselves. With the failure of the parliamentary forces to surrender military tanks 
were used to bombard the White House, and on the 4th of October the parliamentary forces 
66 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 May 1993, n.p.; and RFEIRL Research Report 2, no.21, 21 May 1993, pl2, both quoted 
in Sakwa, Appendix 2.4, p391. 
67 See Sakwa, ppl31-6. 
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surrendered. The revolt cost some 146 lives.68 In economic terms the cost of repairing the 
White House was estimated at 60 billion roubles alone.69 
Following the 1993 revolt the stage was set for the new regime to continue its consolidation. 
This involved holding elections to the new state Duma and a vote on a new Constitution. In 
October 1993 Yeltsin decreed that restrictions on land ownership be removed, and in 
December the first Duma elections under the new regime were held. The Liberal Democratic 
People's patty (LDPR), led by the ultra-nationalist and anti-Yeltsin Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
won the most votes dming these elections, 22.92 percent, followed by Russia's Choice with 
15.51 percent. The 1993 Constitution was also passed by 58.43 percent of the vote.70 The 
Constitution defined the Russian Federation as a "democratic federative rule-of-law state," 
and gave much power to the head of state, the Russian President.71 The Federation Council 
and the Duma met for the first time in January 1994, and that year Yeltsin commented that 
"Not a single other large country has lmown so many upheavals as we have in recent years."72 
The most important event in 1994 in terms of its long-term consequences was the decision to 
invade the Chechnyan republic. The Chechnyan war was the first major war undertaken by 
the new regime, and was in line with post-Soviet threat perceptions. Under President Jokhar 
Dudayev Chechnya had declared itself independent in November 1991 despite Moscow's 
opposition. Yeltsin attempted to blockade the republic and cut it off from federal budget 
funds. However Dudayev remained in power and Yeltsin became increasingly impatient. The 
republic's growing instability, the need to control Chechnyan oil fields and pipelines, and the 
belief that the republic could be swiftly subdued, encouraged this impatience. 73 It was within 
this context that Russia was involved in a failed attempt to overthrow Dudayev in November 
1994, and a full-scale invasion was launched that December. However the invasion swiftly 
turned into a drawn-out conflict. Indeed Checlmyan rebels in June 1995 attacked the Southern 
Russian town of Budymmovsk, and in January 1996 attacked K.izlyar, a provincial centre in 
68 Ibid., Appendix 1, p386. For a comprehensive study of the revolt see Alexander Buzgalin and Andrei 
Kolganov, Bloody October In Moscow: Political Repression in the Name of Reform, translated by Renfrey 
Clarke (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994). 
69 "Most Of Moscow's Dead Were Civilians-Minister," Reuters, 9 October 1993. 
70 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 21 December 1993, pl; Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, 1, no.12, 1994, 1, no.12, (1994): pp34-8; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 December 1993, pl; Byulleten' 
Tsentral'noi izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1, no.12 (1994): p67, all quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 
2.5, pp391-2. 
71 TI1e Russian Constitution, quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 3, pp395, 395-429. 
72 Yeltsin, The View, p130. 
73 See Gall and Waal, ppl03-72. 
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Dagestan. Fighting only ceased in late 1996 after an agreement was reached by which Russia 
and the republic would have 5 years to work out Chechnya's status. Some 50,000 civilians, at 
least 6,000 Russian troops, and 2,000 to 3,000 Chechnyan rebels were killed during the war. 74 
It was with the Checlmyan war raging, and growing concerns over the economy, that the 
consolidation of the new regime continued with the 1995 Duma elections, and the 1996 
presidential elections. The second Duma elections were held in December 1995. The 1995 
elections were similar to the preceding elections, as anti-Yeltsin attitudes are evident, 
however the popularity of parties had changed. The Communist party, led by Gennady 
Zyuganov, won the most support with 22.30 percent of the vote, followed by the LDPR with 
11.18 percent. 75 The following year Yeltsin won the presidential elections. These competitive 
elections clearly contrast those held during the Soviet era. The first round of elections was 
held in June 1996 when Yeltsin won 35.28 percent, followed by Zyuganov with 32.03 
percent, and retired General Alexander Lebed with 14.52 percent. As the Constitution 
stipulated that the successful candidate required over 50 percent of the vote a second round 
was held in July, after Lebed had exited to support Yeltsin. Yeltsin then won 53.82 percent of 
the vote, compared to 40.31 percent for Zyuganov, and was inaugurated for a second term in 
August 1996.76 
These developments impacted on the milita1y, and although I examine the effects of the 
transition on the military in-depth in chapter 4, I shall briefly outline the changes to put them 
into context. Yeltsin established the Russian Ministly of Defence in 1992 after it became clear 
that a unified military along Soviet lines was not feasible. The militaiy was deployed by the 
new regime against the 1993 parliamentaiy revolt, a deployment in stark contrast to the 
minimal use of the militaiy for domestic security before 1985, and against the Chechnyan 
rebels. The militaiy's involvement in politics also increased relative to the Soviet era. The 
new regime continued to refonn the military, and the resultant upheaval remained a source of 
contention. The dramatic nature of change is again shown by the reduction of the military' s 
size. The number of ground force pers01mel declined from 1,400,000 in 1992, to 460,000 in 
74 With regard to casualties see Gall and Waal, p360. 
75 OMRI Daily Digest no.249 Part 1, 27 December 1995, n.p.; OMRI Daily Digest no.l Part 1, 2 January 1996, 
n.p.; ITAR-TASS, 22 December 1995; and Moscow News no.51, 29 December 1995, p2, all quoted in Sakwa, 
Appendix 2.6, pp392-3. 
76 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 Jm1e 1996, n.p., quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, p393. See also p394. Please note that I 
use the English name 'Alexander' rather than 'Aleksandr' when I refer to both Rutskoi and Lebed because 
Western scholars frequently use it. 
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1996. This represents a 67.1 percent decline, and means that there were over four times more 
personnel in 1985 relative to 1996. To put this in perspective the cuts elsewhere in Europe 
were much less severe. For example, the number of Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and 
Romanian personnel fell on average by 20.8 percent.77 
Thesis Structure 
The hypotheses can be placed into two broad categories: the study of regime transitions and 
the military, and the study of coups. With regard to transitions and the military, the theoretical 
framework focuses on six key areas where they can impact on the military (see model 1). 
These areas are derived from my study of past transitions and include the areas I have found 
to be most important, and most likely to experience change. The structure of the civil-military 
relationship and how this is impacted upon is most important and is thus assessed first. 
Second, and also important, the roles that the military performs and the impact of the 
transition on the allocation of these are examined. Third, I assess transitional changes to the 
military's level of budgetary support and popular support. Fourth and closely related, the 
impact of transitional changes on the morale of personnel is assessed. Fifth, transitional 
changes to the military's cohesion and size are examined. Finally, a transition's impact on the 
level of military expertise is studied. 
Model 1: Potential Consequences of Regime Transition for Military 
Regime transition • Impacts on military • Potential changes to: 





Military cohesion and size 
Military expertise 
To explain why the military intervenes, and the impact of a transition on the likelihood of this, 
I examine three main determinants influencing the military, though these are not mutually 
77 USS, The Milita1J' Balance 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's for the USS, 1992), pp70-82, 93; and USS, The 
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exclusive. First, I assess whether the military has the capacity to intervene and to stage a coup. 
Second, I assess whether the militaiy has the disposition to intervene. Third, I assess whether 
the military has the opportunity to intervene. These are in tum comprised of numerous factors 
that can both encourage and can discourage a coup. These factors are covered both in general 
and in the context of my case study. They range from whether there are potential coup leaders 
to the popularity of the regime. As I have already noted, I assume that the coup leaders will 
seek to stage a successful coup. 
This thesis has a total of 8 chapters that examine the validity of my hypotheses. After the 
introduction outlines the importance of regime transitions and coups, chapter 2 examines the 
various factors that influence the militaiy's decision to intervene. Following this, chapter 3 
introduces the case study. It first provides an overview of the theoretical models that have 
dominated the study of Soviet civil-militaiy relations by Western scholars before outlining 
civil-military relations from 1917 to 1985. The chapter then examines the state of the military 
before the transition, and the transition's impact from 1985 to 1991. Chapter 4 continues this 
assessment by examining the impact of the transition on the military from 1992 to 1996, and 
then argues that the tln·eat of a Russian militaiy coup was present. The following tln·ee 
chapters attempt to explain why the militaiy did not intervene, despite the dramatic changes 
that occuned with the transition. Chapter 5 examines whether the military had the capacity to 
intervene, and chapter 6 examines whether the military had the disposition to intervene. 
Chapter 7 then examines the third coup dete1minant, whether the military had the opportunity 
to intervene. Finally, chapter 8 summarises my conclusions and provides a brief epilogue that 
updates the thesis to April 1999. 
Sources 
I have utilised a wide-range of resources. Information has been obtained from various sources 
that include newspapers, magazines, the radio, television, and the Internet. I have also 
obtained material via infonnation services like Reuters and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 
In addition, I have accessed archival material from various Internet sites, such as the 
Jamestown Foundation, and electronic sources like The New York Times on CD-ROM. Apart 
from these sources I have used many periodicals and journals, particularly Armed Forces and 
Society and the Journal of Slavic Milita,y Studies. Similarly, I have used numerous books. 
Militcny Balance I 996-1997 (London: Oxford University for the USS, 1996), pp82-95, 114. 
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When possible, I have used statistics, including those gathered from my own sampling, to 
support my arguments. Finally, I have conducted interviews, and have conferred with officials 
and scholars. 
Conclusions 
This thesis examines how regime transitions impact on the military and, more specifically, 
how this impact influences the likelihood of a coup. Transitions involve fundamental changes 
in the composition of the regime and the structure that determine how the state is governed, 
and policy is made and implemented. With regard to coups, these involve the removal or 
attempted removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or threat of violence, during 
which active service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and 
execution of the operation. To examine the impact of a transition on the military key areas are 
assessed. These relate to the structure of the civil-military relationship and the military's roles, 
support and morale, cohesion and size, and expertise. Turning to the case study, the study of 
the fall of Communism and its impact on the Soviet and post-Soviet military is important. The 
transition is divided into two main pe1iods: the fall of Communism from 1985 to 1991 and the 
consolidation of the new regime from 1992 to 1996. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STUDY OF COUPS 
This chapter outlines the factors that might encourage or discourage a coup. The chapter first 
justifies the use of S.E. Finer's work before using it as a guide to study factors that might 
encourage intervention. 1 Finer believed that the military had political advantages over 
civilians, and argued that its capacity, its disposition, and its opportunity to intervene shaped 
the likelihood of its intervention in politics. This chapter is based on the belief that coup 
leaders will take into account the likelihood of their success before acting. I believe that the 
capacity to intervene is closely interlinked with the military's mood, and that corporate and 
individual self-interests, are the most important coup determinants. I shall then examine other 
factors that shape the disposition to intervene before assessing those that determine if the 
militaiy has the opportunity to intervene. Finally, potential coup inhibitors are identified. Of 
fundamental importance is the acceptance of civilian supremacy. This is encouraged by the 
military's inability to intervene, lack of a disposition to intervene, and the lack of an 
opportunity to intervene. These increase the perceived risk involved in intervening. 
This theoretical framework is utilised because I believe that it facilitates a comprehensive and 
valid study of why the military intervenes. This is for four reasons. First, the framework 
clearly distinguishes between the capacity, the disposition, and the opportunity to intervene, 
and the factors that can inhibit intervention. This is important because all the factors influence 
whether a coup is staged. If the opportunity to intervene is present, but the disposition absent, 
a coup is less likely, as personnel will lack the motives to exploit the opportunity. Likewise, if 
the disposition to intervene develops without an opportunity, personnel might be discouraged 
from acting if they feel the regime is too strong to be overthrown. The framework thus allows 
an accurate study of both the occurrence and absence of coups. Second, the framework takes 
into account key factors often identified by scholars as determining the likelihood of a coup. 
Third, the framework allows the categorising of similar factors under sub-headings, ensuring 
clarity and facilitating their critique. I should note however, that the very nature of studying 
an event which might occur because of a multitude of factors means that they do not 
necessarily fit precisely into one part of the coup equation. Fourth, the importance ofFiner's 
1 See S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Militmy in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 
p23. Italics are original. Another edition was published in 1988. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Militmy 
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framework, from which my framework derives fundamental components, is widely recognised 
by scholars.2 
The Man on Horseback 
Finer defined an intervention by the military in politics as the "constrained substitution of 
their own [the military's] policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian 
authorities," and argued that there were four levels of military intervention.3 These were: 
1. Influence through the nonnal constitutional channels, and collusion, or competition, with 
the civilian authorities. 
2. Blackmail through collusion, or competition, with the civilian authorities, intimidation of 
the civilian authorities, and threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian 
authorities. 
3. Displacement of the civilian leaders and their replacement with other civilians through 
threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities, failure to defend 
the civilian authorities against violence, and violence by the military itself. 
4. Supplantment of the civilian leaders with military leaders through threats of non-
cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities, the failure to defend the civilian 
auth01ities against violence, and violence by the military.4 
Of most relevance here are levels three and four, as here the coup is one of the methods used 
by the military to remove civilian leaders. 
Capacity to intervene 
Finer believed that military intervention was "a product of two sets of forces-the capacity and 
propensity of the military to intervene, and conditions in the society in which it operates."5 
in Politics, second enlarged edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988). This edition used the same 
framework to examine interventions with minor changes. 
2 See Finer, second edition, p23 l; Claude Wech and Arthur Smith, Milita,y Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-
Military Relations (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, A division of the Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1974), p266; Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy over the 
Military: Its Nature and Limits," AFS 19, no.l (Fall 1992): p8; Edmonds, pp5, 74-6; Brnce Farcau, The Coup: 
Tactics in the Seizure of Power. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Books, 1994), pp5-6; Gregor Ferguson, Coup 
d'Etat: A Practical Manual (Dorset: Arms and Arn1our Press Ltd, 1987), pl 1. Donald Horowitz provides a brief 
history of the study of coups. David Horowitz, Coup Theories And Officers' Motives (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), pp3-15. 
3 Finer, p23. 
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Finer initially characterised the military as having three "massive political advantages over 
civilian organizations."6 These were a superior organisation derived from its centralisation of 
control, strong discipline, and elaborate communication system that encouraged a strong esprit 
de corps, and contempt for civilians. The military also had virtues such as bravery, which won 
sympathy and mystique, and a near monopoly over weaponry.7 Finer though argued that the 
size and firepower of the military had no impact upon whether a coup succeeded or failed, as a 
low number of personnel could successfully take power. Finer also concluded that a divided 
military was most likely to intervene as factions sought to counter, and to emulate, those that 
had seized power, and as the regime established by the divided military faced challenges from 
other factions. 8 
However Finer wrote that the military had political weaknesses. First, the military was 
technically unable to govern developed societies. Second, in those societies that were 
developed the military lacked the right to govern, as it was not widely recognised as the lawful 
and rightful government. 9 Thus, when the military "breaches the existing political order" it 
would be forced to claim a "moral authority for its actions." 10 
Disposition to intervene 
The disposition to intervene was encouraged by three broad motives or factors, and by the 
military's mood. However Finer first assessed the motives that might inhibit intervention. 
Finer argued that the most obvious inhibitor was the absence of motives. 11 Military 
professionalism was then assessed, and Finer argued that this was an inadequate inhibitor if 
the principle of civilian supremacy was not accepted. 12 This principle was the "trnly effective 
check." 13 Other potential inhibitors included the fear that military capacity would be harmed 
by the intervention, the fear of a civil war, and the fear of the consequences for both 
themselves and the military if the intervention failed. 14 Turning to the motives that might 
4 Ibid., pl40. See also pp86-7, 140-63. 
5 Finer, second edition, p224. Please note that the -esprit de corps of the military and civilian respect for the 
instihition are both examined in the context of the military's mood. This is because I believe that the morale and 
prestige of personnel is directly linked to their self-perception and whether this is high or low. 
6 Finer, p6. 
7 Ibid., pp 6, 6-13. 
8 Finer, second edition, pp225-30. 
9 Finer, pp14-20. 
10 Ibid., p20. 
11 Ibid., p23. 
12 Ibid., p30. 
13 Ibid., p30. 
14 Ibid., pp30-2. 
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encourage intervention, these were the manifest destiny, the belief that the military was the 
guardian of the national interest, the national interest itself, and sectional interests based on 
class, region, the military institution, or the individual. With regard to the milita1y's mood, if it 
was one of"self importance," or "morbidly high," the likelihood of intervention increased. 
The motives disposing the militaiy to intervene according to Finer were: 
1. Manifest destiny. Finer derived this te1m from the writing of President Betancourt on the 
1948 coup in Venezuela. Here Betancourt commented that the office of the Chief of Staff 
sought support by claiming the coup was being staged in accordance with the "manifest 
destiny," the ''providential mission of the soldiers as saviours of their countries."15 According 
to Finer, the validity of this claim was de1ived from three factors. First, soldiers were 
purportedly apolitical, and their sole purpose was to defend the state. Second, the militaiy was 
closely associated with sovereignty and independence. Third, Finer wrote that the milita1y's 
esprit de corps was based upon the supposed national values and virtues. Thus, personnel were 
indoctrinated with nationalism supportive of the belief that it was their duty to 'save' the state 
when necessary. 16 
2. National interest. As the militaiy accepted that its manifest destiny was to intervene, 
personnel developed a "special and indeed unique identification with the 'national interest." 
This provided the incentive for the military to fulfil its manifest destiny and to intervene. 17 
Finer argued that the military' s actions were likely to be influenced by its own concept of the 
national interest. 18 However he cast doubt on whether the military would actually be motivated 
to intervene to protect the national interest. Finer argued that after a coup the militaiy often 
reneged on its promises to promote electoral rights and public liberties. 19 He concluded that 
"very often it [the military] acts primarily if not wholly not for the national interest at all, but 
rather out of a desire to protect or extend its privileges as a peculiar corporation."20 
15 Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela: Politica y Petro/ea (Mexico: no publisher, 1956), pp468-70 quoted in Finer, 
p32. Italics are original. 
16 Finer, pp33-4. 
17 Ibid., p35. 
18 Ibid., p38. 
19 Ibid., p37. 
20 Ibid., p39. See also second edition, pp235-6. 
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3. Sectional interest. Four broad interests were identified by Finer: 
• Class interest: Here the militaiy supported the civilian government when it was derived 
from the same class, and acted against it when derived from a different and hostile class. Finer 
wrote that according to this approach most of the militaiy' s political activities are "totally 
incomprehensible." This was because interventions had been staged both for and against the 
same classes. However class interests in certain cases had been influential in shaping the 
military's political actions.21 He rejected the argument that it was the sole motive.22 
• Regional (paiiicularistic) interest. When the officer corps was predominantly from one 
region or developed special ties with one region this might motivate intervention. 23 
• Corporate self-interest of the militaiy. The military's desire to protect its autonomy was 
"one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention." In its "defensive 
fonn" the military insisted that it alone should control issues, such as recruitment and 
equipment. In a more "aggressive fonn" the milita1y could demand control over all matters 
affecting it.24 In 1981 he wrote that the corporate interest "is clearly a powerful and frequent 
motivation for military intervention."25 
• Individual self-interest. Finer identified the material interests of the officers as a potential 
motive for political involvement. These interests might include the desire for influence, higher 
pay, and easier promotion.26 
Finer believed that the militaiy's motives were often a mixture of the above, and varied 
according to each case. 27 
Finer next argued that the militaiy' s mood influenced its disposition to intervene. Though this 
was more difficult to establish, Finer argued that one element was always present: the 
military's awareness of its special and separate identity. According to Finer, to this only two 
factors often needed to be added to encourage intervention: the sense that there was nothing 
21 Ibid., p40. See also second edition, p234. 
22 Finer, second edition, p232. 
23 Finer, p43. Finer now uses the term 'particularistic' to take into account ethnic and confessional 
particularisms. Finer, second edition, p231. The author to assess both region and ethnicity thus uses this term. 
24 Ibid., p47. 
25 Finer, second edition, p240. See also pp236-9. 
26 Finer, pp56-7. 
27 Ibid., pp58-60. 
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that could stop it from having whatever it wished, and a grievance.28 Finer identified two 
moods that might encourage intervention: 
1. The "self-important" militm.y. Here pers01mel had a good, though not excessive, opinion of 
themselves relative to that they held of the government or civilians, and may take action when 
they feel humiliated by the government. 29 
2. Annies with a "morbidly high self-esteem." This was more extreme as personnel believed 
they were inherently superior to civilians. Again, perceived affronts to their pride were likely 
to create resentment, though in this case they were more likely to motivate intervention. 30 
Opportunity to intervene 
Finer also argued that the opportunity to intervene shaped how, when, and possibly whether 
intervention occurred. 31 Finer wrote that "on the whole" an intervention will not occur if there 
is the opportunity but not disposition to intervene.32 However Finer believed that the military 
might still intervene without a disposition. For instance, the military might intervene after 
"much prodding and pushing" and an invitation by the regime. 33 Finer argued that the 
oppmttmity to intervene depended on the situation that civilian leaders faced, and the level of 
"political culture." With regard to the situation Finer defined three broad types: 
1. Increased civilian dependence on the milita1y. This dependence might result from its 
indispensability to the state's foreign policy, for instance in war/4 or because of the domestic 
situation. 
2. The domestic situation. Three key situations were identified, the first being an "ove1t 
crisis." During such a crisis "rival political forces have arisen willing and able to use violence, 
which are so equally matched that no government can rely on support from any single one 
without drawing on itself the full violence of the rest."35 When this occurred "a country is 
effectively in a state of potential or even incipient civil war."36 Second, a "latent crisis" might 
28 Ibid., p6 l. 
29 Ibid., p63. 
30 Ibid., p67. 
31 Finer, p71. 
32 Ibid., p83. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., pp72-5. 
35 Ibid., p75. 
36 Ibid. 
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exist. This was more common, and developed when a political or social minority hated by the 
masses governed. As the civilian leaders were "Faced by a consensus of indifference or active 
hatred, often expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations, murders or jacqueries," they 
became dependent on the military, which then became their "master."37 Third, a "power 
vacuum" might exist whereby there was an absence of organised political movements of any 
strength and little political opinion, though this was rare in industrialised societies. In such 
circumstances there was nothing to prevent the military from intervening. 38 
3. The popularity of the military. Here the military's popularity and prestige assisted in the 
taking of power. This was particularly the case when the civilian government was discredited 
by weaknesses, such as inefficiency and cmru.ption. 39 
Finer argued that the level of "political culture," the degree of attachment to civilian 
institutions, was connected to the domestic conditions, and that its level influenced the type of 
military intervention.4° Finer believed that there were four levels of "political culture." To 
assess the level of culture Finer posed three questions: 
1. Does there exist a wide public approval of the procedures for transfe1Ting power, and 
a con-esponding belief that no exercise of power in breach of these procedures is 
legitimate? 
2. Does there exist a wide public recognition as to who 01~ what constitutes the 
sovereign authority, and a corresponding belief that no other persons or centre of power 
is legitimate or duty-worthy? 
3. Is the public proportionately large and well mobilised into private associations? i.e. 
do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and firms, labour unions, and 
1. . 1 . ?41 po 1tlca parties. 
According to Finer, the answers to these questions determined the level of military 
intervention. When the answers to all three of the questions was affirmative, the "political 
culture" was high. An intervention then "would be regarded as a wholly unwan-antable 
intrusion" and such states had a "mature political culture. "42 Finer argued that the level of 
37 Ibid., pp77-8. The term 'jacqueries' is derived from the collective name given to the French peasantry by the 
pdvileged classes and applies to the 14th century peasantry rebellion in France. 
38 Ibid., pp79-80. 
39 Ibid., pp80-3. 
40 With regard to this connection see pp84-5. 
41 Ibid., pp87-8. Finer in 1981 reduced the number of questions to two in 1981 to simplify the framework by 
combining both questions one and two. Finer, second edition, p245. However I have used the three questions to 
ensure that each is clearly examined and related to both transitions and the occun-ence of coups. 
42 Ibid., p88. Italics are original. 
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"political culture" influenced the degree of military intervention in politics.43 With regard to 
the second level, or developed "political culture," civil institutions were highly developed, the 
public large and well-organised, and civil procedures and public authorities entrenched. 
However the legitimacy of the process for the transferral of political power, and the question 
of "who or what should constitute the sovereign authority are both in dispute."44 Finer te1med 
this a "developed political culture." This meant that the typical level of intervention ranged 
from military influence on politicians to blackmail. However coups were "rare, brief and 
unsuccessful. "45 
Contrasting these two cultures were those of the low and minimal type. The prevalence of a 
"low political culture" meant that opposition to an intervention would not be strong, as the 
public was "relatively narrow and weakly organized, [and] where the institutions and 
procedures of the regime are in dispute also."46 The militaiy's intervention here might include 
the ove1iuming of governments, and the installing of others or their pennanent supplanting.47 
Finally, in those states with a "low political culture" the public had little political awareness 
and was poorly organised. Finer wrote that the characteristic of such states was "not that there 
are 'no people able and willing to hold political ideas' or to act from 'political conviction,' but 
that they are so few and so scattered as to be altogether negligible when political issues are to 
be decided. These issues are decided by force or threat of force. "48 Here the supplanting of 
civilians can occur. 49 
In summary, Finer argued that a militaiy's capacity, disposition, and oppmiunity to intervene 
determined its likelihood of intervention in politics. The military's advantages over civilian 
institutions because of its strong organisation, positive image, and control of weaponry 
influenced its capacity. The manifest destiny, the national interest, the sectional interests, and 
the mood shaped the disposition. With regard to the oppmiunity, the degree of civilian reliance 
upon the milita1y, the domestic situation, the militaiy's populaiity, and the "political culture" 
were impmiant. 
43 Ibid., pl39. 
44 Ibid., p88. 
45 Ibid., p90. See also pp90-109. 
46 Ibid., p89. 
47 Ibid., pllO. Finer in 1981 stressed that a low or minimal culture does not automatically mean that the military 
will intervene. Finer, second edition, p248. 
48 Finer, p130. 
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Modifying Finer's Framework 
Although Finer's framework helps scholars to understand military interventions, it has a 
number of weaknesses that need to be addressed. With regard to the capacity to intervene, I 
believe that Finer' s arguments need to be modified and expanded. This is because the type of 
personnel involved in a coup, their cohesion, and to a lesser extent their number is important 
and needs to be adequately examined. Finer's assessment of the militmy's mood also needs to 
be expanded to clearly take into account the influence that negative self-perceptions among 
personnel have in discouraging coups. The mood is important because the self-perceptions of 
pers01mel influence whether they believe that the military has the capacity to intervene. It 
follows then that when the self-perceptions of personnel decline to the extent that they doubt 
their own capabilities to successfully stage a coup, the threat of a coup declines. This is the 
result of personnel lacking the confidence that they can successfully stage an operation as 
complex as a coup, and because they lack the necessaiy confidence to take the many risks 
involved. A dramatic fall also is likely to increase negative perceptions of the militmy, and 
thus the probability that civilians will actively oppose intervention. This is important when 
personnel are unsure of themselves and the viability of a coup, as it further weakens their 
resolve, pmiicularly when they do not wish to risk causing civilian casualties and instability. 
Finer' s study of the disposition to intervene likewise needs to be modified. I believe that the 
factors that can encourage the disposition to intervene should be ranked according to their 
influence. This better indicates the importance of factors, and ultimately facilitates the study of 
why the military intervenes. In line with this, I have labelled factors as primmy or secondmy 
according to their influence in coups. This means that primary factors are more likely to have a 
major influence on the decision to intervene relative to secondary factors. The division into 
primary and secondary factors is undeiiaken through examining the factors that have 
encouraged past coups. Statistics on the factors that encourage coups are particularly 
imp01iant, as they help estimate the importance of the factors. The statistics have been 
gathered from surveys of past coups. Apart from these factors, I believe that Finer's 
framework needs to be modified to better assess the corporate grievances of the military. This 
is because they often play an important role in motivating intervention. Similarly, Finer's work 
needs to be modified to specifically assess the role external actors (foreign states and 
49 Ibid., p139. 
40 
organisations) can have in determining the likelihood of a coup. This is because these actors 
can influence the decision to intervene. 
Finer's study of the opportunity to intervene is also problematic. The te1m "political culture" is 
controversial and assessing its role is difficult. The practicality of using Finer' s framework 
here is called into question because of three fundamental weaknesses. First, the term is 
controversial because defining exactly what makes up a 'culture' is challenging. Finer's use of 
the term presents even more problems. His use of the term implies that some cultures are more 
advanced than others according to how they comply with his criteria. Second, it is unlikely 
that a case study will fit exactly into his framework. For instance, a society might have the 
characteristics of both a "developed" and a "low level of political culture." Third, actually 
finding the evidence to accurately ascertain the level of culture according to Finer' s questions 
can be difficult. However this third weakness is not specific to Finer's work, as a lack of 
quality evidence is a problem that can face any approach given the difficult nature of 
predicting the public's reaction to a coup. 
Finer's criteria is also open to critique, as grading the level of cultures is ve1y problematic. Its 
use to assess the level of culture can be misleading. For instance, there might be strong public 
approval of the procedures for transferring power but these procedures may not actually be 
important in detem1ining who holds power. Illustrative of this is the rigging of elections or 
restricting of electoral candidates to members of one party. Indeed the characteristics of a 
"mature" or "developed" level of culh1re might actually facilitate a coup. This is because well-
established and strong organisations might sympathise with a coup. Another key problem is 
that the strength of the organisation is often not as important in influencing its response to a 
coup, as its depth of cmmnitment to the regime. For example, an organisation might have 
limited numbers but members more willing to actively oppose a coup relative to larger and 
better-established organisations. Transitional developments are particularly relevant here, as 
new institutions might emerge with the new political framework but suffer from weaknesses 
that limit their power. Furthennore, support for the regime must be assessed relative to other 
regimes. This is because although the regime might not be strongly supported, the alternatives 
may receive even less support. Thus, democracy might not be paiiicularly suppmied but nor 
might a coup be suppmied, if a military dictatorship is even less suppmied. 
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Having recognised that the tenn "political culture" is ve1y controversial, and that Finer' s work 
has wealmesses, I shall not use the tenn and will modify his framework. I believe that the term 
"political culture" should be replaced by the term 'regime attachment.' This indicates that I am 
refe1Ting foremost to the level of suppo1t for the regime and that I am not arguing that one 
culture is better than another. Of fundamental importance too is Finer's recognition that the 
context within which regime attaclm1ent is examined is critical. Finer correctly examined the 
level of support for both the power transfe1Tal procedures relative to their violation, and the 
level of recognition of who, or what, constitutes the sovereign authority. This is undertaken 
within the context of whether another person, or group, is believed to be more legitimate, or 
duty-worthy. This is critical to the provision of an accurate assessment of the level of support 
for the regime. For instance, the level of supp01t for the procedures used to transfer power 
might be minimal but high relative to the level of supp01i for a procedural violation like a 
coup. Of direct relevance here is Adam Przeworski's argument that the level of support for a 
regime might be minimal but the population may not believe that there is a viable alternative.50 
Similarly, the legitimacy of the regime leader's actions might be questioned but his or her 
legitimacy may be high relative to others. Here Finer co1Tectly recognised that there can be an 
important difference between the level of support for the leader, and attitudes toward their 
legitimacy. This is impo1iant because people can detest a leader but still recognise, at least 
relative to others, that he or she legitimately holds power. 
I also believe that with modifications weaknesses of Finer's framework are addressed. First, 
the procedures used for the transferral of power can be initially examined to assess whether 
they are actually imp01iant in deciding who holds power. This determines whether the level of 
regime attaclm1ent to them is an accurate indicator of the public's response to intervention. 
Second, an examination of the strength of private organisations needs to be followed by an 
assessment of how such organisations will respond to a coup. This assessment can be based on 
the attitudes and actions of the organisations, and facilitates a more accurate evaluation of 
regime attachment by extending the focus beyond the strength of private organisations. This is 
particularly important because I believe that the organisation's depth of commitment to the 
regime can be most imp01iant, and modify Finer's framework accordingly. More specifically, 
the study of transitions requires that the level of regime attaclm1ent be assessed before the 
50 Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions fi·om 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Sclm1itter, and Laurence 
Whitehead, with a forward by Abraham Lowenthal, (Baltimore, Maiyland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), pp51-6. 
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transition to gauge its impact. Because the military is not completely isolated from society 
comparisons of militaiy and civilian attitudes are also helpful. 
To correct the weaknesses I believe exist in Finer's work I shall now present a modified 
framework. This framework examines the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene 
and factors that might inhibit a coup. Within this framework I have re-ordered and moved 
arguments to better reflect their significance. This is best shown by my categorising of motives 
according to whether they are important, and thus primary factors, or not important, whereby 
they are secondary. I have also expanded on those that I believe are important, brought 
attention to other potential factors, and qualified Finer's arguments when they are problematic. 
Of paiiicular impo1iance with regard to my framework is its division into two sections. This is 
because I first examine factors that can determine whether the military intervenes before those 
factors that can inhibit intervention. I have done this to better distinguish between these two 
types of factors, and to ensure that those factors that encourage intervention are not examined 
at the expense of inhibitors. Therefore, when Finer's work on inhibitors is paiiicularly relevant 
it appears in this second section. I have also sought to link factors with transitions and to 
present the work of other scholars. This prevents a reliance on the work of one scholar, Finer, 
developed over 30 years ago. 51 
Capacity to intervene 
The capacity to intervene 1s a fundamental requirement for the military to stage a coup. 
Although the military may have both the opportunity and disposition to intervene, it can still 
be discouraged from intervening. This is because the military might perceive itself neither able 
to successfully overcome the numerous hazards of staging a coup or, if it seeks to govern, of 
governing. 52 Effectively, the militaiy must believe that it has the capacity to defeat, or 
successfully intimidate the regime's key leaders and supporters. Likewise, it must be able to 
seize strategic sites necessaiy for the successful excising of power, and be able to act swiftly to 
guarantee surprise, and to minimise organised opposition. Therefore, I believe that the 
51 Although the second edition of The Man on Horseback was published in 1988 the main text was only updated 
to 1981. Appendix I was originally published in 1985 and examined the reh·eat from power of military regimes. 
Appendix II and III listed military interventions from 1958-73, and Appendix IV listed the proportion of military 
interventions from 1958 to 73 by region. Finally, Appendix V and VI examined the relationship between per 
capita income and interventions from 1958 to 1973. 
52 Challenges facing military governments are examined when the national interest is examined because they are 
of direct interest when assessing if the military intervenes to protect or promote the national interest, at least when 
equated with protecting or promoting civilian living conditions. See chapter 2, pp59-60. 
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militaiy's mood is directly relevant and it is examined here, though I accept that it can 
influence the disposition too. 
In line with these changes, I do not examme other factors in accordance with Finer' s 
framework when I believe that they ai·e better assessed elsewhere. I do not examine the 
military' s esprit de corps here because I assess the role that military self-perceptions have on 
the willingness to intervene within the context of the military's mood, given their influence. I 
also refer to the military' s technical ability to govern in the context of its mood. This is 
because the decision to intervene is determined by whether or not personnel are confident that 
they can successfully intervene, and possibly govern. Similarly, the military's popularity or 
legitimacy to govern is not examined here because they are addressed in the context of the 
opportunity to intervene. This is because civilian perceptions of the military directly impact on 
how the public reacts to a coup, and thus influence whether there is the opportunity to 
intervene. 
Of fundamental imp01tance to the military's capacity is the type of personnel involved, their 
cohesion, and to a lesser extent their number. As the presence of these factors strengthen the 
military's capacity to successfully seize power they are coup conducive. Primarily, the 
likelihood of success will be enhanced by the active participation of personnel who are: 
• Leaders. Of most importance here is the presence of figures willing to lead a coup who are 
both populai- with the personnel, and who have the ability to lead an intervention. 
• Strategically located. The participation of officers commanding personnel located near key 
sites will increase the speed, and thus the surprise with which the operation can be staged. This 
is demoralising for the regime. As key supporters and strategic sites are swiftly captured, the 
regime is isolated from the means of communicating with loyalists, and it is forced to rely on 
personnel whose deployment may take precious time. 
• Effectively anned and trained. The participation of army pers01mel is important given they 
are most likely to have the heavy weapomy required to seize strategic sites, to enforce a state 
of emergency, and to have expertise in fighting in urban areas. In addition, the participation of 
elite units will facilitate a swift operation, and they have the potential to discourage opposition 
given their presumed high level of readiness and expertise. 
The cohesion and number of the likely active coup participants will also influence the 
probability of the military perceiving itself capable of intervening. 
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• Cohesion of forces. Although a threat to military cohesion may become a coup grievance, 
and military factions may encourage the repetitive staging of coups, the cohesion of the forces 
expected to execute the coup will influence the ability of the coup leaders to swiftly and 
effectively seize power. For example, the unwillingness of personnel to risk civilian casualties 
and indeed a civil war, despite their orders, and their opposition to intervention, increases the 
likelihood of failure. The active involvement of key members from each of the services will 
further discourage the perception that the coup is being staged to advance the interests of one 
service over those of another. The capabilities of the coup leaders will also be increased by 
this involvement. Therefore, if a lack of cohesion is perceived, potential coup leaders may feel 
that intervention is too hazardous. This is particularly relevant given the impact that a 
transition can have on cohesion. 
• Number of personnel. This is not as important as the cohesion of the coup forces, as a 
limited number of skilled and well led personnel might be able to stage a successful coup. 
Indeed it is advantageous to limit the number of personnel involved in the planning of the 
coup to ensure secrecy. However the more personnel involved in the execution of the coup, if 
effectively coordinated, the more likely the operation can be swiftly staged. This is because of 
the necessity to seize a number of sites like radio and television stations, important members 
of the new regime, and to counter those loyal to the new regime. 
The level of influence the above factors have in dete1mining if the military has the capacity to 
successfully intervene is based, to a large degree, on the characteristics of both the forces loyal 
to the regime, and the state itself. If the forces loyal to the regime are poorly led, are not 
located close to strategic sites, and lack expe1tise and firepower, the capacity of the coup force 
will not have to be as great. Similarly, the size of the state and consequent number of sites that 
must be taken to seize power influences the capacity required. Turning to the level of cohesion 
and the number of coup participants, I believe that these also need to be assessed relative to 
the regime and the state. For example, the importance of cohesive and lar·ge coup forces is 
dependent on the cohesion and the number of regime loyalists they need to overcome. The size 
of the state is important too, as the more sites that must be seized the greater is the need for the 
coup forces to be cohesive and large. Closely associated with this is the way the military 
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believes the general public will react to a coup. This is because the level of public resistance 
the military expects will influence whether it perceives that it has the capacity to successfully 
intervene. 
The potential role of the above factors is recognised by various scholars. Farcau argued that 
the size of the coup forces; their firepower; the location of the coup forces; their mobility and 
self-sufficiency; their readiness and training; their cohesiveness; and their special skills were 
important. 53 Likewise, Eric Nordlinger argued that successful coup leaders require the active 
participation of strategically located mid-level commanders. This is because these troop 
c01mnanders are the highest-ranked officers who have "face-to-face contact" with the 
soldiers.54 Similarly, he argued that a sufficient number of personnel to simultaneously seize 
key personalities and sites, along with speed and coordination, are impmiant. 55 The need for 
such paiiicipation is reinforced by the need to seize a large number of targets in modem states, 
ranging from the seizure of key structures to that of prominent politicians.56 
Similarly, scholars have examined the impact of a lack of the above qualities. The failure of 
previous coups illustrates the role of inadequate military support, and the failure to act swiftly 
and effectively. 57 Thompson found that only 37 percent of coups involving grievances derived 
from perceived threats to sub-organisational cliques were successful from 1946 to 1970, and 
that a mere 4 percent of coups throughout the world were encouraged by the coup-makers 
perceiving a threat to the milita1y's unity. 58 Similarly, research into African coups indicates 
that cohesion is an imp01iant feattire of militaries that stage coups.59 As Rosemary O'K.ane 
argued, loyal personnel reverse most defeated coups, which she defined broadly as the 
execution of an illegal strategy for ove1ihrowing the government. 60 Indeed a control 
mechanism available to the regime is the manipulation of the military tln·ough preventing 
53 Farcau, pp48-54. 
54 Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers In Politics: Mihtmy Coups And Govemments (Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), pl02. 
55 Ibid., pp103-7. For in-depth analyses of staging coups see Ferguson; Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A 
Practical Handbook (London: Penguin Press, 1968); and Farcau, pp41-143. 
56 See Farcau, pp75-97. See also Ferguson, pp49-55, 70-5, 83-110; and Luttwak. 
57 See Farcau, pp145-64; Ferguson, ppl23-5; and Kebschull, pp570-5. 
58 Thompson, pp51, 13. 
59 Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat McGowan, "Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat, 1960-1982," 
APSR 78, no.3 (September 1984): pp634-5. 
60 Rosemary O'Kane, The Likelihood of Coups, (Aldershot, Rants: Avebury Gower Publishing Comp Ltd, 1987), 
p35. With regard to her coup definition see p37. 
46 
stable internal factions. This ensures that at least some personnel supp01i the regime. 61 
However past coups also show that a large number of paiiicipants is not always a necessity, 
and that their failure is not inevitably linked to a lack of participants.62 Indeed a limited 
number of paiiicipants, at least during the planning stage, can ensure secrecy. 63 
I have already argued that the factors that influence whether a coup is staged do not 
necessarily fit precisely into one category, and the military's mood demonstrates this. The 
mood of the military is vital in examining the capacity to intervene, as it is the personnel 
themselves who ultimately decide whether or not they are capable of intervening. The two 
mood types are examined here together. This is because they are essentially based upon the 
perception that the milita1y is superior to civilian institutions, and both have the potential to 
motivate intervention. Threats to the military' s prestige have the potential to create discontent. 
This is encouraged by the importance persom1el place on honour, their tendency to stress their 
supremacy over civilians, and the impact of poor prestige upon morale and the military's 
influence. According to Thompson, a threat to the militaiy's honour encouraged 6 percent of 
coups worldwide and 86 percent of coups that involved this grievance were successful. 64 
Scholars have argued that the militaiy' s mood is comprised of various components. Morris 
Janowitz identified four components of the mood in new nations. First, pers01mel had a strong 
nationalistic attitude and second, a strong sense of Puritanism was held with com1ption and 
decadence being opposed. Third, there was agreement that collective public enterprises 
represent the means of achieving social, political, and economic change. Finally, and most 
imp01iantly, they had an attitude of "antipolitics" whereby civilian political leaders were not 
trusted.65 This attitude is vital given it is likely to weaken anti-intervention traditions, and to 
provide a basis for the manifest destiny and a perception of supremacy over civilians. Indeed 
61 See Farcau, pp190-1. See also David Rapoport, "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality, and Impotence," 
in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Militmy Relations in Communist and Modernising Societies, ed. 
Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp259-60. 
62 See Claude Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," in Civilian Control of the Milita,y: 
The01y and Cases fi·om Developing Countries, ed. Claude Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1976), p26; Alfred Stepan, The MilitmJ' in Politics: Changing Pattems in Brazil (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971 ), pp2 l-2; Finer, second edition, p224-5; and Kebschull, p572. 
63 See Finer, second edition, p226. 
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Henri Barkey wrote that the military in removing a government was asserting its belief it can 
perform a government's functions better than civilians could.66 
This mood is derived from vanous sources. Primarily, as the militaiy' s expe1iise and 
capabilities increase, and become more diverse, the confidence that it could govern is likely to 
grow stronger. In addition, the militmy might be inclined to perceive the problems of 
governing as minimal, and thus can downplay its technical inadequacies with regard to its 
ability to govern. Conducive to this is: the expectation that if the militaiy's formal and proper 
procedures are followed problems will be solved; the leadership's expectation that orders will 
be swiftly executed; an overly positive assessment of the utility of force; and a negative view 
of politicians, paiiicularly those in government.67 In tum these views are encouraged by the 
militaiy' s regimented and hierarchical structure, and the imp01iance placed upon force. 
Moreover if the military does not have close ties to the civilian leaders, it might not realise the 
difficulties the leaders encounter as they govern. A simplistic perception of governing is likely 
to encourage an interventionist mood, as persom1el will be less tolerate of the regime and may 
wish to govern themselves, at least initially. 
Transitions have the potential to encourage an interventionist mood. First, the new regime may 
be perceived as not acknowledging or downplaying the militmy's capabilities. Second, 
transitional instability and civilian disunity can reinforce the positive perception personnel 
have of themselves versus civilians. This is most likely if the transition, at least initially, has a 
minimal impact upon the capabilities of pers01mel, and if the transition is to democracy, as 
decisive action can be hindered by the need to take into account a divided electorate. Third, it 
is likely that at least some members of the new regime will be inexperienced, and thus be 
prone to poor judgement. This can increase the military' s disdain of civilian politicians and 
might encourage civilians to seek military intervention. Such developments equate with a high 
level of self-confidence, and thus a greater likelihood that personnel believe they have the 
capacity to intervene. 
Various scholars have examined interventionist perceptions. Nordlinger wrote that the military 
was likely to use an achievement criterion in promotions, place an emphasis on rationality in 
the decision-making process, and a strictly hierarchical ordering of positions. This meant that 
66 Henri Barkey, "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition," AFS 16, no.2 (Winter 1990): pl 73. 
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persom1el were likely to perceive themselves as highly competent and rational. This can lead 
to the problems associated with governing being under-estimated, as they believed that 
decisions based upon a managerial and teclmical criterion would swiftly solve problems. 68 
Furthermore, military doubts regarding democracy have been identified. Constantine 
Danopoulos argued that democratic procedures may be viewed as "problematic" in their 
usefulness and applicability, given that militaries "tluive on the command and obey 
principle. "69 
As I have already noted, a fall in the self-perceptions of personnel to the degree that they 
doubt their own capabilities can discourage a coup. This is where Finer's framework needs to 
be modified to better talce this into account. A dramatic fall is likely to reduce the confidence 
that personnel have in their capacity to successfully intervene, and negative perceptions of the 
military increase the probability that civilians will actively oppose a coup. This is impo1iant 
when pers01mel are unsure of themselves and the viability of a coup as it wealcens their 
resolve, particularly when they must risk civilian casualties and widespread instability. Here 
the work of David Mendeloff is relevant. Mendeloff wrote that the level of confidence among 
persom1el was directly related to their level of prestige. 70 Similarly, Donald Horowitz argued 
that civilian support for the military could contribute to officers having an "unshakeable belief 
in the rightness of their action," which encouraged them to stage a coup.71 A high level of self-· 
confidence is also important in order to intervene in the modern state. This is because of the 
complexity of governing a state with a large infrastructure and diverse economy. Finer thus 
argued that the complexity of the modem state ensured that the military increasingly lacked 
the teclu1ical skills to govern. 72 
Transitions and capacity 
Past regime transitions provide evidence of the role that the above factors have on the 
likelihood of a coup, and its outcome. With regard to personnel, the Philippines is particularly 
relevant. The imp01iance of strong leadership is shown by Criselda Y abes arguing that Gringo 
67 I have used Nordlinger's work on the governing style of military regimes to help identify factors that can 
contribute to the military's mood. See Nordlinger, pp118-24. 
68 Nordlinger, pp43-47, 119-24; and Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal From Government Responsibility," 
AFS 10, no.4 (Summer 1984): pp555-6. 
69 Constantine Danopoulos, "Democratising the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe," West European 
Politics 14, no.4 (October 1991): p31. 
70 David Mendeloff, "Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: The "Paradox of Disintegration" and the Myth of 
a Military Coup," CPCS 27, no.3 (September 1994): pp238-9. 
71 Horowitz, Coup Theories, pl 89. 
49 
Honasan played a vital role in leading challenges to the new regime after the fall of Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1986. Yabes also wrote of the importance that strategically located personnel, the 
equipment available to coup conspirators, and their cohesion and number had in determining 
the outcome of interventions.73 Herspring argued that the lack of cohesion among former 
Warsaw Treaty militaries prevented them from posing a real threat to the post-Communist 
regimes. 74 The influence that the level of self-confidence among personnel has in determining 
whether they intervene is also evident in former Communist militaries. For example, 
Herspring argued that the fall in morale among Albanian personnel discouraged them from 
intervening. 75 
In summary, the likelihood of intervention is influenced by whether coup leaders are present, 
and whether personnel strategically placed; effectively armed, and effectively trained are 
willing to actively support a coup. Likewise, the cohesion and size of the coup forces may play 
a role in deciding the outcome. Of vital importance too is the military' s mood. This influences 
whether personnel believe that they have the capacity to intervene. Therefore, whether or not 
coup leaders believe that their forces have the above qualities should influence their decision 
to intervene. 
Disposition 
The disposition to intervene can be influenced by the presence of interventionist motives, the 
military's mood, and external actors. As I have already discussed the military's mood I shall 
focus here on motives and external actors. These are likely to be influenced by a transition, 
however their influence in deciding the probability of a coup varies. I believe that corporate 
and individual interests, and the military' s mood, are most important. I thus label them 
primaiy factors. Those factors I believe are less impmiant are then assessed and labelled 
secondary factors. These are the militaiy's class and particularistic interests along with the 
manifest destiny, the national interest, and external actors. 
72 Finer, pp14-17. 
73 Criselda Yabes, The Boys From The Ban·acks: The Philippine Milita,y After EDSA (Manila: Anvil Publishing 
Inc., 1991). With regard to strategically located personnel see pp167, 169. With regard to equipment see p53. 
Yabes wrote extensively on the divisions within the Philippine military. 
74 Herspring, "Post-Communist Eastern Europe," pp 105, 111, 121. 




The violation of corporate interests is often the most influential coup grievance. This is 
because such a violation directly impacts upon the military' s ability to successfully execute its 
primary role of ensuring national security, upon its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, 
and upon the conditions under which personnel operate. Such a violation will also have 
repercussions on individual interests. Indeed despite the civilian leaders seeking to address 
military concerns, the perception may persist that corporate interests are threatened and that a 
coup is necessary. Actions by a regime that may be perceived as threatening the military range 
from budgetaiy support increasing at an unsatisfactory rate, to the emergence of a rival armed 
force loyal solely to the civilian leaders. 
The role of corporate grievances is widely recognised, and Finer's work needs to be expanded. 
According to Thompson, 23 percent of coups worldwide from 1946 to 1970 involved any 
corporate positional grievances (CPG). CPGs ai·ose from perceived threats to the military's 
autonomy, hierarchy, monopoly over weaponry, cohesion, honour, and political position. In 
addition, Thompson calculated that 33 percent of coups worldwide involved corporate 
resource grievances (CRGs). There were four such grievance subtypes. First, dissatisfaction 
arose over pay, promotions, appointments, assignments, and/or retirement policies. Second, 
dissatisfaction arose from budget allocations, training facilities-policies, and/or inter-service 
favouritism. Third, dissatisfaction arose over general military policy and/or support for 
militaiy operations during war, an insurgency, or to maintain order. Fourth, a combination of 
the above grievances developed.76 Thompson calculated that 61 percent of coups encouraged 
by corporate factors succeeded.77 Nordlinger also believed that corporate interests were 
influential.78 Nordlinger wrote that officers could rationalise their actions by believing what 
was positive for the military was positive for the nation. 79 This perception is clearly associated 
with the manifest destiny. Nordlinger classified the corporate interests as follows: 
76 Thompson, The Grievances, pp13-25. For more recent information see Finer, second edition, pp236-40 and 
Ferguson, pp18-9. 
77 Thompson, The Grievances p51. 
78 Nordlinger, p65. 
79 Ibid. 
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• Autonomy. Nordlinger claimed interference in the military's internal affairs was likely to 
encourage intervention and was frequently behind corporate motivated coups. 80 Thompson 
calculated that 8 percent of coups were encouraged by this grievance, of which 78 percent 
succeeded. 81 Pers01mel might feel regime interference, irrespective of its magnitude, is 
detrimental to corporate interests. Perceived interference might include attempts to influence 
promotions and to introduce politics as a criterion for promotion. This interference may lower 
professional competence and the self-image of the officer corps.82 Given the probability that a 
new regime will seek to ensure its supremacy, perceived threats to the military's autonomy can 
arise during a transition. 
• Absence of functional rivals and the survival of the military. This again can be one of the 
more influential corporate grievances. According to Thompson, 7 percent of CPG coups were 
encouraged worldwide by a perceived threat to the military's monopoly over weapons, and 56 
percent succeeded.83 Nordlinger argued that establishing a functional rival and threatening the 
military's survival can motivate intervention. These interests are closely related, as the 
creation or expansion of a civilian-controlled militia is perceived as a threat to both. This is 
because the military' s adequacy and reliability as upholder of security is questioned, and the 
provision of responsibilities and support to perceived inferiors is insulting. Likewise, the 
military's political power and prestige declines with its weapon monopoly and the militaiy is 
essentially told that it is replaceable. 84 As with autonomy, the military' s responsibility for 
security and its survival may be threatened by a transition during which the new regime seeks 
to consolidate through establishing its own an11ed forces. 
• Budgetaiy support. A reduction of the militaiy' s budget or refusal to increase support is a 
potential coup grievance. Nordlinger examined the role of discontent over budgetaiy support, 
and James Dolian argued that budgetaiy support often increased after a coup. 85 However 
80 Ibid., pp71-5; and Thompson, The Grievances, pp12-4. See also Farcau, pp26-7; Stepan, The Militmy in 
Politics, p81; and Welch and Smith, p241. 
81 Thompson, The Grievances, Table 3, p13, and Table 17, p51. 
82 Nordlinger, p71. 
83 Thompson, The Grievances, Table 3, pl3, and Table 17, p51. See also Anton Bebler, Militmy Rule in Africa: 
Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali (New York, Praeger, 1973), pp85-8, 110, quoted in Nordlinger, p76. 
84 Nordlingerp75-8; See also Farcau, p28; Finer, pp55-6; and Thompson, The Grievances, p15. 
85 Nordlinger, pp66-71. See also Thompson, The Grievances, pp20-5. With regard to James Dalian see his "The 
Military and the Allocation of National Resources: An Examination of Thirty-Four Sub-Sahara African Nations" 
(paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, New York, 14-17 March 1973, pl9) quoted in 
Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military," p26; John Fitch, The Milita,y Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: 
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Thompson found that only 3 percent of CRG coups worldwide were encouraged by disquiet 
over budgetaiy support, training arrangements, and inter-service favouritism. Of these 33 
percent failed. 86 Interventions may occur regardless of increases, coups do not necessarily 
result in increased defence expenditure, and budget cuts may not encourage widespread 
discontent if conducted gradually and the regime's leadership is respected. 87 The new regime's 
economic performance is particularly relevant here, as economic problems place a greater 
stress on resources while high inflation reduces the military budget in real terms. 
Although I do not believe that budgetary support alone is as important as the first two 
grievances, it's wider impact can be influential. For example, it is likely that the level of 
budgetary support will directly influence the level of pay. Thompson found that dissatisfaction 
over pay, promotions, appointments, assignments, and/or retirements accounted for 15 percent 
of CRG coups worldwide, the most frequent factor, though only 43 percent succeeded. 88 
Nordlinger argued that the level of support detennined the material well-being of officers, 
served as an indicator of the military's political power and prestige, and influenced the 
officers' perception of the milita1y as a modem and professional organisation. 89 
Individual interest 
Second to the corporate interests are the individual interests of personnel which play an 
influential role in motivating coups. The. individual interests are closely associated with 
corporate interests, as both essentially originate from the same developments. For instance, 
although I assess the potential role that discontent over pay might have in the context of 
budgetaiy support, it is closely associated with the individual interests of personnel. These 
interests are influenced by a transition, and thus personnel might believe that they are being 
violated. For example, moves by the new regime to reduce the number of personnel, and to 
Ecuador, 1948-1966 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), ppl21-5; and Finer, p56, 
second edition, p240. 
86 Thompson, The Grievances, Table 4, pl9, and Table 17, p51. 
87 See Albert Michaels, "Background to a Coup: Civil-Military Relations in Twentieth Century Chile and the 
Overthrow of Salvadore Allende" (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 
Buffalo, 1974) quoted in Nordlinger, p71; Thompson, The Grievances, pp20-2; Gary Zuk and William 
Thompson, "The Post-Coup Military Spending Question: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis," 
APSR, 76, no.l (March 1982): pp60-74; Frank Wayman, Milita,y Involvement in Politics: A Casual Model, 
International Studies Series volume 3 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc, 1975), p57; and Alfred Stepan, 
Rethinking Milita,y Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp73, 
80-1. 
88 Thompson, The Grievances, Table 4, pl 9, and Table 17, p51. 
89 Nordlinger, p68. 
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promote personnel on the basis of their political loyalty, are potential threats to individual 
interests. 
Coup grievances among personnel might be derived from vanous individual interests. 
Perceived threats range from the lack of promotion to the violation of their living conditions, 
and, ultimately, to the threat of execution. For example, a regime may seek to reinforce its 
position by eliminating perceived enemies, and might prosecute those deemed responsible for 
actions considered criminal before and during the transition. Similarly, a new regime might 
use the military despite its lack of preparedness. Personal grievances may exist prior to a 
transition too, and may grow if the military supported the transition but feels that the new 
regime is not showing gratitude. The new regime itself will contribute to this grievance if it 
promises rewards it fails to deliver. 
Scholars have also recognised the diversity of potential individual gnevances. Individual 
interests that might weaken the loyalty of personnel to the regime include: political ambitions; 
demands for higher rank with more power and pay; and the conditions of work. 90 More 
specifically, moves by a new regime to punish persom1el for their oppressive role under the 
previous regime are likely to cause discontent.91 It has also been written that the military's 
active transitional role strengthens the claims that personal have to power.92 Thus, they might 
feel particularly aggrieved if their hopes are unfulfilled. Coup leaders might believe too that 
their individual interests are threatened when a danger arises to their suborganisational clique, 
as the clique protects them and offers opportunities of patronage. 93 
Transitions and primary factors 
Past transitions provide evidence of the grievances that might arise from perceived threats to 
corporate and individual interests. Discontent arose among fonner Warsaw Treaty militaries as 
they experienced drastic reductions in their budgets.94 Past transitions also illustrate how 
individual grievances can arise. For example, concern in Nigeria grew over the promotion of 
90 See Perlmutter, The Military and Politics, plOl; Farcau pp29-32; Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and 
Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pl 49, quoted in Farcau, p3 l; 
and Thompson, The Grievances, pp18-20, 26-8. 
91 See Stepan, Rethinking Militmy Politics, pp69-72. The issue of dealing with past human rights violations was 
also examined by Huntington, The Third Wave, pp21 l-231. 
92 Welch, "Civilian Control of the military," p21. 
93 See Thompson, The Grievances, pp28-9. Factional loyalty was widespread in the Philippine military. See 
Francisco Nemenzo, "A Season Of Coups," Diliman Review 34 no.5 and 6 (1986): ppl8-20. 
94 Herspring, "Post-Conununist Eastern Europe," p 110. 
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officers by the new regime after the transition to independence.95 Moves by the new regime to 
punish officers in the Philippines for their actions under Marcos caused discontent too.96 
Secondary Factors 
Class interest 
Although a class interest might motivate the military to stage a coup it is generally not as 
influential as the above factors. At one level clearly identifying the class of the officer corps is 
not necessarily simple; they might not be of one dominant origin. Thus, accurately arguing 
that the transition's impact upon the class interest is the primary factor behind a coup, and that 
it had a disproportionate effect on one class, might be difficult. Associated with this, the 
approach assumes that classes are united, and thus can be the focus of coup grievances. In 
reality this is unlikely. The approach also assumes that personnel will place a priority upon 
loyalties established before they joined the militmy, rather than those built up among 
personnel, and their loyalty to the military itself. This is questionable given the importance the 
military places upon de-emphasising civilian life, and the intensive indoctrination of 
personnel. Also, members of the regime might not act according to their class origins once 
they become part of the political elite. Moreover, even if officers are of middle class origins, 
the class often associated with officers, the middle class's support of a coup is very debatable. 
This is because members of the middle class often actively oppose coups and military regimes. 
Finally, even if the class interest encourages a coup its role during the actual intervention is 
likely to be minimal given its military nature. Indeed class or particularistic grievances may 
actually hinder the staging of a coup through denying its leaders broad support. 
The work of scholars highlights the problem of emphasising the class interest. Although a 
coup may benefit one class, it is unlikely that the prime motive is derived from assisting this 
class. Though the ruling class may benefit from a coup to maintain stability, this goal of 
preventing instability can also prompt the overthrow of the regime, and even a change of the 
status quo the military believes produces instability.97 Indeed it is more probable that civilian 
parties will be the victims of a coup rather than the beneficiaries.98 The initial problem of 
95 Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Milita,y: A Sociological Analysis Of Authority & Revolt 1960-67 (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), ppl92, 246. 
96 Yabes, p64. 
97 Martin Needler, "Military Motivations In 1l1e Seizure Of Power," Latin American Research Review X, no.3 
(Fall 1975): pp67-8. 
98 Thompson, The Grievances, p32. 
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establishing the class composition of the officer corps is recognised and the same applies to 
the role of the middle class in encouraging intervention.99 The weakness of the middle class-
military link is further illustrated by the possibility that a militaiy of middle class origins 
adopts upper class behaviour when it seizes power. 100 Even if the class interest does encourage 
the coup, the operation is "planned, organized, and executed by the army and for the army, 
with little or no support from movements and classes." 101 Finally, Alfred Stepan wrote that 
although the middle class may have supported a coup, military violations of civil rights might 
reduce this support and lead it to challenge a military regime. 102 The middle class may actually 
be a major threat to the military's interests. 103 
Despite the likelihood that a class interest will not be the dominant factor behind a coup, it 
needs to be assessed because it can play a role. A class interest might be derived from either 
the family background of officers or the class they associate with. According to this argument, 
an intervention against a regime may result from the military' s class interest being threatened. 
Thus, a transition's impact on the class interest is particularly relevant. For example, 
instability and economic problems which violate the militai·y's class interest are theoretically 
likely to increase the probability of a coup. Similarly, whether members of the new regime are 
from a predominantly different class to that of the military, and whether this leads to policies 
violating its class interest, might influence the decision to intervene. 
The class interest is recognised by various scholars who argue that the middle class is most 
frequently associated with coups. This is based upon the argument that officers generally 
01iginate from the middle class, and thus share its attitudes and seek to protect its interests. 104 
Wilson Mc Williams wrote that if recruitment was primarily from groups alienated from the 
general population, like a particular class, the military was more likely to place its loyalty here 
rather than with the state. 105 It is also argued that the military may act to ensure that the 
99 See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
pp200, 300-304. See also Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pl0. With regard to the middle class and coups see 
Fitch, ppl25-6; John Markoff and Silvio Baretta, "What We Don't Know About Coups: Observations on Recent 
South American Politics," AFS 12 no.2 (Winter 1986): pp208-12; Perlmutter, The Militmy And Politics, pp99-
100; and Huntington, The Third Wave, p67. 
100 Jose Num1, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz, The Politics of Non Conformity in Latin 
America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p85 quoted in O'Kane, p7. 
101 Perlmutter, The Milita,y And Politics, pl 58. See also pp162-4; 
102 See Stepan, The Milita,y in Politics, pp47-8. 
103 Ibid., p52. 
104 See Stepan, The Militmy in Politics, pp32-4; and Nordlinger, pp32-4, 82-5. For further information on the role 
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middle class can enter politics, and to protect this involvement. Huntington argued that the 
military was likely to support the middle class as it entered politics through staging a 
"breakthrough coup," and to protect this position through undertaking a "veto coup" when the 
lower classes posed a threat. 106 He also noted however that as the power of the middle class 
grew after democratisation, the "social basis" for staging a coup declined. This was because 
the class increasingly did not require the military's protection. 107 Possible transitional 
conditions like instability have also been identified as motivating a coup to restore order for 
the middle class. 108 
Particularistic interest 
According to this approach coups are motivated by a regime threatening the regional and or 
ethnic interests of the conspirators. Howevei; I believe that one should be cautious about 
stressing their influence. Factors that weaken the influence of these interests include the 
development of internal loyalties, which are likely to at least reduce pre-service loyalties. In 
fact the preservation of particularistic affiliations can hinder the development of a cohesive 
coup force. The level of support for the new regime might also outweigh the particularistic 
interests of persom1el. This is particularly likely if the new regime acts to minimise 
particularistic grievances. This might be achieved by ensuring that there is no discrimination 
against the regional and ethnic groups closely associated with the military. 
Scholars have also argued that the approach is problematic. According to Thompson, sectional 
groups that perceived their primordial or ethnic-regional interests were threatened staged only 
3 percent of world coups, and of these 67 percent failed. 109 Horowitz wrote that it is often too 
simplistic to explain the staging of a coup in multi-ethnic states solely in terms of racial 
conflict. 11° Furthermore, even where ethnicity influenced the decision to stage a coup its role 
may be unclear. This is shown by Andrew Scobell's study of ethnicity and the May 1987 coup 
106 Hm1tington, Political Order, p222. See also pp201-2. 
107 Huntington, The Third Wave, p235. 
ws See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions fi-o,n Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p27. 
109 See Thompson, The Grievances, Table 8, p30, and Table 17, p51. 
110 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p472, quoted in 
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m Fiji. 111 Robin Luckham also noted that internal military bonds between personnel of 
different origins were strong, even after the Nigerian coups. 112 
However particularistic interests might play a role, and hence should be recognised. The 
origins of officers and the1 composition of the military is important here, and a transition can 
impact upon these. Theoretically, the impact of a transition will depend upon whether there is 
a regional and ethnic basis of the new regime, whether this differs from that of the militaiy, 
and whether particularistic interests are thus threatened because of the regime's actions. For 
instance, the new regime might favour personnel of one region or ethnicity. This might lead to 
these personnel being promoted more rapidly or to better positions, and the new regime 
seeking to alter the military' s composition in their favour. Such moves are likely to encourage 
resentment among those who experience discrimination. The impact will also be shaped by the 
strength of regional and ethnic attachments held by personnel, and by whether these are 
stronger than attachments to the new regime. 
Though particularistic interests might not be very influential there presence within the military 
is likely, as no militaiy is completely isolated from civilian society. It is certainly inaccurate to 
argue that the socialisation of personnel eradicates all pre-service loyalties. This is illustrated 
by the militaiy's reflection of ethnic and regional divisions in society. 113 Likewise, the 
potential over-representation of officers from specific regions has been identified in 
influencing the staging of coups. 114 
Manifest destiny and national interest 
The manifest destiny and the national interest are combined here because of their ties and 
common origins. When the military develops the belief that it has the duty (the manifest 
destiny) to intervene, this is essentially based upon the perception that it is the state's guardian. 
Thus, scholars have argued that if the manifest destiny exists, the military will believe its duty 
is to intervene when it perceives the national interest is threatened. Furthennore, both are tied 
to the close association the milita1y has with independence and sovereignty. As transitions can 
111 See Scobell, ppl92-3. 
112 Luckham, pl 80. 
113 See Nordlinger, pp39-42. 
114 With regard to regional over-representation see Stepan, The Militmy in Politics, pp37-40. With regard to the 
role of regional differences in coups see Ro1y Ewins, Colour, Class, and Custom, The Literature of the 1987 Fiji 
Coup (Canberra: The Australian National University, 199.2), pp33-5. See also Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing 
The Occurrence Of Military Coups D'Etat In Latin America," Journal of Peace Research 4, no.3 (1967): p232. 
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have far-reaching consequences, the manifest destiny and the military's perception of the 
national interest can be influenced. For example, the repercussions of a transition might 
include an economic downturn. Theoretically, such developments could motivate intervention 
because personnel might believe that their impact threatens the national interest. 
It is difficult to assess the role of this interest but I believe that it is unlikely to be a major 
motive. Defining the national interest is difficult, especially as it is the military's perception of 
the interest that is of greatest importance, and this varies. Nor do I believe that perso1mel often 
intervene primarily because they believe that it is their manifest destiny to protect the national 
interest, pa1ticularly when this is equated with protecting and promoting civilian interests. 
Statistical evidence supplied by scholars like Thompson indicates that corporate and individual 
grievances are more influential. Second, coup leaders often renege on their promises to solve 
the problems that the state is experiencing. Third, a coup is likely to have some adverse impact 
on the national interest and this is clear to persom1el, given the impact of past coups. 
Opposition to a coup, at least in the long term, is likely to develop and threaten stability. 
Indeed civil war and the fragmentation of the state are possible. This is pmticularly likely 
during transitions as dramatic change will not be met with a consensus of opinion, and military 
action against the new regime might thus be divisive. Fourth, coups can have a negative 
impact on the militaiy, as it becomes divided on political issues and its focus on politics 
diverts attention away from combat readiness. This is particularly relevant because I support 
Finer's argument that the perception personnel have of the national interest is often derived 
from the belief that the military is closely associated with the state. Thus, what is positive for 
the militaiy is positive for the state. Finally, militaiy regimes are unlikely to perform as well as 
civilian regimes in dealing with problems where the military has little expe1tise, such as 
fighting poverty. These last factors however are only relevant if the milita1y recognises that it 
is unlikely to be able to provide better governance, and that its own interests will be threatened 
by intervention. 
Scholars have discussed the problems of explaining coups according to the manifest destiny 
and national interest. According to Thompson, only 8 percent of coups worldwide were 
motivated by the conspirators attempting to correct the injustices and abuses of the political 
and economic systems, and 32 percent failed. 115 Furthermore, Thompson found that only 8 
115 Thompson, The Grievances, p44-45, Table 17, p51. See also Nordlinger, pp85-6 and Fitch, p83. 
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percent of coups were staged to maintain public order. 116 Fitch argued that the rnilita1.y often 
defined the national interest largely in terms of its own interests, and he used the 1963 coup in 
Ecuador to illustrate this. 117 Moreover, the military's duty to protect the state from the danger 
of other militaries is threatened by its active involvement in politics. This can be influential 
when the military recognises this and believes that security threats exist. For instance, David 
Rapoport found that militaries heavily involved in politics often performed poorly in 
combat. 118 The time period within which many coups occur places further doubt on whether 
the military intervenes to safeguard the national interest. Coups often occur before an election, 
thus denying people the opportunity to vote out a regime that is considered to be unsuitable by 
the people. 119 
Military regimes themselves are unlikely to perform better than civilian regimes. This is 
imp01tant when the military recognises its inadequacies as a ruler, and does not aim to hand 
over power to civilians once it has intervened. Finer argued that only in exceptional cases and 
for brief periods can the military govern without civilian collaboration, as it lacked both the 
capacity and moral right.to govern in a mo_dern state. 12° For example, the likelihood of future 
coups increases, at least in the short term, if a successful coup has been staged. 121 A military 
regime's characteristics are difficult to align with the national interest, however it is defined. 
Such regimes are more likely to lack legitimacy, use coercion more often, suffer more 
violence, be less responsive to popular demands, and less likely to unde1take progressive 
economic changes. 122 The negative impact of military regimes on the economy is widely 
documented, as with the fallacy that the milita1.y modernises the economy and political 
system. 123 Military regimes are often as corrupt as the civilian regimes they replace too. 124 
Nordlinger also demonstrated that the average life expectancy of milita1.y governments was 
five years shorter than that of civilia11 regimes, military leaders most frequently leaving power 
voluntarily because of the numerous problems they faced in attempting to govern. Such 
116 Thompson, The Grievances, p45. 
117 Fitch, pp119-21. 
118 Rapoport, p269-72. See also pp272-3. 
119 See Thompson, The Grievances, pp36-9; and Fossum, p234. 
12° Finer, pp14-22. 
121 See John Londregan and Keith Poole, "Poverty, The Coup Trap, And The Seizure Of Executive Power," 
World Politics XLII, no.2 (January 1990), pp152, 163, 175; Huntington, Political Order, pp204-8; Ferguson, 
p194; and Thompson, The Grievances, pp32-9. 
122 Thompson, The Grievances, p51. See also O'Kane, pp7-9. 
123 With regard to the economic impact of military regimes see Richard Lagos and Oscar Rufatt, "Military 
Government And Real Wages In Chile: A Note," Latin American Research Review X, no.2 (Summer 1975): 
pl 45. With regard to their modemising role see O'Kane, pp7-9. 
124 See Nordlinger, pp88, 126-8. 
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problems can range from the loss of prestige that results from public discontent, to the fall in 
cohesion as conflict occurs over government objectives and decisions. 125 
Despite the limited influence of the manifest destiny and national interest they can influence 
the decision to intervene, and hence should be assessed. Various factors are likely to 
encourage the development of the manifest destiny, and national interest motive. A militaiy's 
tradition of relative isolation from society might encourage personnel to perceive themselves 
as neutral guardians of the state, whereas they believe that civilian politicians are motivated by 
personal gain. Carina Perelli wrote that civil-militaiy boundaries encouraged the belief that the 
military was the "moral reservoir of the nation," with its monopoly over legitimate violence 
and belief it was the "embodiment of the nation."126 An acceptance of the manifest destiny 
may also be encouraged by the positive roles some scholars attributed to the military. 127 
Scholars have likewise examined the role of the national interest in motivating intervention. 
That officers believe this national interest exists and should guide the regime's actions is 
recognised. 128 Similarly, scholars have argued that this perception has the potential to motivate 
intervention. 129 Furthe1more, there has been a progressive widening of the definition of 
national security, and thus national interest, officers believe must be upheld. Thus, the line 
between legitimate internal security activities and militaiy interference in civil matters has 
become "blurred," as security threats like terrorism encouraged its internal deployment. 130 
The exact components that motivate an intervention based upon the national interest are 
difficult to categorise, as they depend upon the military's perception. However scholars have 
argued that some factors are especially relevant. These include political corruption, the 
nation's prestige, and an internal or external war. 131 Additional factors, which when threatened 
may motivate intervention, include the state's territorial integrity, position in international 
alliances, internal stability, and external threats. 132 In the absence of a clear definition of a 
'national crisis,' John Fitch wrote that adverse public opinions of a regime may act as a 
125 Nordlinger, pp138-47. See also Huntington, Political Order, p242; Sundhaussen, pp545-9; and Welch and 
Smith, pp240- l. 
126 Carina Perelli, "From Counte1Tevolutionary Warfare To Political Awakening: The Urnguayan and Argentine 
Armed Forces in the 1970s," AFS 20, no.1 (Fall 1993): p29. See also Huntington, Political Order, pp225-8. 
127 See Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in The Role of the Milita,y in 
Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John Johnson, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp80-9. 
128 Nordlinger, pp58-60. 
129 See Lucld1am, pp286-7; Horowitz, Coup Theories, pp147-78, 182; and Welch and Smith, p239. 
130 Edmonds, p105. 
131 Ibid., Figure 1, p103. 
132 O'Dom1ell, Schmitter, p27. See also pp23-4. With regard to external threats see Perelli pp33-4. 
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smTogate for those officers who believe that they are protectors of the constitution. 133 A lack 
of regime legitimacy might arise from diverse developments ranging from the regime's illegal 
acts to its inability to solve problems. 134 
External actors 
I believe that Finer' s framework needs to be modified to specifically assess the role of external 
actors (foreign states and organisations). It is difficult to assess the role that external actors 
play in motivating coups because of the secretive nature of their involvement. However it is 
clear that they can influence whether a coup is staged. Their role can range from actively 
participating in the coup through to notifying potential coup plotters that they will not oppose 
intervention. There are two broad ways that the interests of external actors might be 
threatened, and they might be encouraged to support a coup. First, the regime might follow a 
foreign policy that is deemed threatening. For instance, new leaders might seek close relations 
with other regimes perceived to be enemies, or renege on the agreements and obligations of 
their predecessors. Second, a regime's domestic policies might violate the interests of actors. 
Violations may occur as new leaders act to regulate foreign businesses. A more extreme 
scenario is a new regime's moves to nationalise ventures despite the interests of foreigners. 
Other violations might involve the infringement of the rights of ethnic and religious groups 
who are influential in determining the actions of external actors. Supporting a coup against a 
regime perceived to be hostile can be more cost effective, both in monetary and human terms, 
than the actor having to deploy its own forces, which might be limited. Furthermore, providing 
covert assistance to coup forces is easier to keep confidential than overtly using force against a 
regime, thus reducing the potential of global repercussions. 
Of particular relevance here is the work of Steven David. David argued that supporting a coup 
can be advantageous to external actors. This was because it could take minimal resources to 
assist groups seeking to overthrow their governments, and external actors had a strong interest 
in assisting those to power who were likely to closely align the state to the actor and its 
policies. 135 David categorised three levels of assistance. First, the actor provided advice and 
encouragement to the coup leaders. Second, the actor provided material support, such as 
133 Fitch, ppl 11-116. 
134 With regard to the factors that encourage a loss of legitimacy see Nordlinger, pp92-9, 193-4; Luckham pp 17-
20, 32-3, 39, 201-2 and Fitch, pp80-5, 101-10. More specifically, with regard to the military's position when 
civilian leaders break the law see Kemp and Hudlin, pp13-9. 
135 Steven David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), p3. 
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money and weaponry. Third, the actor assisted the coup through deploying its own personnel. 
This deployment differs from an invasion because the number deployed is limited, and the 
operation is confined to the overthrow of the regime. 136 
David also argued that there were four categories of regimes particularly vulnerable to foreign-
assisted coups. First, regimes dependent on the deployment of foreign perso1mel for their 
survival were vuh1erable. Second, those regimes comprised of "relatively simple societies with 
a minimum of meaningful political participation and a maximum of political instability" were 
vulnerable. This was because only a limited number of individuals were likely to oppose a 
coup. 137 Third, neighbouring states involved in a conflict might support coups against another 
regime, as such operations require fewer resources than an invasion. Finally, regimes seeking 
to distance themselves from a major power without having removed its influence over the 
military risked a coup. 138 The role of external actors is shown by past coups. For instance, the 
US and Soviet Union were often involved in foreign coups. 139 More specifically, organisations 
like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have frequently been suspected of such 
involvement. 140 
However although external actors might influence the decision to intervene, I believe that they 
are rarely influential and therefore label them a seconda1y factor. It is unlikely that a milita1y 
will have a relationship with an external actor strong enough to motivate it to stage a coup if 
the institution itself is not aggrieved. For instance, the militaiy will be reluctant to risk 
becoming vulnerable to criticism that it is a 'puppet' of foreigners, and will be aware that the 
actor will expect favours in return, favours that the military might be reluctant to grant. 
Moreover, if the actor wishes the coup to succeed it must have both the capacity to play a 
decisive role, and be willing to do so without regard for the consequences. For example, the 
regime and its allies are likely to greet the actor's moves with hostility, and its efforts might be 
wasted because of the prospect of failure. Nor does the success of the coup guarantee that the 
actor will receive tangible benefits. This is because the military' s leaders might be unwilling 
or unable to keep promises they made in return for assistance. 
136 Ibid., ppl40-5. 
137 Ibid., pl 45. With regard to a dependency on external actors and coups also see O'Kane, p93. 
t3s Ibid., pp145-6. 
139 Ibid., pp16-105. 
140 See O'Kane, pp90-2. 
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The limited influence of external actors is shown by past coups. David found that from 1945 to 
mid-1985 foreign involvement was significant in supporting only 6. 7 percent of the coups 
staged in the Third World. 141 More recently, Yekutiel Gershoni argued that the decline of the 
Cold War reduced the level of external support provided to African coup conspirators by the 
superpowers. 142 Furthe1more, O'Kane found that coups were rare even in states where the 
interests of external actors were violated and they had persom1el deployed there. 143 Another 
possible weakness of stressing the role of external actors is that the military might actually be 
discouraged from intervening by such actors. This is because its attention is drawn away from 
domestic issues if it perceives an external actor poses a threat. 144 More specifically, the 
success of external actors appears to be limited. David wrote that American and Soviet eff01is 
were often unsuccessful, and that foreign support had little impact on the success rate of 
coups. 145 These effmis also illustrated the numerous problems facing actors. 146 
Transitions and secondary factors 
Past transitions provide evidence of the limited role secondary factors might have in 
motivating coups. Of direct relevance are the Philippine and Romanian transitions. This is 
because the military played an active role in both of these transitions to democracy from 
unpopular and discredited regimes. However evidence suggests that it is too simplistic to 
argue that the militaries united behind the transitions in the national interest. Indeed in the 
Philippines personnel apparently had intended to establish a military led regime. 147 Finally, I 
have found no evidence to indicate that external actors have played a vital role in motivating 
coups against the new regimes I examined. 
Overall, it is likely that a variety of grievances will motivate a coup, and it is simplistic to 
argue that personnel will stage such a potentially hazardous operation because of one motive. 
A range of grievances is especially likely if the coup members are not all of the same social 
background, do not have the same rank, and are not from the same service. As Farcau 
141 David, p2. 
142 Yekutiel Gershoni, "The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa, AFS 23, no.2 (Winter 
1996): pp240-3. 
143 O'Kane, pp91, 87-9. 
144 This has been noted by Huntington, The Third Wave, p252. 
145 David, pp61 and 92. With regard to the US and Soviet efforts see David, pl 48. 
146 Ibid., pp88-9, 97-9. 
147 With regard to the Philippines see Nemenzo, p20. With regard to Romania see Porter, Red Armies, pp23-4. 
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concluded, "any single explanation for a phenomenon as complex as a coup d'etat will be less 
than satisfactmy." 148 
In summary, the disposition to intervene is shaped by the military's sectional interests, the 
military's mood, and external actors. I previously examined the military's mood in the context 
of the capacity to intervene, and thus focused on sectional interests and external actors here. 
All of these are likely to be influenced by a transition but primary factors are most important. 
These are the corporate and individual interests of the military, and the previously examined 
mood of the military. Though class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and the 
national interest, and external actors might influence whether an intervention occurs, I believe 
that they are unlikely to be important. 
Opportunity 
Opportunity is another important factor determining whether an intervention occurs. The 
opportunity to intervene is dete1mined by the level of "political culture," civilian reliance on 
the military, and the military's popularity. That the civilian reaction might influence the 
outcome of a coup is shown by the research of Amos Perlmutter who studied coups in the 
Middle East from 1936 to 1969. Perlmutter found that no coup that received mass public 
support failed, and 80 percent that received civilian support succeeded. This compared with 40 
percent of those that received no support succeeding. 149 As with the disposition, a transition is 
likely to impact upon the opportunity to intervene, and thus the likelihood of a coup, as 
negative developments like instability can occur. 
However I believe that the opportunity to intervene is not as important as the capacity or 
disposition. This is because a military detennined to intervene and unconcerned with the 
prospect of causing civilian casualties will act regardless of the prospect of opposition. The 
prospect of the militaiy being detennined to seize power regardless of casualties is graphically 
illustrated by O'Kane's research. This indicated that of the 134 successful coups she recorded 
from 1950 to 1985, only 36 were bloodless. 150 Moreover, the military might actually 
'manufacture' the conditions to intervene. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka is 
148 Farcau, p33. See also Thompson, The Grievances, pp 10, 11. 
149 Amos Perlmutter, "The Arab Elite," World Politics XXII, no.2 (January 1970): p292. With regard to the 
influence of public opinion also see Fitch, ppl 11-6. 
150 0 'Kane, p3. 
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alleged to have had links to the protesters that caused instability prior to the May 1987 coup in 
F ... 151 lJl. 
Political culture/regime attaclmrnnt 
Having recognised that the tenn "political culture" is ve1y controversial and that Finer's work 
has weaknesses I shall use the tenn 'regime attachment.' This indicates that I am refening 
foremost to the level of support for the regime, and that I am not arguing that one culture is 
better than another. Although the level of regime attachment might not have a decisive impact 
on whether or not the military decides to intervene, I believe that it does influence the 
decision. Assuming that the coup leaders are rational decision-makers, the hazards associated 
with intervening against a popular regime will influence them. This is primarily because the 
coup leaders must be sure that the military will obey its orders, and that personnel will be 
willing to use violence against civilians. This is a key question given that personnel are not 
isolated from societal attitudes, and that cohesion is a detenninant of the capacity to intervene. 
The degree of violence also influences the credibility of milita1y claims that it is acting in the 
national interest. Thus, when the loyalty of persom1el is doubtful coup leaders will be more 
reluctant to intervene because of the greater perceived risk involved. 
The iiifluence that the level of regime attachment can have on the outcome of coups is shown 
by the work of scholars. David argued that a lack of "meaningful political participation," and 
"weak public commitment to civilian institutions," provided the pre-conditions for the many 
coups experienced by Third World states. 152 Similarly, Edward Luttwak: wrote that coups were 
possible when civilians were politically passive and did not have a close relationship with the 
civilian leadership. This was because there would be little opposition and he argued that was 
"the key to the victory of the coup."153 I believe that this can be the case, but would qualify his 
statement by arguing that the influence of civilian opposition ultimately depends on whether 
the militaiy is willing to inflict civilian casualties when it intervenes. Statistics also indicate 
that in at least some regions the level of public opposition can have an important impact on the 
outcome of a coup. Thompson found that 71 percent of successful Latin American coups from 
1946 to 1970 met minimal or no resistance. 154 Moreover,Farcau argued that the presence of 
151 Ewins, p36. 
152 William Thompson, "Systemic Change And The Latin American Coup," Comparative Political Studies 7, 
no.4 (January 1975): p453. With regard to David see pp9-13. See also Farcau, p34. 
153 Luttwak, p33. Italics are original. See also pp29-35. 
154 Thompson, "Systemic Change," p452. See also Nordlinger, pl 00. 
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large numbers of civilians restricted the firepower available to the coup forces. This was 
because the use of heavy fii-epower against civilians was rare, and it was more common to "see 
the bulk of the aimed forces alienated by the indiscriminate use of heavy firepower." 155 Coups 
have also failed when their leaders have been unwilling to act rnthlessly against active 
opposition, and when civilians do not rally behind them. 156 Scholars further note the potential 
impact of specific groups. Luttwak wrote that "even one well-organized demonstration, or 
well-timed stiike, could pose a serious threat to the coup" and that the potential actions of 
religious groups, political parties and trade unions must be recognised when a coup is 
plam1ed. 157 
Civilian dependence and the domestic situation 
Civilian dependence and the domestic situation are closely related to the level of regime 
attachment. This is because a lack of attachment increases the likelihood of a regime becoming 
dependent on the military, and the level of attachment is influenced by the domestic situation. 
Civilian dependence on the militaiy ultimately increases the ease with which the institution 
can intervene, the position of the military becoming stronger at the expense of the civilian 
leaders. The level of dependence is influenced by the civilian security perceptions with both 
external and internal threats potentially encouraging a reliance on the military. Moreover the 
developments that encourage greater civilian dependence on the military also have the 
potential to discourage a high level of attachment to the regime. This is because the regime's 
involvement in a costly and unpopular war, and inability to prevent serious domestic 
problems, will discourage a strong level of regime attachment. 
With regard to Finer's framework I believe that three issues need to be addressed. First, 
civilian dependence on the military because of an external threat like a foreign war should be 
examined after the domestic situation. This is because the impact of a war on the opportunity 
is largely dete1mined by the resultant changes in the domestic situation. The link between the 
military staging coups during a wai· is also more debatable relative to the domestic situation. 
This argument is supported by the research of scholars. Egil Fossum found that the number of 
coups in Latin America was lower from 1940 to 1945 than during any other six-year period 
155 Farcau, pl37. 
156 With regard to the failure of coups because of a lack ofmthlessness see Kebschull, pp573-4. For information 
on the role that minimal civilian backing of a coup can have see Kathleen Callihan and Constantine Danopoulos, 
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between 1940 and 1966.158 Second, the debatable role that instability can play in determining 
the likelihood of a coup should be recognised. This is because Finer associates protests and 
demonstrations, both potential sources of instability, with overt and latent crises that provide 
the opportunity to intervene. Though instability might facilitate a coup, evidence of the link 
between coups and instability is unclear. Although Fossum argued that nearly 61 percent of 
coups in Latin America from 1907 to 1966 occurred during times of public disorder, 
Thompson in his global study of coups from 1946 to 1970 found only 29 percent were 
associated with public disorders. 159 Indeed the doubt that exists over the instability-coup link 
supp01is my earlier argument that class and particularistic interests are not influential, as these 
are potential sources of instability. Third, countries are unlikely to comply exactly with Finer's 
framework with regard to the domestic situation. Thus, it should be recognised that a case 
study might have the characteristics of more than one such situation. 
The developments that Finer associates with overt and latent crises have been recognised as 
increasing the opportunity to intervene. Approaches which focus upon the milita1y being 
dragged into politics because of the weaknesses of the political leadership and socio-economic 
problems have been defined as identifying the 'pull' of regime vulnerability. 160 These 
essentially argue that a regime might fall because it has too few friends rather than too many 
enemies. 161 For instance, David argued that where a regime is dependent on the military to 
govern it is more likely to experience a coup. 162 Fitch also argued that a lack of public supp01i 
for a regime influenced the likelihood of an intervention as the military risked unpopularity if 
it supp01ied an unpopular regime. 163 Similarly, scholars have argued that personnel may resent 
a dependence on the military to preserve the regime and domestic security. 164 For example, 
pers01mel might resent their police duties, as they believe these harm their self-image. 165 
Moreover, Sundhaussen argued that the likelihood of a coup increased if one had already been 
158 Fossum, Table 10, p237. 
159 Ibid., p234. With regard to Thompson see Thompson, "Explanations of the Military Coup," ppl56-7, quoted 
in Thompson, The Grievances, p45. 
160 Thompson, The Grievances, p5. 
161 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978), pp14-50, quoted in Farcau, p34. 
162 David, pl3. 
163 See Fitch, pplll-6 
164 See Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp419-20; Welch and Smith, pp237-8, and Needler, "Military 
Motivations," p70; and Luckham pp248-50. 
165 Welch and Smith, p237. 
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staged. This was because the crisis that motivated the first coup may remain and indeed be 
worsening under civilian control. 166 
Various factors might encourage the development of a domestic situation characteristic of a 
"latent" or "overt crisis." Most importantly, when the level of attachment to the regime is low 
relative to other regimes this can encourage people to believe that there is a viable alternative. 
This not only reduces the likelihood that a coup will be opposed, but also increases the 
probability the regime leaders will be actively challenged. A wide-range of factors can 
encourage this lack of attaclunent to the regime. Legitimacy is particularly relevant as this 
directly influences the level of regime attachment, and the willingness to directly challenge the 
authority of the civilian leaders. Apait from this legitimacy which I have already examined, 
William Kornhauser identified factors that encouraged a popular revolt similar to those that 
could encourage intervention. These were: an inept and incompetent government; a 
govermnent inaccessible to the general population; a corrupt and self-seeking government; and 
an arbitrary government that acted offhand and was indifferent to popular expectations. 167 
Though negative economic developments do not necessarily result in a coup, and interventions 
can occur when there is economic growth, research indicates that coups often occur during 
periods of economic trouble. 168 With regard to discontent arising despite economic growth, of 
direct relevance is the themy that a "revolutionary gap" can emerge between the expectations 
of people and the regime's capability to meet their demands. 169 O'Kane also wrote that 
economic backwardness was an inadequate explanation for coups because of their occurrence 
in relatively wealthy states. She proposed that the degree of reliance on the export of primary 
goods, and thus vulnerability to global changes, was more impmtant. 170 Moreover, economic 
166 Sundhaussen, p555. See also Londregan and Poole, p165-67. Robert Putnam also breifly assesses the impact 
of past interventions. See Robert Putnam, "Towards Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American 
Politics," World Politics XX, no.l (October 1967): pp83-110. 
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problems directly impact on the military's corporate self-interests as, apart from the impact on 
budgetaiy support, militaiy business interests can be violated. 171 
Apart from "ove1i" and "latent crises," there is the prospect of "power vacuums." Although 
today it is unlikely that there will be no strong political organisation or any political opinion, a 
fall in the authority of the civilian leaders can occur, and can facilitate a coup. This is 
particularly likely when a transition occurs, because of the wide-ranging societal changes that 
impact on the state's infrastructure, and can increase the level of civilian dependency and 
weaken regime attachment. This concurs with my argument that the level of regime 
attachment influences the ease with which the militaiy can intervene. The presence of 
organised political groups but absence of the political structures required to translate their 
demands into policy can also be problematic. This is especially relevant to transitions where 
existing structures have weakened or fallen and new structures are inadequate. Huntington 
argued that an intervention was part of the increasing mobilisation of all groups, which 
occurred with modernisation. If specialised political institutions, particularly modem parties, 
were inadequate goal transmitters for social groups, such groups became highly politicised as 
they pressured the political elite. This was because the intennediary institutions that would 
collect and contain popular demands were non-existent. Thus, each group utilised the means it 
had to fulfil its demands, the militaiy's being the coup. 172 
Finally, civilian dependence might arise from a regime's involvement in a war given combat is 
the ultimate test of the military. This dependence could facilitate a coup, but I have already 
argued that its impmtance is largely derived from its impact on the domestic situation. The 
level of dependence is based on the extent to which the regime is reliant on the expertise and 
resources of the military in executing its war aims, and on the magnitude of the war. The role 
of external threats in increasing civilian dependence, and thus military influence in politics, is 
shown by past wars. Huntington detailed the growing power of the American military during 
the Cold War, and Peter Karsten updated this argument to include the Vietnam and Gulf 
171 See Stepan, Rethi11king MilitmJJ Politics, pp82-6. For more information on the military-industrial complex see 
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wars. 173 Although it has been argued that the presence of a clear external threat reduces the 
likelihood of intervention, as the military is pre-occupied with countering this threat, the 
evidence I have presented indicates that coups do not cease with the out-break of war. 
Similarly, Farcau cast doubt on the argument that when the military was busy fighting a war it 
would not intervene. 174 
Military popularity 
I believe that the military's popularity is important because it directly impacts on the self-
perceptions of personnel, and on whether their mood is interventionist. Assuming that people 
distinguish between the regime and the military, the level of popularity to a large degree is 
dependent on the level of regime attachment and the domestic situation. This is because a low 
level of attachment, and negative domestic developments, can increase the popularity of the 
military relative to the regime. The perceived, rather than actual level of popularity is of key 
importance here. This perception is important, as the military is capable of misreading its 
popularity and thus feeling confident that its intervention will be widely supported, even when 
the opposite is true. Various factors may contribute to the military's popularity. Apart from the 
support the military might receive because of its close association with sovereignty, past 
victories, and emphasis on valued attributes like loyalty and bravery, a transition can have a 
positive impact. Assuming that the military's cohesion and expertise are not seriously eroded 
by a transition, at least initially, it may be seen as a source of strong and stable leadership. This 
perception is encouraged by a new regime that becomes unpopular because of its decisions, 
and its inability to deal with transitional problems. 
Scholars have also recognised the role that military popularity can play in facilitating 
intervention. N. Y efimov wrote that when society was unstable people looked to the military 
to restore order, this being "perfectly natural" given it was the best organised and equipped 
institution for such a task. 175 Indeed Thompson argued that a coup might be encouraged by 
opposition parties or disgruntled politicians. 176 Stepan also argued that the potential for 
intervention increased when the unity of the governing elite declined. This was because the 
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elite might seek to increase their power by deploying the military, and civilians may reject this 
and call for personnel to assist. 177 
Transitions and the opportunity 
Past transitions provide evidence of the role that the above situations can play in facilitating 
intervention. The impact of external threat perceptions on civil-military relations is shown to 
some extent by the Chinese experiences. Here the involvement of the new regime in the 
Korean war and the increased importance of the military led to moves to institutionalise 
professionalism, and led to civil-military conflict. 178 With regard to the domestic situation, of 
direct relevance is the increased power of the military in Yugoslavia as it began to disintegrate 
in 1991. The military became increasingly involved in politics as violence escalated and the 
civilian leaders proved to be incapable of preventing the disintegration of the state. 179 
Similarly, in the Philippines opposition to the new regime's actions toward Communist 
insurgents encouraged military discontent. 180 However the Philippines also shows that the 
national interest is often not important to coup conspirators. Y abes wrote that the threat of 
Communism was merely an excuse used by the leaders of the January 1987 revolt against the 
new regime. 181 She also wrote that officers sought to provoke instability for personal gain, and 
moves against the new regime were encouraged by a belief that civilian opposition would be 
minimal. 182 Finally, one of the consequences of widespread unpopularity, a fall in morale, is 
evident among the former Warsaw Treaty militaries. I have already described the impact of 
this in the context of the military' s mood. 
In summary, the opportunity to intervene is an important coup dete1minant but its influence 
does not match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. If the military is capable and is 
determined to intervene, civilian opposition will not deter it. When the militaiy is wary of 
causing civilian casualties, I believe that the level of regime attachment is the most important 
determinant of the opportunity. With regard to civilian dependence, the domestic situation is 
more impmiant than the dependency that occurs because of a war. Finally, the level of 
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popularity is closely associated with the above two factors, as the level of regime attachment 
and the regime's performance directly influence the level of military popularity. This 
popularity is imp01iant because of its close relationship to the military's mood. The 
opp01iunity is likely to be influenced by a transition. 
Intervention inhibitors 
Intervention inhibitors are those factors that might discourage the military from intervention. 
These inhibitors are primarily derived from various factors that can inhibit the development of 
the above coup detenninants. Thus, when these factors are strong the military can be denied 
the capacity to intervene and lack both the disposition and opportunity. Inhibitors should be 
assessed to more accurately explain why coups occur. This is because they can influence in 
various ways the likelihood of intervention, ways that otherwise could be neglected and could 
make it more difficult to understand why intervention does not occur. For instance, the 
military might have many grievances but these are effectively countered by the regime's 
moves to ensure that it lacks the capacity to intervene. This means that despite the military' s 
grievances a coup might not eventuate. A new regime might also employ various means to 
reduce the military's grievances or effectively counter them. Moreover, Finer argued that 
given the military's organisational attributes and control over weapons the key question was 
"not why this [the milita1y] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them."183 
This is indeed a question that should be addressed. Furthermore, the study of why the military 
does not intervene is often neglected; a problem recognised by scholars. 184 Because of this, I 
put f01ward here factors that might discourage intervention, and these are then examined in the 
context of the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene when I assess the case study. 
Acceptance of civilian supremacy 
The acceptance of civilian supremacy is the fundamental inhibitor. The military is very 
unlikely to stage a coup if the supremacy of the civilian leaders is accepted, and their removal 
is deemed intolerable. I believe that the military must clearly link its acceptance of civilian 
supremacy with the regime's leaders. This is important because it prevents the military from 
obeying the orders of civilians who are not the legitimate leaders, and who might use the 
institution to challenge the regime. I thus concur with Finer who argued that a "Firm 
183 Finer, p6. 
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acceptance of civilian supremacy" was the "truly effective check."185 The strength of this 
supremacy is associated with the level of attachment to the regime among personnel, and 
partly detennines whether or not the military has an interventionist disposition. This principle 
of civilian control according to Kemp and Hudlin has two components. First, an acceptance 
that the civilians are the policy makers while the military implements the policy, and second, 
that the civilian leaders decide where this line between policy-making and implementation is 
drawn. 186 
Factors behind the Acceptance of Civilian Supremacy: 
Lack of capacity to intervene 
As I believe that the capacity to intervene is a basic requirement for the military to stage a 
coup, it logically follows that when the institution does not perceive itself to have this capacity 
it will be less inclined to act. The type, cohesion, and number of coup participants relative to 
regime loyalists and the number of strategic sites will determine this capacity. Of importance 
too is whether the military perceives that opposition to a coup will be strong or weak, and thus 
the level of capacity it needs. To ensure that the military does not perceive itself capable of 
staging a successful coup the civilian leaders might increase the difficulty of seizing power. 
For instance the regime can ensure that loyal well-trained and equipped personnel are located 
close to strategic sites. Similarly, the regime can appoint scapegoats in order to prevent the 
militaiy from uniting against the civilian leaders. In extreme cases the regime might also 
eliminate the militaiy altogether if it fears that the threat it poses is greater than the security 
threats it is required to counter. 
Likewise, an interventionist mood may be countered. The regime might ensure that it is seen 
as respecting the military, perhaps through publicly acknowledging its importance. However 
in tandem with this, the military and public may be made aware of the militaiy' s inadequacies, 
especially as they apply to politics, the negative consequences of intervening, and the benefits 
of the regime's rule. More specifically, a new regime can seek to win over the milita1y by 
addressing the grievances it held under the previous regime. Though less important, secondary 
grievances can also be addressed. For instance, the regime can attempt to limit violations of 
the class and particularistic interests most associated with the military. 
185 Finer, p30. 
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Scholars have recognised the various methods that might be used by a regime to increase the 
difficulty of intervening. Of particular interest is the work of Farcau who has examined the 
means by which civilian leaders can counter a coup. Farcau argued that civilians might "divide 
and rule" through balancing competing military factions off against one another, and might 
ensure that powerful well-equipped units are deployed within the capital. 187 Civilians may 
reinforce this by securing strategic sites like communication centres, and by ensuring that such 
sites are replicated to increase the difficulty of seizing power. 188 Similarly, Farcau believed 
that civilian leaders could reduce the military's capacity by ensuring that no one unit was 
powerful enough to overthrow them. 189 Finally, Farcau argued that the milita1y might be 
eliminated altogether in extreme cases. 190 
Lack of disposition to intervene 
This is a very important and obvious inhibitor. A regime can ensure that it does not violate 
those interests that are considered vital by both the military and individual personnel. This 
might be achieved through gauging the opinion of the military and 'sweetening' controversial 
decisions. For instance, a regime might reduce military expenditure but accompany this with 
the promotion of leading officers. Allowing military involvement in the decision-making 
process on relevant issues may also discourage greater political participation through 
satisfying its needs and convincing it that supp01iing the regime best serves its interests. Less 
impmiantly, secondary motives might be c01mtered. For example, a regime might endeavour 
to ensure that its policies do not violate the class and particularistic interests held dearly by 
persom1el. 
Scholars have written of the ways that an interventionist disposition can be prevented. A civil-
militaiy relationship of cooperation is most important. Rebecca Schiff wrote that intervention 
is deterred by a concordance relationship between the military, political elite, and citizenry. 
Here an agreement is reached on the social composition of the officer corps, the political 
decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style (the military's 
external and internal manifestations).191 Both positive and negative incentives might also be 
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used to strengthen civilian supremacy, as they reinforce the attitude that it is in the military's 
interests to obey. 192 These incentives are particularly influential when persom1el decide 
whether it is in their own individual interest to intervene, as they directly affect them. Positive 
incentives are essentially those which keep personnel content. Such incentives include the 
provision of adequate support, and promotion of loyal officers. Farcau wrote that bribing key 
officers may ensure their loyalty, and Huntington argued that a new regime should ensure the 
living standards of personnel are adequate, provide new equipment, and identify the regime 
with the military by praising and supporting it. 193 Negative methods might be utilised too. 
These focus on forcing personnel into submission rather than winning support, and reinforce 
the risk of intervention. A regime may carefully monitor the military and act swiftly if plotting 
is discovered. Negative methods range from various types of punishments and sanctions, like 
demotions, and the reduction of budgetaiy support, to the more extreme execution of 
personnel. 194 
I believe that a combination of these incentives best discourages an interventionist disposition. 
This is because a reliance on positive incentives will require concessions that might not 
guarantee the milita1y's loyalty, and could encourage the militaiy to support the highest 
bidder. 195 A new regime may also be unable to supply positive incentives if it is co1lllllitted to 
rewarding other groups that facilitated the transition, and there are more pressing demands for 
resources. Solely using negative incentives can be problematic too. For instance, a military 
that continually experiences or is threatened with negative incentives might come to see 
intervention as a plausible alternative. A regime may also lack the capability to effectively 
police the militaiy, and may find morally repugnant extreme measures such as executions. 
Lack of oppo1iunity to intervene 
The lack of an oppo1iunity will discourage intervention, however I believe that its influence is 
limited if the military is determined to intervene. A regime needs to ensure that the level of 
regime attachment is strong, and that developments do not necessitate a dependency on the 
military. This is ultimately determined by the regime's perfmmance as the successful and 
legitimate exercising of power will restrict discontent. At the most basic level the regime 
needs to ensure that its right to govern and its decisions are accepted as legal, its actions are 
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not detested to the point that widespread demonstrations occur, and living conditions for the 
majority are not harsh enough to prompt support for intervention. This is particularly 
important for a new regime, as it must solidify its hold on power. With regard to the level of 
support for the military, the regime might also actively seek to guarantee that this is not 
superior to its own by limiting military glorification and ensuring that its prestige is not 
founded upon past political roles. Various scholars have recognised the methods by which a 
regime can limit the opportunity to intervene. Perlmutter wrote that a legitimate and popular 
regime "will be able to mobilize popular support and defeat any such move," and further wrote 
that a "stable, sustaining, and institutionalized civilian regime can hardly succumb to military 
pressure and rule." 196 Similarly, Farcau argued that "the only secure defense of a regime 
against a coup is the establishment of stable institutions and, more importantly, the kind of 
legitimacy in the eyes of its own people and the world that makes a coup impossible."197 
Perceived risk of intervention 
The perceived risk of intervention is derived from all three of the above factors and its 
importance will depend on the militaiy' s disposition and mood. This is because if the military 
is detennined to intervene, and its mood is such that it believes the risk of intervention can be 
successfully overcome, the military will still stage a coup regardless of the degree of 1isk. Of 
particular relevance are the negative incentives that I outlined above, as a new regime can use 
these to reinforce the risks of intervention. 
There are three broad risks that a coup force might face. The influence of all three of these 
risks depends on whether personnel believe that they have the capacity to successfully 
intervene and hold power. First, coup participants face the risk of failing to seize the necessaiy 
strategic sites and to defeat or intimidate opposition. This risk of failure might be higher 
during the i1m11ediate transitional period if euphoria over the previous regime's fall remains, 
and disillusionment in the new regime's perfo1mance is yet to develop. The potential for 
further problems increases when a coup occurs in a large modern state. This is because of the 
many strategic sites, and the large number of coup participants that are likely to be required. 
This also makes it more difficult to maintain secrecy and coordination. Second, there is the 
risk that the regime will punish the coup supporters that survived the failed intervention, and 
more generally the military as an institution. Here negative incentives are most relevant and a 
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new regime's punishment of coup leaders can range from demotion to death. Third, even if the 
coup leaders successfully seize power, the risk remains. If the military attempts to govern it 
might face challenges, and the threat remains that coup supporters will be punished once the 
military, or those that it placed in power, are removed. 
Various scholars have acknowledged the risk involved in staging a coup, and during the 
aftermath of a failed attempt. The failure of many coups clearly illustrates the risk involved. 
Gavin Kennedy found that 50 percent of 284 coups from 1945 to 1972 failed. 198 Nordlinger 
also argued that around 80 percent of all coup attempts were "fairly risky enterprises," and that 
there were many ,reasons why a coup might fail. These ranged from the conspirators being 
discovered plam1ing the intervention to their failure to seize strategic sites. 199 The risk of 
failure is increased by the many important decisions that need to be made by the coup leaders 
before intervening. For example, Farcau wrote that the timing, logistics, and teams deployed 
would all be vital in detennining the coup's outcome.200 
Moreover, the repercussions of staging a failed coup are senous, as with the problems a 
milita1y regime might experience. Harvey Kebschull argued that the price of failure was high 
and the punishment of coup participants was usually swift and harsh. 201 Apart from the risk 
that a coup will fail, scholars have argued that the military faces additional problems if it 
actually succeeds in taking power. These problems have already been examined in the context 
of the national interest. However I believe that this lisk is less imp01iant because the military 
might not seek to govern after a coup. 202 
Professionalism 
It has been argued that professionalism inhibits intervention, essentially because of the 
apolitical nature of the professional militaiy. Scholars have argued that this professionalism 
will prevent the militaiy from intervening in politics, even during periods of upheaval. 
However I believe that military professionalism is unlikely, at least alone, to inhibit 
intervention and that it might actually encourage a coup. 
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Various scholars have argued that professionalism inhibits a coup. Huntington is the chief 
proponent of this approach.203 Hm1tington believed that military professionalism had three key 
components. First, professional officers were experts in the "management of violence," which 
required their total concentration.204 Second, professional officers were responsible for the 
military security of society whose political agent, the state, determined their actions and they 
could only provide advice on security.205 Third, professional officers had a sense of 
corporateness, whereby they shared a sense of "organic unity" and perceived themselves as a 
group apart from laymen. 206 This meant that the professional military was "politically sterile 
and neutral."207 He further argued that professional values, beliefs, and attitudes "normally 
approximate a conservative military outlook that recognises the limited functions of the 
militaiy and is compatible with civilian control."208 More specifically, scholars have argued 
that professionalism inhibits the military from intervening during a transition. Porter argued 
that when a regime is m1dergoing a crisis, professionalism "will normally preclude military 
coups from occun-ing, or at least from succeeding, and limit army involvement in politics."209 
Likewise, Sestanovich wrote that the transitions from Communism are indicative of 
professionalism, discouraging intervention because it would violate "the veneer of 
independent professionalism. "210 
However I believe that professionalism is unlikely to inhibit a coup. Huntington was incorrect 
when he argued that the professional military was apolitical. I have already argued that no 
military is completely isolated from societal attitudes and that these impact on the attitudes of 
personnel. This ultimately ensures that the military is aware of political developments and that 
it will take a stance on such developments, particularly when personnel believe that the issues 
are of direct concern. Moreover the qualities Huntington attributed to professionalism can 
actually encourage intervention. A high level of expertise increases the capacity of the military 
to intervene, and increases the likelihood of the institution believing that it is superior to 
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civilians, thus encouraging an interventionist mood. Professional personnel may also feel that 
their distinct interests cannot be met by the regime, and that only they are competent to make 
decisions on issues that affect them. This mood is particularly important during transitions, as 
a new regime might be unpopular because of transitional problems. Professional personnel 
may also act if they believe civilians threaten their expertise. For instance, the level of training 
allowed by the regime's budgetary support might be perceived to be inadequate. Similarly, I 
associate a high level of corporateness with a high level of cohesion, which I have already 
argued increases the milita1y's capacity to intervene. Moreover, a high level of corporateness 
might encourage intervention by uniting personnel in their grievances and producing stronger 
bonds of loyalty to the militruy than the regime. Again this is particulru·ly relevant to 
transitions, as the new regime and civil-military relations might be weak. 
Many scholars have expressed doubt over the role of professionalism as an inhibitor. Of 
pru'ticulru· relevance is the work of Finer, given this thesis is based on a modified version of his 
framework. Finer argued that the "whole weakness" of Huntington's work was his "ve1y 
special definition of professionalism."211 Finer further argued that the nature of 
professionalism, as defined by Huntington, "often thrusts the military into collision with the 
civil authorities. "212 This ru·gument is based on three key points. First, the consciousness of 
personnel that they ru·e members of a profession might encourage them to perceive themselves 
as servants of the state rather than the government. Second, because personnel are specialists 
in their field they might feel that they alone are best able to make decisions relating to their 
institution. This might result in civil-milita1y conflict. Moreover, Finer wrote that the military 
might seek to establish security, as the institution perceives it, again raising the prospect of 
civil-military conflict.213 Third, persmmel may resent domestic duties, as they believe that 
their professional role is to ensure security from external threats. 214 
Other scholars also recogmse the weaknesses associated with the argument that 
professionalism inhibits intervention. Scholars have put forward broader definitions of 
professionalism wherein the militruy is not apolitical. For example, Stepan argued that a more 
recent development was 'new professionalism' and that militaries in Latin America have the 
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characteristics of this 'new professionalism.' These characteristics include a military having 
highly inteITelated political and military skills, an unrestricted scope of action, a domestic 
focus, and a stance on politics.215 Similarly, William Odom wrote that the apolitical military 
was a "mythical convention."216 Moreover, Huntington later accepted that in eve1y society 
military personnel became politically active in order to promote their interests.217 Nordlinger 
also wrote that the expertise of professional personnel was likely to increase their disdain for a 
regime that cam1ot govern effectively, and Perlmutter wrote that professionals strive to 
maximise their autonomy and that this might encourage political involvement.218 Perlmutter 
further argued that it took the sldll and knowledge of professional officers to stage a coup and 
replace the civilian authorities. 219 
External actors 
The role of external actors is examined last because their influence on the coup leaders can be 
very limited. This is particularly the case when the military is dete1mined to intervene despite 
the actions of external actors. For example, the coup leaders might feel that their interests are 
threatened to such a degree that their only alternative is intervention. Likewise, a military that 
is not dependent on an actor is unlikely to be decisively influenced. This is because an actor is 
less likely to be able to pressure the military, perhaps through threatening to reduce the supply 
of aims. David found that foreign involvement played a significant role in suppressing only 
3.9 percent of Third World coups from 1945 to mid-1985.220 Past coups illustrate the limited 
role that external actors can have. O'Kane acknowledges that coups have occurred even in 
states where foreign troops are based. 221 Similarly, David classified the US as having mixed 
success in deteITing Third World coups and its attempts to suppress them as being of limited 
success.222 Though the Soviet Union was more successful, coups still occuITed in Third World 
States that had pro-Soviet leaders.223 
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However external actors can influence whether a coup occurs and thus should be assessed. An 
external actor can play a key role if it makes clear to the military that it is strongly opposed to 
intervention, it is capable of acting swiftly and decisively, and the military that threatens 
intervention is dependent on the actor. If this is the case the militruy will have to balance 
carefully the risks of intervention, and might decide that the risk of retribution and the denial 
of support outweigh the benefits of intervention. Numerous options are available to the actor 
and will vary according to its willingness and ability to inhibit a coup. Most dramatically, an 
actor might deploy its forces to actively resist a coup. Less dramatically, an actor may warn 
the military that a coup will not be tolerated and punitive measures will be taken against coup 
forces. For instance, cooperation with the military might be reduced along with the provision 
of resources. The role of external actors is recognised by various scholru·s. Huntington ru·gued 
that actors can have a significru1t role in helping a democratic regime to consolidate.224 More 
specifically, O'Kane wrote that the presence of foreign troops can be an obstacle for coup 
plotters as they might actively support the regime. 225 
Transitions and inhibitors 
The potential role of inhibitors is evident when past transitions ru·e examined. First, the 
militaiy' s lack of capacity to intervene and its role in discouraging intervention is shown by 
the fall in cohesion experienced by former Warsaw Treaty militaries, and the inhibiting nature 
of this fall. Second, characteristics of a weak disposition are illustrated by former Warsaw 
Treaty militaries. This is because a strong interventionist mood was discouraged by a fall in 
morale among persom1el. Third, with regard to the opportunity it is evident from the former 
Warsaw Treaty states that negative developments, such as economic difficulties, can be 
experienced during transitions. However it is also evident that new regimes have actively 
sought to minimise their dependency on the military by removing its domestic roles.226 These 
all contributed to a high risk of intervening. With regard to professionalism, the former 
Warsaw Treaty states have attempted to increase the level of professionalism, as defined by 
Huntington. However there is little evidence to suggest that such moves have reduced the 
military's involvement in politics.227 Finally, the Philippines provides a dramatic example of 
an external actor playing a decisive role in preventing a successful coup. Here the US use of 
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aircraft to intimidate the coup forces was important in saving the new regime from a 1989 
coup. 
In summary, an acceptance of civilian supremacy by the military is the fundamental inhibitor 
to its intervention. This acceptance is primarily derived from a military's lack of capacity, 
disposition, and opportunity. These three factors then contribute to the high risk of 
intervening. An external actor can play an important role but this is rare, and I do not believe 
that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an effective inhibitor. 
Conclusions 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework to explain whether the military will intervene in 
politics; the coup being the intervention method studied. The framework presented by Finer is 
first outlined. Finer defined intervention by the military in politics as the substitution of its 
own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognised civilian authorities and argued 
that there were four levels of military intervention. These ranged from influencing the civilians 
to the removal of the civilian leaders. 
Finer believed that the capacity and propensity of the military to intervene, and the conditions 
within which the military operates, cause military intervention. Finer initially wrote that the 
militmy has political advantages over civilians before arguing that the disposition to intervene 
was encouraged by three broad motives and the military's mood. These motives are the 
manifest destiny, the belief that the military is the guardian of the national interest, the national 
interest itself, and sectional interests based on class, region, ethnicity, the military institution, 
or the individual. With regard to the military's mood, if it is one of "self-importance" or 
"morbidly high" the likelihood of intervention increases. Finer then argued that the 
opportunity to intervene shaped how, when, and possibly whether intervention occmred. Here 
the level of civilian dependency on the military because of a war and the domestic situation 
was important. Of particular relevance were those domestic situations where there was an 
"overt" or "latent" crisis, or "power vacuum." The level of "political culture" was also 
important as this influenced the level of military intervention. Finer labeled four levels of 
culture: mature; developed; low; and minimal. 
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To correct the wealmesses I believe exist in Finer's work I then presented a modified version 
of the above :framework:. This framework examines the capacity, disposition, and opportunity 
to intervene and factors that might inhibit a coup (see model 2). It should be noted, though, 
that the categories are not mutually exclusive. With regard to the capacity to intervene, I 
believe that the military must believe itself capable of defeating, or successfully intimidating, 
the regime's leaders and supporters, seizing strategic sites, and acting swiftly to guarantee 
surprise and minimise organised opposition. The likelihood of success is enhanced by the 
active participation of personnel who have leadership skills, are strategically located, and are 
effectively armed and trained. Similarly, the cohesion and number of active coup participants, 
relative to the regime's forces and the size of the state, influences the likelihood of the military 
perceiving itself capable of intervening. Transitions are relevant here because of their impact 
on the militaiy; they can reduce its capacity to intervene. 
Closely associated with the militaiy's capacity, and indeed disposition, is the military's mood. 
The self-perceptions of personnel will determine whether they believe that they have the 
capacity to intervene. Tlu·eats to the militaiy' s prestige have the potential to create discontent 
and this might arise during a transition. For instance, the new regime may be perceived as not 
aclmowledging the militaiy's capabilities. However I believe that Finer's work needs to be 
expanded to better take into account the influence that negative self-perceptions among 
persmmel have in discouraging coups. This is because when the self-perceptions of military 
personnel decline to the extent that they doubt their own capabilities, the threat of a coup can 
decline. This is the result of personnel lacking the confidence that they can successfully stage 
such a risky and complex operation. This is particularly important when they must risk civilian 
casualties, and widespread instability. Another vital detenninant is the militaiy' s disposition. 
Here I believe that there are two main types of factors: primary factors that are often 
influential in encouraging intervention and secondary factors that are less influential. 
Assessing the primaiy factors first, the violation of corporate interests is the most influential 
coup grievance. This is chiefly because such a violation directly impacts upon the military' s 
ability to successfully protect national security, its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, 
and the conditions under which personnel operate. Actions by a regime that may be perceived 
as tlu·eatening the militaiy range from grievances arising over the violation of autonomy to the 
presence of a rival armed force that threatens the military's monopoly over weaponry. Given 
the probability that a new regime will seek to ensure its supremacy and will make decisions in 
Model 2: Factors that can determine the lik.elihood of a coup 
Capacity to Intervene 
Fundamental requirements: 
Type of personnel 
Cohesion of coup forces 
Number of personnel 
Mood of military 
. . . 
Disposition to Intervene 
Corporate interests 




Manifest destiny/national interest 
External actors 
Opportunity to Intervene 
Increased civilian dependence on the military 
(Level of regime attachment) 
The impact of the domestic situation 
Overt crisis 
Latent crisis 




Acceptance of civilian supremacy 
Perceived incapacity to intervene 
Risks of intervening 
Lack of a disposition 







accordance with its own perceptions rather than those of the previous regime, the potential for 
corporate grievances is real. Individual interests are also very important and are closely 
associated with corporate interests. These again are likely to be impacted upon by a transition 
because of its potentially wide-ranging consequences. Perceived threats range from the lack of 
promotion opportunities to the threat of execution. 
Apart from these factors are those that often have a limited influence, the secondaiy factors. 
First, I doubt whether the class interest is important. Theoretically, intervention may result 
from the militaiy's class interest being threatened, and thus by a transition's impact on the 
class interest. However evidence indicates that the influence of the interest is limited and this 
approach is problematic. Second, I believe that the particularistic interest is unlikely to be 
influential. Nor do I believe that the third factor, the manifest destiny and national interest, are 
important. Finally, though external actors might influence whether a coup occurs, their role is 
unlikely to be significant. The limited role of these factors is evident when past coups are 
examined. 
The opportunity to intervene is another imp01iant coup detenninant .but its influence does not 
match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. This is because if the military is capable 
and detennined to intervene civilian opposition will not deter it. Assuming that the military is 
waiy of causing civilian casualties, I believe that the level of regime attachment is the most 
impmiant detenninant of the opportunity. I have used this te1m rather than "political culture" 
because it is less problematic. The level of regime attachment is imp01iant because the hazards 
associated with intervening against a popular regime will influence coup leaders. This is 
because militaiy leaders must be sure that troops will obey their orders and be willing to use 
violence against civilians. With regard to war and the domestic situation, both can facilitate 
intervention. However I believe that the influence of a war will be largely determined by its 
domestic impact, because of increased civilian dependence. The level of support is closely 
associated with the above two factors, because the level ofregime attachment and the regime's 
performance directly influence the level of military popularity. I believe that support of the 
militaiy is imp01iant because of its close relationship to the militaiy' s mood. All three factors 
are likely to be influenced by a transition. 
Finally, I believe that intervention might not occur if the above factors are countered by what I 
tenn intervention inhibitors. To accurately explain the occmTence of coups those factors that 
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can discourage intervention need to be carefully assessed. This is important because factors 
not only can encourage a coup but can also reduce the military' s capacity and disposition to 
intervene, and the opportunity to intervene. Thus, even though the military might have 
grievances a coup might not eventuate. Regardless of the military' s capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity, it will not stage a coup if the supremacy of the civilian leaders is accepted and 
their removal deemed intolerable. The acceptance of civilian supremacy is primarily derived 
from a militaiy's lack of capacity, disposition, and opportunity. Various methods might be 
used by a regime to ensure that these factors do not encourage intervention. For instance a 
regime might utilise positive and negative incentives. Inhibitors combine to dete1mine the risk 
of intervening. An external actor can play an important role but this is rare and I do not believe 
that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an effective inhibitor. Indeed I believe that 
the qualities Huntington attributed to professionals might actually encourage intervention. 
The following chapter introduces the case study. This chapter first summa1ises the models 
that have dominated the Western study of Soviet civil-military relations before describing 
Soviet civil-military relations from 1917 to 1985 in the context of these models. Following 
this, the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition are described. Here 
the structure of the civil-militaiy relationship, the militaiy's roles, the level of milita1y 
budgetaiy support, the level of popular support for the military and the closely related level of 
morale among pers01mel, the cohesion and size of the milita1y, and militaiy expertise are 
assessed. These characteristics are then examined in the context of the transition's first period, 
the decline of the Communist regime from 1985 to 1991. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SOVIET REGIME TRANSITION AND THE MILITARY: 1985-1991 
This chapter introduces the case study through examining the characteristics of the Soviet 
military before and during the transition from Communism. I shall first provide a brief 
overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars to examine the Soviet 
civil-military relationship, as these facilitate a better understanding of the relationship. 1 The 
relationship prior to the initiation of the transition by Gorbachev is then briefly described 
within the context of the dominant theoretical models. Following this, the characteristics of 
the Soviet military on the eve of the transition are described. Here the structure of the civil-
militmy relationship, the military's roles, the level of military budgetary support, the level of 
popular support for the military and the closely related level of morale among personnel, the 
cohesion and size of the military, and militmy expertise are assessed. These characteristics are 
then examined in the context of the transition's first phase, essentially the decline of the 
Communist regime from 1985 to 1991. Therefore, hypothesis one, regime transitions can have 
the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is evaluated here in the context of the 
1985 to 1991 period. 
Theoretical Overview 
To better understand developments in the Soviet civil-military relationship the maJor 
theoretical models of Western scholars are first presented in chronological order. Though I do 
not examine the structure of the civil-military relationship in exact accordance with these 
models, outlining the history of civil-military interaction in the context of these models is 
important. This is because they have shaped the study of this interaction. The three dominant 
models described here are the conflict, participatory, and symbiotic models. Various scholars 
have recognised these three models, and their dominance over the Western study of Soviet 
civil-military relations. 2 
1 When referring to the civil-military relationship in this chapter it is within the context of the relationship 
between the Communist party leadership and the military leadership. Similarly, when I refer to the Communist 
regime it relates to the regime led by the Communist party. 
2 See Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," 
in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Milita,y Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, ed. 
Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd, 1982), p232; 
William Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," Problems of Communism XXXIX, no.3 (May-June 1990): 
pp69-70; Timothy Colton, "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union," in Soldiers And The 
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Conflict model 
Roman K.olkowicz (1967) argued that conflict within the Soviet civil-military relationship 
was inevitable. K.olkowicz argued that the relationship was cyclical and repetitive as rises and 
falls occurred in the party's authority. He further argued that "the relationship between the 
Communist Party and the Soviet military is essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a 
perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state. "3 "The contradictoriness and 
incompatibility of certain basic characteristics of the military and the features that the Party 
would have it exhibit" encouraged this conflict (see table 1).4 K.olkowicz argued that the 
incompatibility of the party and military led to a range of conflicts, and that the party 
employed various methods to control the military. First, positive measures were used which 
involved the granting of socioeconomic privileges, political cooptation and agreement to 
military demands. Second, prophylactic measures were used which entailed the indoctrination 
and supervision of persom1el. Third, negative measures were used, including intimidation and 
coercion.5 
Table 1: Contradictory and Incompatible Military and Party Traits According to Kolkowicz 
Natural Militmy Traits Traits Desired by the Party 
Elitism Egalitarianism 
Professional autonomy Subordination to ideology 
Nationalism Proletarian internationalism 
Detachment from society Involvement with society 
Heroic symbolism· Anonymity 
Source: Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Milita,y and the Co111m1111ist Party, p21 
Apaii from the dynamics of the civil-military relationship, Kolk:owicz described the pa1iy's 
control of the military and the developments_in the relationship within the context of conflict.6 
He then examined the impact of technology on the relationship and the military's role in 
Soviet State: Civil-Militmy Relations From Brezhnev To Gorbachev ed. Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), ppl2-4; and Thomas Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Militmy 
Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p25. 
3 Kolkowicz, Soviet Milita,y and the Co1111111111ist Party A Westview Encore Edition (Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1985), pl 1, Appendix B, pp370-l. 
4 Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p21. See also pp20-8. 
5 Ibid., pp28-30. 
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politics.7 With regard to this political role, Kolkowicz argued that the military's freedom was 
increasing. Various factors contributed to the military's increased freedom. These ranged 
from the transformation of the officer corps into a "group of more sophisticated, self-assured 
young specialists," to the importance of "mutual understanding" because of the Soviet 
Union's extensive political-military commitments.8 Kolkowicz then argued that party-military 
tension also increased. He attributed this tension to the military's dissatisfaction "with those 
detente-motivated foreign policies and consumer-oriented domestic policies that threaten its , 
basic institutional interests."9 Kolkowicz later wrote that although a coup was unlikely, party 
dependence on the military was increasing, and the military could play the leading political 
role. This could occur if there was a "systemic crisis of legitimacy, succession, internal 
disruptions, or external threat." 10 
Symbiotic model 
William Odom (1973) emphasised civil-military cooperation and the lack of a military threat 
to civilian supremacy. Odom questioned the conflict model and presented a model Thomas 
Nicholas labelled the "symbiotic model."' 1 Odom wrote that although some civil-military 
disagreements arose they were "against a background of broad pragmatic consensus." 12 
Moreover Odom questioned the assumptions made ·by Kolkowicz. Odom did not believe that 
the military was an interest group, and questioned whether party and military values 
differed. 13 He further conceptualised the military on the basis of his assumption that "the 
marshals and generals are left to act as executants--executants of only a few aspects of the 
vast and complex process required by the Soviet military posture." 14 Odom believed that the 
military was an administrative arm of the party rather than a separate and competing 
institution, the party-military relationship had symbiotic aspects in domestic politics, and the 
military was a political institution. 15 Even if the military did become involved in a political 
power struggle, he argued that it would not be a "serious contender for power" because it 
6 Ibid., pp36-306. 
7 Ibid., pp309-49. 
8 Ibid., p345. 
9 Ibid., p348. 
1° Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention," p134. 
11 Nichols, Sacred Cause, p28. 
12 Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique" in Civil-Militmy Relations in Communist Systems. ed. 
Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Ltd, 1978), p32. See also p33. 
13 Nichols, Sacred Cause, pp28-9. 
14 Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p44. 
15 Ibid., pp41-4. 
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would not be united. 16 Odom concluded that the military had a subordinated role and would 
refrain from taking power "even when that power falls temporarily within reach during a 
succession strnggle." 17 
Participatory model 
Timothy Colton (1979) argued that the civil-military relationship was one of both conflict and 
cooperation, but even during the worst conflict members of the party and military continued 
to cooperate. Colton believed that military participation in politics had two distinct 
dimensions, the scope of issues concerning the military, and the means it used in politics. 18 
This model emphasised the inter-action between party and military. Although neither gained 
absolute domination, the sovereign power of the party was accepted. Colton thus downplayed 
the level of conflict between the party and military. 19 Colton further wrote that the Main 
Political Administration (MPA) was the unrivalled "party's military voice," though he 
questioned it's ability to effectively monitor the military. This was because of the 
administration's close relationship with the military.20 
With regard to the military's political role, Colton argued that the military's role was limited 
to intramilitary issues, or to providing the civilian leadership with expert advice regarding 
institutional questions. He fmiher argued that "there has been no movement in the direction of 
military rule."21 Colton believed that only on internal military issues and through official 
prerogatives and sanctions did most officers participate in politics, and no officers used 
force. 22 To explain the military's political quiescence, Colton first argued that those factors 
that might encourage greater participation in politics, such as prior military interventions, did 
not apply to the Soviet Union.23 Colton then argued that political intervention was unlikely. 
This was because "party policies on most institutional issues and at most times have indeed 
been consistent with the apparent preferences of most officers."24 For instance, the ideological 
16 Ibid., p46. 
17 lbid. 
18 Colton, Commissars, pp231-49. 
19 lbid., pp221-78. 
20 Ibid., pp9, 85-112. Colton wrote that the MP A's role changed from one of political control over the military to 
one of administration and control. The specific duties of the MPA were described as the political education of 
the army and mobilising personnel. Colton, Commissars, pp37-42, 68-81. However other scholars wrote of the 
MP A primarily in the context of its political control. See Kolkowicz, Soviet Milita,y, pp84-6. 
21 Colton, Commissars, p249. 
22 Ibid., Figure 2, p243. 
23 Ibid., pp250-2. 
24 Ibid., p259. 
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beliefs of officers, their material interests, their status interests, and their professional interests 
were maintained and promoted by the party.25 
In summary, three theoretical models dominated the Western study of Soviet civil-military 
relations. First, the conflict model stressed the conflict prone nature of the civil-military 
relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, the symbiotic model 
emphasised civil-military cooperation and claimed that the party's supremacy was strong. 
Finally, according to the paiiicipatory model the relationship was one of conflict and 
cooperation, but party supremacy was not threatened. 
Soviet Civil-Military Relations: 1917-1985 
The Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. Though originally distrustful of a standing 
professional a1my, this was overcome by the need during the civil war to defeat the White 
am1ies. Vladimir Lenin signed the decree that established the Red Army in January 1918, to 
be led by Leon Trotsky, the Commissar for War. Early controversies included whether the 
anny should be truly revolutionary and should be based on ideology, or a professional army 
independent from ideology. The am1y ultimately came to have characteristics of both, with 
the use of former Imperial anny officers called 'military specialists. ' 26 Civil-military relations 
were further shaped by the implementation of the commissar system. The first party 
organisation for political work in the military was the Military Organisation of the Central 
Committee. Commissars, or political officers, were widely deployed with the introduction of 
'military specialists,' and their -role was formalised as "the direct political organ of Soviet 
power in the aimy" in April 1918. 27 The following year dual command was established 
whereby commissars counter-signed orders, and in May 1919 the MPA was established. The 
commissar system was controversial, as support and opposition to the system arose. 28 Colton 
wrote that the system had weaknesses, as the loyalty of commissars was not beyond doubt. 29 
Indeed Kolkowicz argued that from the civil war the potential for civil-military tension arose, 
as the Communist military personnel had "tasted power and status."30 Additional moves to 
25 lbid., pp259-75. 
26 See Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, pp38-47. With regard to 'military specialists' see Erickson, Soviet High 
Command, p40. 
27 Kolkowicz, Soviet Milita,y, p82. 
28 See Kolkowicz, Soviet Mi/ita,y, pp81-2. 
29 Colton, Commissars, pp38-9. 
3° Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p43. 
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ensure party control occurred after the civil war. The subordination of the MP A to the party 
was strengthened and its role of controlling the military reaffirmed. 
After the death of Lenin in 1924, civil-military relations were dominated by the moves of 
Joseph Stalin to assert his authority. Key figures like Trotsky were replaced and political 
controls increased, with limited military opposition. 31 For instance, in May 1927 it was 
directed that political disputes between commanders and political assistants be refe1Ted to 
higher political rather than military organs. By the late 1920s branch departments of the MP A 
had been established in air, naval, and armoured units. Party control was further increased 
during the 1930s. By January 1934, over 25 percent of personnel were party members, and the 
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) reinforced paiiy control.32 Odom argued 
that such developments did not lead to conflict because the divisions into "purely a uniformed 
faction versus others" did not arise. 33 
However the most dramatic developments during the 1930s were the purges. AITests began in 
1936 and after a reshuffle of the high command in early 1937 the 'great purge' began. Those 
arrested were accused of belonging to an "intra-am1y opposition group."34 However both the 
military and paiiy control methods were affected as the MPA was also ruthlessly purged. 35 
Colton argued that there were no stark divisions between "an a1my seeking autonomy and a 
Paiiy seeking hegemony and control."36 Opposition again was minimal, as officers remained 
loyal. 37 In addition, dual command was re-established in May 1937. By 1938 Nichols argued 
that "there was no one who could even begin to challenge Stalin's military authority on any 
grounds. "38 After the purges the repression of the military continued but conciliatory moves, 
such as those aimed at encouraging professionalism, were made.39 According to Kolkowicz, 
the purge and earlier developments illustrated "the cyclical pattern of Party-military 
31 With regard to the limited nature of opposition see.Colton, Commissars, p46. 
32 With regard to party membership see Colton, Commissars, Table 2, pl 7. For information on the establishment 
of the NKVD see Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp375-8. 
33 William Odom, "Smashing an Icon: The Soviet Military Today," The National Interest, no vol. or no., (Fall 
1990): pp63-4. 
34 "O tak nazyvaernoi 'vnutriarmeiskoi oppozitsii' 1928 goda," Izvestiia TsK KPSS, March 1991, p85, quoted in 
Nichols, Sacred Cause, p47. 
35 See Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp504-6; and Colton, Commissars, ppl36-51. 
36 Colton, "Perspectives," p 119. 
37 See Colton, Commissars, ppl39, 150-1, 276-7. 
38 Nichols, Sacred Cause, p48. 
39 For information on conciliatory moves see Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, pp62-4. 
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relations." This was because the military had grown in influence during Stalin's moves to 
industrialise the Soviet Union and the party's hegemony thus needed to be reasserted. 40 
The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 impacted directly upon the civil-military 
relationship. Initially party control was stressed as moves were made, such as the 
reinstatement of the dual command system removed in 1940, to strengthen its authority over 
the military. Control was then loosened again to raise the morale of personnel.41 However as 
the external threat receded party control was re-emphasised and by 1944 to 1945 the party-
political organs again were active. Indeed Kolkowicz argued that "the officer corps was 
beginning once more to feel the heavy hand of the dictator. "42 Kolkowicz further argued that 
relations between commissars and commanders were often tense during the war, whereas 
Colton wrote of their cooperation. 43 
Stalin dominated civil-military relations until his death in 1953, after which Nikita 
Khrnshchev took power. According to Kolkowicz, the cycle of civil-military relations 
continued during this period. This involved party control increasing as threats declined, but as 
problems developed moves were taken to reconcile with officers.44 After Germany's defeat 
Stalin took steps to reinforce his authority. These included the demotion of Marshal Georgii 
Zhukov, Stalin's chief military aide. However during Stalin's last years conciliatory moves 
were made, which Kolkowicz argued occurred to ensure its neutrality during a forthcoming 
purge.45 Stalin's death impacted greatly upon the civil-military relationship given his wide-
ranging powers. Although Khrushchev might have sought to have a similar degree of control 
over the military, Nichols argued that he was not willing to use Stalin's methods, thus losing 
control of the institution. 46 In turn, Kolkowicz argued that "the military's own interests and 
values emerged into the open."47 
Of particular interest here is the rise and fall of Zhukov, as much debate has occurred over his 
swift removal. By 1955, Zhukov was the Minister of Defence, and the following year he 
became the first career officer to sit on the Presidium or Politburo. Zhukov's influence further 
40 Ibid., p56. See also pp57-61. 
41 Ibid., pp64-8. 
42 Ibid., p70. See also pp7 l-5. 
43 Ibid., pp229-231; and Colton, Commissars, ppl52-74. 
44 Kolkowicz, Soviet Military, p71. Kolkowicz summarised this relationship pattern in Appendix B, pp3 70-71. 
45 Ibid., p76. 
46 Nichols, Sacred Cause, p58. 
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increased when he actively supported Khrushchev against his opponents when they attempted 
to remove the General Secretary from office in June 1957.48 However the following October 
Zhukov was removed. Kolkowicz explained the dramatic fall of Zhukov in the context of 
civil-military conflict, claiming he challenged the powerful role of political controls in the 
military.49 Contrasting this, Colton de-emphasised civil-military conflict and rejected the 
party claims against Zhukov, one being that the Marshal sought to remove the party from 
power. 50 
From the removal of Zhukov to his own fall, Khrushchev's actions set the stage for civil-
military relations. Kolkowicz wrote that after Zhukov's fall the military "again had to submit 
to the dreary catechisms of Marxism-Leninism," and that reform of the party control structure 
was aimed at strengthening party supremacy. 51 Kolkowicz argued that in turn military 
discontent arose. However Colton argued that evidence suggested there was little direct 
opposition to the Marshal's removal, and that the party control organs and milita1y cooperated 
after the incident. 52 During his final years Khrushchev sought to reform the military by 
reducing the conventional forces in accordance with the importance he placed on missile 
forces. 53 Kolkowicz argued that these moves, strengthened by discontent over issues like the 
role of the political organs, encouraged greater civil-military tension. 54 Indeed he wrote that 
the military might have placed direct or indirect pressure for Khrushchev to be removed in 
October 1964. 55 However Colton again downplayed civil-military conflict. Colton argued that 
the military and MPA took a similar stance on Khrushchev.56 Odom also rejected the notion 
that the civil-military relationship was a "real or potential cleavage in the Soviet political 
system" after outlining the Khrushchev period.57 
The accession of Leonid Brezhnev is widely recognised to have led to a reduction in civil-
militaiy tensions, at least initially. Colton wrote that Khrushchev's fall removed "a thorn in 
the military's flesh," and even Kolkowicz accepted that the military "quietly tolerated" initial 
47 Kolkowicz, Soviet MilitmJ1, p344. 
48 See Colton, Commissars, ppl 76-8. 
49 Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, pp120-35. 
5° Colton, Commissars, ppl 75-95. 
51 Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p135. See also pl38. 
52 Ibid., pp142-5; and Colton, Commissars, pp193-5. 
53 See Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, ppl50-3. 
54 Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, ppl50-73, 282-300. 
55 Ibid., p289. 
56 Colton, Commissars, pp200, 207. 
57 Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p34. 
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statements ensuring continuity in domestic policies by the new leadership.58 Closer relations 
were encouraged by the greater efforts made by the party to promote and protect the military's 
institutional interests. Thus, civil-military relations from the second half of the 1960s to the 
first half of the 1970s have been characterised as a "Golden Age" during which party 
decisions favoured the military. 59 Zhukov was returned to his post as Chief of the General 
Staff, budgetary support was high, and the military enjoyed much influence over the making 
of national security policy.60 However relations changed as the party placed less emphasis on 
external security threats and actively sought to strengthen its control during the second half of 
the 1970s. For example, Dmitrii Ustinov, who had been more sympathetic to Brezhnev's 
foreign policies, replaced Defence Minister Andrei Grechko in 1976.61 Odom though, in 
1978, argued that military intervention was hardly likely and Colton the following year wrote 
that relations were "remarkably free of direct conflict."62 
During Brezhnev's final years and the years immediately prior to Gorbachev's access10n 
civil-military tensions grew as the party's support of the military fell, at least relative to the 
"golden age." However there is disagreement over the severity of these tensions. Colton 
argued that from the mid-1960s to early 1980s the relationship was one of "relative stability 
and hannony."63 Even Kolkowicz in 1982 argued that the military and party leaders had 
reached a "workable modus vivendi."64 Though the invasion of Afghanistan was not a source 
of civil-military conflict evidence indicates that tensions did increase, at least to some 
degree. 65 This is shown by the conflict between the party and Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief 
of the General Staff. Ogarkov openly opposed the party and expressed concern that the 
military's strength was threatened. This encouraged the party to strengthen its control over the 
military through moving to ensure that MP A officers were loyal to the party. 66 The accession 
of Iurii Andropov as General Secretary with the death of Brezhnev in November 1982 had 
58 Colton, "Perspectives," p25; and Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p301. See also Nichols, Sacred Cause, p92. 
59 Colton, "Perspectives," p25. Italics are original. See also p26. 
60 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, pp93-100. 
61 See Bruce Parrott, in "Political Change and Civ-il-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, pp54-62; 
Nichols, Sacred Cause, ppl 10-3; and Jeremy Azrael, "The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High 
Command, 1976-1986," in Civil-Militmy Relations in the Soviet Union, Russian and Soviet Hist01y 1500-1991 
ed. Alexander Dallin (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1992), ppl67-72. 
62 Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p48; and Colton, Commissars, p285. 
63 Colton, "Civil-Military Relations In The Mid-1980s," in The Gorbachev Era, ed. Alexander Dallin and 
Condoleeza Rice (Stanford, California: Stanford Alumni Association, 1987), p 110. 
64 Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory," p246. Italics are original. 
65 With regard to the Afghanistan invasion and civil-military relations see Bruce Porter, "The Military Abroad: 
Internal Consequences of External, Expansion," in Colton and Gustafson, pp305-16. More generally, with regard 
to civil-military tensions from 1980 to 1984 see Parrott, "Political Change," p62. 
66 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, ppl 19-24; and Azrael, pp 172-83. 
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little impact on this relationship as strains continued to be evident. Andropov continued to 
place less emphasis on the military than enjoyed during the "golden age" and he sought to 
further strengthen the party's position. With the death of Andropov in Febrnary 1984 
Konstantin Chernenko took power and was not swayed by military concerns, such as the 
emphasis that Ogarkov placed on the US threat. Thus, tensions remained evident during 
Chernenko's brief tenure. The most dramatic development was the re-assignment of Ogarkov 
in September 1984. 67 Chernenko died in February 1985, and scholars disagree over the 
military's influence when Gorbachev took power in March.68 
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to authoritatively assess the validity of the above 
models but I shall comment on them briefly. Before this however, it must first be recognised 
that because of the complexity of Soviet civil-military relations the models cannot accurately 
explain eve1y development. After examining civil-military relations during the 1920s, Dale 
Herspring argued that all three models had weaknesses and strengths. For instance, the 
conflict model better explained the tensions that developed between patiy officials and 
'military specialists.' However the participatmy model better explained the initial debate over 
whether a standing anny or militia be established. This was because the militaiy and party 
ultimately cooperated but tensions did arise.69 Sec01id, the time period within which the model 
was first presented must be considered, because it will have been influenced by the state of 
the civil-military relationship at that time. This is clearly shown by the conflict and symbiotic 
models. The conflict model was published when the purge and Zhukov's fall were still 
relatively recent, whereas the symbiotic model was published during the "golden age." 
I believe that the participato1y model appears to best explain developments in the Soviet civil-
military relationship from 1917 to 1985. This is primarily because Colton clearly wrote of the 
various degrees of military involvement in politics, and those factors that influenced its 
political quiescence. Second, many of his arguments are particularly relevant in light of the 
transition. These are examined when I asses;, the 1985 to 1991 period. Third, the relationship 
was not one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. Finally, various scholars who have 
examined Soviet civil-military relations in greater depth concluded that the model was the 
67 For information on the civil-military relationship under Andropov and Chernenko see Azrael, pp188-99; and 
Parrott, pp69-7 5. 
68 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, pl28; and Parrott, p75. 
69 Dale Herspring, Russian Civil-Militmy Relations (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1996), pp55-71, 21-36. See also pp3-20, 37-54. 
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most valid of the three. For example, Thane Gustafson argued that the model considered a 
broader range of civil-military dealings, distinguished between civil-military issues, and 
between the variations of military involvement and participation.70 
On the Eve of Transition: 1985 
I shall now examine the military on the eve of the transition initiated by Gorbachev. This 
study is in accordance with the framework I presented in the introduction. The structure of the 
Soviet civil-military relationship, and the military's roles are first examined. The above 
models that dominated the study of Soviet civil-military relations are further assessed in the 
context of civil-military developments during the transition. However the structure of the 
relationship is assessed via the penetration model I outline below. This is because I believe 
that this model best facilitates an accurate assessment of the structure of the relationship. The 
level of budgetary support for the milita1y, the public perception of the military, and the 
closely related morale of the persmmel are then examined. Finally, the militaiy's size and 
cohesion, and the expertise of persmmel are assessed. 
Structure of the civil-military relationship 
To examine the structure of the Soviet civil-military relationship I shall use the penetration 
model put forward by Nordlinger. According to this model "Civilian governors obtain loyalty 
and obedience by penetrating the arn1ed forces with political ideas (if not fully developed 
ideologies) and political persom1el."71 These political ideas were promoted throughout the 
military, and "The resulting congruity between the political ideas of civilians and officers 
consequently removes a potential source of conflict between them."72 Political confo1mity is 
also rewarded because political ideas are a significant determinant of promotion.73 Nordlinger 
fmiher argued that the regime made "extensive use of controls, surveillance, and 
ptmishment. "74 These controls involved the deployment of political officers throughout the 
military. Their political responsibilities often take precedence over military officers, and 
might include the use of a secret police force along with its informers too.75 
70 Thane Gustafson, "Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, p336. 
See also pp334-40. 






Nordlinger argued that this model of civil-military relations was very powerful. This was 
because in "its fully developed form" it approximated with a "congruence of civilian and 
military beliefs."76 Even "where conflicts of political ideas and interests do arise, the civilians 
enjoy extensive resources for surveillance and control."77 However there are two potential 
problems that might hinder the establishment of this model. First, Nordlinger argued that the 
actual implementation of the model can be "inordinately risky," though this problem "loses 
much of its significance under the unusual circumstances of a weak, newly created army."78 
Second, the regime must have a "single locus of power" rather than "competing centres of 
power." This was because the model required that the military be penetrated by "a single set 
of political ideas and controls," or military divisions and internal conflict would be 
encouraged. 79 
This model is used to examine the structure of the Soviet civil-military structure because it 
avoids some of the problems that are apparent when one assesses the three Soviet models. The 
model is not relevant sorely to the study of the Soviet Union like the previous models but is 
applicable to the study of other Communist civil-military relations, as they all have the 
characteristics of this model. Indeed Nordlinger wrote, "it is among the Communist regimes 
that the penetration model has been applied in its most fully developed form."80 This also 
helps the model accommodate transitional developments. This is because it is not premised on 
a specific group governing, a particularly important point because of the decline of the 
Communist party. 
In addition, I believe that the key assumptions of the penetration model are correct. Most 
importantly, the model recognises that the characteristics of the regime will influence the 
civilian controls that can be successfully implemented. This is particularly relevant to the 
study of regime transitions and the military because a transition in the regime will impact on 
the military. Moreover the Soviet Union cQnforms with Nordlinger's argument that a weak 
military is more susceptible to penetration. Similarly, I believe that Nordlinger is correct, at 
least within the context of the Communist transitions, to argue that the model is very powerful 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p17. 
78 Ibid. See also pl 8. 
79 Ibid., p18. 
80 Ibid., p15. See also pp17-8. 
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and that a coup, particularly a successful one, in a state that has fully implemented the 
structure is unlikely. Only the military in Romania used force to actively support the civilian 
initiated transition. 81 Finally, though Nordlinger argued that in its "fully developed form" it 
approximates with a "congruence of civilian military beliefs," he then wrote that conflict 
could arise. As I believe both cooperation and conflict occurred between the Communist party 
and Soviet military, this is in line with my support of the participatory model. 
Soviet civil-military relations were dominated by the interaction that occurred between the 
Communist paiiy and the military, and clearly had many of the characteristics of the 
penetration model. This is primarily shown by the penetration of the military by the 
Communist party that ensured its supremacy until the party's power monopoly had declined, 
again in line with Nordlinger's argument that a "single locus of power" was necessary. The 
party clearly made extensive use of control methods that involved the penetration of the 
military. First, the Communist ideology was widely promoted throughout the military. The 
MP A was the main political organ used to ensure party control, and although Colto~ doubted 
its effectiveness to monitor the military it is characteristic of a penetration model (see table 2). 
The administration carried out the political education of the army. Its principal focus was the 
promotion of Communism among rank-and-file personnel and NCOs. 82 The MPA was 
subordinate to both the Ministry of Defence and the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party. On average, it appears that military personnel spent 8.6 hours a week attending classes 
on political subjects and on ideological indoctrination, though its effectiveness is doubtful. 83 
Second, the promotion of party ·membership is evident. In 1977, over 90 percent of officers 
belonged to the party or the K.omsomol, the Young Communist League that was primarily 
aimed at rank and file personnel and NCOs. 84 Indeed at the beginning of Gorbachev' s rein, 78 
percent of the officer corps and 100 percent of those higher-ranked belonged to the party. 85 
Moreover military personnel belonged to the party hierarchy. From 1925 to 1976 the military 
made up on average 7.4 percent of the Central Committee, the party's sovereign body 
81 See Barany, Table 1, p603. 
82 Krnsnaia Zvezda, 27 October 1977, n.p., quoted in Colton, Commissars, pp58-112. 
83 Richard Gabriel, The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier, Contributions In Political 
Science Number 44 (Westpo11: Greenwood Press, 1980), pl 90. 
84 Colton, Commissars, Table 6, p49. See also pp16-23, 48-57. 
85 Robert Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization," 
AFS 19, no. 1 (Fall 1992): p28. 
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between party congresses. 86 In 1978, 25 percent of Politburo members had military-related 
work experience and in 1981, 7 military personnel belonged to the regional party bodies. 87 
The military also appears to have influenced politics. Kolkowicz argued that the military 
helped Khrushchev take power, and Bruce Parrott argued that the military later helped 
Brezhnev consolidate his power.88 However in February 1985 the military had neither a 
civilian or professional military representative within the Politburo, and Parrott argued that it 
had little influence over the successions of either Chernenko or Gorbachev. 89 
Table 2: The Roles of the MPA 1986 
Roles of Main Political Administration (MPA) in 1986 
( dual standing as Party Central Committee department and agency of the Ministry of 
Defence) 
• debate and codify ideological/philosophical principles in Soviet doctrine (philosophy of 
war and ideological principles of international politics 
• oversee ideological education of both enlisted men and officers 
• probably some role in military personnel decisions 
Source: Rice, "The Development of Soviet Military Power," in The Gorbachev Era, Figure 2, pl25 
Third, political considerations could influence promotions and demotions. This is illustrated 
' by the political considerations that appear to have influenced Brezhnev's decision to promote 
Ogarkov to the position of Chief of the General Staff, and is indicative of a positive incentive 
being utilised to promote loyalty. The Marshal was believed to be more sympathetic to the 
views of the party leaders.90 The same also applies to the removal of high-ranking officers 
from positions because the party doubted their loyalty. This is again shown by Ogarkov's 
career. Here scholars like Jeremy Azrael have strongly argued that his removal was 
encouraged by party fears that it would not be able to prevent the controversial Marshal from 
being promoted to replace Ustinov, whose health was failing.91 Former officers also wrote of 
the influence that the party could have in determining promotions at lower levels.92 
86 Colton, Commissars, Table 5, p27. 
87 PatTott, pp75-6. With regard to the regional bodies see Parrott, Table 2.1, p76. 
88 Kolkowicz, Soviet Milita,y, pp 105-14; and Parrott, pp5 l-4. 
89 Parrott, pp72-3, 75. 
90 Parrott, p60. See also Azrael, pp 172-4. 
91 Azrael, pp34-5. See also Nichols, Sacred Cause, p 123; and Parrott, p74. 
92 Viktor Suvorov, Inside The Soviet Army, forward by General Sir John Hackett (London: Grafton Books, 
1984), p405. 
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Fourth, it is clear that the party deployed secret police to reinforce its control. This might be 
tern1ed a negative incentive. Kolkowicz, Odom, and Colton all recognised that the secret 
police were active in the Soviet military.93 Secret police were first deployed in the military in 
1918 and remained active throughout the Soviet period. This was because the KGB placed 
personnel within the military who belonged to their Special Departments (SDs), or Osobye 
otdely. A key task of these SDs was the political surveillance of the military. According to 
Soviet law this involved them investigating cases of treason, ten-orism, anti-Soviet agitation 
and propaganda, and other state crimes involving the military.94 The SDs were also alleged to 
have participated in Zhukov's fall. 95 In 1984 it was estimated that there was one SD officer 
for every 600 men. 96 This excludes the number of agents and informants, in the 1960s it was 
estimated that 3 percent of ground and air personnel were informants. 97 Debate smrnunds the 
actual effectiveness of the KGB during the Soviet period. Colton argued that the role of the 
secret police declined after Stalin as its power and size fell. Kolkowicz likewise argued that 
the reduction of the secret police encouraged "significant departures from the oppressive 
conditions of the past." 98 Contrasting this, Knight argued that the KGB played a major role in 
maintaining party control.99 The accounts of fonner Soviet personnel also indicate that the 
KGB was respected and feared. 100 
The establishment of the penetration model in the Soviet Union was facilitated by two factors. 
First, the pmiy actively moved to incorporate the control methods characteristic of the 
penetration model \Vhen the Red Arn1y was small and weak. This is shown by my previous 
examination of the civil-military relationship that briefly covers the fonnative years of the 
93 Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p89; Odom, "Party-Military Connection," p47; and Colton, Commissars, pp225-6. 
94 Osnovy sovetskogo voe1111ogo zakonodatelstva, ed. A.G. Gorny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966) pp31 l-20, 387-9, 
Voe1111oe zakonodatelstvo J pravovoe vospitanie voi11ov, ed. A.G. Gorny et al. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983) 
pp 117-23, 200, both quoted in Amy Knight, "The KGB 's Special Depa1iments In The Soviet Armed Forces," 
Orhis 28, no.2 (Sunm1er 1984): p274. 
95 Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear (New York: Praeger, 1956) p99, quoted in Knight, "The KGB's Special 
Departments," fooh1ote 34, p268. 
96 Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB, (Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Affairs Publishing House, 1976), p26, quoted 
in Knight, "The KGB 's Special Departments," p269; and IISS, The Military Balance 1983-1984, (London: IISS, 
1983), ppl 1-8. 
97 V.P. Artemiev, "OKR: State Security in the Soviet Armed Forces," Militmy Review no vol. or no. (September 
1963 ): p22, quoted in Knight, "The KGB 's Special Deparhnents," p276. 
98 Colton, Commissars, pp226-7; and Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy, p335. 
99 Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments," p280. 
wo Viktor Suvorov, The Liberators: Inside The Soviet Army (London: New English Library, 1983), pp72-3, 200-
4, 218-22; and Suvorov, Inside The Soviet Army, p45. 
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military. Second, and particularly relevant here, the Communist party was the sole and 
dominant source of power. 
Power over the military was held by the Politburo with the General Secretary as party leader 
and Commander-in-Chief. The General Secretary executed his power over the military 
primarily through the Defence Council, a joint political-military committee he chaired (see 
model 3). The Defence Council set the broad policy direction with national government, 
primarily the Supreme Soviet, legalising top-level party decisions. With regard to the daily 
running of the military, responsibility lay with the Ministry of Defence. This entailed the 
ministry officially participating in defence planning, directing research and development, and 
directing matters relating to human resources like combat training. The Defence Minister in 
turn had three deputies, the most impmiant being the Chief of the General Staff. This is 
because he was the immediate superior of the Soviet service chiefs, and had enormous power 
in determining the structure and content of Soviet force posture and doctrine (the roles of the 
party and military leadership are outlined in table 3). 101 





Ministry of Defence 
Institutional roles 
The primary role of the Soviet military was to implement Communist paiiy security and 
foreign policies, and to ensure the party's protection (see table 3). During the Soviet period 
this entailed the military having a predominantly external focus, playing the key role during 
the Cold War in countering the perceived military threat posed by the West. This argument is 
supported by the deployment of Soviet forces, and the perceptions held by both the civilian 
and military leadership. The military did have internal or domestic roles, its political role the 
most important. However the military's internal security role was minimal. 
101 Condoleeza Rice, "The Development Of Soviet Military Power," in The Gorbachev Era, ppl21-8; and Ellen 
Jones, Red Army And Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Milita,y (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp 1-30. 
Table 3: Milita1y Responsibilities of Communist Party and the General Staff 1986 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
( socio-political side of military doctrine) 
• decides when, where and against whom to use military forces 
• allocates resources to defence through role in setting budget priorities 
• approves maJor weapons programs 
• approves any changes in military doctrine 
• develops Soviet anns control positions on basis of options and assessment of military 
and other advisers 
• approves major personnel decisions in military 
General Staff 
(military-technical side of military doctrine) 
• debates impact of changes in military technology on doctrine, strategy and tactics 
• develops overall combined-anns (all service) strategy for Soviet am1ed forces 
• decides composition of Soviet force posture 
• primary military advisors to party on major issues 
• wartime "nerve centre" for direction and planning of military operations 
• gathers military intelligence 
Source: Rice, "The Development of Soviet Military Power," in The Gorbachev Era, Figure 2, pl25. 
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The pnmacy of the military's role as protector and promoter of the Communist paiiy's 
interests is widely evident. The Soviet military had been established for the defence of the 
party led regime, a role encouraged by the history of invasion, the fear of aggression, and the 
importance of the military in maintaining dominance over East Europe. 102 The paiiy leaders 
also recognised the importance of the military in providing security. 103 However, in 
accordance with the increasing need to limit defence expenditure from the late 1970s, party 
leaders stressed that superpower cooperation rather than military strength by itself would 
ensure security. 104 After the Second World War the dominant perceived threat was that posed 
by the US and this detennined the deploymei1t of the military. Grechko spoke of this threat in 
102 See Kolkowicz, Soviet Militmy. ppl8, 36-47; David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in 
Soviet Policy," Daedalus 109, no.4 (Fall 1980): pp14-8, quoted in Civif-Militmy Relations in the Soviet Union, 
ed. Alexander Dallin, pp96- l 00; and Harriet Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc, 1979), pp56-9. 
103 See Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose," pp 16-8, 24-9 in Civil-Militmy Relations in the Soviet 
Union, ed. Dallin, pp98-100, 106-111. 
104 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, ppl08-29. 
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1972 when he instructed officers that the armies of the US and its allies "are being prepared 
with a consideration of using the element of surprise in unleashing war."105 
The military was deployed accordingly. Combat-ready forces were deployed in sensitive 
strategic regions like the Baltic States and in East Europe. Furthermore, the military was 
deployed throughout the world to both counter the West and to promote Soviet security 
interests. 106 Grechko in 197 4 declared that: 
At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to 
their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its 
foreign activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution 
and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely 
resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear. 107 
The primacy of the military' s external focus and the presence of internal security forces under 
the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and KGB, which totalled 600,000 personnel in 1985, meant 
that the militaiy's internal security role was minimal. 108 Although the military did have 
internal roles, such as its active involvement in the economy, the only publicised use of the 
military in upholding internal security after Stalin was in 1962. That year personnel were used 
to put down a strike in Novocherkassk. 109 
Budgetary support 
Although it is difficult to accurately assess the level of defence expenditure it is clear that the 
level was high. Defence expenditure grew rapidly during the "golden age" as the economy 
grew, and Brezhnev sought to reduce civil-military tensions. 110 The CIA estimated that the 
allocation of resources to the military increased by about 4 percent per year from 1965 to 
197 5. After 197 6 the annual level of growth was 2 percent and it was essentially flat by the 
105 A.A. Grechko, Na Strazhe Miro i Stroite!'stva Kom11111nizm (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972), p53, quoted in 
Harriet Scott and William Scott, Soviet lvfilitmy Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Disse111inatio11 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p82, quoted in Michael McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms: Russian-American 
Military-to-Military Contacts Since 1992," JS/vfS 9, no.4 (December 1996): pp749-50. 
106 This global role is shown by Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp285-297. 
107 A.A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," 
Problems ofHisto1y of the CPSU, translated by FBIS, no vol or no. May 1974, n.p., quoted in Scott and Scott, 
The Armed Forces, p57. 
108 IISS, The Militmy Balance 1985-1986 (London: IISS, 1985), p30. 
109 See Colton, Co111111issars, pp247-8, 251. For information on Novocherkassk see chapter 7. 
110 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, pp93-6. 
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1982 to 1984 period. 111 This decline in the growth of expenditure occurred as the economy 
declined and concerns arose over the possibility of internal unrest, but expenditure remained 
high. 112 The official defence budget in 1985 was 19,063 billion roubles (see table 4). This 
meant that by 1985 military spending as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was 16.1 percent, an estimated US$241,500 million. 113 The acquirement of weaponry was 
thus immense. Nichols argued that the military had essentially been provided a "blank 
financial and theoretical check." 114 However it should be noted that this level of support failed 
to ensure a high level of living standards for personnel, particularly for non-officers. 
Lieutenants received 20 times as much pay as Privates whereas in the US it was only four 
times higher. 115 
Table 4: The Defence Budget and Expenditure according to Soviet Published Data 1985-
1991 
Years Official Soviet Defence expenditure Percentage of GDP 
defence budget US$ million 
in billions of roubles (1985 prices and 
exchange rates) 
1985 19,063 241,500 16.1 
1990 70,500 127,638 14.2 
1991 96,560 91,631 11.1 
Source: The Militmy Balance 1985-1986, pl8; and The Militmy Balance /992-1993, p92, Comparisons Of 
Defence Expenditure And Military Manpower 1985-1991 Table, p218. Figures from 1986 to 1989 are excluded 
because they were inconsistent. 
Popular suppmi for the military and morale 
Support for the military was generally high with officers enjoying high status and conscription 
at least tolerated. This level of support is shown by the Communist party's official stance, and 
by surveys of civilians and conscripts. The party's financial support of the military is 
111 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1984 
(Washington DC: GPO, 1984), p23 quoted in Colton and Gustafson, pl29; and "The Soviet Economy under a 
New Leader," (paper prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
for submission to the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the 
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 19 March 1986), p8, quoted in Colton and Gustafson, 
pl 29. 
112 "Survey: Perestroika," The Economist, Survey no vol. and no. 28 April 1990, p5 quoted in Nichols, Sacred 
Cause, pl03. With regard to the increasing concerns of the civilian leadership see Parrott, pp62-3. 
113 The Militmy Balance 1992-1993, Comparisons Of Defence Expenditure And Military Manpower 1985-1991 
Table, p218. 
114 Nichols, Sacred Cause, p95. See also John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined-Aims Concept," 
Strategic Review no vol. or no. (Winter 1977): p39, quoted in Nichols, Sacred Cause, p96. 
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indicative of the high level of support too. Various factors contributed to the support of the 
military and its officers. These included the party's active promotion of the military and the 
material comforts that officers enjoyed. However, enlisted soldiers enjoyed less public 
support because of the more negative attitudes towards compulsory service. These attitudes 
arose against a background of the harsh militaiy life they faced, and the negative perceptions 
that would have entered civilian society when conscripts left the military. As both the level of 
suppmi and living conditions varied greatly between officers and soldiers, it is predictable 
that their morale varied, officers appearing to have a high level relative to soldiers. 
I believe that officers enjoyed a high status before Gorbachev and that most people at least 
tolerated conscription. The Communist party officially and openly praised the military. For 
example, in Gorbachev's March 1985 valedict01y he refetTed to "our glorious Armed 
Forces." 116 With regard to officers there is much evidence to indicate that many envied their 
position and they belonged to at least the middle class. A 1968 to 1970 survey of rural school 
children conducted in four oblasts (regions) found that officers were ranked either second, 
third, or fouiih out of 15 professions. 117 In another survey during the early 1970s, Kiev high 
school graduates ranked officers sixth to eighth out of forty occupations for a career. 118 
Surveys also indicated that although the prestige of the officer corps declined immediately 
prior to Gorbachev taking power, officer careers remained attractive to young people. A 
survey of 40 occupations published in 1979 found that an officer's career ranked in sixth to 
eighth place, and another survey published in 1986 found that officer careers were still 
attractive despite having declined relative to other occupations. 119 Thus, admittance to officer 
115 Gabriel, Red legions, p86. 
116 Mikhail Gorbachev, lzbrannye rechi I stcltf, 2 (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p 132, quoted in 
Nichols, Sacred Cause, pl 33. 
117 A. F. Tarasov et al., "Professional orientation of rural school-age youth," quoted in Opyt 
sotsial 'noekonomicheskogo izucheniya professional 'nay orientatsii sel 'skoy molodezhi (Rostov-Na-Donn: 
Gosudarstvennyy Pedagogicheskiy Institut), 1974, pp25-81. Quoted in Jones, Red Army, p82. 
118 V.F. Chernovolenko et al., Prestizh professiy i problemy sotsialno-professiona 'lnoy orientatsii molodezhi, 
Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya (Kiev: Maukova Dumka, 1979), pp203-4. Quoted in Jones, Red Army, 
p82. 
119 V.F. Chernovolenko et al., Prestizh professii i problemy sotsialno-professionalnoi orientatsii molodezhi: opyt 
sotsio!ogicheskogo iss!edovaniia (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1979), pp203-4, quoted in Ellen Jones, "Social 
Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, p263. With regard to the 1986 survey see V. 
Kovalevskii, "A Profession that Society Needs," Slovo lektora no.8, 1986, pp18-22, quoted in Jones, "Social 
Change," p263. See also Jones, Red Army, pp82-5. 
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schools was competitive. A 1973 poll of students in the Orel found that 8 percent intended to 
enter a military school, but only 3 percent were selected. 120 
With regard to conscription, attitudes appear to have been less positive but service was at least 
tolerated. Both civilians and conscripts accepted military service, and there was at least an 
interest in service among many. Although few soldiers indicated that their families strongly 
endorsed conscription only 6.2 percent told Richard Gabriel (1980) that their families were 
unhappy with them serving, and 76.1 percent said that they were resigned to their service. 121 
The good treatment of soldiers by most civilians further indicates an acceptance of service. 
Gabriel found that 81.4 percent of former Soviet soldiers believed that "most civilians treat 
soldiers well when the soldier is away from base." 122 Conscripts likewise appear to have at 
least grudgingly accepted their service. Gabriel found that 88.5 percent of soldiers indicated 
that their friends tolerated conscription because it could not be avoided. 123 Moreover at least 
an interest in service is evident. A 197 5 survey found that 78 percent of enlisted personnel 
were serving with "great interest." 124 Additional survey findings published in 1980 found that 
58 percent of draftees from 18 to 19 years of age were serving with "great interest." They also 
indicate that although only 29.5 percent on average of older draftees were serving with this 
interest, the majority understood "the social significance, necessity, and importance of 
military service."125 It was within this context that draft evasion was rare. It is estimated that 
not more than 12 percent of individuals avoided service in the active or reserve services. 126 
Support for the military was widely promoted by the Communist party. The party's stance 
was no doubt encouraged by the important role assigned to the military as protector from 
external threats, and by the military' s political influence, both of which have been discussed. 
120 L. I. Shishkina, "Some data on the orientation of Orel sh1dents toward work and education," in 
Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya professio11a! '11oy orientatsii molodezhi (Moscow: Institute for Sociological 
Research, 1975), pp78-83, quoted in Jones, Red Army, p83. 
121 Gabriel, Red legions, p39. Gabriel questioned 134 former Soviet personnel. Of these 66 served in the army, 
12 in the air force, 13 in the navy, 6 in the Strategic Rocket Forces, 17 in air defence, 20 in the construction 
troops, 2 in the border guards, and 1 in 'other.' Of these 52.2 percent were soldiers or privates, 26.5 percent were 
Non Commissioned Officers, 2.7 percent were warrant officers, and 17.7 percent were officers. With regard to 
their period of service, 4.4 percent served before World War II, 21.2 percent served during the war and 
inunediate post war years, 18.6 percent served from 1953-7, 11.5 percent served from 1958-63, and 44.2 percent 
served from 1964 to 78 (11.5 percent served from 1973 to 78). Gabriel, Red legions, pp6-13. 
122 Gabriel, Red legions, p69. 
123 Ibid., p40. 
124 Herspring, Russian Civil-Mi!itmy Relations, pl 08. 
125 N. Yefimov and Yu Deryugin, "Ways to increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic socialization of 
youth," Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniye, no.I (1980), pp60-6, quoted in Jones, Red Army, Table 6.1, pl 53. 
126 Gabriel, Red Legions, p36. 
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Indicative of the party's support is its emphasis on maintaining military values and a strong 
military, along with the importance of service. 127 For example, a 1970 survey found that the 
level of media coverage of officers ranked 10th out of 54 professions. 128 Apart from the 
official promotion of the military, other factors contributed to the public support of officers 
and tolerance of conscription. For instance, the 'Great Patriotic War' (the Second World War) 
and the army's apparent contribution to the economy encouraged positive perceptions. 129 
More specifically, the status of officers was no doubt encouraged by their privileged material 
position. An officer received about one-third more pay than he would normally receive in 
civilian society for the application of similar skills and qualifications. 130 Pensions, the 
accessibility of goods and services, and paid vacations were favourable relative to civilian 
positions too. 131 
Despite the suppmi of the military and acceptance of service, I believe that the perception of 
conscription was more negative because conditions of service were harsh. This also impacted 
on civilians. Conscripts re-entered civilian life with at least some negative perceptions of the 
military. Whereas the pay of officers was relatively high, 77 percent of soldiers told Gabriel 
that their pay was inadequate. Likewise, although 50 percent of officers indicated that their 
housing conditions were adequate or better than civilian dwellings, with soldiers this declined 
to 39 percent. 132 Soldiers not only left with negative perceptions of their officers, as I argue 
later, they also left with the realisation that their superiors occupied a comfortable place in the 
militaiy. Only 22.1 percent of soldiers indicated to Gabriel that officers shared their 
hardships. 133 Conscripts left with negative perceptions of the benefits of service too. Gabriel 
found that only 27.4 percent of conscripts believed that they "got anything good" out of their 
service. 134 Even the Soviet press accepted that not all left with favourable impressions. us To 
put this in perspective, US personnel in the aftennath of the disastrous Vietnam VY ar appear to 
127 William Odom, "The "Militarization" of Soviet Society," Problems of Communism 25, no.5 (September-
October 1976): pp34-51. See also Porter, "Military Abroad," pp321-6. 
128 A. Korbut, "The h·eatment of professions in. mass communications," in Sotsiologicheskiye problemy 
obshchestve1111ogo m11e111j1a sredstv massovoy informatsii (Moscow: Institute for Sociological Research, 1975), 
~pl 17-19, quoted in Jones, Red Army, p85. 
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Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June 1993 available from 
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d58, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, pl of 7. 
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134 Ibid., p42. 
135 Jones, Red Army, pl 70. 
109 
have had a more favourable perception of military service too. A 1979 survey of American 
army personnel ranked from Sergeant through to Private found that 57 percent did not feel 
that they were accomplishing nothing as soldiers. 136 Apart from this, families lost the help and 
money that their children could bring in, and service could actually cost money. For example, 
61.1 percent of soldiers indicated that their families had to send them money so that they 
could get by. 137 Indeed the Soviet press often wrote of soldiers becoming a financial burden 
on their families. 138 
In accordance with their more favourable position, morale among officers appears to have 
been high relative to morale among conscripts. Colton argued that officers were content with 
their positions. This was because the party promoted and protected their ideological interests 
like national unity and prestige, material interests, status interests, and professional interests 
such as career mobility. 139 More specifically, Gabriel found that officers had high self-
opinions in various areas. No less than 70 percent of officers holding combat positions felt 
that they would be "good men to go into combat with," and 75 percent believed that they set a 
good example for their soldiers. 140 Similarly, officers rated their unit's combat ability highly. 
Gabriel found that 55 percent of officers felt that their units would perfom1 "very well" or 
"fairly well" in combat, compared to 40.4 percent of soldiers. 141 More dramatically, the rate 
of suicide among officers appears to have been lower than that among soldiers. According to 
Gabriel, 16.2 percent of soldiers indicated that stories of suicide were very common or 
common with only 28.3 percent saying that these could involve officers. 142 Finally, officers 
were pleased enough with their positions to actively seek long tem1 military careers. Gabriel 
found that 88.5 percent of soldiers' felt that officers were more interested in their own careers 
than in their troops, and 92.8 percent saw officers as overly ambitious. 143 
However the morale of soldiers appears to have been lower and in line with the lower level of 
support and harsher conditions. Gabriel (1980) found that 93.1 percent of soldiers believed 
136 Stephen Westbrook, "The Alienated Soldier: Legacy of Our Society." Army no vol. or no. (December 1979): 
pl 8, quoted in Richard Gabriel, The Antagonists: A Comparative Assessment of the Soviet and American Soldier, 
Contributions in Military History Number 34, with a forward by Sam Nunn, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 
p47. 
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138 Bio/wot agitatora, no.12 June 1971, n.p., quoted in Gabriel, Red Legions, p56. 
139 See Colton, Commissars. pp257-75. 
140 Gabriel, Red Legions, pp 101, 92. 
141 Ibid., p216. 
142 Gabriel, Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book, Contributions In Political Science Number 44 (Westport, 
London: Greenwood Press, 1980), Tables 85, 87, ppl18-19. 
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that their officers were worried about the unit's morale. This appears to be higher than the 
poor morale evident in the US military during the last years of the Vietnam vv ar. In 1971, 
75.8 percent of US soldiers had indicated that their officers were concerned about morale. 144 
Gabriel found that 69.9 percent of Soviet soldiers believed that their superiors were concerned 
with the frequency of absence without leave (AWOL) among soldiers. 145 Similarly, soldiers 
deserted from the military. Although Gabriel found that soldiers generally indicated that 
stories of soldiers deserting were uncommon, 23.9 percent believed that such stories were 
very common or common. 146 Discontent is also indicative of negative perceptions being held 
by personnel. For example, 36 percent of soldiers told Gabriel that they had witnessed 
assaults on officers. 147 Furthermore, though the extent of drunkenness is disputed, it appears 
to have been a serious problem, paiiicularly among lowered ranked personnel. For instance, 
drunkenness among NCOs appears to have been higher than among officers. 148 During the 
costly Afghanistan war, poor morale became increasingly widespread among troops. 149 
Cohesion and size 
To assess the level of Soviet militaiy cohesion I shall focus on five relationships that largely 
dete1111ined institutional cohesion. Thus, the relationship between the services, officers, 
political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups are 
assessed. Most importantly, I believe that inter-service conflict was not serious, though their 
co-ordination in combat had deficiencies. This is because the generally high level of support 
for the military meant that all the services were treated well. When party moves were believed 
to threaten institutional interests, cohesion appears to have been further strengthened. 
Similarly, though it is evident that officers could hold negative opinions of each other, they 
also held positive opinions of fellow officers, and on key security issues remained united. 
However relations between military personnel and political officers, and between officers and 
their soldiers, appear to have been strained. This is shown by the negative opinions that arose 
between each group, particularly officers and soldiers. Finally, despite ethnic discrimination 
there is little strong evidence to establish tlrnt conflict between etlmic groups was a serious 
problem. Turning to the military's size, it is clear that the institution was massive by any 
143 Gabriel, Red Legions, pp108, 112. 
144 Gabriel, The Antagonists, Table 3, p102. 
145 Ibid., p 160. 
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standard. This ultimately resulted from the important position of the military and its high level 
of suppmi. 
First, inter-service rivalry appears not to have threatened cohesion. This was encouraged by 
the better ability of a united military to protect and to promote its interests, along with the 
party's high support of all the services, at least during the "golden age." Inter-service unity 
also confonned with the importance attached to the military's role as an instrument of 
national integration. Though tensions did arise during the Khrushchev era because of the 
greater emphasis placed on the rocket forces, the services ultimately united against the 
General Secretary when he reduced the military's size and de-emphasised the threat of the 
US. 150 Similarly, the decision to invade Afghanistan appears not to have been divisive within 
the General Staff, because even those officers that might have opposed the invasion continued 
to serve in high office during the war. 151 The General Staff included members from the 
various services, and their future promotion was dependent on their effectiveness here rather 
than their promotion of the interests of individual services. More dramatically, the need to 
improve the effectiveness of combat operations in Afghanistan encouraged moves to solve 
those problems with inter-service cooperation and co-ordination that did arise. 152 
Second, poor cohesion appears not to have been a serious problem among officers. Conflict 
no doubt did occur between officers, however this does not appear to have seriously eroded 
cohesion. Despite animosities, only 10.5 percent of officers indicated to Gabriel that the 
quality of their fellow officers was poor or very poor. 153 Nor were commanding officers 
willing to characterise their fellow officers as selfish. 154 Furthennore, on key issues officers 
remained united. Parrott argued that officers were generally united during debates over 
national security and ultimately united behind party decisions even when disliked, at least 
under Brezhnev. 155 More specifically, officers were united in sharing many of Ogarkov's 
main concerns, such as on the decline of resource allocation to the military. 156 Indeed 
149 Olivier Roy, The Lessons of the Soviet Afghan War Adelphi Paper 259 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 
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Kolkowicz wrote that officers had a "finn sense of solidarity" on interests that affected their 
core interests. 157 Gabriel argued that cohesion was reinforced by the stability of the officer 
corps. This was because assignment rotations were limited, officers generally served for the 
long tenn, and conformity was stressed. 158 The importance of conformity is shown by the 
resentment that arose among senior officers when Ogarkov opposed them as a military 
representative at the 1972 Strategic Anns Limitation Treaty I talks. 159 Colton also wrote that 
societal groups, a potential source of divisiveness, had little impact on the military because 
politics was not characterised by "open contention among private groups." 160 
Third, relations between political and military personnel appear to have been more 
problematic. The nature of the civil-military relationship depends largely on the Soviet model 
utilised. Overall however, I believe that relations between individual political and military 
personnel immediately before the transition were not very strong. This is in line with the 
monitoring role and power of political officers over military persom1el. The accounts of 
fo1111er military officers indicate that political officers placed much pressure on personnel to 
act in accordance with the patty directives, and thus were not well liked. 161 In fact Viktor 
Suvorov, a fonner anny officer, claimed that political officers were reluctant to monitor the 
personnel during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 because "it would be so easy 
to get killed by accident."162 The work of political officers was also widely perceived in 
negative tenns and discouraged close relations. In Gabriel's survey of soldiers only 20.4 
percent believed that political and indoctrination classes were important to making a good 
soldier. 163 Similarly, only 8 percent of soldiers and 16.7 percent of enlisted commanders 
regarded Marxism-Leninism as an important combat motivator. 164 
However I do not believe that relations reached a crisis level. First, a dislike of political 
officers did not necessarily equate with a rejection of the party. Carey Schofield in her study 
157 Roman Kolkowicz, "The Military," in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, ed. H. Skilling and Franklyn 
Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19:"71), pl37, quoted in Colton, Commissars, p224. See also 
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of the airborne forces argued that many officers, at least during the 1970s, accepted the "truth 
of the Paiiy's fundamental teachings." This was despite the belief that political officers "often 
talked embarrassing rubbish" and doubts over their efficiency. 165 Second, personnel appear to 
have been resigned to the fact that political officers were active in the military. Suvorov wrote 
that both he and his superiors accepted that the party would influence the promotion of 
military officers because of the party's power. 166 Suvorov further wrote that it was widely 
accepted that if political officers detected disloyalty to the party their personal safety was at 
risk. 167 Third, many senior officers in the military hierarchy actually supported the political 
officers. John Lepingwell argued that senior officers in the militaiy's leadership supported the 
work of political officers because they promoted patriotism. 168 Similarly, Chris Donnelly 
argued that many unit commanders accepted political officers because they could be used to 
unde1iake other tasks. 169 The Soviet press also wrote of the cooperation between political and 
military officers. 17° Finally, although the work of political officers was deemed unimportant, 
many personnel actually enjoyed the indoctrination classes, though not because of their 
ideological content. Andrew Cockburn found that personnel believed that indoctrination 
classes offered them the chance to relax. 171 
Fourth, a salient division existed between officers and lower-ranked personnel. Gabriel (1980) 
found that 77.7 percent of soldiers and 87.5 percent of NCOs believed that their officers 
"never developed close ties with their men." 172 Another 80 percent of soldiers indicated that 
officers "drew too strong a line between himself and his men" or were "too distant." To put 
this in perspective, in 1971, 54.2 percent of American soldiers said that the line between 
officers and soldiers was too strong, and that officers were too distant. 173 More dramatically, 
officers were unable to prevent soldiers deployed against the 1962 Novocherkassk strike from 
fraternising with protesters. 174 This division was encouraged by the negative perceptions both 
officers and their subordinates held of each other. For instance, I have already argued that it 
was widely felt among soldiers that their officers were more concerned about their own 
165 Schofield, p4 7. 
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careers than their men. Moreover, Gabriel found that only 19.5 percent of soldiers felt that 
their officers were competent. 175 The poor quality of officers and their reluctance to listen to 
their men also caused tensions in Afghanistan. 176 I have also noted that soldiers believed that 
officers did not experience the same level of hardship. Likewise, Suvorov wrote that officers 
held the soldiers in low esteem and would not socialise with them. 177 This is supported by 
Gabriel's survey that found that 71. 7 percent of soldiers believed that their superiors showed 
no interest in them. 178 Indeed officers doubted the loyalty of their soldiers and feared for their 
own safety. For example, officers during the invasion of Czechoslovakia were afraid that their 
soldiers might ham1 them. 179 
Finally, ethnic divisions are apparent within the military as ethnic discrimination occurred. By 
the early 1980s a typical regiment contained 20-30 different nationalities, and in 1985, 45.3 
percent of draftees were Russian speakers. 180 Deborah Ball found during a survey of former 
Soviet personnel who served before 1985 that 89.7 percent of the officer corps were Slavic 
and 69.4 percent Russian. 181 Though there is debate over whether the milita1y had a negative 
or positive impact on ethnic relations it is clear that discrimination did occur. 182 In Gabriel's 
survey 69 percent indicated that ethnic discrimination occuned. 183 Ethnic tensions became 
particularly evident during the Afghanistan war, as Central Asian conscripts assisted the 
mujaheddin. 184 
I believe that ethnic tensions resulted from the growing diversity of personnel and the racism 
of many Slav and Russian personnel, but constraints prevented such tension from becoming a 
serious problem. The growing· diversity of personnel facilitated tension. Their different 
customs and attitudes could encourage susp1c10ns, and the inability to speak Russian 
discouraged inter-group communication. Racism is also evident. Cockburn interviewed 
174 See chapter 5, pp246-7. 
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fonner Soviet personnel, and his work published in 1983 indicated that many Russians were 
derogative when discussing non-Russians. 185 Overall though, Ball concluded that the military 
did not exacerbate ethnic tensions, as her data did not demonstrate a strong link between 
ethnicity and the conflict that occu1Ted between personnel. 186 Ethnic baITiers were overcome 
too. Many friendships developed between various ethnic groups as personnel shared 
conditions, and the military actively promoted ethnic harmony. Figures published in 1980 
indicated that 50 percent of friendships between personnel during the initial months of service 
were based on shared ethnic and regional origins. However by the end of service 60-65 
percent were based on personal interests or the tenure of service. 187 
Overall, I believe that cohesion was adequate. Although it is clear internal divisions did arise, 
of particular concern being that between officers and lower-ranked personnel, I do not believe 
that they threatened to fragment the military. This is because the military did not show any 
prospect of fragmenting and disobeying the party's directives or orders from superiors in the 
Ministry of Defence. Though I have argued that civil-military tensions did arise, these 
tensions did not lead to personnel challenging the party's authority by force. Gabriel found 
that 87 .8 percent of soldiers believed that their officers "stuck to the letter of their superiors," 
and 76.2 percent believed that officers would "lresitate to take actions in the absence of 
instructions from their superiors." 188 Another 42.8 percent of soldiers believed that officers 
would not stand up for their men when dealing with their superiors. To put this in perspective, 
in 1971, 21.5 percent of American soldiers believed that their officers would not stand up for 
them when dealing with their superiors. 189 Soldiers also continued to follow orders 
in-espectivc of their validity. This is most clearly shown by the obeying of orders in 
Afghanistan despite the soldiers themselves having serious doubts about their soundness. 190 
With regard to the militaty's size, by any standard it was massive. This is clearly illustrated 
by the large number of persom1el. During the immediate years prior to Gorbachev the 
military's size had increased and by July 19_85, the total number of personnel in the five main 
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services was 3,980,000, compared to 3,450,000 personnel in 1983 (see table 5). 191 The largest 
of the five main services was the army, with over 1.9 million personnel, followed by the air 
defence and the air force. Overall, the number of personnel in the key services increased by 
18.1 percent from 1983 to 1985, the largest increase occurring in the air force (see table 5). 
The massive size of the military is also shown by its quantity of conventional weaponry 
relative to the US. The Soviets in 1985 had over three times the number of tanks compared to 
the US. 192 Thus, at least with regards to size, the military was a fonnidable force. This was in 
accordance with the substantial resources allocated to the military and with its importance in 
Soviet society. 
Table 5: Number of Soviet Persom1el in Key Services 1983-1985 
Years Army Strategic Navy Air Defence Air Force 
(personnel Rocket 
number) Forces (SRF) 
1983 1,800,000 325,000 460,000 500,000 365,000 
1984 1,840,000 415,000 490,000 370,000 400,000 
1985 1,995,000* 300,000 480,000 635,000 570,000 
1983-1985 +10.8 -7.7 +4.3 +27 +56.2 
percentage 
change 
Source: The lvfilitmy Balance 1983-/984, pp14-8; The MilitmJ1 Balance 1984-1985, IISS, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Sh1dies, 1984 ), pp 17-21: and The Militmy Balance l 985 -! 986, pp21-4. 
• The 1983-1985 percentage figures are rounded up. 
* From 1985 the IISS referred to the ground forces rather than the army. 
Expertise 
Overall, I believe that the level of expertise among personnel was not high. This is most 
graphically illustrated by the problematic combat perfmmance of the military during the 
period. For instance, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia appears to have been poorly 
organised and executed. 193 Similarly, the rnilitary experienced problems when it invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979. Here many problems were encountered by the military and personnel, 
including members of the elite airborne forces, failed to show a high level of expertise. 194 I 
191 The Militmy Balance /985-1986, pp21-4, 170-3; and The Militmy Balance 1983-/984, p125. 
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believe that two factors are most important in explaining this inadequacy. First, the military 
lacked combat experience after the Second World War, at least relative to the US. The 1956 
invasion of Hungary, and the later invasion of Czechoslovakia, were not strongly resisted by 
their militaries, and by 1985 only 4.1 percent of Soviet persom1el were stationed outside the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty states. 195 Moreover involvement in Afghanistan peaked in 
1985 at only 2.1 percent of Soviet forces. 196 In contrast, over 21 percent of US forces were 
deployed in Vietnam during 1970. 197 Second, the quality of combat training is debatable. 
Personnel cheated on combat perfomrnnce tests, exercises were strictly choreographed, and 
the expenditure of ammunition restricted. 198 Gabriel also found that the majority of soldiers 
did not rank their combat abilities highly and that they did not believe that their training was 
of a high quality. Gabriel calculated that soldiers on average rated the quality of their training 
at 4.8 out of 10, and officers rated it 5.8. 199 
In summary, this section presents five key arguments. Most importantly, the civil-military 
structure best resembled Nordlinger's penetration model, and was based on the Communist 
pmiy's authority. Second, and also impo1iant, the Soviet military's primary role was to act as 
executor of the Communist party's policies and as its protector, primarily from external 
threats. Third, with regard to the military's support, the level of budgetary support and 
popular support were generally positive. However morale differed according to rank, officers 
having a higher level of morale relative to those lower-ranked. Fomih, cohesion was not 
defective to the point of threatening the central command structure. Finally, the military's 
expertise was not very high. Overall, I believe that the military in 1985 held a privileged 
position in Soviet society and that it was a powerful institution. 
The fall of the Soviet Union: The Gorbachev Regime, 1985-1991 
The collapse of both the Communist system and the Soviet Union itself in December 1991 
was the outcome of many developments. These developments chiefly occurred after 
Gorbachev became the General Secretary in.March 1985. Gorbachev initiated a wide-range of 
refonns that reverberated throughout the Soviet Union. One of the institutions most 
dramatically hit by these reforms was the military. 
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Structure of the civil-military relationship 
Transitional changes to the Soviet structure of civil-military relations had a significant impact. 
The fundamental change here involved the \Veakening of the Communist party, the opposite 
to the 1917 transition to Communism. This is clearly shown by the changes that occurred to 
the control methods, which characterised the Soviet penetration model. These involved the 
restructuring of the MP A in accordance with the goal of reducing, and ultimately removing, 
the central role played by the Communist party. Similarly, party membership became less 
important, and was then discouraged by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Such developments occurred 
as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and implement policy changes. A key 
indicator of the fall of Communist paiiy control is the military's greater political role during 
the 1985 to 1991 period. However characteristics of the penetration model remained when 
Gorbachev believed that they strengthened his position and increased his control over the 
military. These are thus examined after the above developments. Here the continuing role that 
politics could play in influencing promotions, and the retaining of secret police to monitor 
personnel is important. The relationship is finally assessed according to the three Soviet 
theoretical models. I believe that the usefulness of these models became increasingly limited 
during this period. This is because they were based,.on the supremacy of the Communist party 
and this declined and ultimately collapsed during this period. 
It is clear that the Communist party's control over the military via penetration changed and 
declined under Gorbachev. Major structural changes occurred to the MP A after the Soviet 
Constitution was amended in March 1990 to allow the establishment of alternative political 
parties. During the 28th party congress in July 1990 both the military and MP A leaders 
accepted that the administration required re-strncturing. Gorbachev in late 1990 and early 
1991 also transferred the MP A from party to Ministry of Defence jurisdiction, and officially 
removed its responsibility for Communist work. Its new duties included the promoting of 
state policy and military patriotic education. 200 However the MPA remained close to the 
Communist party and was abolished in August 1991 after the failed coup. The following 
month a Ministry of Defence order was passed which aimed to establish a non-partisan and 
professional rnilitary. 201 Party membership also declined among personnel, as they no longer 
200 During this period Gorbachev also renamed it the Military-Political Administration of the Ministry of 
Defence. I continue to use 'MPA' to maintain consistency. 
201 See Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," pp545-6; and Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and 
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believed it helped their careers and they became disillusioned with the party. By July 1991 an 
estimated 70 percent of officers were members of the Communist party, compared to 78 
percent in 1985.202 Lower membership levels occurred particularly among junior officers. 203 
The increasing split between senior and junior officers over their attachment to Communism 
is assessed when I discuss military cohesion. 
The Communist party's position at the head of the civil-military relationship finally collapsed 
during late 1991. During the final month of 1991 the civil-military structure dramatically 
changed, as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed and the civil-military 
structure fell with the Soviet Union. The agreement in early December 1991 to create the CIS 
meant that the issue of military control became significant and the military advocated a 
centralised structure of control preserving its unity. The first attempt to establish a legal 
system of civilian control occurred on December 21 when CIS leaders opted for a 
decentralised structure that gave greater control of the ground forces to the republics. Despite 
this, the Russian leadership was recognised as the 'de facto locus' of supreme civilian 
authority, at least according to the military. This was because Russia was internationally 
recognised as the "continuer state" of the Soviet Union for most treaty obligations and bore 
most of the costs of maintaining the military.204 Htiwever the disposition of and jurisdiction 
over conventional forces rapidly began to devolve to the republics, and on December 31 st the 
Soviet Union officially ceased to exist. 
These developments occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and to promote 
his policies. Although the military was united against Gorbachev, it is clear that tension arose 
over his policies and he faced opposition from military and political officers. These tensions 
arose over various issues ranging from arms control to the introduction of glasnost into 
military affairs. Much has been written on this period and it is clear that Gorbachev actively 
sought to strengthen his position as Commander-in-Chief, and to ensure that his policy 
changes were executed. 205 For instance, : Gorbachev moved to eradicate the military's 
monopoly over defence expertise by increasing the role of civilians. This encouraged civil-
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military tension. 206 Changes also occurred against the background of Yeltsin, first as 
Chairperson of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet and later as Russian President, 
battling with Gorbachev over the military's loyalty. For example, after Yeltsin's election as 
Russian President in June 1991 Gorbachev ordered that Military Councils, which oversaw 
military activities in MDs (Military Districts), be subordinated to the Soviet President rather 
than the Central Committee of the party. Yeltsin countered this in July when he issued an 
edict banning the Communist party from the military, and though the military leadership 
refused to implement this, some units moved to dismantle party organisations. 207 
Of particular relevance here is the opposition that Gorbachev faced from the MP A. Many 
officers of the MP A opposed Gorbachev's actions or did little to counter criticism. For 
example, opposition to Gorbachev's new political thinking arose among MPA academies. 208 
More specifically, Colonel General Dmitrii Volkogonov, the Deputy MPA Chief, was a vocal 
opponent of Gorbachev. 209 The MP A also proved to be an ineffective control mechanism 
during the later years and this is shown by the 1991 coup. Here MPA officers supported 
intervention, and John Lepingwell argued that the administration's leadership was "reportedly 
more willing to suppo1i the coup than was the regular military."210 Though Colonel General 
Victor Novozhilov, the Commander of the Far East;MD, opposed the coup, his MPA Deputy 
Commander distributed documents of the State Committee on the State of Emergency 
(GKChP). 211 Similarly, General Konstantin Kobets, head of Russia's State Defence 
Committee and a coup opponent, accused the Strategic Rocket Forces' (SRF) political officers 
f . l . l ,12 o active y supporting t 1e coup.-
The decline of Communist party control 1s shown by the military's increasingly open 
involvement m politics. The key factors that encouraged this greater involvement are 
206 See Parrott, pp79-81; Davenport, ppl79-[8l; and Edward Warner III, "New thinking and old realities in 
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examined in the following chapters because they are important in explaining the military's 
unwillingness to intervene under Yeltsin. By the late 1980s various, political groups like the 
All-Anny Officer's Assembly had emerged within the military. 213 The military also became 
increasingly active in electoral politics. This is shown by the spring 1989 elections for the 
Congress of People's Deputies, a new institution designed to be an active law-making body, 
where 82 officers were elected.214 Furthermore, 3 senior active duty officers were among the 
serious candidates who campaigned in the 1991 Russian presidential election.215 Indeed 
whereas in 1989, 11,900 active duty personnel held elective office throughout the Soviet 
Union, by early 1991 there were 1,004 soldiers holding elective office in the Leningrad region 
alone.216 Scholars also argued that the political influence of at least some officers grew. For 
instance, Michael Desch argued that officers pressured Gorbachev over issues ranging from 
am1s control to clamping down on the Baltic States.217 Most dramatic though is the 
involvement of personnel in the 1991 coup, which I describe in the following chapter. In 
addition, the military influenced the outcome of the leadership struggle between Yeltsin and 
Gorbachev, who ultimately resigned as Soviet President on December 25, 1991. Both sought 
to win over the military.218 This struggle occurred after the 1991 coup as Yeltsin issued 
decrees that increased his power over the military at the expense of Gorbachev's authority. 
HO\vever characteristics of the Communist penetration model remained throughout this era 
,vhen they confom1ed to Gorbachev's desire to undertake his reforms, and to maintain control. 
It is evident that politics could continue to influence the promotion and removal of officers. 
Nichols argued that Gorbachev in mid-1987 replaced the Minister of Defence, Marshal Sergei 
Sokolov, with Yazov, and in December 1988 he promoted Colonel General Mikhail Moiseev 
to Chief of Staff, to strengthen his position.219 Soviet politics could also influence MPA 
213 See Richard Spence, "The Military in the "New Russia," in Danopoulos and Zirker, pp23-4. 
214 Yang Zhong, "The Transformation of the Soviet Military and the August Coup," AFS 19 no. I (Fall 1992): 
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215 Zhong, 'The Transformation," p56. 
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leadership changes. For example, Volkogonov was reassigned in 1988 to the Military History 
Institute.220 The secret police also remained active within the military to ensure loyalty to 
Gorbachev. The number of military ground force personnel declined by 29.8 percent from 
1985 to 1991, but the number of KGB personnel declined by only 8 percent and numbered 
230,000 in 1991.221 Indeed after the 1989 withdrawal from Afghanistan members of the 
airborne forces were placed under the operational control of the KGB, and military personnel 
remained suspicious of those they felt were agents.222 Gorbachev also used the KGB to 
monitor his rivals.223 As internal instability increased, the KGB in December 1990 was given 
the authority to take steps to ensure the smooth functioning of the armed forces. Although the 
KGB was officially abolished in October 1991 it was replaced by five separate organisations. 
With regard to the KGB's abolishment in October 1991 and subsequent restrncturing, this 
occurred in the months immediately after the 1991 coup. High-ranking KGB officers actively 
supported the coup. Of particular importance here is Kryuchkov, a prominent coup leader. 
According to Sergey Stepashin, the chairperson of the state investigation of KGB activities, 
materials from t\vo secret meetings held by the coup plotters in August 1991 implicated the 
KGB head as one of the main planners.224 Immediately after Gorbachev left for his Foros 
dacha in the Crimea on August 6 the KGB head ordered KGB officials to make detailed drafts 
analysing the possibilities of enacting a state of emergency and its impact. Furthem1ore, it was 
Kryuchkov who notified the other coup plotters that the time had come to act, and KGB 
troops were used to isolate and surround Gorbachev's dacha.225 Yeltsin himself wrote that 
Kryuchkov was the "most dangerous of the conspirators," and that the KGB "the driving 
force" behind the coup. 226 Hoivever evidence indicates that lower-level officers opposed 
intervention. The KGB Alpha unit allegedly refused to obey orders to storm the parliament 
buildings that Yeltsin occupied.227 KGB personnel also reportedly leaked the plan to arrest 
220 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, p202. 
221 The lvfi!itmy Balance 1985-/986, pp22, 30; and The Milita,y Balance 1991-1992, pp37, 45. 
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Yeltsin and current and former KGB officers claimed that they opposed the coup. Likewise, 
during the coup a reporter phoned the KGB headquarters and was told that "We're all for 
El 'tsin [Yeltsin] here! "228 
These developments impacted on the validity of the three Soviet civil-military models. Indeed 
the developments encouraged scholars to update their work. For instance, Odom in 1990 
argued that although some senior officers had opposed Gorbachev's reforms, "the officer 
corps has accepted party and military discipline and made no effort to resist as an 
institution."229 It is difficult to accurately assess the models in light of the developments 
during the Gorbachev era because of their wide-reaching and diverse nature. In fact Colton in 
1989 wrote that none of the models "can at this point be treated as more than a hypothesis 
needing proper development and testing. " 23° Furthermore, Herspring concluded that no single 
model would suffice in explaining civil-military relations under Gorbachev. This was for four 
reasons. First, there were too many variables for one paradigm to include all of them. Second, 
the high rate of change complicated matters. Third, a particular point in time was taken and 
universalised by the scholars, as Kolkowicz did with the conflict that occurred under 
Khrushchev. Finally, the models superimposed Western concepts on the Soviet Union. For 
example, Kolkowicz, after examining the US mihtary, assumed that increased technology 
would strengthen the autonomy of the Soviet military. 231 
Overall, I believe that none of the three models provides a flawless explanation of transitional 
civil-military relations. The conflict model obviously is relevant because civil-military 
tensions did arise, and ultimately_ encouraged some personnel to support the 1991 coup. Other 
aspects of the model are also relevant. I believe that within the context of the Gorbachev era, 
Kolkowicz was partially right to assert that military and party traits opposed each other. It is 
clear that many personnel resented the military's growing internal role and that others, 
especially junior officers, opposed Communist activities in the military. However the model 
has imperfections. Most basically, it is very simplistic to argue that tensions led to a situation 
whereby the party and military were clearly opponents. Of direct relevance here is the failure 
of the 1991 coup leaders to unite the military behind their intervention. The neutrality of most 
228 Iain Elliot, "Three Days in August: On-the-Spot Impressions," RFEIRL Report on the USSR, 6 September 
199 I, p65. See also Miller, "The Soviet Coup," pp73-4. 
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personnel and the active support some gave to Yeltsin illustrates this. The "natural traits" also 
do not necessarily correspond with reality. Senior officers, at least initially, sought to retain 
Communism whereas Gorbachev moved against it. This contradicts Kolkowicz's argument 
that subordination to an ideology was a party trait in conflict with the military's desire for 
professional autonomy. 
With regard to the participatory model, I believe that this is most useful but also has flaws. I 
believe that at least some of Colton's arguments are particularly relevant in light of the 
transition and the 1991 coup. Colton envisaged a "full-scale intervention" if "a reformist 
civilian leadership embarking [ ed] upon policies of ideological revision, military 
demobilization, shifting of investment priorities, and accommodation with foreign adversaries 
such as would alann military leaders."232 Though the military did not unite behind the 1991 
coup, key members were actively involved, and this was encouraged by factors he identified. 
Colton's examination of the military's political quiescence is also useful. Colton argued that 
the civilian leaders can encourage political involvement and this certainly is applicable.233 
This is clearly shown by civilian leaders of the 1991 coup seeking to use military power to 
overthrow Gorbachev. However I do not believe that the model can accurately explain the 
dramatic upheavals experienced during the transition. For instance, I do not believe that the 
model forecast the level of civil-military conflict that arose under Gorbachev. Colton admitted 
in 1989, "it is not difficult to find developments in civil-military relations under Mikhail 
Gorbachev suggestive of Model I [the conflict model]."234 
Finally, the symbiotic model has both strengths and weaknesses. The model does have some 
features I believe are valid. For instance, Odom correctly argued that the military would 
become involved in a political crisis during which it would become divided. This argument is 
particularly relevant in light of the 1991 coup. However I believe that the model has 
fundamental flaws which hinder its suitability for the study of the period. Most importantly, 
the model places too much stress on the coo,peration between the party and the military. This 
is because of the increased tensions that are evident after the "golden age," and are especially 
evident under Gorbachev. More specifically, it is clear that conflict between the party 
leadership and military leadership arose over issues where Odom argued party-military 
attitudes were similar. For example, Odom argued that the party and military were in a 
232 Colton, Commissars, p288. 
233 Ibid., pp250-2. 
125 
"conservative union" with regard to moves in East Europe toward political and economic 
liberalisation.235 However during the transition conflict arose between Gorbachev and military 
leaders over moves to grant East Europe greater freedom, and the resultant fall of 
Communism. 
Institutional roles 
I have already argued that the main role of the Soviet military had traditionally been to 
implement the Communist party security and foreign policies and ultimately to ensure the 
party's protection. This did not change under Gorbachev, in the sense that as General 
Secretary he continued to deploy the military in accordance with his threat perceptions. 
However the orientation of the military changed substantially. This change was from an 
external anti-West focus to an internal role to meet internal threats, and to correspond with 
Gorbachev's greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. Indicative of the move away from 
the traditional external anti-West focus is the decline of the military's external deployments 
and increased Soviet-US military cooperation. After outlining this reorientation of the military 
I shall examine the factors that played an important role in encouraging this change. Here the 
General Secretary's threat perceptions, his realisation that the Soviet Union faced various 
problems that required a change in foreign policy, ·and the military's influence are assessed. 
More specifically, internal developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats. For 
instance, the fall of the Communist party's authority and the policies of 'glasnost' (openness) 
and 'perestroika' (reconstruction or rebuilding) facilitated nationalism and ethnic tensions. 
This is shown by the increasingly active role the military played within the Soviet Union. 
It is clear that Gorbachev downplayed the military's role of countering the external threat 
---~. 
posed by the West during much of this period. Gorbachev often stressed the importance of 
strong Soviet-US relations and his actions reflected this, despite some tension arising over 
Gorbachev's 'hardline' approach to\vards republican nationalism and separatism from 1990 to 
1991. Gorbachev in A_pril 1985 declared t~at past Soviet-US cooperation showed that "the 
most reasonable [path] is to find the way leading to the smoothing of relations, [and] to build 
bridges of cooperation, but to build them from both sides."236 Thus, Gorbachev in April 1985 
announced a moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, in January 1986 
m Colton, "Perspectives," pp3 l-2. 
235 Odom, "The Party-Military Connection," p33. 
236 Mikhail Gorbachev, Jzbrannye rechi i stat 'i, 2 (Moscow: Politicheskoi literatury, 1987), p 171, quoted in 
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called for a nuclear free world by the year 2000, and provided diplomatic support for the US 
during the 1990-1991 Gulf war. Major bilateral arms control agreements like the 1987 
Intem1ediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty were also signed, and by 1991 Soviet personnel 
were participating in two United Nation's peacekeeping operations. Similarly, Soviet-US 
military cooperation increased and included greater contact between senior Soviet and US 
officers.237 In line with this, senior officers like Sokolov were at least initially more 
conciliatory towards the \,Vest. 238 Forces abroad declined in accordance with Gorbachev's 
policies. Whereas in 1985, 219,810 were deployed outside of the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Treaty states, by 1991 they numbered around 22,375, excluding peacekeepers.239 
Changes to the threat perceptions of the party leaders encouraged these developments. Of 
vital importance is the decline of the closed and secretive nature of military and defence 
decision-making. This is important because it encouraged the emergence of new theories and 
ideas regarding the military's roles. Gorbachev encouraged debate on issues related to 
security, and he actively sought to increase the policy input of civilians, a process begun by 
Brezlmev. 2-1° Gorbachev proposed a series of concepts that fanned his 'new political 
thinking.' These included a greater emphasis on the military's defensive rather than offensive 
role, improving relations \vith the West, and less ·emphasis on the military contribution to 
security. In 1986 Gorbachev said that "The guaranteeing of security ever more appears as a 
political problem, and it can be resolved only by political means."241 Furthem10re, Gorbachev 
countered the more pessimistic threat perceptions held by many officers. In 1986 he rebutted 
military warnings about American advanced weaponry and the threat posed by the US 
military-industrial complex.242 At least some members of the military hierarchy recognised 
the need for greater Soviet-US cooperation too. For example, Admiral William Crowe, US 
Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Sergei Akhromeev, Soviet Chief of the General 
m See McCarthy, pp750-2. . 
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Staff, formed a close friendship. 243 This is in marked contrast to the military's offensive 
orientation before Gorbachev when Grechko, the Minister of Defence, had declared the 
military "supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' 
aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear."244 
Gorbachev's perceptions were in tum encouraged by his realisation that many problems faced 
the Soviet Union, and that change was vital. Nichols argued that Gorbachev "inherited a state 
and a society that was, by his own admission, in precarious condition."245 Gorbachev realised 
that the emphasis on the military was causing a substantial drain on resources. In 1985 
defence and fixed defence investment was absorbing 45 percent of Soviet output, twice the 
average Western rates. 246 This drain was particularly serious because of the poor performance 
of the economy. This is shown by the deceleration of Gross National Product (GNP). 
Although it grew by 5.3 percent per year from 1966 to 1970, by the 1980 to 1985 period it 
was 2.4 percent, falling further to 2.3 percent from 1986 to 1988.247 By 1988 there were 
increasing food shortages and inflation. These developments encouraged Gorbachev to seek 
to re-allocate resources to civilian industry, and to promote the production of consumer 
goods. 248 Gorbachev also faced other issues, such as the growing Soviet inability to keep up 
with technological advances. Accompanying these issues was Gorbachev's willingness to act 
outside of the ideological conventions that had traditionally restricted the actions of the -
General Secretary.249 
Contrasting the overall decline of the military's role in protecting and promoting Soviet 
interests vis-a-vis the West was '.the dramatic increase in the emphasis that Gorbachev placed 
on its internal security role. Though the number of personnel involved in internal operations 
might not have rivalled the forces deployed outside of the Soviet Union at their 1985 peak, the 
number clearly increased. In December 1986 the military intervened in Alma Ata and again in 
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Tbilisi during April 1989. This intervention in Tbilisi caused much controversy as civilians 
were killed.250 The military was deployed in the Caucasus and Moldavia during 1990, and that 
year General Boris Gromov became Deputy Minister of Interior and established special units 
to deal with internal security with the use of military resources. 251 In fact in December 1990, 
Gorbachev issued a presidential decree. This condemned republics for undermining the 
military, and gave the Ministry of Defence and the KGB the authority to ensure the military's 
smooth functioning. 252 Later that month Gorbachev said that the military was "the most 
important bulwark" ensuring "internal and external security."253 Likewise, in January 1991, 
the Kremlin announced that army personnel would be deployed on the streets of the main 
cities with MVD forces. It was then announced in February that the number of patrols would 
increase from 1,740 to 2,636 and involve over 12,000 troops.254 This increasing reliance on 
the military by the late winter of 1990-1991 encouraged fears that Gorbachev was considering 
establishing a dictatorship based upon the military' s power.255 
The internal deployment of the military was encouraged by the growing threat that the Soviet 
Union would fragment as ethnic and regional nationalism increased. Challenges to Moscow's 
authority became increasingly direct as Gorbachev moved to restrncture the political system. 
In October 1988 Latvia declared sovereignty with Estonia following suit in November. 
Fmiher declarations occurred in 1989 as both Lithuania and Azerbaydzhan declared 
themselves sovereign. During 1989 organisations like RUK.h in Ukraine became active in 
demanding a larger role for the republics in policy-making. Most other republics followed the 
Baltic example the following year. Tensions increased as such developments occurred. The 
harassment and threatening of R"i.1ssians and other non-native residents increased substantially 
in Central Asia, the Baltics, Moldavia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. 256 William -Jackson also 
argued that nationalism increased throughout the Soviet Union. This was because 
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dissatisfaction over the progress of 'perestroika' grew, doubts grew over the authority of the 
Communist party, and policies that threatened the position of minority ethnic groups were 
encouraged by political and economic concerns. 257 It is evident that these developments 
influenced Gorbachev' s decision to deploy personnel. In August 1990 he told officers that it 
was "our 11111tual responsibility" to prevent internal developments from bringing the Soviet 
Union to the "brink of disaster," and that this might require "radical measures."258 
These developments caused concern in the military and semor officers placed increasing 
pressure on Gorbachev to act. Most generally, though many personnel opposed their use to 
uphold internal security, it is evident that personnel in the final year of the Soviet Union 
opposed its demise. In the March 1991 referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, 
90 percent in military precincts voted for its preservation. 259 Of particular concern to senior 
officers was the impact on its resources that the union's fragmentation would have, as 
republics sought to increase their power over conscripts. The military leadership denounced 
these moves and indicated that the use of force to quell etlmic disturbances was possible. 260 It 
was against this background that Gorbachev took an increasingly hard-line stance from 1990 
to 1991. This is shown by the decision of both civilian and military leaders to send Valentin 
Varennikov, Deputy Defence Minister and Conimander-in-Chief of Ground Forces, to 
Lithuania. 261 
Budgetary support 
Although the military had traditionally enjoyed a generous level of budgetary support, the 
transition from Communism saw this change. Under Gorbachev the level of budgetary 
support declined in real tern1s. This was in accordance with the re-orientation of the military 
away from its global role of protecting and promoting the Communist party's interests. 
Gorbachev was faced with various factors that discouraged a high level of defence 
expenditure and these are described after the level of expenditure is assessed. For instance, I 
have already discussed the increasingly ,inadequate performance of the economy and 
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Gorbachev's threat perceptions. However in addition, Gorbachev did not have the close ties to 
the military that might have made him more susceptible to its demands. The level of funds 
allocated to the military became progressively more controversial as 'glasnost' made the issue 
more open, and resources were increasingly needed elsewhere. 
It is difficult to accurately assess the level of defence expenditure, but although the defence 
budget increased in tenns of roubles, it appears to have fallen in real tem1s. The official 
defence budget in 1985 was 19,063 billion roubles and by 1991 it had increased to 96.560 
billion (see table 4). However inflation increased dramatically from -1.6 percent in 1985, to 
41 percent in 1990, and 89 percent in 1991.262 Soviet published data, which is likely to 
underestimate expenditure, indicates that in 1985 defence expenditure was US$241,500 
million, by 1991 it was $91,631 million in 1985 prices and exchange rates. This meant that 
defence expenditure had declined from 16.1 percent of the GDP to 11.1 percent (see table 4). 
The actual severity of cuts is debatable as Soviet figures are of dubious accuracy and 
estimates vary. However I believe that cuts, at least in real tenns, did occur. US intelligence 
calculated that the cuts in real tenns during 1989 and 1990 were between four and five 
percent.2<'3 The military hierarchy also publicly denounced cuts. In September 1989 Yazov 
claimed that it was wrong "to try to make reduction··of defense expenditures the sole means to 
liquidate the budget deficit and resolve all of today's social problems."264 Similarly, the 
increasingly harsh conditions personnel faced, and the cuts to the military's size all 
correspond with budget cuts. The production of key weapons declined too. The production of 
main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines, and inter-
continental ballistic missiles frorn 1990 to 1991 declined on average by 31.4 percent?'5 
The state of the economy, Gorbachev's personal position, the growing openness of defence 
appropriation, and the growing strain on resources encouraged this decline in real terms. I 
have already discussed the poor state of the economy and it is clear that this was influential. 
Eduard Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister, claimed in mid-1990 that "in squandering a 
quarter of our budget on military expenditures, we ruined the country. If things \Vent on like 
261 Porter, Red Armies, p53. See also Porter, Red Armies, pp49-55. 
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263 So,·iet Militmy Power (Washington DC: Department of Defence, n.d.), p34 quoted in Porter, Red Armies p45. 
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this, we would have no need for defense, as a ruined country and an impoverished people 
have no need for an army."266 It is also apparent that Gorbachev's more optimistic threat 
perceptions encouraged reductions. In January 1989 Gorbachev declared that "A preliminary 
study shows that we could cut them [defence expenditures] without weakening our state's 
security or its defense potential."267 Apart from the economy, Gorbachev also took power 
without strong links to the military and at least initially did not seek to identify himself with 
officers. Gorbachev had little experience in security affairs, having only entered the Politburo 
in 1980, and did not seek to develop a reputation of military experience like his 
predecessors. 268 Competition for resources increased too. Gorbachev attached increasing 
importance to the manufacturing of civilian machines and the military-industrial complex was 
under increasing pressure to produce civilian goods.269 Likewise, although the number of 
military personnel declined substantially, the number of personnel belonging to paramilitary 
forces, such as the KGB and the MVD, declined only slightly. They declined from 675,000 in 
1985 to 580,000 in 1991.270 
Popular support for the military 
The military had traditionally been officially highly regarded, and officers enjoyed a high 
status among civilians, though military service was"less positively perceived. However under 
Gorbachev the perception of the military, officers, and military service declined. This decline 
is evident at the highest level, as Gorbachev was increasingly willing to publicly reprimand 
the military. Likewise, fewer civilians showed an interest in joining the officer corps, the 
evasion of conscription became rampant, and personnel faced an increasingly hostile public. 
Hostility manifested itself in both verbal and physical attacks on personnel. This fall in 
support was encouraged by two key factors. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev 
discouraged a high level of support for the military. This is because military opposition to 
Gorbachev's policies encouraged moves against the military, and more open discussion of the 
military and its problems was allowed under the new General Secretary. Second, it became 
evident that the military was failing to perfgrm its allocated roles. The roles themselves were 
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also unpopular among many. Here the military's publicised failures in Afghanistan and 
controversial operations within the Soviet Union are of particular interest. 
Evidence of the increasingly negative perception of the military is widespread. At the highest 
level party leaders openly attacked the military. This is illustrated by Gorbachev's reaction to 
the military's failure to prevent Matthias Rust from violating Soviet airspace and landing his 
small plane in Red Square during May 1987. Gorbachev commented that this event 
demonstrated the presence of "powerful" negative phenomena in the military and declared 
that there must be no doubt about the military' s ability to defend the country. 271 Indeed Parrott 
wrote that the severity of Gorbachev's chastising of the military had not been seen in 
decades.272 Other high-ranking party officials also attacked the military. For example, when 
Shevardnadze resigned in December 1990 he criticised "boys in colonel's epaulets," and said 
that he could not reconcile himself "with what is happening in my country."273 
A fall in support is likewise evident among the general public, particularly during the later 
years. This is best shown by the absence of widespread support for the 1991 coup in chapter 
7. Apart from this, there is much evidence of increasingly hostile attitudes. Soviet newspapers 
increasingly published stories detailing the hosti'le reception many Afghanistan veterans 
received. 274 Opinion polls further indicate that many civilians did not support the military. 
Gabriel (1980) found that 6.2 percent of soldiers indicated that their families \Vere not happy 
with them serving, in 1990, 31 percent indicated this. 275 Another poll in December 1989 
found that 14 percent did not trust the military, by October 1991 this ,vas 36 percent. 276 A 
1990 survey actually found on-e in seven civilians believed that the am1y was no longer 
needed. 277 Political candidates like General Al'bert Makashov also received little support in 
the 1991 Russian presidential election. 278 
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Moreover people were increasingly willing to avoid the draft and to actually physically attack 
personnel. Before Gorbachev the number of individuals who escaped active or reserve service 
is estimated to have not exceeded 12 percent, and Gabriel found that 88.5 percent of young 
men believed that service \Vas unavoidable. 279 However under Gorbachev draft evasion 
became rampant. By the spring of 1991 on average the draft in the republics was only around 
68.3 percent fulfilled. 280 Indeed whereas in 1988 a survey found that 81 percent of young men 
were prepared to defend their country, by 1990 this had declined to 59 percent.281 Similarly, 
in 1975, 78 percent of enlisted personnel expressed a "great interest" in serving, by 1990 this 
was only 12 percent. 282 It was within this context that the number of applications for many 
officer schools declined. Rather than the tough competition for places at officer schools 
before Gorbachev, the Transbaykal MD had a shortfall of 54 percent of student numbers in 
1989.283 Physical attacks on personnel also became a major issue as civilians directly vented 
their rage. For example, serious crime against personnel increased, civilians killed 85 officers 
in 1989 and in the first quarter of 1990, 21 were murdered and a further 189 injured. 284 This is 
a dramatic development given that 81.4 percent of soldiers who served before 1979 indicated 
to Gabriel that most civilians treated them well. 285 
The decline of the military's image can essentially be attributed to two key factors. First and 
most importantly, the refonns instigated by Gorbachev encouraged and facilitated a decline in 
the level of support. Military opposition to Gorbachev's 'new thinking' led to civilian 
counter-attacks against the military, and efforts to accelerate 'perestroika' were accompanied 
by attacks on military recalcitrance and inefficiency. 286 Accompanying these developments 
was the emergence of' glasnost,' which facilitated the growth of negative attitudes. 'Glasnost' 
facilitated a marked increase in media coverage of issues relating to society-military 
interaction, especially those controversial. The media mentioned army activities and military 
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themes 142 times in 1983, by 1989 such mentions numbered 560.287 Thus, military problems, 
such as dedovschina (the brntal bullying of new recrnits), were publicised, and groups like the 
Committees of Soldiers' Mothers emerged to challenge the military.288 
Second, the military's roles under Gorbachev and its ability to perform these successfully was 
influential. This is because of the impact these roles had on the perception of the military. The 
roles allocated to the military led to conflict between the military and civilians, a development 
bound to encourage negative perceptions. Here the military's internal deployment caused 
disquiet, especially given the increasing nationalism of non-Russians and the bloody results of 
the military's deployment. 289 One survey in December 1989 found that even when protest was 
accompanied by a threat of violence or force the majority of people opposed the use of the 
arn1y. Even when protest disrupted the life of people or paralysed a city, a significant minority 
did not support the use of the arn1y (see tables 6A and 6B). Similarly, although high-ranking 
officers might have supported moves to suppress ethnic groups, personnel who carried out 
1 . f 1 290 sue 1 operations spoke o the popu ar hatred they encountered. 
Table 6A: Protest and the use of the Soviet Army 1989 
People were asked: "What should be the authorities'' position regarding protests if the protest 
is accompanied by a threat of violence or force?" 
Authorities response: Respondent's opinion: 
(percentage) 
Not interfere 3 
Engage in dialogue with its _organisers 43 
Intervene using militsia and am1y 45 
Can't say 10 
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Table 6B: Protest and the use of the Soviet Army 1989 
People were asked: "What should be the authorities' position regarding protests if the protest 
disrupts the normal life of people or paralyses a city?" 
Authorities response: Respondent's opinion: 
(percentage) 
Not interfere 2 
Engage in dialogue with its organisers 31 
Intervene using militsia and army 57 
Can't say 11 
This survey was carried out in December 1989 and involved 2521 respondents. Source: OmvTs, no.9, 1990, 
VTsIOM all union survey, quoted in Matthew Wyman, "Russian Political Culture: Evidence from Public 
Opinion Surveys," Joumal of Communist Studies 10, no.1 (March 1994): Table 24, p50. 
Another role which was conducive to negative attitudes was the military's deployment in 
Afghanistan. This role became increasingly controversial as the military failed to achieve a 
clear victory despite the costs, both in material and human terms. I have already noted that 
Afghanistan war veterans were increasingly vilified, but in addition to this there was a general 
'backlash' against the military after its withdrawal in 1989. This is shown by the increasing 
doubt that newspapers cast over the decision to invade. 291 In early 1986 Gorbachev himself 
refe1Ted to the war as a ''bloody stump."292 The military's negative image \Vas reinforced by 
its seemingly insatiable demands for resources, despite the economic difficulties, particularly 
as information about defence expenditure was declassified. 
Morale 
In line with the poor level of support for the military, low morale was a widespread problem. 
Evidence of the serious lack of morale includes surveys of personnel, the exodus of large 
numbers of personnel from the military, and perhaps most graphically, the increased 
frequency of suicides. I attribute this decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition 
upon the military. This is fundamentally l?ecause the military moved from being a well-
supported institution with close ties to the party elite and Soviet power, to one undertaking 
increasingly unpopular roles, and one facing the collapse of the party and empire it was sworn 
to defend. More specifically, the conditions of service for personnel became increasingly 
intolerable. This is an important source of disillusionment given at least officers had 
291 Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp318-20. 
292 Schofield, pl08. 
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traditionally received favourable treatment. Such poor conditions included the lack of 
sufficient accommodation for personnel, and the increasingly inadequate level of military pay. 
Though morale among conscripts had traditionally been low, evidence indicates that their 
morale declined further, along with that of the once highly motivated officers. The opinions 
and actions of personnel that increasingly showed a sense of pessimism and despair best 
illustrate this trend. Indicative of this is a 1990 survey where only 40 percent of officers rated 
· their job as satisfactory.293 By January 1992, one poll of 2,500 officers found that 95 percent 
were demoralised.294 An increasing number of officers left the corps too. From 1988 to 1990, 
29· 
3 percent of the officer corps were released at their own request. ) These developments 
contrast the impo1iance officers had previously placed on their military careers, as I have 
already noted that most soldiers complained to Gabriel (1980) that officers placed their 
careers above their men. Most graphically, the number of suicides by personnel increased. In 
June 1991, an estimated 4,000 committed suicide annually, up from perhaps 3,000 during the 
1970s.296 Dese1iion also increased. Gabriel (1980) found that only 23.9 percent of soldiers 
believed that stories of soldiers deserting were very common or common.297 However in 1990 
· 798 1t was reported that 1,188 had dese1ied from the Transcaucasus MD alone. -
I attribute this decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition upon the military. The 
decline occurred as the military moved from being a well-suppmied and elite institution, to 
one increasingly viewed in negative terms. It was also facing the collapse of the party and 
empire it was sworn to defend. This is shown by the negative impact on morale that the 
decline of Soviet power and fragmentation of the Soviet Empire had on many. The military 
withdrawals to many personnel were humiliating and perceived to be detrimental to 
security. 299 The withdrawals caused numerous problems, such as the lack of proper 
accommodation I examine below. The simultaneous withdrawal from the Third World had a 
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similar impact.300 Such withdrawals starkly contrasted the glorious advances and expansion of 
the Soviet military in previous times. Accompanying this decline was the discrediting of the 
Communist ideology. Although I believe that many personnel, particularly soldiers, did not 
have a close bond of loyalty to Communism it is clear that many senior officers became 
disillusioned. For instance, Akhromeev, the fom1er Chief of the General Staff, committed 
suicide after the 1991 coup. Akhromeev wrote in a last letter "its very depressing to be told 
that everything you have worked for and fought for over 50 years is wrong. "301 
The conditions of service for personnel also became increasingly intolerable, especially for 
officers accustomed to favourable treatment. Although many personnel had always 
experienced some degree of hardship, it is evident that conditions deteriorated under 
Gorbachev. The withdrawal of forces to the Soviet Union placed great strain on 
accommodation and led to shortages. In January 1989, an estimated 170,500 military families 
were without housing in the Soviet Union, and by September 1991, 292,000 officers and NCO 
families were without housing.302 Moreover the standard of accommodation for those 
personnel that were not homeless was substandard. In mid-1990 an estimated 74,000 officers 
lived in accommodation so substandard that it rivalled the worst slums in the West. 303 This 
contrasts Gabriel's survey of personnel who served before 1979 that found 50 percent of 
officers believed that their accommodation was adequate or better than civilian housing.304 
Such conditions no doubt facilitated the rise of heath problems, as from 1980 to 1990 nervous, 
and psychiatric disorders among draftees increased by 50 percent and internal diseases by 38 
percent.305 Inadequate military pay also became an increasingly controversial issue. Whereas 
Soviet officers had traditionally been well paid, in 1990 it was claimed that bus drivers earned 
more than Majors or Lieutenant Colonels.306 Finally, the reduction of the military meant that 
many personnel had to take forced retirement without either the skill to find civilian work or 
an adequate pension. 
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Cohesion and size 
The military changed dramatically during this period. The changes essentially occurred 
because of the repercussions of Gorbachev's reforms. These changes are important as they 
affected the military's ability to fulfil its allocated roles, both through detem1ining the 
quantity of resources available and the ability to effectively use these resources. The military 
was negatively influenced as its cohesion and size declined. Examining cohesion, the 
emergence of salient divisions in the five relationships that largely shaped institutional 
cohesion clearly is indicative of a decline. More specifically, the relationship between the 
services, officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various 
ethnic groups is assessed. After this assessment the factors that contributed to this lack of 
cohesion are outlined. I believe that cohesion fell because of the divisive developments that 
occuned throughout the Soviet Union. For instance, controversy over the military's position 
in politics, and domestic tum1oil such as the growing nationalism of the Soviet republics, 
were divisive. 
Inter-service and officer cohesion declined under Gorbachev to the point of open conflict. 
This lack of cohesion is best shown by the 1991 coup where both the services and officers 
took different positions. The degree of service cohes'ion is in stark contrast to that before 1985 
when the services united in opposition to Khrushchev's moves to restructure the military, and 
when officers were generally united during debates over national security. The most salient 
di\'ision that arose involved the services and their officers over whether to support or oppose 
intervention. Although the chiefs of the airborne forces, the air force, and SRF actively 
opposed the coup, the chiefs of ground forces and air defence forces supported intervention. 307 
Most however appear to have remained neutral during the intervention like the Commander of 
the Leningrad MD. 308 Colonel General Evgenii Shaposlmikov, the head of the air force 
promoted to Defence Minister after the coup, perhaps best summed up the lack of cohesion. 
The Colonel General claimed that the members of the General Staff were reluctant to openly 
state their stance on the coup to one another because they rarely socialised and did not trust 
one another. Shaposhnikov commented "I think if we [the General Staffj had had a human 
atmosphere in our headquarters, may be we could have shared opinions with each other, but. .. 
such things never happened." Therefore, he exchanged only a few guarded comments with an 
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Admiral as he left the meeting. 309 The lack of cohesion is further shown by the replacement of 
9 of the 17 members of the Defence Ministry Collegium after the coup. 31° Correspondingly, 
divisions occurred between officers of different rank. An army intelligence officer who 
defected to Yeltsin during the coup said, "Most middle officers are democrats. But the 
generals are another story."311 Other officers like Lieutenants also concluded that the coup 
was illegal. 312 
Reform and the changes to the military's role also eroded unity. Services like the navy, SRF, 
air force, and air defence forces, which required skilled personnel and were relatively small in 
size, supported moves from conscription to volunteers. However the ground forces, with the 
exception of the airborne forces, suppotied the continued use of conscripts. Mikhail Tsypkin 
argued that the ground forces with their lower skill requirements and their large size, which 
made a reliance on volunteers unrealistic, encouraged this. 313 Similarly, the air force and 
navy vvere in conflict with the ground forces over the lessons that could be drawn from the 
1990-1991 Gulfwar. 314 An increasingly divisive debate also developed over the proposed and 
actual changes to the military. Evidence of this includes the divergent attitudes among 
personnel on institutional reform and the military's internal role. 315 The military's increased 
political role exacerbated divisions too. 316 
Further instances of conflict between officers are also evident. Fundamental and public 
disagreements between senior officers and those in junior and middle positions occmTed. This 
conflict manifested itself in junior officers increasingly seeking redress via politics rather than 
through the military hierarchy. -JI 7 This contrasts the respect, at least in public, shown by 
officers to their superiors before Gorbachev. For instance, officers would ignore the mistakes 
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made by their superiors irrespective of their magnitude. 318 The feeling among junior officers 
that their superiors were not interested in the increasing problems that they faced, the issue of 
separatism, and refom1s encouraged such conflict. 319 Indeed one 1990 poll of officers found 
that one third believed that their commanders behaved toward their subordinates in a rude 
' 
anogant, and disrespectful way. 320 Moreover, officers had divergent political attitudes, as 
junior officers generally supported refom1ist democrats but senior officers continued to 
suppoti the Communist party. An analysis of the 1989 voting patterns among military 
People's Deputies in the Russian legislature showed that over 50 percent of junior and middle 
officers voted for Democratic Russia. However over 50 percent of senior officers voted for 
the Communist party. 321 Correspondingly, in 1990, 82 percent of senior officers in the 
legislature voted against Democratic Russia. However 63 percent of middle officers and 73 
percent of junior officers voted for Democratic Russia. 322 Finally, splits between officers 
arose over the desirability of withdravvals from East Europe and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union.323 
Under Gorbachev, the division between personnel and political officers widened. I have 
argued that high-ranking officers continued to strongly support the Communist paiiy relative 
to lower-ranked officers. This encouraged greater ··animosity between political officers and 
those officers not part of the military hierarchy. For instance, the high CC?mmand defended the 
continued role of the political organs because they felt they maintained stability. 324 However 
by the later Gorbachev years even high-ranking officers recognised the need to refom1 the 
political organs. For example, Akhromeev in early 1990 said that as a multi-pa1iy political 
system developed it would not be possible to have a variety of parties exist in the military, 
and hence "1 think the Am1ed Forces will become a nonpartisan organization."325 Similarly, 
when political officers in the Kaliningrad region circulated petitions calling for Yeltsin's 
removal as head of the Russian parliament it appears that most junior officers refused to sign 
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them.326 However the 1991 coup is the most dramatic example of the deterioration of ties as 
most personnel refused to actively support it despite the MPA's support, and after the coup 
the militaiy leadership moved to disband the organisation. This relationship developed against 
a background of growing opposition to the Communist party's role in the military. According 
to a 1990 poll of officers taken by the MP A, and thus likely to overstate support for the 
Communist party, at most 45 percent of officers supported the party. 327 
With regard to relations between soldiers and officers, these remained tense. The continued 
animosity between officers and soldiers is most clearly shown by the 1991 coup, during which 
many soldiers indicated that they would disobey their officers if ordered to fire their weapons 
at civilians. I cover this in-depth when I focus on the military's mood so will only briefly 
outline this unwillingness here. For instance, when one soldier near Red Square was asked if 
he would follow an order to shoot at civilians he answered "No, I will not."328 Similarly, 
Yeltsin wrote that an attack on the White House would have required shooting "the pride and 
hope of Russia right in the face." However "Obviously, the army could not do this."329 This 
unwillingness was encouraged by the negative perception of officers among soldiers. 
Conscripts called their officers "jackals" and one former paratrooper wrote immediately after 
the coup "it's ve1y bad for novices [to the ~ilitary] ... They get the thick end of 
everything. "330 
Ethnic divisions also grew with the growing separatism and nationalisrn in the republics. 
Though the number of Russian speaking conscripts increased during the last years of 
Gorbachev's rule because of \.Videspread draft evasion, from 1985 to 1989 the number of 
Russian speakers drafted in the spring intake averaged only 43.2 percent.331 The increasing 
presence of diverse customs, and an inability to communicate in an institution where racism 
was evident, occurred against a background of increased ethnic volatility in the republics. 
Ethnic tensions were thus encouraged, particularly given the military did not move to 
effectively counter these problems. In 1989, up to 80 percent of officers had not been taught 
326 "Another Anonymous Appeal For Signatures," 1v/oscow News, no.5, 2-10 Febrnary 1991, p2, quoted in 
Meyer, "How the threat," footnote 18, p13. 
m "Chto pokazalo anketirovaniye," KZ, 26 July 1990, p4, quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military 
Relations, p556. 
328 Keller, "The Soviet Crisis," pAl. 
329 Yeltsin, The View, p99. 
330 The /11depe11de11t, 22 August 1991, p6, quoted in Brian Moynahan "The Soviet Coup- Red Army Discontent 
Was At Heart Of Attempted Coup," in Reuters, 22 August 1991. 
331 Table 2, in Crisis In The Former Soviet Militm)1, p23. 
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how to control relations between different ethnic groups.332 Although Ball had earlier found 
no strong link between ethnicity and conflict between personnel, under Gorbachev it is 
apparent that ethnicity did play an increasingly important role in motivating conflict. In 1989, 
20 percent of all crimes in the military and 40-70 percent of serious breaches of discipline 
were caused by ethnic tensions.333 Furthennore, in May 1990 it was reported that 80 percent 
of all criminal hazing incidents in one unit were ethnically based, a figure dramatically higher 
than that a year before.334 These figures indicate that tensions increased under Gorbachev. 
This is because 31.9 percent of soldiers told Gabriel (1980) that ethnic discrimination was not 
common. 335 Similarly, figures published in 1980 indicated that by the end of service 60-65 
percent of friendships between personnel were not based on shared ethnic and regional 
origins. 336 
Overall, I believe that cohesion fell during the Gorbachev period. Although divisions did exist 
prior to Gorbachev these became increasingly salient and this is most clearly shown by the 
1991 coup. Falls occurred with regard to inter-service, officer, and military and political 
officer cohesion. In addition, the division between officers and soldiers remained stark. It was 
against this background that General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence Minister, declared 
that the Russian leadership had taken control of an am1y "that was practically 
unmanageable."337 Similarly, scholars expressed their concern over the potential 
fragmentation of the military. 338 
A significant decline also occuned in the number of personnel during this period. The 
reduction of the military resulted primarily from the new policies of the party leadership, and 
developments in the Soviet Union. Changes occurred in accordance with Gorbachev's 
downplaying of the threat posed by the West, and his recognition that military expenditure 
needed to be reduced because of the lack of economic growth. Apaii from these two points 
that I have already assessed, the reduction of the military occurred against a background of 
332 "Intematsional'nomy vospitaniyu-bol'she partiynogo vnimaniya," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sit no.5, 1989, 
f:8, quoted in Herspring, Russian Civil-Militm)' Relations, pl 18. 
-33 Colonel O A Bel'kov, "Light and Shades of Relations Between the Nationalities," Armiya, no no., October 
199 L p42, quoted in Crisis /11 The Former Soviet Militmy, p4. 
334 Argw11e11ty i fakty 110.8, May 1990, n.p., quoted in Porter, Red Armies, p38. 
335 Gabriel, Red Legions, p72. 
330 V. Kovalev, p140, quoted in Jones, Red Army, pl 94. 
337 Russian TV, 28 February 1993, quoted in Lepingwell, "Restrncturing the Russian Military," RFEIRL 
Research Report 2, no.25, 18 June 1993, p17 quoted in Pavel Baev, The Russian Army In A Time Of Troubles 
(Oslo: Peace Research Institute; London: Sage Publishers Ltd, 1996), p38. 
338 Po11er, Red Armies, p93. 
143 
growing public interest in restructuring the military, and an emphasis among officers on 
qualitative rather than quantitative factors in modem warfare. Moreover, in practical terms it 
became increasingly difficult to maintain the size of the military as central control over the 
republics decreased, thereby reducing the number of potential draftees, and draft evasion 
grew. 
It is clear that the number of personnel declined dramatically under Gorbachev. This contrasts 
the enlargement of the military after the 1917 transition to Communism. From 1983 to 1985 
the number of personnel in the key services increased on average by 18 percent. However 
from 1985 to 1991 they declined by 26.6 percent (see tables 4 and 7 and graph 1). In terms of 
the percentage of personnel, the size of the SRF declined the most as it fell by 45.3 percent. 
The number of Soviet ground force personnel fell from 1985 to 1991 by 29.8 percent, navy 
personnel by 6.3 percent, and air force personnel by 26.3 percent. To put this in perspective, 
the number of ground force persmmel in the Warsaw Treaty states fell by an average of 12.1 
percent, navy personnel by 9.1 percent, and air force persom1el by 17.7 percent. 339 The Soviet 
services lost the largest number of personnel in 1989 when 350,000 lost their positions (see 
table 7). This is largely because of the sweeping reductions to the ground forces that occuned 
after Gorbachev in 1988 pledged to unilaterally reduce the military. Apart from 1989, 
reductions were most severe in 1986, largely because of the cuts to the air defence service. 
Contrasting this, in 1987 the number of personnel actually increased, mainly because of the 
moves to strengthen the air defence service, perhaps because of the Rust episode that year 
(see table 7). In addition, fmiher reforms of the military's size and other changes, like 
reducing its dependence on conscripts, were increasingly contemplated.340 
The growing realisation that cuts were required and the impracticality of maintaining the 
military in its current state is widely evident. Under Gorbachev the restructuring of the 
military became an increasingly public issue. Apart from Gorbachev's moves to reduce the 
military civilians like V.L. Lapygin, Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on 
Defence and State Security, called for military reform.341 Indeed by the later years military 
leaders recognised that restructuring was required. In November 1990 the Ministry of Defence 
announced a 10-year draft reform plan that called for the reduction of the armed forces by an 
339 The Militmy Balance 1985-1986, pp31-6; and The lvfilitmy Balance 1991-1992, pp84-93. 
340 See Arnett, "The Soviet Debate," pp277-97. 
341 "Glasnost'i gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost' ," lzvestiia, 26 June 1989, p2, quoted in Holloway, "State, 
society," pp 17-8. 
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Table 7: Number of Soviet Personnel in Key Military Services 1985-1991 




1985 1,995,000 300,000 480,000 635,000 570,000 
1986 1,991,000 298,000 451,000 371,000 453,000 
1987 2,000,000 298,000 477,000 520,000 454,000 
1988 1,900,000 298,000 458,000 520,000 444,000 
1989 1,596,000 287,000 437,000 502,000 448,000 
1990 1,473,000 260,000 410,000 500,000 420,000 
1991 1,400,000 164,000 450,000 475,000 420,000 
1985-1991 -29.8 -45.3 -6.3 -25.2 -26.3 
percentage 
change 
Sources: The Military Balance /985-/986, pp21-24; IISS, Miiitmy Balance /986-/987 (London: IISS, 1987), 
pp36-9; IISS, !vfilitm)' Balance /987-1988, (London: IISS, 1988), pp33-7; Militmy Balance 1988-/989, pp33-6; 
Militwy Balance /989-/990, pp32-5; Militmy Balance 1990-1991, pp34-6; and Jv!ilitmJ' Balance I 991-1992, 
pp36-8. The percentage change figures are rounded up. 
estimated 560,000-760,000 by the end of 1995. 342 Members of the military also realised that 
modem warfare required high quality forces rather than large but poor quality forces. Colonel 
General Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, in early 1989 commented that "the 
future of the an11ed forces must be conditioned by qualitative parameters, not quantitative 
ones."343 More specifically, the limited change to the size of the navy occurred against a 
background of strenuous opposition from the service, whereas Gorbachev had taken steps 
immediately after taking power to reduce the influence of the SRF.344 Finally, in practical 
terms it became increasingly difficult to maintain the size of the military, as central control 
342USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, "USSR Ministry of Defense draft military reform concept," 
Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik no.48, November 1990, pp5-10, quoted in Arnett, "The Soviet Debate," p279. With 
regard to structural reform also see John Lepingwell, "Towards a Post-Soviet Army," Orbis 36, no.l (Winter 
1992): pp93-102; and Jacob Kipp, "The Soviet Ground Forces between Repression and Reform," Defense 
Analysis 7, no.2/3 (1991): pp216-24. 
343 M. Moiseyev, "S pozitsiy oboronitel'noy doktriny," KZ, 10 Febrnary 1989, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The 
Soviet military and Change," p323. 
344 See Nichols, Sacred Cause, pp219-21, 142-5. 
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over the republics decreased and draft evasion grew. For example, in October 1990 the 
Armenian Supreme Soviet suspended the All-Union law on compulsory military service. 
Similarly, it became increasingly difficult to obtain suitable draftees. In Leningrad during 
1988, 3,000 draftees were rejected as unfit for service, by 1990 the number had increased by 
,4-50 percent: ::, 
Expertise 
Finally, the military continued to lack the expertise that was needed to successfully execute 
the operations that its roles entailed, and expertise actually declined. The military's 
performance in Afghanistan and within the Soviet Union itself is indicative of this 
inadequacy. I have already examined many of the factors that contributed to this lack of 
expertise. However I believe that three factors are most important in explaining this 
inadequacy and these are described after the level of expertise is assessed. First, the military 
was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. This is shown by the use of the 
military to uphold domestic security despite its inexperience here. Second, personnel of a high 
quality increasingly left without being replaced by qualified personnel. Third, the quality and 
quantity of training fell. This is indicated by surveys of personnel during this period. 
The Afghanistan war and the military's deployment in the Soviet Union show that the military 
lacked the expertise it needed. With regard to the Afghanistan war, the military remained 
unable to achieve a clear victory. In the last major offensive launched in 1987 the Soviets 
encountered many difficulties in fighting the mujaheddin, and the guenillas had taken back 
the territory they lost within a nionth. 346 Dennis Marshall-Hasdell after assessing the military 
concluded "many of the basic problems" of fighting in Afghanistan "were never fully 
addressed."347 With regard to the military's internal deployment, inadequate expertise is best 
shown when I assess the level of expertise during the 1991 coup in my study of the military's 
capacity to intervene. Likewise, the military proved itself to be incapable of avoiding 
controversy and civilian casualties when n~eeting internal threats. This is illustrated by the 
military's actions in Tbilisi. Furthern1ore, surveys of personnel indicate that expertise had 
declined. In a June 1990 survey, only 6 percent of soldiers on average believed that the 
combat skills in their units were good. Although officers had more positive opinions, none 
345 Major General A Obukhov, "The State of Military Conscription in Leningrad," BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 13 May 1991, quoted in Crisis In The Former Soviet militmy, p4. 
346 See Schofield, pp 116-25. 
347 Marshall-Hasdell, p37. 
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believed that the level of combat skill was excellent, and on average only 46 percent believed 
that their combat skills were good.348 This compares with 40.4 percent of soldiers, and 58.4 
percent of connnanding officers, telling Gabriel (1980) that their units would perfo1m well or 
ve1y well in combat. 349 
Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not prepared. This is best 
illustrated by its domestic performance, particularly during the 1991 coup, which I examine 
later. Apart from this, experienced persom1el left without being suitably replaced. A 1989 
survey found that 90 percent of the officers leaving the military were considered excellent or 
good, and 210 junior officers in the Kiev MD alone applied for a discharge in the first eight 
months of 1991, compared to 200 throughout 1990.350 This problem was compounded by the 
lack of suitable replacements, a problem I have already noted. Moreover, the inability to fulfil 
draft quotas meant that quality standards had to be reduced. Whereas in 1988, 2.2 percent of 
the Leningrad call-up had failed to complete their secondary education, this had increased to 
13 percent by 1990.351 This contrasts the increase in qualifications held by personnel before 
Gorbachev. 352 Similarly, I have already noted that the number of draftees speaking Russian 
fell from 1985 to 1989 and this is likely to have hindered training. This is because the Russian 
language was used in the training and instructing of personnel. Finally, the quality and 
quantity of training fell. One 1990 survey of high-ranking officers found that on average 56.5 
percent indicated that they believed training had worsened since 1980.353 The quantity of 
training likewise declined. In the above survey over 88.5 percent indicated that their combat 
training was not being completed.354 More specifically, in the late 1970s Soviet air force 
pilots flew 100 homs per year, in 1991 they flew only 20-25 hours.355 
348 Voennyy Vestnik, June 1990, p43, quoted in Crisis In The Former Soviet Milita,y, p24. 
349 Gabriel, Red Legions, p216. 
350 S S'yedin and V Mukhin, "Officers request Discharge into the Reserve," Argument I Fakty, 13 April 1990, 
pl; and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 August 1991, both quoted in The Crisis In The Former Soviet 
Milita,yp7. 
351 Major General A Obukhov, "The State of Military Conscription in Leningrad," BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 13 May 1991, quoted in Crisis In The Former Soviet mi/ita,y, p5. 
352 See Jones, Red Army, pp57-63. 
353 Voennyy Vestnik, June 1990, p43, quoted in Crisis In The Fonner Soviet Milita,y, Table 3, p23-4. 
354 Ibid 
355 Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Milita,y Posture for Fiscal Year 1979, 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1978), p112, quoted in Joshua Epstein, Measuring 
Milita,)1 Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p108; and "Reforma 
vannii: orientiry dla voem1oy pressy," KZ, 25 May 1993, n.p., quoted in Dale Herspring, "The Russian Military: 
Three Years On," Communist and Post Communist Studies 28, no.2 (June 1995): pl 70. 
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In summary, from 1985 to 1991 major changes occurred which affected the military. Most 
importantly, the structure of the civil-military relationship changed. Although characteristics 
of the penetration model remained, the central role played by the Communist party and its 
control structures declined. One outcome of this was the military's increased political activity. 
Of the Soviet models, I believe that the participatory model appears to best explain these 
developments, but all three are problematic. Of importance too are the changes to the 
institutional roles that occurred, as the military became increasingly focused on domestic 
security. Popular support of the military and budgetary support also declined. This in tum 
reduced morale. Cohesion and size declined too. Finally, the military's expertise remained 
inadequate and actually worsened. 
Conclusions 
This chapter introduces the case study through examining the characteristics of the Soviet 
military before and during the transition from Communism. The chapter first provides a brief 
overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars to examine the Soviet 
civil-military relationship. This is to facilitate a better understanding of the relationship. Here 
three models are most important. First, Kolkowicz's conflict model stressed the conflict prone 
nature of the civil-military relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, 
the symbiotic model put forward by Odom emphasised civil-military cooperation and the 
strength of the party's supremacy. Finally, according to Colton's participatory model the 
relationship was one of conflict and cooperation. I believe that the participatory model is most 
useful in assessing the Soviet civil-military relationship from 1917 to 1985. This is mainly 
because Colton clearly wrote of the various degrees of military involvement in politics, and 
those factors that influenced its political quiescence. Second, I believe that many of his 
arguments are particularly relevant in light of the transition. Third, the relationship was not 
one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. Finally, various scholars who have examined Soviet 
civil-military relations in greater depth concluded that the model is the most valid. 
I then examined the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition. Most 
importantly, 1 believe that the Soviet civil-military structure best resembles Nordlinger's 
penetration model and was based on the Communist party's authority. This model is used to 
examine the Soviet civil-military structure namely because it is not confined to the case study, 
and it avoids some of the problems that the three previous models have. Soviet civil-military 
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relations are characteristic of a penetration model. This is shown by the penetration of the 
institution by the Communist party that ensured its supremacy, the military not directly 
threatening the civilian leaders until the 1991 coup. Second, the Soviet military's primary role 
was to protect and promote the interests of the Communist party. This involved the military 
being externally focused and countering the perceived security threat posed by the West. 
Third, the level of budgetary support and official support of the military were both positive. 
However popular perceptions differed according to rank. Thus, officers had a higher level of 
morale relative to soldiers. Fomih, cohesion was not defective to the point of threatening the 
central command structure. Here I examined five key institutional relationships and found 
that, except for a salient division between officers and soldiers, cohesion appears to have been 
adequate. Apaii from this, although tensions are certain to have existed, relations between the 
services, officers, military personnel and political officers, and the various ethnic groups that 
made up the military were not seriously threatened by conflict. Finally, I believe that the 
military's expertise was inadequate. Most indicative of this are the military's experiences in 
the Afghanistan war. Overall, I believe that the military held a privileged position in Soviet 
society and that it was a powerful institution. 
I next examined how the transition from Communism impacted on the military. Most 
importantly, changes to the structure of the civil..:military relationship had a significant impact. 
The fundamental change here involved the weakening of the Communist party and changes to 
its control methods that had characterised the penetration model. Correspondingly, 
Communist paiiy membership· became less important and then was discouraged. These 
changes occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and implement policy 
changes. A key indicator of the decline of the party's authority is the military's greater 
political role during the 1985 to 1991 period. However characteristics of the penetration 
model remained when Gorbachev deemed them useful to his quest for greater control. Here 
the continuing role that politics could play in influencing promotions and the retaining of 
secret police are patiicularly relevant. I again believe that the three Soviet models are 
problematic but that the participatory model appears to remain most valid. 
With regard to the military's roles, these did not change in the sense that the General 
Secretary retained the power to deploy the military. However the orientation of the milita1y 
changed substantially from an external anti-West focus to an internal role and to correspond 
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with Gorbachev's greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. More specifically, domestic 
developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats, which in tum were met with 
military deployment. For instance, the fall of the Communist party's authority and the policy 
of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' facilitated ethnic tensions, that in tum promoted grievances and 
separatist aspirations. 
Dramatic reductions to budgetary support, popular support, and military morale all occurred 
under Gorbachev. The real level of budgetmy support changed in accordance with the re-
orientation of the military. Various factors discouraged defence expenditure. These included 
the inadequate performance of the economy and Gorbachev's perceptions, namely that the 
military global role should be reduced. The perception of the military, officers, and military 
service also declined. This decline is evident at the highest level and among the civilian 
population, as fewer were willing to serve and personnel even were physically attacked. Two 
key factors encouraged this fall of support. First and most importantly, the reforms instigated 
by Gorbachev encouraged and facilitated a decline in the level of support. Second, it became 
evident that the militmy was failing to perform its allocated roles and the roles themselves 
were unpopular among many. Accompanying this, and the increasingly harsh conditions 
personnel faced, a decline in morale is evident. Opinion surveys indicated that pessimism 
among personnel increased and this equated with problems like dese1iion. More graphically, 
the frequency of suicide increased. 
The cohesion and size of the military changed dramatically under Gorbachev, but expertise 
remained inadequate. Changes essentially occmTed because of the repercussions of 
Gorbachev's reforms. Examining the militmy's cohesion, the emergence of salient divisions 
clearly indicates that a decline occurred, and this is reflective of the divisions that emerged 
throughout the Soviet Union. More specifically, the relationship between the services, 
officers, political officers and military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic 
groups was assessed. Here fmiher tension? emerged as divergent views were held of the 
transitional changes, of the actions of one another, and of the responsibility for problems that 
personnel experienced. With regard to its size, this decline is clear given the numerical 
decline of personnel. This reflected the different priorities of the party leaders and the impact 
of their reforms on the human resources available. Finally, the military continued to lack the 
expertise that was needed to successfully execute the operations that its roles entailed. This is 
best shown by the militaiy's performance in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Three factors 
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explain this inadequacy. First, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly 
prepared. Second, personnel of a high quality left without being replaced by similarly 
qualified personnel. Third, the quality and quantity of training fell. 
Therefore, I believe that in the context of the Soviet transition from Communism hypothesis 
one is valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to 
negatively impact upon the military. This is because the transition changed the structure of 
the civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, 
military morale, and cohesion and size. Likewise, the expertise of personnel changed. It is 
equally clear that this change was overwhelmingly negative. 
The following chapter continues to assess hypothesis one but within the context of the 1992 to 
1996 period. During this period the new regime led by Yeltsin governed as the Communist 
regime had collapsed. The examination of this period is via the framework used here. The 
chapter then assesses whether there was a threat that the military would stage a coup. To 
identify this threat I briefly document the threats of force made by military personnel against 
the new regime, and then examine relevant opinions publicised during this period. This shows 
that the threat was recognised and deemed serious· enough to wainnt discussion. The brief 
outline of the coup threat provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are 
evaluated. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a 
coup and their importance can vary. These factors are detailed in the introduction. With 
regard to hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup 
conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REGIME TRANSITION, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY, AND THE 
THREAT OF A COUP: 1992-1996 
This chapter examines the second stage of the transition from Communism before briefly 
outlining the threat of a military coup during this period. The main section of the chapter 
entails an assessment of the military under the new regime led by Yeltsin. During this period 
the impact of the collapse of both the Soviet Union and Communist ideology reverberated 
throughout the Russian Federation. The military was changed by these dramatic events and 
this impact is examined according to the framework I have developed. Thus, the structure of 
the civil-military relationship and the militaiy's roles are first outlined. Budget and popular 
support for the military is then examined. Following this, military cohesion and size are 
assessed. Finally, the military's expertise is evaluated. After the transition's impact on the 
military is assessed I outline the threat posed to the new regime by a coup. Here I briefly 
document the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime, and then 
examine relevant opinions publicised during this period. These show that the coup threat was 
recognised and deemed serious enough to wan-ant discussion. 
Therefore, hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon 
the military, is evaluated here during the changes from 1992 to 1996. The outlining of the 
coup threat provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are evaluated in the 
following chapters. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to 
stage a coup and their importance can vary. These factors are listed in the introduction. With 
regard to hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four a regime transition can be 
coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene. 
The Regime Transition· and the Military: 1992-1996 
Structure of the civil-military relationship 
The transitional impact upon the structure of the civil-military relationship remains of greatest 
importance, as it directly affects the strength of civilian control and the decisions of the 
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civilian leaders. This ultimately determines how the military operates. The dramatic collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the Communist regime had a major impact upon the structure of the 
civil-military relationship. Two key trends are evident during this period. First, moves were 
made to re-build the structure to reflect the post-Soviet environment, an environment in which 
the traditional civilian leadership was now absent. This meant that the structure needed to be 
based on the new Yeltsin led regime controlling the Russian military, as opposed to the now 
defunct Communist party controlling the Soviet militaiy. 1 This is illustrated by developments 
during the immediate post-Soviet period. Second, despite the structural changes that occurred, 
characteristics of the penetration model remained. Of most relevance here is the continued 
promotion of a political ideology, and the presence of secret police to maintain surveillance 
over the military. This reflected the aim of the new regime's leaders to establish personal 
control over the military, thereby strengthening their own political positions. After the 
changes to the structure and the continued characteristics of the penetration model are 
outlined, I shall assess the validity of the three models that traditionally dominated the 
Western study of Soviet civil-militaiy relations. These are the conflict, participatory, and 
symbiotic models. Given the dramatically altered nature of the civil-military structure, I 
believe that the usefulness of these models became ever more doubtful. 
The development of the Russian military occurred after the collapse of the Soviet military and 
it became apparent that a unified militaty mirroring the former institution could not be 
maintained. Yeltsin continued to seek a unified military and pledged that Russia would 
establish its own military only after and if all the remaining republics did so. However as 
inter-republic tensions hindered ·moves to retain a unified military of the CIS, Yeltsin decreed 
the fonnation of the Russian Defence Ministry in March 1992 and initially named himself 
Defence Minister. The following month, Grachev, and Andrei Kokoshin, a civilian academic 
and renowned security analyst, were named as the first Deputy Defence Ministers. This move 
was encouraged by the goal of balancing the military's concerns and the demands by 
refonners that a civilian Defence Minist~r be appointed. 2 These developments laid the 
foundations for the establishment of the Russian military. The Russian Armed Forces were 
formally established on 7 May 1992 with Yeltsin naming himself Commander-in-Chief and 
1 When referring to the civil-military relationship in this chapter it is within the context of the relationship 
between the new regime led by Yeltsin and the Russian military. This is because of the decline and ultimate 
collapse of the Communist regime and Soviet military. 
2 Stephen Foye, "Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army," RFE/Rl Research Report 1, no.33, 
21 August 1992, p7. 
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providing Grachev immediate and temporary control. This was followed later that month by 
Grachev being made the permanent Defence Minister, a move which caused tension between 
Yeltsin and the parliament over the power to promote officers to high positions.3 The move to 
a Russian military continued in June 1993 when control over nuclear weapons was moved to 
the Russian Ministry of Defence from the CIS Supreme Commander, whose office was 
abolished. 
The post-Soviet structure of the civil-military relationship was headed by the Russian 
President rather than the Communist party (see model 4). According to the 1993 Constitution, 
the President of the Russian Federation forms and heads the Security Council, approves the 
military doctrine, appoints and removes the military high command, and is the supreme 
Commander-in-Chief.4 The Security Council was the main military and political body 
controlling the defence establishment, and had the power to issue orders to the heads of 
ministries and local governing bodies. It also controlled the activities of organisations 
involved in the implementation of its decisions. 5 However the council did experience 
problems, such as insufficient staff, that hindered its role. 6 Indeed in late July 1996 some of 
its powers went to a newly established Defence Council that was chaired by Yeltsin, and 
made decisions on military structures, and on key ·questions such as the defence of Russia. 7 






Ministry of Defence 
3 For additional information on the structural changes see Davenport, ppl83-7. 
4 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Articles 83-87, quoted in Sakwa, pp4 l 4-5. 
5 For information on the Security Council see Sakwa, pp145-6; and Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian 
Security Policy," in State Building And Mi!ita,y Power In Russia And The New States Of Eurasia, The 
International Politics Of Eurasia Vol. 5, ed. Bruce Parrott (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 1995), pp 15-6. 
6 See Valerrii Manilov, Syn Otechestva no.49, December 1993, p4 quoted in David Albright "Democratization 
and Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Ukraine," quoted in Lovell and Albright, p37. 
7 See The Defence Council Of The Russian Federation, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military 
Academy, Sandhurst, March 1997, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c95.txt, 
Internet, accessed 1 August 1998, pp 1-6 of 6. 
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The Ministry of Defence was responsible for developing and implementing military, 
technical, and personnel policy. With regard to the Prime Minister and the State Duma, the 
lower house of the bicameral Federal Assembly established by the 1993 Constitution, 
influence could be asserted over defence policy via the control of budgets and the Duma's 
Defence Committee.8 
I believe that President Yeltsin clearly headed the civil-militaiy structure despite military 
influence and insubordination. This is shown by developments under the new regime. Yeltsin 
was in control during the 1993 parliamentary revolt and dominated the decision-making 
process with regard to the 1994 invasion of Chechnya, as I argue in the following chapters. I 
believe that the military ultimately accepted Yeltsin's right to govern. This is most clearly 
shown by the lack of military support for the parliamentary revolt, and by the absence of a 
coup. I again examine this reluctance to directly challenge Yeltsin in later chapters when the 
disposition to intervene is assessed. Yeltsin also actively moved to widen his powers. 
Indicative of this is the draft defence law passed by the Duma in October 1995. In accordance 
with article IV, the President only needed to notify the legislature that he intended to declare 
war, mobilise the military, and introduce martial law. The President could also launch a 
nuclear strike without approval from the legislature.9 Moreover: Yeltsin in early 1995 
contemplated removing the General Staff and having the militaiy report directly to him. 
Yeltsin also actively sought to limit the role of other members of the new regime and the role 
of the legislature. With regard to members of the new regime, ofrelevance here are the moves 
to limit the Prime Minister's role. The Russian Constitution initially made the Minister of 
Defence subordinate to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers; however, Yeltsin 
decreed that the Minister of Defence was directly subordinate to the President and did not 
have to report to the Prime Minister. Turning to the legislature, with the 1992 Law on 
Defence the legislature failed to gain authority over the confirmation of the Defence Minister 
and his Deputies. The 1993 Constitution and a Presidential Decree further weakened the 
8 For information on the Federal Assembly-parliament see The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Articles 
94-109, quoted in Sakwa, pp417-21. 
9 Stephen Blank, (paper presented at the Clingandael,_ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhaus conference on 
the OSCE Code of Military-Political Conduct, The Hague, December 10-12, 1995) available from 
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c88, Internet, accessed 22 March 1997, p4 of 15. 
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authority of the legislature. 10 Moreover, only 11 of 128 budget lines in the Ministry of 
Defence's aimual budget request were available to parliamentary scrutiny, 11 Yeltsin acted 
with little regard of the legislature. Yeltsin did not formally consult the Duma before sending 
a peacekeeping force to the former Yugoslavia in 1994, and the same year there was no 
communication with the Duma before the invasion of Chechnya, More recently, some moves 
have been made to widen civilian oversight. For instance, in May 1996, The Law on Defence 
was passed. This meant that for the deployment of personnel for "other than their primary 
purpose" the consent of the Federation Council, the upper house of the parliament, was 
required. 12 However, as is clear, such moves are not consistent with the main trend. 
Penetration methods of control were realigned during this period to enhance the President's 
authority. Though the monopoly of one ideology had been broken, loyalty to Yeltsin was 
promoted through the continued penetration of the military. For instance, the Department of 
Military Politics in the Presidential Chief of Staffs Office was established to politically 
'screen' personnel from division command level up. Similarly, the Main Personnel 
Directorate (MPD), the successor of the MPA, operated during this period. By late 1993 it 
employed 20 Generals, compared to the 345 employed by the MPA before the 1991 coup. 13 
This was another organisation used by Yeltsin to promote support for the new regime. When 
many persom1el supported Zhirinovsky, leader of the LDPR, during the 1993 Duma elections, 
it faced restructuring. 14 In line with the move to competitive elections, the new regime also 
used penetration methods to win electoral support. This is shown by the 1996 presidential 
elections. In March 1996, Grachev ordered that all officers spend 4 to 6 hours studying 
Yeltsin's State of the Federation speech, and military academies were instructed to insert it in 
their cuniculum. Similarly, personnel were assembled to listen to Yeltsin supporters and the 
official Ministry of Defence press promoted Yeltsin daily. As the military and associated 
10 For information on the lack of legislative oversight see Alexander Belkin and James Brusstar, A Milita1y in 
Charge of Jtse(f· Civilian Control is a Russian Myth, no.50, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National 
Defence University, October 1995, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum50.html, Internet, 
accessed 1 February 1998, ppl-6 of 6. . 
11 Vladimir Averchev, "The Chechnya War and a Crisis of Russian Statehood," (paper presented at the III 
Annual Conference on Russian Defence Decision-Making, War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security 
Policy', Monterey, CA., 7-8 November 1995, p5) quoted in Blank, conference paper, p2. 
12 Laura Belin, "Duma Passes Law On Defense," RFEIRL Daily Report, NSS, Internet, 25 April 1996, accessed 
14 April 1998. 
13 Stephen Foye, "Defense Personnel Directorate To Be Reduced," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 4 
January 1994, accessed 15 April 1998; and Colonel 0. Valdykin, "Iz Moskvy: Komissiya zavershaet rabotu," 
KZ, 20 November 1991, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p137. 
14 See Thomas Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces," AFS 21, no.3 
(Spring 1995): p330; and The Independent, 31 December 1993, pl, quoted in Christopher Bellamy, "Political 
Commissars Get Their Marching Orders," Reuters, 31 December 1993. 
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military-industrial complex had a potential 40 million voters this was critical. 15 Likewise, the 
secret police remained active, the KGB's monitoring role was simply taken over by other 
organisations. The largest internal security organisation was the Federal Security Service 
(FSB). The service by early 1997 had a formal strength of 76,000 personnel and an extensive 
network of infonners. 16 More specifically, the Ministry of Security continued to control the 
personnel of the Special Departments (SDs) tasked with monitoring the military. Airborne 
personnel throughout 1992 and 1993 told Carey Schofield that their activities had increased. 17 
Likewise, figures popular with personnel, such as Lebed, were closely monitored. Indeed two 
officers were arrested in the Trans-Dniester Republic during late 1995, allegedly to obtain 
evidence on Lebed for the new regime. 18 
The military remained politically active, especially relative to the pre-Gorbachev period, as 
Communist control structures collapsed or were restructured. 19 Although the political activism 
of most persom1el was confined to voting and very few sought to directly challenge the new 
regime, as I argue later, it is clear that the military was politically active. 20 This is most 
dramatically shown by the parliamentary revolt, during which a minimal number of personnel 
challenged Yeltsin' s authority. The military as an institution defeated the revolt. This event 
clearly indicates Yeltsin's willingness to use the military to protect his position and override 
its reluctance to act. Apart from this, during the 1993 elections, 25 active duty servicemen and 
officers along with 2 semi-retired officers in single member districts or on paiiy lists stood for 
office, and 9 were elected.21 In the 1995 elections military personnel again were candidates. 
The Ministry of Defence alone sponsored 123 officers, of which it sought to win the election 
15 Timothy Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections: Dissatisfaction Continues to Grow in 
the Armed Forces," JSMS 9, no.3 (September 1996): p541. 
16 See "Heirs to the KGB," JJSS Strategic Comments 3, no.2, March 1997, pl. For more information on the 
various security forces see Timothy Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions in the Russian Army," Orbis, 39, no.4 
(Fall 1995): pp534-6; Mark Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces-a city's balance of power," JIR 9 no.2 (Febrnary 
1997): pp51-4; and Jacob Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The Dilenm1a Of Russian Military Professionalism: 
Implications For Civil-Military Relations," (paper presented at the Strategic Conference: Russia Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 22-25 April 1997), Attachment to E-mail from 
Jacob Kipp (KIPPJ@LEAV-EMHl.ARMY.MIL) . to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 4 
November 1997, pp6-19 of 27. 
17 Schofield, pp238-9. 
18 Pravda Weekly no.5, 1995, n.p., quoted in "Federal Security Service Searching for Evidence Against Lebed," 
Analytica Moscow: Politica Weekly Press Summa,y Electronic mail version 2 no.37, 23-9 September 1995. See 
also Timothy Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p527. 
19 I examine in detail the degree of political activity among personnel and the factors that shaped the military's 
political stance in the following chapters 
2° For an overview of the military's political role see Brnsstar and Jones, "How Can The Military's Role Be 
Explained?" McNair Paper 34, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34how.html, 
ppl-2 of 2. 
21 Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp329-30. 
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of 35. However Grachev failed miserably, as only 3 of his candidates were elected in districts. 
In total, 19 military officers (8 active and 11 retired) entered the Duma, with 13 winning 
districts and 6 entering the Duma through party lists.22 Personnel also were involved in 
various groups that were politically active despite legislation against such involvement. For 
example, the Ministry of Justice officially registered at least 20 officers' organisations.23 
During this period the three theoretical models of Soviet civil-military relations became ever 
more redundant. This is fundamentally because all three were based on the relationship 
between the now defunct Soviet military and ruling Communist party. The conflict model 
remained relevant in the context that much conflict did occur. However the military did not 
unite against the regime. This should become clear in the following chapters, where I argue 
that the military did not unite behind an opponent of Yeltsin or become predisposed to using 
force against him. Nor was the conflict that did arise a result of contradictory and 
incompatible military and party traits given the party had fallen from power. Turning to the 
participatory model, both conflict and cooperation occurred and personnel were reluctant to 
become politically active beyond voting. This largely concurred with Colton's argument that 
although officers were politically active this activity was restricted to official prerogatives and 
sanctions. However Colton also envisaged a "full-scale intervention" if "a reformist civilian 
leadership embarking [ ed] upon policies of ideological revision, militaiy demobilization, 
shifting of investment priorities, and accommodation with foreign adversaries such as would 
alaim military leaders."24 Despite these developments the military did not intervene against 
Yeltsin. Finally, it is clear that the militmy was not the obedient bureaucracy Odom described, 
again in the context of its relationship with the now defunct Communist party.25 
Institutional roles 
During the 1992-1996 period the roles allocated to the military continued to differ from those 
before 1985, as further changes were made by the new regime. These changes again are 
significant as they had a wide-ranging impact upon the military. The dramatic nature of post-
Soviet changes is illustrated by the moves to deploy military forces to accomplish goals 
22 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp534-6, 541-2. 
23 Mendeloff, p233. 
24 Colton, Commissars, p288. 
25 For a more in-depth evaluation of the models in the context of post-Soviet experiences see Herspring, Russian 
Civil-Militmy Relations, pp 153-79. Herspring concluded that no model explained civil-military relations after 
Gorbachev. This was because the military's poor cohesion ensured that relations remained in flux and the lack of 
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substantially different from those during the Cold War. Whereas the 1917 transition to 
Communism meant that the military became the instrument of the Communist party and 
protector of the Soviet Union, the opposite occurred after 1991. Under Yeltsin the military' s 
traditional roles were replaced by commitments to Russia and the CIS, as perceived by the 
President. The Soviet collapse also meant that the military's role in meeting security 
challenges derived from ethnic and separatist tensions was expanded, as forces were now 
deployed to protect Russians in the 'near abroad,' the other republics of the former Soviet 
Union. Accompanying this change was the continued absence of the military's predominant 
external and anti-West role before Gorbachev. Having outlined these changes, I shall argue 
that developments occurred in accordance with the priorities and threat perceptions of the new 
regime. 
Transitional developments are indicative of these role changes. Initial moves were made to re-
allocate the military roles in accordance with Yeltsin's perception of Russian and CIS 
interests with the May 1992 appearance of the draft military doctrine. This draft made no 
reference to Marxist ideology, and identified Russia's primary political goal in a war as 
defending Russian sovereignty and territory, along with that of its CIS allies.26 'The Basic 
Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian. Federation' were approved in November 
1993. These provisions identified the expansion of military blocs and alliances as a potential 
military danger, but concluded that "the main danger" was now posed by local wars and 
armed conflicts.27 The provisions further stated that "the main objective" of the military was 
to "localize a seat of tension and tern1inate military operations at the earliest possible stage."28 
The internal role of the military also remained important and continued to 'overshadow' its 
pre-1985 anti-West and externally oriented role. The military's domestic deployment was 
limited compared to the number externally deployed before the reorientation. Forces in 
Afghanistan peaked at 118,000 in 1986, whereas in the Chechnyan region they peaked at 
clarity over the process of national security decision-making. Herspring, Russian Civil-Milita,y Relations, 
~p189-90. 
6 See Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFEIRL Research Report 1, no.40, 9 October 1992, 
r.p4s-so. 
Raymond Garthoff, "Russian Military Doctrine And Deployments," in State Building and Milita,y Power in 
Russia and the New States Of Eurasia, ed. Bruce Parrott, p58. See also p57. For additional information see 
Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no.46, 19 November 
1993, pp44-50. 
28 Garthoff, pp58-9. 
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65,000 in 1996. 29 Yet it is clear that the role became more important relative to its anti-West 
role. Forces outside of Russia and the 'near abroad' (excluding peacekeepers) peaked at 
11,365 in 1992.30 The military's internal role was again formally recognised as the 'Basic 
Provisions' identified a number of potential internal security threats. The main one was the 
"illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations aimed at destabilizing the 
situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out 
using armed violence. "31 Two events under Yeltsin most clearly illustrate this domestic role. 
First, the military was deployed against the supporters of the parliamentary revolt who 
barricaded themselves in the White House. The military's role in the revolt is examined in 
later chapters. 
Second, in December 1994 the military invaded Chechnya. Chechnya had declared itself 
independent in 1991 under President Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General. 
Russia opposed independence and established an economic blockade, but economic activity 
continued. After the failure of various attempts to remove Dudayev, including an attack on the 
capital Grozny involving Russian personnel in November 1994, the republic was invaded.32 
The resultant war continued until late 1996 when a peace agreement was signed. The conflict 
cost at least 6,000 soldiers their lives with another ·50,000 civilians killed. 33 Apart from this 
campaign, personnel were also used to enforce the law and collect taxes. In mid-1995, 23,000 
army and interior persom1el were assigned to Moscow to help ensure security in the capital.34 
These developments were accompanied by the dramatic emergence of the military's security 
role within the 'near abroad.' The 1993 'Basic Provisions' referred to the 'near abroad,' and 
stated that a source of military danger was "the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and 
legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states."35 The most visible 
sign of this new role is the Russian military's increased deployment in the 'near abroad' for 
29 The Milita,y Balance 1986-1987, p46; and The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, pl 15. The Chechnyan figure is 
derived from the number of personnel in the North Caucasus MD. 
30 The !vfi/ita,y Balance 1992-1993, pl0I. 
31 Garthoff, p58. 
32 For an in-depth examination of the Chechnyan war see Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, Chechnya: A 
Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997). For a more specific examination of the invasion see Andei 
Raevsky, "Russian Military Performance in Chechnya: An initial evaluation," JSMS 8, no.4 (December 1995): 
pp681-90. 
33 Gall and Waal, p360. 
34 lnterfax, 21 June 1995, quoted in Stephen Blank, Russian Defense Legislation And Russian Democracy, 17 
August 1995, available from http://carlisle-www.army.miVusassi/ssipubs/pubs95/rus1egis/ruslegis.txt, Internet, 
accessed 26 June 1998, p9 of 31. 
35 Garthoff, p57. 
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'peacekeeping' operations, the diplomatic framework for this role being established through 
the CIS.36 Although the forces deployed in the 'near abroad' declined significantly as 
withdrawals from the republics were executed, Russian forces remained stationed in the 
region throughout this period. For instance, in 1992 personnel numbered over 231,000, by 
1996 they numbered around 18,400.37 A particularly publicised example of the military's 
'peacekeeping' role in the 'near abroad' is the 1992 deployment of the 14th Army in Moldavia 
in support of the pro-Russian Trans-Dniester Republic.38 This is well known because its 
Commander from 1992 to 1995 was Colonel Lebed who was willing to dispute the wisdom of 
his orders and use force to make peace between the warring factions. 39 
Contrasting these roles, the military's anti-West and externally oriented role before 
Gorbachev remained limited. Although Russian foreign policy became more assertive, 
relative to the immediate post-Soviet period, during this time the military's primary role did 
not revert back to that of the Cold War. This is shown by the continued decline in the 
military's traditional deployments. Forces deployed outside of the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Treaty states (excluding peacekeepers) in 1991 numbered over 20,275, by 1992 the number 
outside of Russia and the former Soviet republics was around 11,365. By 1996 this had 
declined fmiher to 2,160.40 In line with this, military cooperation with the West increased. 
Whereas in 1991 Soviet personnel were deployed in two United Nation peacekeeping 
operations and numbered around 20, by 1992 they numbered 1,011 and were deployed in four 
such operations. This had increased further by 1996 to over 2,000 personnel in nine 
operations.41 Despite some problems, Russian and Western military cooperation increased 
36 The Russian definition of peacekeeping is much wider than that used in the West, including activities that 
would be termed enforcement operations or counter insurgency in the West. 
31 The Mi/ita,y Balance 1992-1993, ppl00-101; and The Mi/ita,y Balance 1996-1997, pl 15. 
38 For info1mation on the military's deployment in the 'near abroad' and 'peacekeeping' see Frank Umbach, 
"The Role and Influence of the Military Establishment in Russia's Foreign and Security Policies in the Yeltsin 
Era," JSMS 9, no.3 (September 1996): pp467-500; M.J. Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June 1994, available from 
gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/a97mjo.txt, Internet, accessed 13 March 1996, ppl-10 of 10; and 
Baev, pp127-49. For accounts of the military's deployment in the 'near abroad' by personnel see Schofield, 
pp231-54. 
39 See S. Simonsen, "Going His Own Way: A Profile of General Aleksandr Lebed," JSMS 8, no.3 (September 
1995): pp529-34. 




too, and forces were re-deployed from the Western borders.42 With regard to greater military 
cooperation, this included joint Russian and American exercises like 'Peacekeeper 94.' 
As with the Gorbachev period, these role changes were essentially motivated by the new 
regime's perceptions of security and evaluation of transitional developments. This is shown 
by the post-Soviet threat perceptions that shaped the 'Basic Provisions.' The provisions put 
forward by the Ministry of Defence de-emphasised the military's role of meeting the external 
threat posed by the West, and fighting in a world nuclear or conventional war. 43 Contrasting 
this, the threat posed by the violation of Russian rights in the 'near abroad' was recognised by 
the 1992 draft military doctrine and 'Basic Provisions.'44 Transitional developments also 
influenced the military's roles. The use of personnel to collect taxes was encouraged by the 
failure of the taxation system, and widespread crime that were deemed to warrant drastic 
action.45 
More specifically, the influence of the new regime's threat perceptions is shown by the 
military's role in the 'near abroad.' This role was motivated by post-Soviet conflict and the 
consequent perceived threat to Russian interests. For instance, by the spring of 1992 only two 
of the 23 borders separating former Soviet republics were not contested. 46 Yeltsin' s 
perceptions are again important, as during debate over Russian policy toward the 'near 
abroad' in 1992 he criticised the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' preoccupation with the West. A 
result of this was the move to more closely assess foreign policy and military interests here.47 
Influential in encouraging military deployments to meet threats was the promotion and 
protection of Russian interests and security, as perceived by the civilian and military 
leadership.48 The importance of the 'near abroad' was reinforced by the goal of re-integrating 
the post-Soviet region and the Russian military's role in policy-making. The military 
42 See McCarthy, pp743-78; Baev, pp90-100; and Richard Staar, "Beyond the Unipolar Moment," Orbis 40, no.3 
(Summer 1996): pp375-80. . 
43 See Garthoff, p57; and Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p47. With regard to the 1992 draft 
doctrine see Scott Michael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFEIRL Research Report 1, no.40, 9 October 
1992, p45. 
44 See Garthoff, p57. 
45 With regard to the use of personnel as police see Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Proposes That Army Aid in Crime 
Fighting," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 3 June 1993, accessed 27 April 1998. 
46 Schofield, p23 l. 
47 John Lepingwell, "Yeltsin's Calls For Tougher Foreign Policy," RFEIRL Research Report 1, no.44, 6 
November 1992, pl 7, quoted in John Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near 
Abroad," Survival 36, no.3 (Autumn 1994): p73. 
48 See Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy," pp70-82; and Umbach, pp475-9. 
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ultimately sought to establish a united military.49 Finally, the military's role was facilitated by 
the vulnerability of former Soviet republics. 50 
Contrasting these developments was the continued downplaying of traditional threat 
perceptions that prevented a return of the military's anti-West role. Here again the security 
perceptions of the new regime are vital. Changes occurred against a background of generally 
close relations between Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton.51 Correspondingly, though 
many officers continued to be suspicious of the US the military hierarchy did not view the 
superpower as a threat on a comparable scale to during the Cold War. Grachev characterised 
'Peacekeeper 94' as a move toward cooperation and in 1993, 67 percent of officers considered 
that the main threat to Russia's security came from inside rather than outside the state. 52 This 
contrasts the strong anti-American sentiments of officers during the Cold War. The decline of 
the anti-West role was further encouraged by the importance placed on positive relations. In 
fact the new regime employed private American advisers close to the Clinton administration 
to help win Yeltsin's re-election in 1996.53 
Budgetaiy support 
Support for the military continued to be limited, 'relative to the pre-transitional period. In 
roubles the budget increased but it failed to keep pace with high inflation, and thus in real 
terms decreased significantly. Though expenditure remained high relative to other countries, 
and it is difficult to determine the exact level of expenditure because of conflicting estimates, 
it is apparent that the military's budget in real terms declined. Changes in the real level of 
budgetary support occurred in accordance with the continued downplaying of the military's 
external role. After I have covered the level of expenditure I shall outline the main factors 
behind this. Most importantly, resources became increasingly unavailable because of the 
economic situation and the many demands placed on the economy. Furthermore, even the 
support that was granted did not necessarily reach the personnel most in need, as corruption 
was rampant. 
49 See Umbach, pp481-8. With regard to the military's role in policy making also see Mikhail Tsypkin, "The 
Politics of Russian Security Policy," pp22-4; and "Your policy or mine?" The Economist 329, no.7835, 30 
October 1993, pp55, 58. 
50 Umbach, pp488-9. 
51 With regard to the President's view of Clinton see Yeltsin, The View, p 136. 
52 Vladimir Gondusov and Nikolay Goncharov, untitled radio broadcast, n.d., carried by Moscow ITAR-TASS 
World Service in Russian, 1249 GMT, 7 September 1994, in "Grachev speaks to Secretary Perry from Totskoye 
Exercises," FBIS, London, UK 071502Z September 1994, quoted in McCarthy, p761; and Alexander Zhilin, "If 
the War Comes Tomorrow," Moskovskie Novosti no.2, 9-16 January 1994, quoted in Baev, footnote 49, p23. 
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It is clear that the defence budget in roubles increased, but in real terms declined under the 
new regime. It remains difficult to compare Soviet and Russian defence budgets because of 
the problematical nature of obtaining accurate information during the Soviet era, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and conflicting figures. With regard to roubles, the official defence 
budget increased from 901 million roubles in 1992, to 80,185 million in 1996 (see table 8 and 
graph 2). However in real terms a decline occurred because of high inflation. Inflation is 
estimated to have averaged 583.1 percent from 1992 to 1996.54 The International Institute of 
Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Russian defence expenditure was $US 146 billion in 
1992. By 1996 this had declined to an estimated $73 billion (see table 8). To put this in 
perspective, US defence expenditure fell from $US286.1 billion in 1992, to $266.4 billion in 
1996.55 The IISS in 1994 calculated that in real terms official military expenditure might have 
declined by 40 percent from 1989 to 1994.56 The IISS further estimated in 1996 that after 
1992 the real decrease in military expenditure had been about 45 percent. 57 Cuts encouraged 
Grachev to declare in 1994 that "We must frankly ask ourselves the question-do we need an 
anny? If so, it is a sin to keep it in poverty and half-starved."58 These comments were echoed 
by his successor, Colonel General Igor Rodionov. Rodionov in 1996 stated that "The day 
staiis and ends in searching for money for the am1y. "59 The severing of power to the Strategic 
Nuclear Missile Command Centre in September 1994 because electricity bills had not been 
paid fmiher shows this fall in support. Similarly, the procurement of weaponry declined 
sharply.60 Only 775 main battle tanks and 2,030 infantry fighting vehicles were produced 
from 1992 to 1996, compared to 850 tanks and 3,000 infantry fighting vehicles in 1991 
alone. 61 
53 See Michael Kramer, "Rescuing Boris," Time, no vol. or no., 15 July 1996, ppl9-27. 
54 IISS, The lvfilita,y Balance 1994-1995 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1994), pll l; IISS, The Militmy 
Balance 1995-1996, (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 1995), p113; The Milita,y Balance 1996-1997, 
pl 13; and IISS, The Milifa,y Balance 1998-1999 (London, Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998) pl 08. 
With regard to the growth of the defence budget see The Milita,y Balance 1998-1999, Table 14, p105. 
55 The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, Table 5, p21. The figures refer to the national budget defence function 
outlay. 
56 The Militmy Balance 1994-1995, p281. 
51 The lvfilitmy Balance 1996-1997, pl07. 
58 Steven Erlanger, "Russia's Army Seen As Failing Chechnya Test," NYTOndisc, 25 December 1994, pl. 
59 JR Orr, The Current State Of The Russian Armed Forces, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal 
Military Academy, Sandhurst, n.d., available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d60.txt, 
Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p6 of 18. 
60 See Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs 74, no.2 (March/April 1995): pp88-9. 
61 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, in IISS, The Milita,y Balance 1998-1999 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for the IISS, 1998), Table 15, p106. 
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Table 8: Official Russian Defence Budget and Military Expenditure 1992-1996 
Years Official total defence Military expenditure Percentage of GDP 
budget in millions of US$ billion IISS estimates 
roubles IISS estimates 
1992 901 146 12 
1993 3,116 114 9 
1994 40,626 101 9 
1995 59,379 86 8 
1996 80,185 73 7 
The rouble figures are based on official Russian information and the US figures are IISS estimates. Source: IISS, 
The Militmy Balance 1998-1999 (London, Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1998) Table 14, pl 05. 
This trend was essentially a result of the numerous demands placed on the increasingly 
limited resources available. The key transitional problem that facilitated this trend was the 
economy's poor performance, which denied the new regime the resources required to 
adequately fund the military. Though I believe that living conditions were not too extreme for 
the majority of civilians, it is clear that serious economic problems were experienced.62 
Between 1990 and 1995 GDP fell by some 50 percent, compared to a cumulative fall of 
around 31 percent in US GNP during the depression. 63 This occurred against a background of 
resources being lost with the Soviet Union's collapse and an increasing inability to collect 
taxes. Russia lost 10 percent of the Soviet Union's oil and 20 percent of its natural gas. 64 
Similarly, in 1994 only 36 percent of budgeted revenue was received by the Ministry of 
Finance because of widespread tax revenue shortfalls. 65 Financial strains were worsened by 
the diversification of the military's roles after 1985, and it continued to incur the high costs of 
performing its internal security roles. This is clearly shown by the costs incurred during the 
Chechnyan war, costs that were not met with an adequate increase in support.66 Furthermore, 
other armed forces deprived the military of resources. Though paramilitary forces declined 
from 520,000 in 1992 they still numbered 352,000 in 1996, a decline of 32.3 percent whereas 
62 With regard to the seriousness of living conditions see chapter 7, pp330-2. 
63 Sakwa, p236. See also pp23 l-54. 
64 Sakwa, pp30-1. 
65 The Militmy Balance 1995-1996, p109. 
66 See The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, ppl08-9. 
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the military services declined by an average of 48 percent.67 Finally, the allocation of 
resources to the military did not guarantee that those most in need received it. The high level 
of corruption diverted many resources away from their intended destinies, such as the 
construction of military housing. 68 
Popular support for the military 
As under Gorbachev, the general perception of the military, officers, and military service 
remained negative under Yeltsin. This contrasted the pre-1985 period when the military had 
been highly regarded and officers enjoyed a high status among civilians. Though there was 
some support of the militaiy, negative perceptions are again evident at the highest levels. 
Public denouncements of the military by the civilian leaders continued despite the new regime 
taking power. A lack of support among the general public is also evident. This is illustrated by 
the hostile attitudes many civilians showed toward the military. This hostility is apparent 
when surveys of the period are examined. Problems that had become increasingly serious 
under Gorbachev remained evident under Yeltsin too. For instance, draft evasion and a lack of 
interest in serving remained. I attribute this negative trend to the same key factors that 
encouraged negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev 
meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated 
to the military and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions. 
Evidence of the negative perception of the military is widespread. At the highest level the 
leaders of the new regime openly attacked the military. Yeltsin's televised meeting with the 
milita1y after Chechnyan rebels seized the Russian town of Kizlyar in January 1996 
dramatically shows this. During this meeting Yeltsin furiously attacked those present for 
allowing the seizure and declared "We have received another blow. How should we 
understand you, generals? Playing with toys, are you?"69 Limited support is likewise evident 
among the general public, and this is indicated by the hostile attitudes among many civilians. I 
examine civilian attitudes toward the military in-depth when I examine whether an 
opportunity for a coup arose, but will briefly outline the negative attitudes that appear to have 
67 The Militmy Balance /992-1993, pl0l; The Militmy Balance 1996-/997, p119. 
68 See CJ. Dick, A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army in the Nineties, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
June 1996, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, available from 
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c89.txt, Internet, accessed 11 March 1996, p6 of 8; and 
Alexander Zhilin, "Conuption Keeps Generals In Line," Jamestown Prism no vol, no no., 22 September 1995, 
available from http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public _ html/russia _/rusmil7. txt, Internet, accessed 18 
August 1998, ppl-8 of 8. 
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increased under Yeltsin. Overall, 41 percent of civilians in a survey conducted soon after 
Yeltsin took power did not indicate that they had any confidence in the military and personnel 
themselves were clearly aware of their lack of support. 70 A 1992 poll found that 50 percent of 
officers believed that their relations with the local population had worsened since 1991, and 
more than one third believed that relations with local political authorities and the local mass 
media had become strained.71 In 1994, only 11 percent of mid-level and senior officers 
believed that officers enjoyed popular respect and only 4 percent stated that General level 
officers were respected.72 Indeed officers in Chelyabinsk during 1992 were ordered to wear 
civilian clothes to work to reduce the likelihood of attack. 
In addition, it is apparent that many civilians were reluctant to serve and many personnel 
sought to leave the military. Before Gorbachev evasion was rare, but draft evasion remained a 
serious problem under Yeltsin. In 1989, 2,800 avoided the draft in Russia and by 1994, 
27,500 avoided the spring call-up.73 In the spring of 1996, 26,000 avoided the draft. 74 Of 
those that were drafted in 1995, fewer than 12 percent indicated that they were pleased to 
serve whereas in 1986 the percentage was 63 percent and in 1975, 78 percent. 75 The low 
number of applicants for officer schools exacerbated this problem. Before Gorbachev 
competition for entry was intense. However in 1989 there were 1.9 applicants for each place 
and this had declined to 1.6 by 1994.76 Moreover over 50 percent of applicants left before 
they were commissioned. 77 
The negative perception of the military was facilitated and encouraged by the new regime's 
leaders. The decline of the mihtary's image can essentially be attributed to the same two 
factors that encouraged similar perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by 
69 Gall and Waal, p289. 
70 Mark Rhodes, "Political Attitudes in Russia," RFEIRL Research Report 2, no.3, 15 January 1993, p42, quoted 
in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pl 66. 
71 V. Mukhin, "God posle 'putcha'. Chem zhivet armiia?" Armiia no.18, 1992, p48, quoted in Mendeloff, p239. 
72 James Brnsstar and Ellen Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer C01ps, National Defence University 
Strategic Forum, Number 15, Institute For National ·Strategic Studies, January 1994 (sic 1995), available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/fornm 15 .html, Internet, accessed 10 December 1997, p 1 of 5. 
73 N. Yefimov, The Army, Society, Reform. Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1995, available from 
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/adl027.txt, Internet, accessed 8 March 1997, p5 of 12. 
74 0. Falichev, "Call-Up-96: Who Will Stand Under the Colours," KZ, 11 April 1996, pl, quoted in Orr, The 
Current State, p3. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines," p540. 
75 Moskva, no.10, n.d., n.p., quoted in "Russians Don't Want to Serve in Army," Jamestown Monitor 1, no.44, 3 
July 1995, available from http://www. Jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/044_018.htrn, Internet, accessed 31 
August 1998; and Herspring, Russian Civil-Milita,y Relations, p108. 
76 V. kokhukhovskiy, "We Are Looking For Talented Youths, KZ, 4 January 1996, p2, quoted in Orr, The 
Current State, p6. 
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Gorbachev meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Most evident of this 
is the publicising of the military's corruption and its poor performance in Chechnya. Grachev 
was nicknamed "Pasha Mercedes" because of his corruption, and was named "Russia's Most 
Incompetent Commander" by the press because of the disastrous Chechnyan campaign. 78 
Another result of the political liberalism instigated by Gorbachev was the increasingly 
organised and active protests by groups. For example, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers 
sought better conditions for draftees and played a leading role protesting against the 
Checlmyan war. 79 
Second, the new roles allocated to the military and its inability to perform them reinforced 
negative perceptions. Of greatest importance was the invasion of Chechnya, the unpopularity 
of the operation, and resultant problems that reinforced negative perceptions. Indicative of 
Russian attitudes is a December 1994 poll that found only slightly over 20 percent supported 
the invasion and anti-war protests occurred throughout the war.80 Likewise, the military's role 
during the 1993 parliamentary revolt lacked popular support, as I argue when the military's 
oppmiunity to intervene is assessed. 81 Finally, the deployment of personnel in the former 
Soviet republics reinforced negative perceptions, as they were increasingly viewed as 
occupiers. 82 By March 1994, 107 soldiers had be'en killed and a further 193 wounded in 
'peacekeeping' operations.83 Thus, the negative perception of the military was again derived 
from the close association of the military with the discredited Communist party, and the 
general decline of military capability. 84 
77 Dick, A Bear, p5. 
78 Kevin Fedarko, "The Red-Army Blues," Time no vol., no. 49, 5 December 1994, p24. With regard to 
Chechnya see Moskovsky Komsomolets, pl, quoted in James Jackson, "Fighting The Press," Time, no vol. or no., 
23 January 1995, p20. 
79 See Brenda Vallance, Shaping Society's Demands: Russian Soldiers' Mothers And Militmy Reform, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, December 1996, available from 
gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c91.txt, Internet, accessed 18 May 1997, ppl-14 of 14. 
80 With regard to the 1994 poll see Julia Wishnevsky, "Invasion Of Chechnya Unpopular In Russia," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 12 December 1994, accessed 6 April 1998. For information on anti-war protests see 
Wishnevsky, "Anti-War Demo In Moscow," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 3 May 1996, accessed 6 April 
1998. 
81 See chapter 7, p328. 
82 Dick, The Current State, p3. 
83 Orr, The Russian Army and Peacekeeping, pl. 
84 For a summary of the decline in the perception of the military see Serge Schmemann, "Russia's Military: A 
Shrivelled And Volatile Legacy," NYT Ondisc, 28 November 1993, section 1, ppl, 6-7. 
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Morale 
As is to be expected with the low level of support for the military, poor morale among 
personnel was widespread. The unwillingness of most soldiers to serve, as evident after the 
1917 revolution, and the continued exodus of large numbers of officers illustrate this. Most 
graphically however, the frequency of suicide among personnel increased. After outlining the 
level of morale, I shall examine the factors behind the widespread pessimism. I again attribute 
the decline in morale to the negative impact of the transition upon the military, and believe 
that the contrast of this with the traditionally high level of support the military enjoyed 
exacerbated the decline. More specifically, I believe that the decline occurred as many 
personnel were pessimistic about their future, the military continued to lack support, 
unde1iook unpopular roles, and faced the collapse of the empire it was sworn to defend. I also 
believe that although many personnel showed little attachment to the Communist ideology, at 
least some grieved its demise because of their indoctrination during the Soviet period. 
A lack of morale is widely evident. Indeed Yeltsin in 1992 claimed that "The demoralization 
of a once well-organized military machine in certain military combined units is going so far 
that there is a potential threat both to Russian society and to the Army itself."85 The 
widespread lack of morale is shown by the pessimistic perceptions of many personnel and 
their resultant actions. The majority of conscripts in 1980 at least recognised the importance 
of military service. However in surveys during 1994 nearly 70 percent of conscripts believed 
that military service was unnecessary, and 35 percent indicated that they were ready to 
emigrate from their 'motherland.' The surveys also found that every second conscript thought 
that concepts like military duty~ honour, and patriotism were values that no longer had any 
meaning.86 Similarly, officers continued to leave the military in large numbers. By August 
1991 up to 27,000 officers under the age of 30 had resigned from the military. However over 
75,000 under 30 left from 1992 to 1994.87 Pessimism was present among even elite 
personnel.88 It was against this background that suicide rates increased. Whereas suicides 
accounted for 21.9 percent of deaths in the military during 1991, for the first 7 months of 
85 "Predsezdovskie khlopoty vlastey," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 November 1992, ppl-2 carried in FBIS, 25 
November 1992, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pl 68. 
86 Yefimov and Deryugin, pp60-6, quoted in Jones, Red Army, p153; and "Obshchestvo bolno bezdukhovnoctyu, 
Luchsee sredstvo ot etogo-patriotizm" KZ, 12 April 1994, n.p., quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: 
Three Years On," pl 74. 
87 Lieutenant Colonel S. Akhundzyanov, "Providing Social Justice," Vennyy Vestnik, August 1991, p22, quoted 
in Crisis In The Former Soviet militmy, p7; and Dick, A Bear, p5. See also Yefimov, p2. 
88 Schofield, pp233-41, 245-7. 
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1992 the percentage was 28.1 percent.89 Similarly, although desertion had once been rare, in 
1993 an average of 120 conscripts deserted every week.90 
This decline in morale is attributable to the negative impact of the transition upon the military. 
Most generally, many personnel were pessimistic about the turbulent changes that occurred 
with the transition. This is shown by 1994 survey findings. These indicate that only one in ten 
mid-level officers believed that production levels or living conditions would increase in the 
near future, and 82 percent predicted more unemployment. 91 It is also clear that the fall in 
support of the military had a serious impact on personnel. In 1992, 70 percent of officers 
indicated that the main reason for them leaving the military was the feeling that society did 
not recognise the social significance of their profession.92 The military's unpopular and poorly 
organised roles also contributed to the lack of morale. This is best illustrated by the 
demoralising impact of the Chechnyan debacle. Veterans of the war recalled that "Many 
thought they would not get out [of Chechnya] alive."93 Personnel operating elsewhere also 
suffered from poor morale because of their low pay and casualties. In 1994, 43 percent of 400 
personnel deployed in Tajikistan indicated that they did not wish to serve. 94 
Poor service conditions further eroded morale. it is clear that poor service conditions 
continued to be a serious issue. In 1992, 78 percent of officers believed that the "material 
situation of military personnel compared to the rest of society is worsening."95 Whereas 
Gabriel (1980) found that 50 percent of officers believed that their accommodation was 
adequate or better than civilian housing, in 1994 less than a quarter described their living 
conditions as good or very good.96 Regardless of rank, personnel also faced long delays 
before they received any pay, which in tum did not match inflation. Though before 
Gorbachev the level of pay officers received was favourable relative to many civilians, and a 
89 TRW Waters, The New Russian Army One Year On, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military 
Academy, Sandhurst, 11 August 1993, available from gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/d59, 
Internet, accessed 18 March 1996, p3 of 7. See also Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p174; 
and Doug Clarke, "Suicide A Problem In Military," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 10 July 1995, accessed 
16 March 1998. 
90 Yu Deryugin, Nedelya, no.10, 1993, n.p., quoted in Dick, The Current State, p2. 
91 Brnsstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Co1ps, p2. 
92 Waters, The New Russian Army, p4. 
93 Slava Naumov, interview by Gall, 10 October 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210. 
94 Armiya no.8, no month, 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, p7. See also pp5-10; 
and The Moscow Times, 12 August 1997, n.p., quoted in Carlotta Gall, "Military Malaise Tums Peacekeeper To 
Killer," Reuters, 12 August 1997. 
95 F Makarov, V. Frolov, N. Miloradov, D. Osipov, "Na chto nadeiutsia ofitsery i praporshchiki?" Armiia no no., 
21-22 November 1992, p24, quoted in Mendeloff, footnote 7, p229. 
96 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer C01ps, p2; and Gabriel, Red Legions, p65. 
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Platoon Commander's pay in 1990 was 5.5 times greater than the minimum living wage, by 
1996 it was only 1.5 times greater.97 Likewise, accommodation continued to be in short 
supply. In mid-1990 an estimated 74,000 officers lived in accommodation so substandard that 
it rivalled the worst slums in the West. By early 1996 an estimated 50,000 officers continued 
to live in slum conditions.98 Indeed from June to December 1995 there were 20 reported 
malnutrition deaths among personnel, whereas before Gorbachev the majority of personnel 
told Gabriel (1980) that the amount of food was adequate.99 Health problems remained 
widespread too. Indicative of this is the increase by 35 percent of internal diseases among 
soldiers from 1982 to 1994.100 Other problems included the reduced job security for officers 
and their increased workload because of staff shortages. 101 
The collapse of both the Soviet superpower and Communist ideology hit morale too. Though I 
believe that most personnel accepted the demise of the Soviet Union and few believed that 
force should have been used to prevent its collapse, surveys indicated that many opposed its 
collapse. In 1994, 70 percent of mid-level and senior officers agreed that "the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union is a misfortune for our country."102 Many personnel opposed the retreat 
from East Europe too, as the Soviet superpower status was lost along with territory, military 
bases, and equipment. 103 At least some personnel also mourned the loss of Communism, the 
ideology they had been sworn to protect. For instance, some airborne personnel indicated to 
Schofield that they grieved the paiiy's loss. 104 Iuri Chernavin wrote that the fall of 
Communism, and the failure to replace it, meant that there was an absence of the "ideas and 
spiritual values which would make it possible to have a purposeful, instructive influence on 
servicemen."105 However I do not believe that the fall of the ideology had a serious impact on 
97 Jones, Red Army, p83. With regard to the pay of platoon officers see Orr, The Current State, pl 4. With regard 
to civilian and military incomes see chapter 6, p275. 
98 Fedurin, "Our Defenders Need Defending," quoted in Crisis in the Former Soviet Militmy, p9; and Dick, A 
Bear, p5. With regard to conditions also see Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pp165-7, 172-
3; Crisis In The Fonner Soviet militmy, pp9-10; Mendeloff, pp228-9; and Orr, The Current State, pp7-10, 14. 
99 "Starving Soldiers Make Good Deserters," Moscow News no.9, 7-13 March 1996, p4; and Gabriel, The Red 
legions, p50. For more information on service conditions see Robert Duggleby, "The Disintegration of the 
Russian Armed Forces," JSMS 11, no.2 (June 1998): pp7-10. 
10° Charles Dick, The Russian Anny: Present Plight and Future Prospects, Conflict Studies Centre Occasional 
Brief, no.31, 1994, p3, quoted in Duggleby, p9. 
IOI With regard to job security see Robert Arnett, "Russia After the Crisis: Can Civilians Control the Military?" 
Orbis, 38, no. I (Winter 1994): p52; and Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," ppl 74-5. For 
information on the workload of officers see Dick, A Bear, p6. 
102 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, p4. With regard to the acceptance of the 
Soviet Union's collapse by most personnel see chapter 5, p208. 
103 See Schmemann, pl; and Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," p88. 
104 Schofield, pp233-4. 
105 Iuri Chernavin, "The Status of the Army in Russian Society," JSMS 9, no.4 (December 1996): p741. 
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many, particularly those not in senior positions. This is because I have already argued that 
many personnel did not strongly endorse the ideology. Moreover, in the following chapter I 
argue that the military did not unite behind any one figure or party. 
Cohesion 
Relations between the services, officers, political officers and military personnel, and officers 
and soldiers remained problematic. I do not examine intra-military ethnic relations because 
when I evaluate whether ethnic interests could have motivated intervention I argue that such 
interests were not important. This is primarily because ethnic diversity declined substantially 
as the Soviet republics achieved independence. 106 The Chechnyan war is graphically 
illustrative of the lack of cohesion, as personnel were bitterly divided over the invasion's 
merits and cohesion was so poor that casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Adding to 
these divisions were those that arose because of divergent opinions over restructuring the 
military, service conditions, and the continued debate over the place of politics in the military. 
Thus, the impact of the transition from Communism was similar to the divisive impact of the 
1917 transition to Communism. 
The lack of cohesion between the services and· officers is most clearly shown by the 
Chechnyan war and the parliamentary revolt. As I examine the revolt, along with the failure 
of the military to unite behind one potential coup leader in the following chapter, I shall focus 
on Chechnya here. During this war a serious lack of cohesion among the services cost many 
casualties. There were frequent incidents where Russian soldiers fought each other. The 
attacks by the air force on Russian ground personnel most graphically illustrate this. A Deputy 
Commander of reconnaissance in Grozny later exclaimed that he most feared air and rocket 
attack from his own side. 107 Another Lieutenant commented that "I could never imagine our 
own military bombing us like this."108 It is estimated that for every solder killed by the 
Chechnyans five died due to carelessness or to other reasons. 109 This costly lack of cohesion 
appears to have been primarily caused by the lack of prior joint-service training and, more 
106 See chapter 6, p288. 
107 Denis Fedulov, interview by Gall, 26 September 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210. With regard to intra-
army casualties see Gall and Waal, p207. 
108 Tom Post, "Gaping Wound," The Bulletin, 116, no.5954, 17 January 1995, p42. 
109 Charles Blandy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, quoted in Gall and Waal, p208. 
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specifically, poor pilot expertise and incompetent Generals. 11° Cohesion was low relative to 
the Afghanistan war. Here problems were evident but those with first-hand experience of both 
wars argued that at least personnel united to protect one another when they came under attack, 
and the services launched joint efforts to free Soviet prisoners. In Chechnya the opposite 
occurred. 111 
The war also highlights the salient divisions that developed between officers. For instance, 
officers fought over whether the invasion should have been launched, given the military's 
poor state and the use of force against civilians. This is in stark contrast to the apparent unity 
of the military when the decision to invade Afghanistan was made. I examine the reasons 
behind the opposition to the invasion more closely in the following chapter because they 
influenced the military's mood but will outline the intra-officer conflict here. Opposition to 
the invasion is clearly shown by the actions of Major General Ivan Babichev, Commander of 
the western-most group of the invasion force. In December 1994 he initially refused to 
advance against civilians in defiance of his orders. 112 Both Lebed and Colonel General Eduard 
Vorobyev, First Deputy Commander of Land Forces, also actively opposed the invasion. 
Contrasting this, Grachev sought to ensure that the hierarchy's authority was not violated. 113 
Other Generals stressed that orders had to be obeyed to ensure that the military, and the state, 
did not break-up. Colonel General Valentin Yakovlev wrote in January 1995 that "If you are 
ordered to go [to Chechnya], you must go and carry out the order you have been given." 114 
Additional divisions between the services developed because of moves to restructure the 
military. This was encouraged ·by the services seeking to avoid cuts. For instance, when 
Grachev moved to restructure the airborne forces and to place four air assault brigades under 
the ground forces the airborne forces objected. After Rodionov replaced Grachev in July 1996 
he moved to reduce the airborne forces by 14,000 personnel and was met by widespread 
opposition. This led to the dismissal of the Airborne Commander after he publicly condemned 
the cuts. Opposition grew so strong that th~ new regime moved to prevent the restructuring. 
110 Orr, The Current State, ppl 1-2; Oleg Blotsky, "Lessons Not Learned," Time no vol., no.7, 20 February 1995, 
pp26-7; and Gall and Waal, pp207-8. With regard to pilot expertise see Nelan, "Why It All Went So Very 
Wrong," p20. With regard to the Generals see Post, p42. 
111 Blotsky, "Lessons Not Learned," pp26-7. 
112 Lee Hockstader, "Russian General Says He Refuses to Attack," Washington Post, 17 December 1994, pAl, 
quoted in Lyle Goldstein, "Russian Civil-Military Relations in the Chechen War, December 1994-February 
1995," JSMS 10, no.l (March 1997): pl 10. 
113 See Goldstein, ppl09-27. 
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Other services also opposed cuts in their size. For example, when moves were made to further 
cut the ground forces to 12 divisions in October 1996, Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, declared that such a cut was "simply unreal." 115 
The various stances of the services encouraged Rodionov to comment that "Everybody says 
refo1111 is needed, but not in my forces." 1I6 Contrasting this, services like the air force that 
realised Rodionov placed a priority on the maintenance of a modem air force supported 
reductions. 
Other divisions encouraged poor officer cohesion too. First, hostility remained between high-
ranking officers who enjoyed the support of the new regime and those lower-ranked who 
experienced more hardships, and resented their superiors' lack of action. This is shown by the 
widespread dislike of Grachev who was blamed for the military's plight and believed to be 
incompetent. In 1994, only 17 percent of officers said that they supported the Defence 
Minister, more than 50 percent did not trust him, and none indicated that Grachev was a role 
model for them. 1I7 The following year, 52 percent of 615 officers indicated that they had a 
negative opinion of Grachev. II8 Second, divisions arose between the military hierarchy and 
district commanders like Lebed. These divisions arose as support from the central command 
declined and resentment of the hierarchy increasecl. For instance, the Siberian Agreement 
linked the Siberian MD with the governor and regional leaders, as support from Moscow was 
inadequate. 119 Third, divisions occuned because of divergent political attitudes. It is apparent 
that no single politician could unite personnel, as I argue in the following chapter. 
Cohesion between political officers and many military officers remained poor. Though the 
Soviet political organs had collapsed with the Communist party and the Soviet Union, they 
were restructured and then continued to monitor personnel. This caused resentment among 
many because of their spying, negative characteristics, and the view that they were rivals. For 
114 Colonel General Valentin Yakovlev, "The State and the President Need Devoted Officers," Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, 8 Febmary 1995, p5, quoted in Goldstein, pl 12. 
115 Michael Orr, Rodionov and Reform, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, 
Sandhurst, January 1997, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/c92.txt, Internet, 
accessed 18 May 1997, p9 of 13. 
116 Orr, Rodionov and Reform, p8. 
117 Argumenty i Fakty, October 1994, n.p., Moskovskii Komsomolets, 26 October 1994, 11 November 1994, n.p., 
all quoted in Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army: A Key Player In Moscow's Current Political Crisis," 
European Security 4, no.3 (Autumn 1995): p423, footnote 21, p434. With regard to opposition to Grachev also 
see chapter 6, pp267-8. 
118 Stephen Meyer, "The Devolution of Russian Military Power," Current History 94, no.594 (October 1995): 
p327. 
119 Thomas, "Fault Lines and factions," p537. More generally, see pp531-48. 
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instance, airborne officers commented that SD officers actively attempted to recruit "stool 
pigeons" and kept information on al1 personnel. They further complained of SD personnel 
"pointedly not saluting the commander, and taking pleasure in letting it be known that his 
orders had been countermanded."120 Similarly, Stanislav Terekhov, head of the radical 
Officers' Union, complained that many officers belonging to the union had to conceal their 
political sympathies because they feared official retaliation. 121 Former high profile officers 
like Lebed were also under surveillance, as I have already noted. Another likely source of 
irritation was the better pay that personnel in the monitoring services received, and the 
perception that they were rivals for resources. 122 
Finally, relations between soldiers and officers remained tense. This is best shown by the 
Chechnyan war where many soldiers openly questioned their superiors given the disastrous 
nature of the campaign. For instance, soldiers conspired with local Ingusheti villagers near the 
Chechnyan border to sabotage their military vehicles so that they could not enter the republic. 
There are also at least two cases of members of the elite airborne forces surrendering to the 
rebels after being surrounded and becoming bitter that their superiors did not provide them 
adequate assistance. Instances of soldiers shooting their officers are recorded too, crimes that 
officers before Gorbachev had dreaded. Another indicator of the hostility between officers 
and soldiers is the unwillingness of soldiers to unite behind the candidates put forward by 
their superiors in the 1995 elections. This is shown by Grachev's failure to successfully 
promote his candidates among personnel: only 3 of his 123 candidates were elected. Apart 
from the Chechnyan war where many soldiers viewed their officers as incompetent, the harsh 
conditions personnel experienced, and the apparent inaction of their officers, discouraged 
harmonious relations. Indicative of such inaction is the failure of officers to prevent 
dedovschina. In 1994 it was estimated that a man entering the army had an 80 percent chance 
of being beaten up. To put this in perspective, 69.1 percent of soldiers indicated to Gabriel 
(1980) that experienced soldiers very often or often treated new recruits unfairly. 123 
Overall, I believe that intra-military relations were consistently worse than before 1985. This 
is shown by the conflict that occurred between the various groups within the military. 
120 Schofield, p238. 
121 "Leader Says Army Backs Salvation Front," Interfax, 24 October 1992, carried by FBIS, Daily Report, 
October 1992, pp38-9, quoted in Mendeloff, footnote 27, p235. 
122 See Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp534-6. See also chapter 6, pp269-70. 
123 Dick, The Russian Militmy: Present Plight and Future Prospects, p3, quoted in Duggleby, pl 1; and Gabriel, 
The Red Legions, p73. 
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Grachev in 1994 exclaimed that the "real disintegration of the army" was possible, a view 
shared by scholars. 124 
Size 
As with the level of cohesion, the transition led to a drastic decline in the number of 
personnel. This decline contrasts the enlargement of the military after the 1917 revolution and 
the ground forces were hardest hit. After outlining this decline via the use of statistics, I shall 
assess those factors that encouraged the trend. The decline accompanied the decline of the 
military's external role and the fall in budgetary suppmi that occmred with the poor 
performance of the economy. In addition, it became increasingly difficulty to find those 
willing and able to serve. Of particular relevance here is the drop in the number of potential 
personnel because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the smaller population of Russia. 
A dramatic decline in the size of the military is evident. Although there were 5.3 million 
personnel in the armed forces in 1985, and in 1991 they numbered 3.4 million, by 1996 there 
were 1.2 million. 125 The most significant decline occuned to the ground forces, as their 
number of personnel was more than halved by the new regime. Indeed the Commander-in-
Chief of the Ground Forces in October 1996 declared cuts to the forces could be so severe as 
to threaten the "collapse of reforms." 126 The air force and air defence services experienced 
significant reductions too, though the number of air force personnel increased in 1996. The 
most severe cuts occurred during the regime's first years and the ground forces were nearly 
halved from 1992 to 1994. Even the SRF, to which the regime increasingly attached 
importance as a safeguard of security because of the decline of conventional combat 
capabilities, fell by 30.6 percent. From 1992 to 1996 the number of ground force personnel 
fell by 67.1 percent, navy personnel by 40.6 percent, and air force personnel by 51.7 percent 
(see table 9 and graph 1). To put this in perspective, in the former Warsaw Treaty states that 
remained unified the number of ground force personnel fell on average by 3.5 percent, navy 
personnel by 16.5 percent, and air force per~onnel increased by 21.6 percent. 127 
124 "Grachev Tells Duma: 'I am Clean Before the Army," Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 18 November 1994, 
carried by FBIS: Central Eurasia, 21 November 1994, p31, quoted in Herspring, 'The Russian Military: T!u·ee 
Years On," p 178. With regard to scholars who shared this opinion see John Lepingwell, "Is the Military 
Disintegrating from Within?" RFE/RL Research Report 2, no.25, 18 June 1993, pl 6. 
125 The Milita1y Balance 1985-1986, p21; The Militmy Balance 1991-1992, p36; and The Militmy Balance 
1996-1997, pl 13. -
126 Orr, Rodionov and Reform, p9. 
127 The Militmy Balance /992-1993, pp70-83; and The Milita1y Balance 1996-1997, pp82-96. The states 
examined were Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. 
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Table 9: Number of Russian Personnel in Key Military Services 1992-1996 




1992 1,400,000 144,000 320,000 356,000 300,000 
1993 1,000,000* 144,000 300,000 230,000 170,000 
1994 780,000 114,000 295,000 205,000 170,000 
1995 670,000 100,000 200,000 200,000 130,000 
1996 460,000 100,000 190,000 175,000 145,000 
1992-1996 -67.1 -30.6 -40.6 -50.8 -51.7 
percentage 
change 
Source: The Militmy Balance 1992-1993, pp93-101; The Militmy Balance 1993-1994, pp99-100; The Milita,y 
Balance 1994-1995, ppl 11-14; The Mi/ital)' Balance 1995-1996, ppl 13-15; and The Militmy Balance 1996-
1997, ppl 13-19. *From 1993 the IISS uses the term army rather than ground forces. The percentage change 
figures are rounded up. 
As I have already argued, the decline in the number of personnel was in line with the lower 
importance attached to the military' s traditional role of countering external threats, and the 
economic problems that restricted defence expenditure. Apart from these significant factors it 
became increasing impractical to maintain a large military. Most dramatically, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and failure to maintain a united military of the CIS reduced the number of 
potential servicemen. Whereas in 1985 there were 31 million men aged between 18 and 30, by 
1996 there were only 15 million aged from 18 to 32. 128 In addition, declining health standards 
meant that where less than 10 percent of young men were exempted from service in 1987 on 
medical grounds, by 1996, 30 percent were exempted. 129 The obtaining of draft deferrals 
through bribery also became widespread. Thus, only 16 percent of the potential draft pool 
were liable for call-up by 1993. 130 As the ground forces were the most draining on human 
resources and the perception that a large-scale war with the West was increasingly out-dated, 
they experienced the most severe cuts. The draft pool was reduced further by the general 
reluctance to serve, as shown by draft evasion and desertion. The military also faced increased 
128 The Milita,y Balance 1985-1986, p21 The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, pl 13. See also Orr, The Current 
State, p2. 
129 0. Falichev, "Call-Up-96: Who Will Stand Under The Colours," KZ, 11 April 1996, pl, quoted in Orr, The 
Current State, p3. 
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competition from other armed forces like the MVD, and by 1996 the military received only 
two-thirds of the personnel recruited. 131 More specifically, the limited change to the SRF 
compared to the other services is indicative of the greater emphasis placed on nuclear 
weapons because of the decline in conventional combat capabilities. The 1993 'Basic 
Provisions' illustrate this greater emphasis. The provisions abandoned the Soviet pledge not to 
use nuclear weapons first, and apparently reserved Russia the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to a conventional attack on its territory and allies. 132 Correspondingly, the military 
hierarchy placed an increased emphasis on highly manoeuvrable, technologically advanced, 
and well-trained forces rather than large yet inferior forces. 133 
Expertise 
The inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev remained and probably worsened. 
This lack of expertise is primarily shown by the lack of even a minimal level of skill during 
the single largest military operation during this period, the Chechnyan war. The lack of 
expertise continued to be caused by factors apparent before and during Gorbachev's rule, 
these being assessed after the level of expertise is evaluated. Most importantly, I believe that 
the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Second, quality 
personnel left without being replaced by qualified personnel. In line with this was the 
continued service of incompetent officers. This is a trend examined in the context of the 
disposition to intervene, as it is indicative of the regime's moves to win the loyalty of key 
officers. 134 Third, the quality of training fell even lower than the standard I believe prevailed 
before Gorbachev. Finally, both the new regime and military failed to move to improve the 
level of expertise. 
The lack of expertise is graphically shown by the military' s performance in Chechnya and I 
examine examples of poor expertise particularly relevant to the seizure of power in the 
following chapter. The lack of expertise and skill is evident at all levels. At the highest level 
Grachev failed to deploy infantry with the ta_nks that attacked Grozny. This was a fundamental 
mistake because tanks are vulnerable in urban areas without protective cover from infantry. 
130 Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating," p 13. 
131 Falichev, "Call-Up-96," pl, quoted in Orr, The Current State, p3. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines," p540. 
132 Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p47. 
133 See Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas, "A Russian View of Future War: Theory and Direction," JSMS 9, no.3 
(September 1996): pp501-18. 
134 See chapter 6, pp267-8. 
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Thus, at least 100 vehicles had been lost by early January 1995.135 In fact Grachev had 
ridiculed the failed attempt to overthrow Dudayev in November 1994, exclaiming, "Where 
were the infantry? You must not send tanks in without infantry."136 Grachev had further 
claimed before the invasion that Grozny could be taken in two hours by one parachute 
regiment. 137 Indeed Babichev told a visiting delegation from the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe that "Our commanders in Moscow have let us down."138 Lower down 
the chain of command poor expertise is also noticeable. One Tank Commander exclaimed that 
NCOs assigned to his units could not even tum the tank turrets. 139 With regard to soldiers, 
many could not accurately fire their weapons, knew little about fighting in urban areas, and 
often shot one another. 140 Expertise appears to have declined further under Yeltsin. For 
example, personnel learnt from their mistakes and improved their tactics in Afghanistan. 
However, in Chechnya personnel repeated the same mistakes. 141 Overall, by 1994 over half of 
mid and- senior-level officers believed that Russia could not rebuff an aggressor. 142 
Contrasting this, Gabriel (1980) found that 55 percent of officers felt that their units would 
perform "very well" or "fairly well" in combat. 143 
The lack of expertise continued to be caused by factors apparent before and during 
Gorbachev's rule. Most importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not 
properly prepared. This is most graphically evident at all levels of the Chechnyan campaign. 
For instance Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov, First Deputy Commander of the Ground 
Forces, was asked to take command of the invasion despite having played no part in planning 
it. 144 This inadequate preparation is evident throughout the military. Draftees were sent to 
Chechnya without knowledge of their role or proper training. Although conscripts underwent 
two months preparation before being sent to Afghanistan, in Chechnya soldiers were sent 
almost immediately after being drafted. Commanders lacked adequate maps of where they 
135 Gall and Waal, p12. 
136 Ibid., p13. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Istvan Gyarmati, interview by Jorg Haskemeyer, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, ARD-TV, 4 July 1996, quoted in 
Gall and Waal, pl 4. 
139 Blotsky, p27. 
140 With regard to the incompetence shown during the campaign see Gall and Waal, pp9, 12-4, 177-82, 202-3, 
207-11, 272; and Lester Grau, Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny, National Defence 
University Strategic Forum, Institute For National Strategic Studies, n.d., available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum38.html, Internet, accessed 10 November 1997, ppl-4 of 4. 
141 See Marshall-Hasdell, ppl-40; and Orr, The Current State, pl2. 
142 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, pl. 
143 Gabriel, Red Legions, p216. 
144 Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, 19 July 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, pl 77. 
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were meant to advance. Nor were personnel given accurate information about their role. One 
Deputy Commander of a reconnaissance force exclaimed that "We thought there would be 
guards simply protecting the President [Dudayev]. It turned out the opposite: there was a 
whole am1y of Chehens [sic] there." 145 
Apart from the military's ill preparedness, experienced personnel continued to leave and 
training remained inadequate. With regard to the loss of experienced officers, most of the 
154,687 officers who left from 1992 to 1994 were categorised as able, efficient, and forward 
thinking. 146 This loss of experience was a serious problem because the military found it very 
difficult to find able replacements. For instance, whereas 4.1 percent of military academy 
students were expelled in 1987 for failing to study, by 1993 13.4 percent were expelled. 147 
Even the increased reliance on contract personnel did not solve the problem. Although the 
number of contract soldiers increased from 80,000 to 170,000 between 1994 and 1996, they 
included alcoholics, drug abusers, and the chronically ill. 148 Moreover training was 
inadequate. Semenov complained in October 1994 that the army was deteriorating to the level 
of a Third World army and had not held a single division-level exercise since 1992. 149 
Similarly, though the number of hours flown annually by pilots increased from 20-25 hours in 
1991, to 30-35 hours in 1993 their hours remained •inadequate. They were only 50 percent of 
the hours required to maintain expertise and less than 40 percent of the time spent flying in 
the late l 970s. 150 Training was fmiher hindered by the need of personnel to find additional 
work to survive and the heavy workloads of officers because of staff shortages. 151 Finally, the 
military continued to be an active participant in the economy, further reducing the opportunity 
to train. 152 
145 Slava naumov, interview by Gall, 10 October 1996, quoted in Gall and Waal, p210. 
146 Dick, A Bear, p5. 
147 "Molodye ofitsery segodiya kak nikogda nuzhdayutsya v pomoshchi starshukh. Polychat li oni ee?" KZ, 10 
June 1994, quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pl 70. 
148 The Militmy Balance 194-1995, pl 12; and The !vf.ilitmy Balance 1996-1997, pl 14. With regard to the quality 
of contract soldiers see Orr, The Current State, p4. 
149 "Ground Forces in Critical State," RFEIRL Daily Report, no no., 29 October 1994, quoted in Herspring, "The 
Russian Military: Three Years On," pl 71. 
150 "Reforma varmii: orientiry dla voennoy pressy," KZ, 25 May 1993 quoted in Herspring, "The Russian 
Military: Three years On," p 170; and Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Militmy 
Posture for Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1978) pl 12, quoted in 
Joshua Epstein, Measuring Milita,y Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (London: Taylor and Francis, 
1984), pl 08. More generally, see Orr, The Current State, ppl0-1; Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years 
On," pp 165, 170-1; Chemavin, pp734-5; and Dick, A Bear, pp6-7. 
151 See Orr, The Current State, p7. 
152 See Chernavin, pp735-6. 
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In summary, from 1992 to 1996 major changes to the military occurred. Most importantly, the 
structure of the civil-military relationship changed. Although characteristics of the penetration 
model remained, the Communist party no longer was instrumental. All three of the Soviet 
theoretical models became ever more redundant. With regard to the military's roles, they 
continued to reflect the changes that occurred under Gorbachev. More specifically, 
deployments in the 'near abroad' were an important development. Budgetary support in real 
terms and popular support for the military both declined further, and in tum reduced morale. 
Similarly, military cohesion, size and expertise declined. Overall then, developments 
continued the negative trend of the first transitional period. 
The Threat of a Military Coup against the New Regime, 1992-1996 
I shall now argue that the threat of the Russian military staging a coup was present under 
Yeltsin. To identify the presence of this threat I briefly document the threats of force made by 
military personnel against the new regime and then examine relevant opinions publicised 
during this period, which show that the threat was recognised and deemed serious enough to 
warrant discussion. I believe that two broad opinions are discernible. First, the threat of a 
coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over this threat. Second, the threat of a 
coup was downplayed. However the military's loyalty was not taken for granted. Three 
sources of analysis are utilised here to support this argument. First, the relevant opinions and 
actions of civilian and military officials are noted. Second, similar opinions and actions are 
identified among scholars. Finally, the work of journalists is examined. 
It is evident that the threat of a coup against the new regime was present in Russia. The 
willingness of some personnel to intervene against the civilian leadership is most clearly 
shown by the 1991 coup. It has been argued that this was not led by the military. Apart from 
the important role of some KGB members that I have already noted, the military's role in the 
attempt has been downplayed. Defence Minister Shaposhnikov stated that most personnel 
were "free of guilt," a perception shared by lower-ranked personnel. 153 One soldier who 
believed that the army was not behind the coup, exclaimed, "Do you think the coup would 
153 The Times, 26 August 1991, n.p., quoted in Michael Evans, "3000 Generals Face The Sack After Coup Fails," 
Reuters, 26 August 1991. 
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have collapsed if it [the army] was?"154 Scholars like Vyatcheslav Amirov also argued that it 
was "not a military coup."155 
However key supporters of the coup participants were from the military. Although it is 
estimated that only 15 of the 180 regular divisions were involved in the attempt, it is evident 
that the coup involved the military. 156 In total 30 Generals from the high command, 9 Deputy 
Ministers of Defence, 10 MD and fleet commanders, 8 heads of major Ministry of Defence 
Departments, 3 lower-ranking commanders, and 316 additional Generals were reported to 
have actively supported the coup. 157 Though Yazov may have been a reluctant participant he 
was a member of the GKChP and commanded that the military support the coup. Yazov 
gathered military commanders on the second day of the coup to instruct them to ensure law 
and order and "As for the rest you'll learn that from the radio and newspapers."158 Varennikov 
was another active participant and he was one of those who detained Gorbachev at his dacha. 
Likewise, other commanders supported the intervention and Shaposhnikov, an opponent of 
the coup, recalled that after speaking with members of the Ministry of Defence "it became 
clear that I would have difficulty in finding allies."159 Even Grachev initially was involved in 
the planning of the attempt. 160 Lepingwell is thus accurate when he argued that the military 
was a key player in both the initiation and collapse of the coup. 161 
The threat of a coup remained after the failed coup of 1991, with a minority of personnel 
threatening to use force against the civilian leadership. At the general level, it was felt by at 
least some politically active officers that the military should have a larger political role. Only 
19 percent of 1,500 officers polled at the All-Army Officers' Assembly in January 1992 
154 Richard Meares, "Westernised" Soviet Troops Say They Had No Sympathy For Coup," Reuters, 22 August 
1991. 
155 New Zealand Herald, 21 August 1991, p9, quoted in "Soviet Coup Approved By Professor," Reuters, 21 
August 1991. 
156 Patrick Tyler, "After The Coup; Leadership Of Soviet Milita1y Facing Shuffle And Reduced Independence," 
NYTOndisc, 23 August 1991, pA14. 
157 "On the Military Leadership's Participation in the State Coup of 19-21 August 1991," Armiya, no.6, 1992, 
p24, quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, pl 40. 
158 Coup in the Soviet Union Day 1 18-19 August 199 I: A Minute-By-Minute Chronology, no publisher, n.d., 
available from http://artnet.net/~upstart/18l9aug.htm1, Internet, accessed 12 September 1998, pl of 11. 
159 Shaposhnikov, interview by Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 August 1991, p3, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, 
"Notes," McNab· Paper 34, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/macnair34/34tan.html#2S, 
footnote 35, p2 of 4. 
160 "Why the Thunder Did Not Rumble," Moskovskiye novosti no.29, 17-24 July 1994, p8, quoted in Brusstar and 
Jones, "Notes," McNair Paper 34, available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/macnair34/34tan.html#25, footnote 29, pl. More generally, with regard to 
military involvement in the coup see Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The August 1991 Coup," ppl-4. 
161 Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p539. 
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believed that the army should wait for politicians to make decisions on issues relating to the 
military. 162 More specifically, in 1992, 10 percent of officers believed that it was permissible 
to use force "as a result of the failure to carry out demands," and 4 percent agreed with this in 
1993 (see table 10 and graph 3). Indeed in January 1993 an armed Major was apprehended in 
Moscow intending to assassinate Yeltsin. 163 The willingness of a few personnel to directly 
challenge the new regime is best shown by the active support some gave to the 1993 revolt. 
One Colonel in command of a regiment near Podolsk led eighteen of his men to defend the 
White House, but was arrested in transit. Another 18 personnel followed a Deputy Company 
Commander in Noginsk and set out for the White House, and were also arrested. 
Threats of direct action continued after this revolt and though personnel overwhelmingly 
showed little desire to intervene the threat appears to have increased. According to a Centre 
for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research (CMSPLR) survey, the 
willingness of officers to use force so as to meet their demands peaked after 1993 at 26 
percent, and averaged 16.7 percent from 1994 to 1996 (see table 10). One senior officer in 
November 1993 actually threatened that "the politicians will be swept out."164 A Colonel 
serving on the General Staff stated that same month that if Yeltsin became unamenable to the 
military his "illusions about his power functions ·will be dispelled at once."165 The most 
popular saying among personnel fighting in Chechnya during its initial stages was also that 
"We will be here another week or so, then on to Moscow." 166 It was further reported in June 
1996 that a group of officers had planned to kidnap the President by intercepting his 
motorcade. 167 Similarly, during the same month then Security Council Secretary Lebed 
asserted, at least initially, that he had foiled a coup involving supporters of Grachev. These 
162 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 February 1992, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Officers and Politicians," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 6 February 1992, accessed 18 March 1998. 
163 Serge Schmemann, "Russian Major Caught Seeking To Kill Yeltsin," NYTOndisc, 31 January 1993, Section 
1 p 13. 
164 "Article Examines Armed Forces' View of Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, pp60-2, quoted 
in Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p332. 
165 "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, pp39-40, quoted in 
Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p33 l. 
166 "Zavtra on Army as Threat to Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995, p22, quoted in Goldstein, 
pl 18. 
167 Kevin Ferdarko, "Giving the Big Kiss-Off," Time no vol., no.23, 3 June 1996, p26. 
Table 10: The Opinions of Russian Officers with regard to the Permissible Ways of protecting their Rights and Interests 1992-1997 
This table records the percentages of personnel who believe that the following actions are permissible. The most relevant of these are displayed in 
graph 3. 
Forms of Action 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Dealing with complaints and proposals in line with 56 41 41 41 36 32 
existing regulations 
Early Discharge from army 23 17 20 24 38 41 
Participating in activities of organisations defending 21 16 13 19 26 46 
servicemen's rights 
Issuing statements and demands to the media 22 16 11 23 24 37 
Ostentatious passivity in carrying out official duties 2 6 9 14 19 22 
Using force as a result of the failure to carry out demands 10 4 6 18 26 31 
These polls were undertaken by the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research. The results for 1996 and 1997 are based on expert opinion, as mass 
polls using the same methodology were not carried out during these years. These findings are based upon a poll of 300 experts. Those polled included the leaders of major 
military collectives, military journalists, observers, General Staff and Defence Ministry analysts. Please note that all the figures listed are from the original source. Source: 
















Graph 3: Russian Officers and Persmissible Ways of Protecting Rights and Interests 1992-
1997 
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accusations however are not very credible and Lebed distanced himself from them. 168 
The warnings and actions of the civilian and military leadership also indicate that a coup was 
feared. Evidence indicates that anxiety arose over the possibility a coup, even before the new 
regime took power. For example, St Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak exclaimed that a 
military coup was a real possibility in December 1991. 169 Likewise, anxiety arose during the 
second transitional period. In March 1994 rumours of an imminent coup involving military 
personnel were reported to have encouraged urgent talks between Russian Prime Minister 
Victor Chemomyrdin and Yeltsin. 170 Later that November, Zhirinovsky warned that military 
rule was possible. 171 Following this, in early 1995 former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar 
claimed that the potential for a coup was increasing and that it could easily succeed given the 
disastrous Chechnyan war. 172 Indeed rumours of a coup in early 1995 encouraged Yeltsin to 
cancel a trip abroad and in April the new regime denied that a coup attempt had occurred. 173 
Similarly, in June 1996 Anatoliy Chubais, then a leading member of Yeltsin's re-election 
team, warned that a coup was a "ve1y real danger."174 Moreover some military personnel 
spoke of the possibility of another coup. Immediately after the 1991 coup, Colonel Viktor 
Alksnis swore that another was possible. 175 Lebed also claimed in May 1995 that the 
probability of a militaiy revolt was "50-50."176 
168 Alexander Lebed, "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup, New Security Policy-Interview," interview by NTV, 
Moscow, in Russian, 1535 gmt, 18 June 1996, carried by BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR (BBC MS: 
FUSSR), quoted in "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup, New Security Policy-Interview," Reuters, 20 June 
1996. However evidence indicated that no such attempt occurred and Lebed distanced himself from his initial 
claims. See ITAR-TASS news agency (world service), Moscow, in Russian, 0849 gmt, 21 June 1996, carried by 
BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 June 1996, quqted in "Parliament Finds No Evidence Of Attempted Coup," Reuters, 22 
June 1996; and Ostankino Radio Mayak, 21 June 1996, quoted in "Lebed Tells Parliament How He Headed Off 
Umest In Army," Reuters, 24 June 1996. 
169 Megapolis-Express, 5 December 1991, n.p., quoted in "Shevardnadze Issues New Coup Warning, Says 
Newspaper," Reuters, 4 December 1991. 
170 See The Financial Times, 22 March 1994, pl, quoted in Jolm Lloyd, "Russian Coup Plot Reports Spark 
Urgent Yeltsin Talks," Reuters, 22 March 1994. 
171 Doug Clarke, "Zhirinovsky Tells Americans That Military A Threat In Russia," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 
Internet, 9 November 1994, accessed 28 June 1998. 
172 Wendy Sloane, 'Yeltsin Critic: Chechnya's 'Disastrous' Fallout," Christian Science Monitor (CS/vf), 87, 
no.32, 13 January 1995, p7. 
173 See "Defense Ministry Shakeup Predicted in March-April," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 28 January 1995, p 19 quoted 
in Goldstein, p 118; and "Filatov Says Yeltsin "Absolutely in Control," FBIS-SOV-95-019, 30 January 1995, 
p15, quoted in Goldstein, pl 18. With regard to the alleged coup see "Yeltsin Press Office Denies Coup 
Rumours," Reuters, 28 April 1995. 
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1991, pA25. 
176 Alexander Lebed, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," interview by Alexander Zhilin, 
Jamestown Prism 1, no.2, 12 May 1995, available from 
http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/001/002 _ 006.htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998, p3 of 4. 
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Scholars and journalists also feared that a military coup might be staged. Scholars like 
Stephen Foye recognised that the threat of a coup was becoming increasingly serious during 
the months prior to the 1991 coup. 177 Though I believe that most scholars downplayed the 
threat of a coup, some emphasised the possibility of such an intervention. Richard Spence 
argued that "Russia appears to be a military coup waiting to happen" because ofYeltsin's lack 
of political support. 178 Lyle Goldstein also wrote after examining the instability of civil-
military relations during the Chechnyan war that the "ugly specter of military coup" had 
arisen. 179 Likewise, Kunio Sakuma feared that a military coup could be staged in 1995 as "the 
military, political, and economic crisis deepens."180 Journalists also expressed anxiety. 
Directly after the 1991 coup journalists wrote of the possibility of another, and in 1992 James 
Camey wrote that the planning of a coup "could become a reality."181 Similar fears were 
expressed in The Economist. An article in the magazine claimed in 1993 that it could only be 
a matter of time before officers staged a second coup, and an article in 1994 raised the 
possibility of Lebed using force to take power. In 1995 another article claimed that Yeltsin's 
. ld . . 1s2 actions cou prec1p1tate a coup. 
Despite these warnings, the threat was also downplayed, as is agam shown by the three 
sources of analysis. Overall, this was the dominant view among scholars, including those who 
specifically examined the likelihood of a coup. Both the leaders of the former Soviet regime 
and the new regime downplayed the threat. Gorbachev in early 1993 ruled out the possibility 
of a coup, and in early 1995 Yeltsin responded to coup rumours through Sergey Filatov, 
effectively his Chief of Staff, by declaring that he was clearly in control. 183 The civilian 
leadership also promised to prevent the occurrence of such an intervention. Yeltsin during his 
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1996 re-election campaign proclaimed that his main aim was to ensure stability and prevent 
divisive events like coups. 184 Finally, in June 1996 Oleg Soskovets, First Vice-Premier, 
Aleksandr Korzhakov, Head of the Presidential Security Service and Mikhail Barsukov, 
Director of the FSB were removed. Chubais declared that these removals were paramount to 
"striking the last nail in the coffin of both Communism and military coups."185 
The military leadership echoed these civilian views. Directly after the 1991 coup 
Shaposhnikov ruled out the possibility of another and claimed that military involvement in the 
failed coup was minimal. 186 Shaposhnikov during the January 1992 All-Army Officers' 
Assembly further downplayed the prospect of a coup and declared that "We aren't some 
Thailand, after all." 187 Likewise, in July 1992 the military denied that it was planning a coup 
and in October 1992 General Konstantin Kobets, the Chief Military Inspector, stated that the 
army would prevent any coup against Yeltsin. 188 That year Grachev also said that the officer 
corps would not permit a coup to be staged. 189 Similarly, a survey of officers from December 
1993 to March 1994 found that only 16 percent believed that the military would take over the 
leadership of the state. 190 In June 1996 Colonel General Vik.tor Barynkin, the First Deputy of 
the Russian Military's General Staff, also denied Lebed's coup allegations. Barynkin claimed 
that an attempt aimed at undem1ining the state system would not be possible. 191 Likewise, 
officers during the 1996 elections dismissed the notion that a coup might be staged. 192 
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Numerous scholars also argued that a coup was unlikely, at least in the near-term. Michael 
Desch in late 1993 wrote that most analysts were optimistic about the future of Russian civil-
military relations. 193 Although scholars recognised that the military' s loyalty was not 
guaranteed, they doubted that it would stage an act as extreme as a coup. Desch argued that 
the danger was not of a coup being staged, but rather of the military playing an increasingly 
indirect role in politics via its ties with civilian factions. 194 Tsypkin concluded that 
intervention was unlikely, as the military was focused on its corporate interests and sought 
influence via political alliances rather than political power itself. 195 Kimberly Zisk argued that 
the military did not intervene because Yeltsin "bent over backwards to meet the interests of 
military officers." For instance, he provided it greater budgetary support and control over 
foreign policy. 196 Similarly, Natalie Gross-Rassman argued that positive incentives and 
coercive controls discouraged intervention. These positive incentives included the'military's 
greater role in policy-making, the greater size of the officer corps and more promotion 
opp011unities, and moves to make domestic and foreign policies more attuned to military 
demands. Accompanying these was the presence of other armed forces and the surveillance of 
the military. 197 
More specifically, the military's failure to intervene was often explained, at least to some 
degree, in terms of its poor cohesion and professionalism. Mendeloff s work is particularly 
relevant as he specifically studied the military's political quiescence. Mendeloff argued that 
the danger of a coup was "largely a myth."198 He argued that poor cohesion was an 
organisational barrier to intervention and this contributed to the "paradox of disintegration." 
Here the lack of "organizational cohesion" provided a coup motive, however once cohesion 
had declined too far it inhibited intervention by causing a fall in prestige. This encouraged 
193 Desch, p455. 
194 Ibid., p456. 
195 Tsypkin, "Will the Military" p65. 
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officers to believe that a coup would be met by "mass social unrest." 199 He further argued that 
most officers continued to hold "professional values" that encouraged them to accept civilian 
authority.200 Mendeloff believed that this professionalism was strengthened by the historic 
professionalism of the military, by recent events like the 1991 coup, and by an aversion to risk 
common among professionals.201 
Many journalists expressed similar opinions. At the general level, the likelihood of dramatic 
political changes was downplayed. Nathaniel Knight wrote that Russia's economic and 
political situation had been exaggerated with predictions of civil wars, its dismemberment, 
and the establishment of a hard line dictatorship.202 Likewise, Serge Schmemann argued that 
"the doomsday notion of a fascist dictatorship slouching toward Moscow is overblown."203 
More specifically, the likelihood of the military playing a decisive role in politics, such as 
during the 1996 presidential elections, was downplayed.204 The probability of the military 
staging an actual coup was also downplayed. For example, some journalists from The 
Economist argued that a coup was unlikely, given poor cohesion would inhibit any direct 
action. 205 
As I believe that the military did not have the capacity, strong disposition, or the opportunity 
to intervene, as I argue during the following chapters, I do not believe that the threat of a coup 
was high. However I have doubts over many of the above explanations of why the military 
did not intervene. Apart from their dated analysis, none of the explanations take into account 
the 1995 Duma elections or 1996 presidential elections, at least some of the arguments made 
are contentious. I believe that· Zisk was making an over-statement when she argued that 
Yeltsin "bent over backwards" for the military. For instance, Yeltsin publicly criticised the 
military, and budgetary support fell in real terms, increasing the hardships of serving. 
Moreover when I assess the military's disposition I argue that the military lacked involvement 
in the making of key decisions, like that to invade Chechnya. Gross-Hassman's argument has 
weaknesses too. Her argument shares the s~me problem with regard to the assertion that the 
military enjoyed a greater level of influence and, I argue later, civilian interference in the 
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promotion process actually could be a source of discontent. Nor should the strength of the 
coercive controls be over-emphasised. This is because armed forces apart from the military 
lacked its capacity, and the determination of their personnel to defeat a coup is debatable. This 
is a point I stress when I examine whether the military had the capacity to intervene. 
More specifically, I doubt the validity of arguments that stress the inhibiting role of poor 
cohesion. Although I concur with Mendeloffs argument that the fall of cohesion contributed 
to a loss of prestige, which in turn discouraged a coup because of the prospect of civilian 
opposition, it is overly simplistic. This is because I believe that the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to intervene must all be examined in-depth to adequately explain the absence of a 
coup. I also believe that although poor cohesion was a factor which contributed to the failure 
of the military to intervene, it was not of critical importance. This is because those forces 
available to the new regime for protection experienced a similar loss of cohesion, had less 
firepower, and were of debatable loyalty. In addition, military personnel were united over key 
issues that I discuss when the military' s disposition is assessed. These include the shared 
belief that budgetary support was inadequate. Such beliefs were potential coup grievances. 
Turning to professionalism, the military remained professional if one defines such a military 
as being very reluctant to stage a coup. However I believe that overall professionalism 
declined markedly, as is illustrated by the decline in both military expertise and cohesion. 
This decline was recognised by both personnel and civilians. A survey of officers in 1995 
found that only 26 percent rated Lebed favourably in tem1S of his professionalism. Another 
survey in February 1996 found that only 4 percent of civilian survey respondents believed that 
Russian military professionalism was superior to that of other armies, whereas 21 percent 
believed that it was lower.206 Indeed I believe that the decline of qualities like expertise and 
cohesion commonly associated with professionalism reduced the likelihood of a coup. This is 
because the capacity to intervene fell and an interventionist mood did not develop. I also 
believe that the qualities professionals are attributed do not prevent their intervention. For 
instance, Yazov had served in the army since 18 years of age, fought in the Second World 
War, and was a graduate of both the Frunze Military Academy and General Staff Academy. 
Yeltsin himself acknowledged Yazov's professional attributes. He wrote that Yazov 
205 See "Army without a country," The Economist, p41. 
206 "The Army Through Civilian Eyes," Moscow News, no.9, 7-13 March 1996, p4. 
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"perceived everything with the soldierly bluntness and through the morose bureaucratic prism 
of duty, obedience, and orders."207 
In summary, although a military coup was not staged, the threat that one could occur was 
taken seriously. This is illustrated by the warnings of such an intervention, and the reaction by 
the regime and resultant discussion by civilian commentators. Indeed an investigation of the 
political opinions of officers in 1993 concluded that "[ w ]hether or not the threat [ of the 
military establishing a dictatorship] is great today is still a moot point. That it does exist is 
beyond doubt."208 
Conclusions 
As with the 1985 to 1991 period, major changes to the military occurred under the new 
regime. Most importantly, the stmcture of the civil-military relationship changed, as the main 
actors became the new regime and the Russian military rather than the Communist party and 
the Soviet military. Penetration methods of control were thus realigned to enhance Yeltsin' s 
authority. Indicative of this is the continued monitoring of personnel by the new regime. An 
outcome of the decline of the Communist party and continued use of penetration control 
methods was the military's increased political activity. With regard to the three models of 
Soviet civil-military relations, they became ever more irrelevant. This is because all three 
were based on the relationship between the now defunct Communist party and the defunct 
Soviet military. They all fail to adequately explain the dramatic change that occun-ed during 
this period. 
Apart from changes to the stmcture of the civil-military relationship, other changes also 
occurred. Changes were made by the new regime in accordance with its commitment to 
Russia rather than the Soviet Union, and in line with the new regime's security perceptions. 
With regard to budgetary support, this fell in real terms because of the continued downplaying 
of the military's traditional external role, and the lack ofresources. Similarly, popular support 
for the military, for officers, and for military service, along with the morale of personnel, and 
military cohesion were not isolated from change. Whereas the military had enjoyed much 
207 Yeltsin, The View, p56. 
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suppo1i before 1985, under Yeltsin the perception of the military officers, and military service 
was negative. Limited support can essentially be attributed to the same two key factors that 
encouraged negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev 
meant that the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated 
to the military, and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions. 
In line with these negative developments, morale among personnel was low. To assess the 
level of cohesion I again examined relations between the services, officers, political officers 
and military personnel, and officers and soldiers (but not between various ethnic groups as 
ethnicity is examined later). The Chechnyan war is illustrative of the lack of cohesion as 
perso1mel were bitterly divided over the invasion's merits. Cohesion was so poor that 
casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Adding to these divisions wen~ those that arose 
because of divergent opinions over restructuring the military, over service conditions, and 
over the continued debate concerning the place of politics in the military. 
Finally, both the military's size and expertise changed. As with the level of cohesion, the 
transition entailed a drastic decline in the number of personnel. This change was in line with 
the decline of the military' s traditional external role; and the real fall of budgetary support. In 
addition, it became increasingly difficult to find those willing and able to serve. Turning to 
military expertise, the inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev remained and 
probably worsened given the military's performance in Chechnya. Most importantly, the 
military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Other factors that 
contributed to this inadequacy -include the loss of experienced personnel and the lack of 
training. 
Although a coup was not staged, the threat that one could occur was taken seriously. This 
threat is shown by the threats of force made by military personnel against the new regime, and 
by the various opinions that were held with regard to a coup. The willingness of some 
personnel to intervene against the civilian leadership is shown by the 1991 coup and by the 
1993 revolt. Two broad opinions on the threat of a coup are discernible. First, the threat of a 
coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over the threat. Second, others 
downplayed the likelihood of a coup, though the military's loyalty was not taken for granted. 
However I doubt the validity of many of the explanations for the absence of a coup. 
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Therefore, I believe that in the context of the second period of the transition hypothesis one is 
valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively 
impact upon the military. This is because the transition affected the structure of the civil-
military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, and the 
military morale. Cohesion and size along with expertise changed too. It is equally clear that 
these changes were of an overwhelmingly negative nature. The brief outlining of the coup 
threat also provides the context within which hypotheses two to four are evaluated. According 
to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their 
importance can vary. These factors are detailed in the following chapters. With regard to 
hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage 
a coup. Finally, according to hypothesis four, a transition may be coup conducive as it 
strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene. 
The following chapter starts to examine why the Russian military did not stage a coup with 
regard to the first of the three intervention determinants I assess, the military's perceived 
capacity to stage a coup. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, the presence of those 
personnel whose participation increases the likelihood of a successful coup is examined. 
Second, the military's cohesion is examined. Third, the number of personnel available to 
participate in a coup is estimated. Finally, the mood of the military and whether it was 
predisposed to intervention is assessed. Therefore, this chapter examines hypothesis two 
through to four. Most generally, hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to 
stage a coup and their importance can vary, is assessed. More specifically, the validity of 
hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, 
according to the first of the three factors, the capacity is assessed. Similarly, hypothesis four, a 
transition may be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity 
to intervene, is also examined, again according to the first factor. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996: 
THE CAPACITY TO INTERVENE 
This chapter examines why the Russian military did not intervene against the new regime 
from 1992 to 1996 in the context of its capacity to stage a coup. The military must believe that 
it has the capacity to defeat, or successfully intimidate, the regime's leaders and supporters, 
seize strategic sites necessary for the excising of power, and must be able to act swiftly to 
guarantee surprise and to minimise organised opposition. Therefore, the military's self-
perceptions are directly relevant as they influence whether personnel have the confidence to 
intervene. The military's popularity is not examined here because it is addressed in the 
context of the opportunity to intervene. As factors that might discourage intervention are 
closely associated with the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, I shall note 
their influence within the context of the chapters that assess these coup determinants. Thus, 
factors that might discourage intervention within the context of the capacity to intervene are 
noted here. 
I believe that the Russian military's capacity is influenced by four main factors. First, the type 
of personnel involved in a coup is important. Most importantly, leaders popular among 
personnel both willing and able to lead a coup have a significant impact on the capacity. The 
participation of strategically located officers, those commanding units located near strategic 
sites, can fmiher increase the speed and thus the surprise of an intervention. Effectively armed 
and trained personnel similarly enhance the capacity to intervene. The participation of army 
personnel is important given their weaponry and expertise in ground operations. In addition, 
the participation of elite units facilitates a swift operation and can discourage opposition. This 
is because of their presumed high level ofreadiness and expertise. Second, the cohesion of the 
coup forces is relevant. For instance, the unwillingness of personnel to risk civilian casualties 
and civilian opposition to a coup increases the risks of intervention. Third, the number of 
participants might be relevant. The more personnel, particularly of the above type, that can be 
effectively co-ordinated, the more likely that the operation can be swiftly staged. Numerous 
sites, personalities, and opponents might need to be seized and countered. Finally, the 
military's mood is vital. Personnel must ultimately decide whether they have the capacity to 
intervene successfully, and at least initially, exercise power. 
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Therefore, this chapter examines hypothesis two, three, and four. With regard to the case 
study, I have already argued that hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to 
negatively impact upon the military, is valid. Here I examine the validity of hypothesis two, 
various factors (as noted in full in the introduction) can influence the decision to stage a coup 
and their importance can vary. In the context of the capacity to intervene these factors are: the 
presence of potential coup leaders; participation of officers commanding personnel located 
near strategic sites; participation of effectively armed and trained personnel; cohesion of the 
coup forces; number of personnel; and the military's mood. I shall also examine hypothesis 
three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. This 
hypothesis is examined in the context of the capacity to intervene. Hypothesis four, that a 
transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and oppo1iunity to 
intervene, is also examined, again according to the capacity to intervene. 
Type of Personnel 
Leaders 
I do not believe that transitional developments led to the emergence of the leader or leaders 
capable, and willing, to lead a Russian military coup. This absence of strong leadership is 
vital given the need to effectively lead and to win st1pport for an operation as hazardous as a 
coup. The impo1iance of capable leaders is shown by the 1991 coup where poor leadership 
contributed to the attempt's failure. For instance, personnel were not briefed on the 
operation's objectives except for being told that they were to "preserve calm in Moscow." 1 
Coup leaders like Yazov also showed little enthusiasm. Yazov told the other coup leaders that 
"I will not be another Pinochet [the Chilean military dictator]" and ordered the army to 
withdraw from Moscow. 2 Similarly, Yazov appears to have already been depressed at the 
start of the coup, and afterwards called himself a fool for having participated. 3 This poor 
leadership is noted by scholars like John Lepingwell who wrote "the absence of any clear 
mission and of fim1 leadership at the top precluded success."4 The coup's poor leadership is in 
stark contrast to Yeltsin's decisive rallying of people against the coup. Yeltsin swiftly 
denounced the coup, addressed crowds outside the White House, and actively sought support 
1 Yeltsin, The View, p74. 
2 Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order," pA18. 
3 Yeltsin, The View, p80. See also Schofield, p220. With regard to his view after the coup see Der Spiegel no 
no., 6 October 1991, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Junta Pleading For Mercy," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 
Internet, 7 October 1991, Internet, accessed 16 March 1998. 
4 Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p565. 
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from other countries. 5 He also courted personnel by issuing leaflets that said they were 
subordinate to him as the popularly elected President, whereas the coup leaders' actions were 
illegal. This was a skilful move as it directly appealed to their sense of legality. 6 
The absence of the strong leadership required to intervene successfully is shown by the lack 
of strong political attachments among personnel to a specific party or group that might have 
been able to unite them behind a coup. Two key indicators show that such a leader, or leaders, 
were absent. First, the opinions and actions of personnel show that despite the overall 
negative impact of the transition there was no opponent of the new regime who enjoyed their 
overwhelmingly support. This reduced the likelihood of many personnel actively supporting a 
coup. The failure to win over the military was reinforced by the reluctance of potential coup 
leaders to co-operate. Although I recognise that successful coups do not necessarily involve 
large numbers of personnel, I believe that the larger the number involved in the execution of a 
well-led coup, the greater the likelihood of success. The widespread and active support of 
personnel would be vital in Russia given the complexity of seizing power in a large modem 
state. Second, those opponents of the new regime who received the most support from 
personnel did not advocate that a coup be launched. I believe that key factors here include 
their realisation that power had to be taken legitim.ately rather than via force, and at least an 
acknowledgment of democratic rights. Thus, the military lacked the leadership to stage a 
coup, a key factor likely to discourage intervention. 
The military did not have an attachment with any one opposition party or group strong enough 
to have enabled them to unifo personnel behind a coup. Although personnel became 
increasingly politically active during this period, as I have already argued, they showed a lack 
of a strong commitment to a specific political party. For instance, in 1993 a survey of 13 
military schools found that only 12 percent of officer cadets perceived themselves to be 
followers of the opinions of a specific socio-political movement or party. Indeed by 1994 this 
had declined to 8 percent.7 Likewise, a stuqy published in April 1995 found that no political 
party enjoyed strong support among officers.8 Later that year a survey of 2,500 servicemen 
and 500 members of their families found that 90 percent of them did not identify with any 
5 For an eyewitness account of Yeltsin's importance see Elliot, "Three Days in August," p66. Also see Yeltsin, 
The View, pp41-103. 
6 See Barylski, The Soldier, pl 12. 
7 Chernavin, p738. 
8 Izvestiya, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Robert Orttung, "Izvestiya Examines Political Tendencies In The 
Military," RFEIRL Daily ReportNSS, Internet, 21 April 1995, accessed 17 June 1998. 
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particular party. 9 In 1996 another report also found that personnel had divided political 
loyalties. 10 Those parties often associated with extremism like the LDPR and the Communist 
party also failed to enjoy a strong and unconditional bond with the military, as should become 
apparent when I assess the popularity of their leaders. 
Similarly, extremist groups aimed specifically at the military enjoyed limited support. Only 2 
percent of officers in poll findings published in 1993 had been involved in protests, and in 
February 1993 only 250 officers attended the All-Army Officers' Meeting rather than the 
1,500 expected. The majority of these officers were not on active duty. 11 From 1992 to 1996 
on average only 19 percent of officers indicated in the CMSPLR survey that it was 
permissible to participate in the activities of any organisations defending their rights (see table 
10). This lack of support corresponds with the overall reluctance among personnel to become 
politically active, especially with regard to direct action against the new regime. Among 
groups aimed at personnel, political involvement was not necessarily advocated either. 
Indicative of this is the stance taken by the Servicemen's Independent Trade Union in 1993, 
which declared that politicians should leave the military out of their conflicts. 12 The limited 
appeal of military interest groups was encouraged by the negative perceptions many personnel 
had of such groups. For instance in 1992, 43 pe'rcent of officers indicated that officer's 
assemblies were ineffective and useless. 13 Moreover, personnel who attended meetings were 
not necessarily content with the proceedings. One important member of the Officers' Union 
was booed off the podium when he rose to speak in January 1992. 14 Attempts by these groups 
to win support are also likely to have been hindered by their weaknesses. For example, 
Stanislav Terekhov, head of the·· Officers' Union, attempted to usurp the authority of the All-
Am1y Officers' Assembly. Apart from this, I have already noted that such groups were 
closely monitored by the new regime. 
9 P. Povesmo, "What Is Your Mood, Man In Unifom1'?" KZ, 26 December 1995, p2, quoted in 01T, The Current 
State, pl3. 
10 Moskovskie novosti, 31 March-7 April 1996, n.p., quoted in Scott Parrish, "Military Leadership Maneuvers In 
Presidential Campaign," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, ·Internet, 4 April 1996, accessed 10 June 1998. 
11 S. Solovev and S. Ianin, "Rossiiskaia armiia god spustia: problem ne ubavliaetsia," Armiia no.10, May 1993, 
p32, quoted in Mendeloff, p234. With regard to the 1993 meeting see Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 February 1993, 
n.p. quoted in Konstantin Sorokin, "Russia And The Former Soviet Union," ed. Constantine Danopoulos and 
Cynthia Watson, The Political Role Of The Militwy: An International Handbook, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1996), p397. 
12 Steven Erlanger, "Crisis In Moscow: Divided And Burdened, The Army Stays Neutral," NYT Ondisc, 24 
March 1993, pA8. 
13 P. Zalesskii, "Chto segodnia trevozhit ofitserov," Armiia no no. August 15 1992, p13, quoted in Mendeloff, 
footnote 21, p233. 
14 See Iurii Orlik, "Manvry vokrug ochen' vooruzhennykh sil," Izvestia, 20 January 1992, p2, quoted in 
Mendeloff, p235. 
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More specifically, the evidence indicates that no opponent of Yeltsin who might have played 
a leadership role in a coup enjoyed an overwhelming level of support from personnel. This is 
shown by the military not acting decisively in support of an opponent, personnel failing to use 
force against the civilian leadership on their behalf, or to strongly and consistently support 
them. Such failures were clearly visible to the opponents given the military's actions during 
the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt, the military voting patterns, and the numerous surveys of 
personnel. The ability of potential coup leaders to unite the military behind an intervention is 
critical in Russia. This is because I argue later that a key factor behind the reluctance to 
intervene was the threat that personnel would be divided and fight each other, in tum 
threatening a civil war. The importance of this ability to unify the military was further 
enhanced by the need to use large numbers of personnel to seize power in a large modem state 
like Russia. This is another point I make later in the chapter. Apart from the strong reluctance 
to intervene and the attachment to democratic values, which I discuss when the military's 
mood is assessed, I believe that the actions of the potential coup leaders and the policies 
associated with them limited their appeal. 
The most popular opponents of the new regime failed to win widespread military support, a 
failure likely to have discouraged them from seeking a leadership role in a coup. According to 
the CMSPLR survey taken throughout this period, the opponents most favoured by personnel 
were: Rutskoi; Zhirinovsky; Zyuganov; Lebed; and Gromov. Rutskoi, who was not on active 
duty, received minimal support from the military when he used force to challenge Yeltsin's 
leadership in 1993. Very few officers joined the 1993 revolt and only an estimated 100-200 
officers occupied the vVhite House from 21 st September to 2nd October. 15 There were even 
fewer active officers involved. Grachev claimed that only 15 supported the revolt and even 
Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, an officer in the reserves and a leader of the revolt, 
claimed that 80 active officers participated. 16 To put this in perspective, in mid-1993 the 
Russian army had 690,000 officers. 17 Acti-y~ support from soldiers was similarly minimal. 18 
CMSPLR findings further indicated that while Rutskoi enjoyed the highest level of sympathy 
15 Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pl0. See also Stephen Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow: The 
Army Backs Yeltsin, for Now," RFEIRL Research Report 2, no.42, 22 October 1993, pp 12-3. 
16 Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," footnote 19, p23. 
17 Barylski, The Soldier, p278. 
18 Pavel Grachev, "The Khaki October," interview by Dmitriy K.holodov, 8 October 1993, Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets, 8 October 1993, ppl, 4, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 11 October 1993, quoted in "Defence 
Minister On Storming Of White House And The Army's Role In The Crisis," Reuters, 11 October 1993. 
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among officers, this averaged only 19 .3 percent, peaking at 48 percent in April 1992. This 
compared with sympathy for Yeltsin averaging 25.3 percent (see table 11 and graph 4). 19 
Even then Rutskoi's support was artificially high because personnel could choose two or three 
political leaders to support. The level of this support was unlikely to constitute a strong 
enough bond to motivate intervention. Rutskoi, at least by May and July 1995 when Ball 
surveyed 600 officers, enjoyed a high degree of confidence among 4.4 percent of officers, 
only 2.7 percent more than Yeltsin (see table 12). Similarly, in a survey earlier that year 11 
percent supported Rutskoi as a presidential candidate, whereas Yeltsin was supported by 12 
percent (see table 13). Another March 1995 survey found that only 7.4 percent of personnel 
said that they supported Rutskoi.20 
Rutskoi's lack of widespread support during the latter part of this period was primarily a 
result of his actions during the 1993 revolt. Apart from imploring the military to intervene 
despite its reluctance, Rutskoi failed to skillfully court the military. For instance, he appointed 
Achalov, the former superior of Grachev, as his Minister of Defence despite his unpopularity 
among personnel. 21 Support was fmiher discouraged by his attempt to divide the military. 
This angered the military hierarchy as they felt that their authority was threatened.22 When 
casualties were sustained, personnel blamed these on the revolt leaders and immediately after 
the assault on the parliament, personnel involved in the assault supported Yeltsin.23 Finally, 
Rutskoi treated officers with contempt and lost their support. Lebed wrote that during the 
revolt an envoy of Rutskoi in a bossy tone ordered that he attend a conference. Le bed refused 
and responded that "With human beings, I conduct myself in a human way. With swine like a 
swine. "24 Rutskoi lost his rank 'in October 1993 and his popularity did not recover from his 
bloody failure, sympathy having fallen over 50 percent within a year (see table 11). 
19 For the level of sympathy in 1992 I divide the two survey results to obtain an average level of support. To 
calculate the average level of sympathy for the five years I use the 1992 figure and combine it with those for the 
next four years, and then divide it by five. 
20 Alexander Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win The Russian Army's Hearts And Minds?" Jamestown 
Prism no vol. or no., 8 September 1995, available from 
http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public _html/russia_/milpol2.txt, Internet, accessed 31 May 1998, p2 of 8 
21 Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p9. 
22 Ibid., pp9-14; and Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow," pl 3. 
23 Buzgalin and Kolganov, p 152; and Fiona Fleck, "Russian Troops Say No Doubts Yeltsin Was Right," Reuters, 
8 October 1993. 
24 "Ne veruiushchii, no veruiu ... ," Soldat Otechestva, 13 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p535. 
Table 11: Ratings of Political Leaders Among Russian Officers 1992-1997 
• Officers could choose two or three political leaders with whom they sympathised. 
Leaders: April 1992 July-August To October To October To December May 1996 July 1997 
(percentage) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 '• 
Rutskoi 48 46 35-45 (40) 5-10 (7.5) 2 - -
Yeltsin 38 35 25-30 (27.5) 20-30 (25) 10-15 (12.5) 25 9 
Zhirinovsky 17' 14 12 25-35 (27.5) 21 9 18 
Zyuganov - - - 19 30 28 24 
Lebed 7 - 7 12 20 22 28 
With regard to those that range between two figures, such as Rutskoi's popularity in 1993 and 1994, the figure in the middle of this range is quoted in the main text (these 
figures appear in brackets). 
The polls were undertaken by the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research. The 1997 figure is based upon a poll of 300 experts. For further 
information on the survey see Table 10. Source: Korbut, "Lev Rokhlin and the Officers Movement in Russia." 
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Graph 4: Ratings of Political Leaders,Russian Officers 1992-1997 









1992 1993 1994 1995 
Years 
1996 1997 
_._ Rutskoi ---- Yeltsin -----Jt- Zh:ir:inovsky -a- Zyuganov ~ Lebed 
Source: Table 11, p202. 
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Table 12: Confidence of Russian Officers in Key Figures Mid-1995 
Russian Officers were asked: "How much confidence do you have m the following 
individuals?" 




Lebed 592 21.1 64.2 11.5 3.2 
Gromov 585 11.1 62.6 22.1 4.3 
Yavlinsky 565 4.1 50.8 31.9 13.3 
Zyuganov 576 7.3 42.4 32.6 17.7 
Chemomyrdin 591 4.2 42.6 38.7 14.4 
Rutskoi 565 4.4 35.6 37.7 22.3 
Yeltsin 585 1.7 29.1 44.4 24.8 
Zhirinovsky 585 1.5 14.4 35.6 48.5 
This survey examined the level of confidence in twenty figures whereas I have limited this table to those 
previously identified as the new regime's key opponents along with Yeltsin, Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin and Grigory Yavlinsky a liberal democrat. The survey was conducted in 12 regions of Russian 
between May 24 and July 1 1995. A total of 600 field-grade officers (122 Colonels/First Captains, 200 Lt. 
Colonels/Second Captains, and 278 Majors/Third Captains) ,vere interviewed, 320 were from the ground forces, 
84 the air force, 97 the navy, 89 the strategic missiles, and 10 the air defence. Source: Deborah Ball and 
Theodore Gerber, "The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers," Post-Soviet Affairs 12, no.2 (April-
June 1996): Tables 1 and 8, pp161, 171. 
Second, support for Zhirinovsky was not high throughout this period. Although Zhirinovsky 
in July 1991 said that he would endorse a coup and he supported the forthcoming attempt, the 
military did not unite behind it. 25 Under the new regime sympathy for him, according to the 
CMSPLR survey, peaked at around 30 percent in 1994 and from 1992 to 1996 averaged 17.5 
percent, 7.8 percent less than for Yeltsin (see table 11). Like Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky was not 
highly regarded by the vast majority of officers, at least by mid-1995 when a mere 15.9 
percent held him in any confidence, 14.9 percent less than Yeltsin (see table 12). Similarly, in 
1995 only 9 percent of personnel preferred him as President, 2 percent less than Yeltsin, (see 
table 13) and another 1995 survey found his support was limited to 15.6 percent, only 1 
percent more support than for Prime Minister Victor Chemomyrdin. 26 The validity of figures 
that indicated that Zhirinovsky won overwhelmingly support in the 1993 Duma elections are 
25 With regard to Zhirinovsky's declared support for a coup see The Times, 31 July 1991, n.p., quoted in Bruce 
Clark, "Soviet Hardliner Would Support Military Coup," Reuters, 31 July 1991. 
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also doubtful, and even those indicative of widespread support often failed to show that a 
majority of personnel supported him. For instance, the Ministry of Defence and the Central 
Electoral Conm1ission stated that 99 percent of personnel voted with citizens in open electoral 
districts, thereby making accurate data unavailable.27 Moreover reliable estimates indicated 
that 74 percent of personnel in 1993 supported Yeltsin's Constitution.28 Similarly, 
independent reports indicated that only around 20 percent of persmmel voted for Zhirinovsky 
during the 1995 Duma elections.29 Finally, Zhirinovsky won only 14 percent of the military 
vote in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections.30 
Table 13: Russian Officer and Civilian Preferences for Presidential Candidates 1995 
This survey asked respondents whom they preferred as their presidential candidate in April 
1995. 
Preferred candidate Officers General public 
(percentage) 
Yeltsin 12 3 
Yavlinsky 11 14 
Lebed 11 4 
Rutskoi 11 4 
Zhirinovsky 9 6 
The surveyed officers were from the Moscow and North Caucasus MDs. Source: Izvestia, 21 April 1995, n.p., 
quoted in Meyer, "The Devolution," p327 
This lack of universal support was encouraged by various factors. Zhirinovsky's lack oflong-
term military service would have limited his ability to form close relations with many officers. 
Accompanying this, I doubt whether his political performance would have strengthened his 
26 Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p2. 
27 See John Lepingwell, "How Did The Russian Military Vote?" RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 16 
December 1993; and Steven Erlanger, "Question With No Answer: How Army Voted," NYT Ondisc, 17 
December 1993, pA12. See also Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p20, and footnote 58, p29. With 
regard to figmes showing a widespread level of support see Bmsstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of The October 
Crisis," McNab· Paper 34, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34aft.htn1l, ppl-2 of 
3. 
28 Lepingwell, "How Did the Russian Military Vote?" 
29 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. This estimation is supported by surveys 
of personnel. See Moskovskie novosti, 3-10 September 1995, n.p., quoted in Laura Belin, "Support For 
Zhirinovsky In Almy Still Strong," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 8 September 1995, accessed 27 May 
1998; and Korbut, n.p. 
30 Jane's Defence FVeekly, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Richard Woff, "Ruthless Moves Head Off Communist 
Revival," Reuters, 10 July 1996. See also Simon Saradzhyan, "Sample: Russian Military Chooses Yeltsin; 
206 
suppoti among personnel. For instance, several splits within his party occurred. Also he acted 
outrageously. He actually proposed that Russia attack the US and Japan. 31 Apart from the 
obvious danger of nuclear war, many personnel sought better ties with the US regardless of 
their continued suspicions of the West. For instance in 1994, 57 percent of officers advocated 
that Russia and the US form a partnership. 32 More specifically, Zhirinovsky endorsed policies, 
such as the reduction of terms of military service, unlikely to have been favoured by high-
ranking personnel.33 Nor is his close relationship with Grachev likely to have won widespread 
support, given Grachev's unpopularity.34 Likewise, Zhirinovsky was a vocal suppo1ier of the 
Chechnyan campaign, a campaign widely opposed. 
Neither did Zyuganov, the Communist party leader, win overwhelming support. From 1992 to 
1993 he did not enjoy the sympathy of officers, and when this did develop it peaked at 30 
percent and averaged 15.4 percent from 1992 to 1996, 9.9 percent less than Yeltsin's support 
(see table 11). Zyuganov's lack of strong support is shown by the lack of confidence in him 
during 1995, the year when officers are meant to have been most sympathetic. That year, 7.3 
percent had a high degree of confidence in Zyuganov according to Ball, only 5.6 percent more 
than Yeltsin (see table 12). Earlier that year another survey found that only 14.2 percent of 
persmmel supported him.35 In line with this, an estimated 20 percent of personnel voted for 
his party in the 1995 Duma elections, but none of the active military personnel elected in 
districts were Communist. 36 Zyuganov also appears to have failed to win widespread support 
during the 1996 presidential elections, winning perhaps as little as 8 percent of the military 
vote. 37 
Apart from Zyuganov's lack of long-te1m military service, I believe his lack of strong support 
was encouraged by the reluctance of personnel to return to Communism, and by Zyuganov's 
wealmesses as a campaigner. Surveys indicated that few personnel viewed Soviet Communist 
rule as a viable alternative to the new regime. In Ball's 1995 survey only 13.6 percent 
Shuns Zhirinovsky," RFEIRL Features, 17 June 1996, available from 
http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96061715082446.html, Internet, accessed 20 June 1996, pl of 1. 
31 See The Financial Times, 14 December 1993, p2, quoted in "The Russian Elections-How The Maverick Put 
His Case," Reuters, 14 December 1993. 
32 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer C01ps, p4. 
33 Steven Erlanger, "Question With No Answer." 
34 With regard to Zhirinovsky's relationship with Grachev see Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," pp5-7. 
35 Ibid., p2. 
36 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp534, 541-2. 
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believed that the Soviet system was most suitable for Russia (see table 14). Similarly, though 
73.6 percent of officers in 1995 believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had been 
catastrophic, only 13 percent strongly believed that this collapse should have been prevented 
by any means. The majority accepted the post-Soviet borders too (see table 15).38 Personnel 
also appear to have valued the greater political freedoms under the new regime rather than a 
return to Communist restrictions, as I argue later.39 The many negative developments during 
the final years of the Soviet era, and the weak attachment to the Communist party among 
personnel encouraged these attitudes. Both of these factors have already been described. 
Likewise, Zyuganov's electoral skills were at least occasionally inadequate. For example, he 
campaigned poorly during the 1993 elections and failed to provide a coherent policy to the 
military.40 Moreover it is unlikely that the military leadership favoured Zyuganov, given he 
wanted the military to report directly to him rather than via the Minister of Defence. 
Table 14: Russian Officers and the Suitability of Various Political Systems in Russia Mid-
1995 
Officers were asked "What type of political system do you think is most suitable for Russia?" 
Valid Presidential Parliamentary Soviet Monarchy Other 
number of republic republic system 
responses (percentage) 
590 41.4 38.6 13.6 4.1 2.4 
For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 
. 2, p164. 
Fourth, although Lebed was popular among many personnel as a General, he was less popular 
as a politician. Both scholars and journalists wrote that Lebed was a potential coup leader.41 
37 Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Woff. See Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Simon Saradzhyan, 
"Lebed Gambit Paid Off for Yeltsin," RFEIRL Features, 4 July 1996, available from 
http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96070417333373.html, Internet, accessed 7 July 1996, pl of 1. 
38 With regard to the reluctance to take military action to preserve the Soviet Union see Brusstar and Jones, "The 
Military And The Demise Of The USSR," McNai,· Paper 34, available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34and.html, p2 of 2. Brusstar and Jones also found that the 
majority of officers did not believe that the fall of the Soviet Union should have been prevented by the use of 
force. See Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, p4. 
39 See chapter 5, pp248-55. 
40 Thomas, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp333-4. · 
41 Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" ppl-2; Charles King, "A Russian Pinochet Waits In the (Very 
Distant) Wings," CSM 87, no.56, 17-23 February 1995, p19; and Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years 
On," pl 79. With regard to journalists see "Alexander Napoleonovich," The Economist, 332, no.7878, 27 August 
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Many personnel believed that Lebed should be Defence Minister, and 76 percent of 1,867 
Moscow personnel in 1994 believed that he should replace Grachev.42 Furthermore, in the 
first round of the presidential elections he could have won 47 percent of the military vote, 
though some preliminary results cast doubt on this.43 The Friedrich Ebert-sponsored survey of 
615 officers in August 1994 also found that 58 percent supported Lebed, and Ball in 1995 
found that 85.3 percent of officers had confidence in him (see table 12).44 
Table 15: Russian Officers' Views on Restoring Soviet Borders Mid-1995 
Officers were asked "To what extent do you agree with the following?" 
1. "Russia will lose respect of other countries if she does not rule over the other former Soviet 
Union [FSU] republics." 
2. "I believe that the borders of the FSU [Former Soviet Union] are the borders of our 
country" 
3. "The collapse of the USSR should have been prevented by any means, including military." 
4. "Collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for our country." 
Valid number of Fully agree Somewhat agree Somewhat Fully disagree 
responses (percentage) disagree 
593 6.6 18.4 47.2 27.8 
588 12.8 21.3 39.6 26.4 
570 13.0 29.5 42.8 14.7 
583 36.9 36.7 21.3 5.1 
For infmmation on the survey see Table 12. Source: OMIR survey. Ball and Gerber, Table 4, pl 68. 
However I doubt Lebed's ability to unite the military behind a coup. According to the 
CMSPLR survey, from 1992 to 1996 sympathy for him as a politician peaked at 22 percent 
but averaged 12.2 percent, less than half the average level of sympathy for Yeltsin (see table 
11 ). Although confidence in Lebed was widespread in 1995, this was strong among only 21.1 
percent (see table 12). Moreover, Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber found that Lebed's 
1994, pp43-4. See also EIU, Business Eastern Europe, quoted in "General Lebed Gives Western Firms Cause 
For Wony," Reuters, 10 July 1996. 
42 Basapress, 28 June 1994, 2 July 1994, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Lebed Aiming High," RFEIRL Daily 
Report NSS, Internet, 6 July 1994, accessed 18 March 1998. 
43 Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 July 1996, p8, quoted in Woff. See also Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit Paid Off." 
For evidence which casts some doubt on this estimation see Saradzhyan, "Sample." 
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views on the economy rather than his imperialistic or authoritarian views were the most 
important detenninant of this confidence. This was because his views corresponded with 
those of other officers.45 Similarly, the Friedrich Ebert survey found that only 9 percent of 
officers believed that he was a "model contemporary military figure."46 Therefore, Lebed's 
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) received only an estimated 12 percent of the 
military vote during the 1995 Duma elections. 47 The following year, in at least some military 
towns Yeltsin appears to have won more electoral support than Lebed. 48 Even in Trans-
Dniester, where Lebed commanded the 14th Army from 1992 to 1995, 50 percent of personnel 
did not vote for him during the first round of the presidential elections. Attitudes were also 
mixed concerning his decision to serve as Security Council Secretary.49 
I believe that Lebed's actions and attitudes limited his popular appeal. Most generally, his 
political support among officers was limited by his perceived shortcomings as a leader. For 
instance, officers indicated that a coup would not be staged under Lebed because his political 
abilities were limited.50 Many officers also believed that Lebed would make a poor leader, 
and his statement that he would only command troops in Chechnya to withdraw them 
received a hostile response. 51 Similarly, Lebed's peace deal in August 1996 was criticised by 
many perso1mel in Chechnya as they felt that they were being forced to accept defeat.52 At the 
highest level, it is extremely doubtful whether Lebed enjoyed the support of the military 
leadership given their tense relationship. This was particularly tense between Grachev and 
Lebed. Conflict between the two Generals was encouraged by the Defence Minister's fear of 
Lebed's growing popularity and Lebed's knowledge of his past. 53 Indeed Grachev's sacking 
was one of the prerequisites for· Lebed's support for Yeltsin during the second round of the 
44 With regard to the Friedrich Ebe1t survey see Shlapentokh, p423. This survey included 60 Generals and 
Admirals. 
45 Ball and Gerber, pp 176-8. 
46 Der Spiegel no.36, n.d., quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Military Opinion Survey," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 
Internet, 9 November 1994, accessed 18 March 1998. 
47 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. 
48 See Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit." 
49 Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 18 June 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 20 June 1996, quoted in 
"Mixed Reaction To Lebed's Appointment From Dnestr Region And 14th Army," Reuters, 20 June 1996. 
50 See chapter 5, p243. 
51 lzvestiya, 21 April 1995, n.p., in Joint Publications Research Service "Possible Voting Preferences of Military 
Personnel Examined," Militmy affairs, 2 May 1995, ppl-2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547. 
With regard to the response to his stance on Chechnya see Aleksandr Golovkov and Sergei Leskov, "Top Guns," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, no.3, May/June 1995, p53. 
52 Gall and Waal, pp355-7. 
53 See Alexander Zhilin, "Battle For the Soul of the Russian Army," St Petersburg Times, n.d., available from 
http://www.sptimes.rn/archive/times/l 7 5-176/battle.html, Internet, accessed 1 September 1998, pp 1-6 of 6. More 
generally see Simonsen, pp536-9. 
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presidential elections. Likewise, Lebed supported military reductions, claiming that if elected 
president he would dramatically reduce the size of the military, a move unlikely to have been 
well received by senior officers. 54 
Finally, many personnel supported Gromov, but again I believe that this support was not 
strong enough for him to unite the military behind a coup. The Friedrich Ebert survey found 
that 54 percent of officers supported Gromov, and in Ball's 1995 survey 73.7 percent 
indicated that they had confidence in him (see table 12). 55 However in the Friedrich Ebert 
survey only 9 percent of officers indicated that they perceived him to be a "model 
contemporary military figure," and in Ball's survey 11.1 percent had a lot of confidence in 
him, only 9.4 percent more than in Yeltsin (see table 12).56 Similarly, a 1994 survey of 
Moscow personnel found that only 19 percent favoured Gromov as Minister of Defence.57 
Gromov would not have received much support from the military hierarchy given his 
insubordination. With regard to lower-ranked personnel, I believe that his support was 
restricted by the presence of Lebed. This is because both publicly criticised the new regime 
and shared similar stances on issues like Chechnya. Moreover, Gromov's criticism of Lebed 
is unlikely to have won him much support from personnel given Lebed's popularity. 
The potential coup leaders also showed an unwillingness to unite. This is shown by the 
conflict between them. The two most popular opponents of the new regime, Rutskoi and 
Zhirinovsky showed little willingness to co-operate. In April 1994, Rutskoi claimed that 
Zhirinovsky was "a clinical case" and that he should not be taken seriously as a politician, 
while Zhirinovsky did not support the parliamentary revolt. 58 Similar conflict occurred 
between Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov. The Communist party downplayed the likelihood of an 
alliance with the LDPR. Zyuganov stated in December 1993 that there was "no common 
ground," and prior to the second round of the presidential elections Zhirinovsky told his 
supporters not to support the Communist party.59 This lack of unity was encouraged by 
individual conflicts and by those of an ideological and political nature. Such disunity reduced 
54 RFEIRL Daily Report, no no., 10 April 1996, quoted in Scott Parrish, "Lebed Proposes Sharp Reductions In 
Army," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 16 April 1996, accessed 11 April 1998. 
55 With regard to the Friedrich Ebert survey see Shlapentokh, p431. 
56 With regard to the Friedrich Ebert survey see Der Spiegel no.36, quoted in Socor, "Military Opinion Survey." 
57 Socor, "Lebed Aiming High." 
58 L 'Evenement Du Jeudi, 5 April 1994, n.p., quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Rutskoi On Zhirinovsky," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 7 April 1994, accessed 10 June 1998. · 
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the probability of an alliance between the potential coup leaders and the military, given the 
importance the military placed on cohesion. 60 
Similar inter-personal conflict involved Lebed and Gromov. Apart from Lebed's refusal to 
support Rutskoi during the 1993 revolt, he rejected appeals to make an alliance with 
Zyuganov prior to the second round of the presidential elections and called Zhirinovsky a 
"minus."61 Such conflict is likely to have been encouraged by his disdain for civilian hard-
liners, Lebed terming them "dangerous populist fanatics."62 Similarly, Lebed had his own 
political agenda, and had intentions to hold political office.63 With regard to Gromov, I have 
already noted that he publicly criticised Lebed, but his relations with civilian extremists were 
tense too. He refused to let his 'My Fatherland party' have close relations with extremists 
during the 1995 elections, and actively supported Yeltsin in 1996,. Even if all these men had 
united they would not have enjoyed overwhelming military support. In 1995 when the total 
level of sympathy for Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Lebed peaked, 27 percent 
remained unsympathetic to all of them. Likewise, when the confidence levels of all five were 
combined only 45.4 percent of officers had a lot of confidence in them (see tables 11 and 12). 
Indeed Youry Averyanov, a Russian government official, told me in July 1998 that the 
military's political quiescence could be partly expiained by the unpopularity of "ideas and 
especially leaders of opposition."64 
This lack of coup leadership is further indicated by the reluctance of the above personalities to 
advocate a coup. I believe that although all five potential coup leaders held political 
ambitions, they came to recognise that power could only be obtained by legitimate means and 
that intervention could have a wide-ranging negative impact. Support for the attempts made to 
seize power was limited among the potential coup leaders. Similarly, all five at one stage or 
other contested both Duma and presidential elections. They also made comments at odds with 
a willingness to lead a coup. For instance, they are reported as either having renounced 
59 Zyuganov, "Communists Are Not Sure Of A·lliance With Nationalists," interview with the Russian 
Infomrntion Agency, 13 December 1993, quoted in Vera Tolz, "Communists Are Not Sure Of Alliance With 
Nationalists," RFEIRL Daily report NSS, Internet, 13 December 1993, accessed 17 June 1998. 
60 V.D. Solovei, "Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo natsionalizma," in Russkii narod: lstoricheskaia sud'ba v 
XX veke (Moscow: ANKO, 1993), p304, quoted in Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p27. 
61 "Aleksandr Lebed: Sama zhizn zastavlyaet generalov zanimatsa politikoi," lzvestiya, 20 July 1994, n.p., 
iuoted in _Simonsen, p543. . . . . " 
- "V kramem sluchae general Lebed mdet v otstavku 1 budet klassmm plotmkom, Golas no.21, September 
1994, n.p. quoted in Simonsen, p544. 
63 See Simonsen, pp539-44. 
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violence, or more specifically, openly expressed opposition to the use of the military in 
politics. 
Assessing Rutskoi first, I believe that he would not have led a coup. Rutskoi actively resisted 
the 1991 coup and during his revolt, did not advocate a coup but rather sought to divide the 
military and thus reduce its support for Yeltsin.65 He further termed the coup a "tragedy" in 
1996. 66 Rutskoi also appears to have moved away from violence as a means to seize power. 
This is because he realised the magnitude of his mistake in hoping to seize power in 1993. 
During the government attacks on the White House he is reported to have ordered people not 
to shoot back and exclaimed, "There's no idea vyorth shooting people for."67 After the revolt 
Rutskoi also accepted that he should not have used violence against the new regime. In 1996 
Rutskoi acknowledged that "If I had known how many people would die, if I had known the 
price of the revolt, I would have given up."68 This indicates that he recognised the negative 
impact an intervention could have. In accordance with this, he continued to participate in 
electoral politics after the revolt rather than seeking to forcibly seize power. 
Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov showed a similar reluctance. Although Zhirinovsky claimed that 
his party would support another coup, he neither actively sought a coup against Yeltsin nor 
suppo1ied the 1993 revolt. 69 LDPR officials believed that the party would take power 
constitutionally.70 Zhirinovsky had realised in 1991 that power could only be taken via 
winning electoral support. This is illustrated by his active involvement in electoral politics. 
For instance, he sought to wm the military's support through his campaigning.71 More 
64 Youry Averyanov, Vice-Chief of Analytic Section, The Cossak Hosts Department (Kazac@gov.ru). E-mail to 
Paul Bellamy (pab7l@student.canterbury.ac.nz), 6 July 1998. · · 
65 See Yeltsin, The View, pp77, 101; and "Afghan War Hero Appeals To Soldiers To Join Yeltsin," Reuters, 20 
August 1991. 
66 Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian, 1050 gmt, 19 August 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 21 August 
1996, quoted in "Failed Coup Leader Gennadiy Yanayev Looks Back At Events In Moscow In 1991," Reuters, 
21 August 1996. 
67 Pravda, 21 December 1993, n.p., quoted in Buzgalin and Kolganov, pl 60. 
68 Stephanie Baker, "Today Marks Third Anniversary Of Moscow Rebellion," RFE/Rl Features, 4 October 
1996, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/l 996/1O/F.RU.961004154747.htm, Internet, accessed 23 
May 1997, pl-2 of 2. 
69 Reuters, 29 March 1994, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "Chubais, Zhirionvosky On Coup," RFEIRL Daily Report 
NSS, Internet, 31 March 1993, accessed 28 June 1998. 
70 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian 1035 gmt, 11 December 1993, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 14 
December 1993, quoted in "Profile of Zhirinovsky-Outlines Plans For Return To Empire," Reuters, 14 
December 1993. 
71 See Jacob Kipp, Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky and the liberal-Democratic Party: Statism, Nationalism, and 
Imperialism, Foreign Military Studies Office, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, 
Sandhurst, January 1994, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/zhirinky.kip, Internet, 
accessed 25 May 1998, pp12-3 of 20. 
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specifically, in 1995 the LDPR contributed to the failure of an attempt to impeach Yeltsin. 
Zyuganov is similar to Zhirinovsky in that he too sought to win power legally. Zyuganov did 
not actively support the 1991 coup, the Communist party's 1995 electoral goals included the 
introduction of a military doctrine that banned the use of the military against Russians, and 
after the first round of the presidential elections he sought to make an alliance with Yeltsin. In 
March 1996 Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov actually appealed to the military not to intervene in 
politics. They reminded personnel that the Constitution prohibited its use against elected 
officials, and they recognised that intervention could have a negative impact, warning such an 
act would bring a "black shadow of shame" on the army.72 
With regard to Lebed, it is more difficult to accurately judge his opinion of a coup given the 
diversity of his comments, but evidence indicates an unwillingness to lead a coup. Lebed's 
comments on civil-military relations were certainly inflammatory and he might be perceived 
as the most likely to lead a coup. This is best shown by his admiration for Augusto Pinochet, 
the General who led the 1973 coup in Chile. Lebed in 1994 announced that "I do not in 
principle praise Pinochet. But what did he do? He led the state ·from total collapse and put the 
army in the first place."73 Later that year he further exclaimed "What's wrong with a military 
dictator? In all its history, Russia has prospered ~mder the strictest control."74 Lebed also 
expressed support for the use of the military to restore internal law and order. 75 In line with 
this, he moved to decisively halt the conflict in Trans-Dniester by strengthening the 14th army 
and actively using it.76 
Despite such views, I do not believe that Lebed would have led a coup. Most generally, 
Lebed's active use of force in Trans-Dniester should not necessarily be seen as having 
threatened his superiors. A military spokesperson in 1993 stated that Lebed was acting with 
Moscow's full approval, and an adviser to Yeltsin repeated this in 1994.77 Lebed's lack of 
support for a coup though is best illustrated by his actions in 1991. Here Lebed actively sought 
72 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 March 1996, n.p., quoted in Robert Orttung, "Opposition Duma Leaders Appeal To 
Military," RFEIRL Daily Report, NSS, Internet, 26 March 1996, accessed 10 June 1998. 
73 "Aleksandr Lebed: Sama zhizn zastavlyaet generalov zanimatsa politikoi," lzvestiya, 20 July 1994, n.p., 
quoted in Simonsen, p542. 
74 "General awaits call of destiny," The Financial Times, 6 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p542. 
75 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 January 1993, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Lebed Favours military Action To Restore 
Order," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 11 January 1993, accessed I 8 March 1998. 
76 · See Simonsen, pp529-32. 
77 See Desch, footnote 210, p488. More generally see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pl 7. 
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to prevent the coup from succeeding. Similarly, he did not support the 1993 revolt.78 
Afterwards, Lebed gave political support to the new regime and attempted to reassure it. He 
supported Yeltsin during the 1993 referendum that included a question on his leadership, and 
in early 1995 stated that he would only take power constitutionally.79 He again showed a 
willingness to obey electoral laws by winning a seat in the 1995 elections. The following year 
he promised that any attempt to use force to prevent the second round of presidential elections 
would be ruthlessly suppressed. 80 In fact he joined Yeltsin before the second round, thus 
ensuring his re-election. 
Neither should Lebed's vocal support of military rule be over-stated. At the very least, I 
believe that Lebed did not support a political role for the military firmly enough to lead a 
coup. Lebed did not unequivocally support authoritarianism and recognised that such systems 
could have negative consequences. In September 1994, Lebed commented that "Our history 
supplies some dreadful examples" of dictators. 81 Lebed accepted that a move back to a Soviet-
style dictatorship would be very difficult. He commented that the re-establishment of the 
Soviet Union was "not only impossible but unnecessary" and that "those who dream of 
rebuilding it have no brain."82 More specifically, he appears to have had divergent views on 
military leadership of the state. For instance, during the same month that Lebed asked what 
was wrong with a military dictator he said that he did not unconditionally defend the 'strong 
hand' of goveming.83 Similarly, in February 1995, he claimed that he would only take power 
by constitutional means. That month he commented that "I've had more than my share of war 
and have come to the conclusion that it doesn't resolve anything." 84 In June 1995 he further 
announced that "I am categorically opposed to using the army inside the country for the 
resolution of political problems and conflicts."85 That year he also said, "I am not into 
78 See Simonsen, pp534-6. For Lebed's personal account of the coup see Schofield, pp213-26. 
79 Lebed, "Awaiting His Nation's Call," interview b,v John Kohan, Yuri Zarakhovich, Time, no vol. or no., 27 
February 1995, p25. 
80 "June 20-4:00pm Moscow Time-Special News Flash," p7, quoted in Campaign Tales from Moscow. 
81 "Hier mi.issen Kopfe rollen, gnadenlos," Der Spiegel no no., 5 September 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, 
P:543. 
2 Lebed, "General Lebed: Chechnya Was a Rake on the Path and We Stepped on It," interview by Dimitrina 
Gergova, Trud (Sofia), 25 July 1995, n.p.; and Lebed, "I, General Lebed, Will Be Russia's de Gaulle," Il 
Messagero (Rome), 12 December 1995, n.p., interview by Roberto Livi, both quoted in Benjamin Lambeth, 
"Aleksandr I. Lebed and the Outlook for Russia's Security Policy," JSMS 9, no.3 (September 1996): p550. 
83 "Hier mi.issen Kopfe rollen, gnadenlos," Der Spiegel, quoted in Simonsen, p543. 
84 Lebed, interview by Kohan and Zarakhovich, p25. 
85 Lebed, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," interview by Alexander Zhilin, p2. 
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mutinies, as a matter of principle."86 Finally, in 1996 Lebed announced that "The army simply 
must be positioned with its back to the country and its face to the border."87 
I believe that Lebed did not show the inclination to stage a coup because he realised the 
problems that could arise from intervention. This was encouraged by his experiences, both as 
a child and in the airborne forces. The most important event of relevance during Lebed's 
formative years was his witnessing at close quarters the 1962 shooting of civilians in 
Novocherkassk. This event encouraged him to resent the use of the military when politicians 
had allowed "appalling situations to develop." 88 Later experiences during the collapse of the 
Soviet Union influenced Lebed too. Lebed resented the loss of personnel during domestic 
operations and believed that politicians had allowed such instability to develop.89 More 
specifically, he emphasised the dangers of attempting to seize power. For instance, shortly 
after the 1991 coup he commented that "Any combat in the streets of Moscow would have 
been guaranteed, 100 percent, to lead to large-scale bloodshed."90 Likewise, Lebed refused to 
support the 1993 revolt because he feared that Russia would not survive another civil war. 91 
Finally, I believe that Gromov was an improbable coup leader. Gromov indicated that his 
opposition to the Chechnyan war was encouraged 'by his support of democracy. He argued 
that the war was 'incompatible with the concept of constitutional order and democracy."92 
More specifically, though Gromov helped plan the seizure of the White House in 1991, and 
later defended the coup, during it he made contact with the civilian leaders. 93 Under the new 
regime he appears to have moderated his stance. As a Deputy Defence Minister, Gromov 
disapproved of inflammatory warnings of military insubordination. For instance, when Lebed 
86 Lebed, "Versions" Programme Quizzes Aleksandr Lebed On Politics And The Military," interview by Tatyana 
Zamyatina, Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2125 gmt, 28 September 1995, carried by BBC MS: 
FUSSR, 30 September 1995, quoted in "Versions" Programme Quizzes Aleksandr Lebed On Politics And The 
Military," Reuters, 30 September 1995. : 
87 Radio Station Ekho Moskvy, Moscow, 20 June 1996, quoted in Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," p556. 
88 Schofield, p 187. 
89 Ibid.,ppl87, 194. 
90 "Anti-Coup Leaders-The Men of the Future?" JIR 3, no.10, October 1991, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p535. 
91 "Ne veruiushchii, no veruiu ... ," Soldat Otechestva, 13 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Simonsen, p542. 
92 Business Times, Singapore, 24 Janaury 1995, n.p., quoted in John Helmer, "The "Afghanists' Were The Real 
Worry," Reuters, 24 January 1995. 
93 With regard to Gromov's actions in 1991 see Longman Bibliographical Directory Of Decision-makers in 
Russia and The Successor States, ed. Martin McCauley (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1993): 
p216. For information on his defence of the coup see Ralph Boulton, "Russian Official Defends General On 
Gorbachev Coup," Reuters, 13 July 1994. 
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said in 1992 that the army "is at the end of its tether," Gromov criticised him.94 Neither did he 
actively support the 1993 revolt, but rather emphasised that the military should not intervene 
in politics.95 Gromov further was willing to obey the electoral laws, he winning a seat in the 
1995 elections for the centre-left 'My Fatherland' party. This party he claimed was pro-
democratic. 96 He also campaigned for Yeltsin in 1996. I believe that such actions were 
encouraged by his ambition to hold a high military position. Indeed Grachev complained in 
May 1996 that Gromov was "dishonorable" for having independently met Yeltsin earlier that 
month, and for promising that he would implement military reform if appointed Defence 
Minister.97 
In summary, I believe that no opponent of the new regime could have united the military 
behind their political views, and have been able to lead a coup. This inability to unite the 
military behind a coup was clearly visible given the military's actions during the 1991 coup 
and 1993 revolt, military voting trends, and numerous surveys of personnel. I also believe that 
none of the potential coup leaders showed a clear and strong willingness to risk leading a 
coup against Yeltsin. 
Strategically located 
The transition impacted on all personnel and those strategically located were no exception. 
However, although discontent grew with the negative effects of the transition, this did not 
translate into a willingness to stage a coup. Those military personnel located near the Kremlin 
are the most important, given their close proximity to the centre of power and their familiarity 
with Moscow. The active partkipation of these personnel is thus likely to be a decisive factor 
determining a coup's outcome and, ultimately then, the likelihood of intervention. The 
importance of these personnel is illustrated by the new regime's active cultivation of their 
support. This is best shown by Yeltsin visiting the key military divisions located within the 
Moscow MD, the Taman and Kantemirov divisions, prior to their deployment during the 1993 
revolt. Although they would have been reluctant to decisively support the new regime, it is 
94 Lebed, interview by Natalia Nikonova, Ostankino First Program television network, 14 September 1992, 
carried by FBIS-SOV, 14 September 1992, pp29-3 l; and lnterfax in English, 17 September 1992, carried by 
FBIS-SOV, 18 September 1992, p29, both quoted in Zisk, pp 13-4. 
95 Hungarian Radio, Budapest, in Hungarian 0805 gmt, 3 October 1993, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 5 October 
1993, quoted in "Deputy Defence Minister Gromov On Crisis On 3rd October," Reuters, 5 October 1993. 
96 With regard to the 'My Fatherland' party see Richard Balmforth, "Russian General Launches Centre-Left 
Offensive," Reuters, 20 September 1995. 
97 !TAR-TASS, 29 May 1996, quoted in Scott Parrish, "Grachev Pans Gromov," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 
Internet, 30 May 1996, accessed 19 July 1998. 
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unlikely that the military personnel based in Moscow would have actively supported a coup. I 
have utilised two indicators to support this argument. First, I examine the actions of Moscow 
personnel, especially during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Second, I shall seek to identify 
whether the attitudes of these personnel were interventionist through focusing on their 
political opinions and voting preferences. 
The actions of strategically located personnel indicate a reluctance among most to actively 
support a coup. The actions of personnel during the 1991 coup provide an early indicator of 
this. Lieutenant General Leonid Zolotov, Moscow MD Chief of Staff, opposed the coup, and 
the Taman division Commander stated that he knew nothing of the coup until being ordered 
into Moscow. His personnel then allowed children onto their tanks and a company defected to 
Yeltsin.98 Likewise, members of the Kantemirov division supported Yeltsin.99 The actions of 
personnel under Yeltsin further indicate this unwillingness. Although personnel of the Taman 
and Kantemirov divisions might have been reluctant to become involved, they remained loyal 
to Yeltsin and used force against the parliamentary revolt. 100 Moreover, Rutskoi failed to win 
over the personnel stationed in Moscow despite his appeals to them. Thus, the revolt clearly 
showed any potential coup plotters that they could not rely on the active support of 
strategically located personnel. A successful coup would also necessitate the taking of St 
Petersburg, as it was the second largest city in Russia. Here evidence suggests that personnel 
would not actively support a coup either. Personnel stationed in the city opposed the 1991 
coup and showed little support for Zhirinovsky, Lebed, or the Communists, at least during 
1995. 101 
The second indicator, the opm1ons of strategically located personnel, also i_ndicates that 
though few strongly supported the new regime neither were they likely to support a coup. It is 
apparent that discontent arose among strategically located personnel. The Kantemirov 
Commander resigned over its role in the Chechnyan campaign, and reports indicated that 
98 For information on the Taman division during the coup see Mark Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of 
British Intelligence (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1996), pp188-9. 
99 The Independent, 22 August 1991, p2, quoted in Christopher Bellamy, "Soviet Army Showed How Not To 
Breach Moscow's Barricades," Reuters, 22 August 1991. 
100 With regard to the reluctance of personnel to intervene see Brusstar and Jones, 'The Military And The Fall 
1993 Crisis," McNair Paper 34, available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34fal.htm1, p3 of 
4. For Grachev's account of the deployment of the military against the revolt see Grachev, "Defence Minister on 
Storming Of White House," interview by Kholodov. 
101 Geneive Abdo, "Troops In Leningrad Ignored Coup Leaders' Crackdown," Reuters, 21 August 1991. With 
regard to political attitudes of personnel from the Leningrad or Northern MD see Zhilin, "Which Political Parties 
Will Win," pp3-4. 
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similar discontent emerged within the Taman division. 102 Personnel also showed an 
unwillingness to attack opponents of the new regime. In mid-1995, 63 percent of Moscow 
officers claimed that they would have disobeyed the order to attack the parliament in 1993 
(see table 16). 
Despite the discontent of strategically located personnel, it was very unlikely that they would 
support a coup. Nichols during a 1996 visit to Moscow found that officers did not seek a 
coup. 103 Likewise, Moscow personnel did not unite behind an opponent of the new regime. 
For instance, it appears that reports during the 1993 elections of the Taman and Kantemirov 
Table 16: Active Russian Officer Loyalty According to Region Summer 1995 
Officers were asked 
1. "Would you disobey orders to attack separatists?" 
2. "Would you have disobeyed orders to attack parliament in October 1993?" 
Location of Officers Question One Question Two 
(percentage) 
Kaluga 68 80 
Mari El 70 72 
Tuva 31 72 
Krasnoyarsk 61 70 
Moscow 37 63 
Chita 33 62 
Primorye 39 60 
Sverdlovsk 59 53 
Murmansk 19 52 
-·. 
Nizhnii Novgorod 27 49 
Saratov 46 41 
Voronezh 21 27 
All Officers : 39 51 
-
Source: Deborah Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no.5 (May 1996): 
Table 5, p207. The statistics are based on the findings of her 1995 survey of600 officers. See Table 12. 
102 With regard to the Taman division see The Times, 12 January 1995, n.p., quoted in Anatol Lieven, "Elite 
Russian Troops Denounce Their Officers-Chechnya," Reuters, 12 January 1995. 
'°3 Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" pl. 
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divisions voting overwhelmingly for Zhirinovsky during the 1993 elections are false. 104 
Neither were Lebed, Zhirinovsky, or Rutskoi strongly supported by Moscow officers 
according to a 1995 survey (see table 13). Similarly, a survey from December 1994 to March 
1995 of the Moscow and Northern Caucasus MDs found that Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky were 
poorly supported, and most felt that Lebed would not be a good leader. In fact, at least 59 
percent did not even believe that the military would be periodically involved in politics. 105 
The following year the Moscow MD Commander suggested that the 1996 presidential 
elections be postponed so as to prevent Yeltsin's possible defeat. 106 Moreover, during the 
elections Yeltsin appears to have won strong support from military towns near Moscow. 107 
Finally, Yeltsin could deploy personnel from elsewhere if Moscow personnel were reluctant 
to act (see tables 16 and 17). 108 
Table 17: Russian Officers and the use of the Military to protect the President and Parliament 
Smnmer 1995 
Officers were asked whether they approve or disapprove of using Russia's armed forces to 
1. Protect parliament 
2. Protect the president 
Question Approve Disapprove 
(percentage) 
Protect parliament 45 52 
Protect president 47 50 
For info1mation on the survey see Table 16. Source: ROMIR Survey, Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's 
·. Officers?" Table 5, p205. 
Apart from the absence of an interventionist mood I cover later, Yeltsin's c1.1ltivation of 
support among Moscow personnel helps to explain the reluctance to intervene. Grachev in 
1994 stated that the MD should be an elite among the districts and it thus received preferential 
10~ Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p20; and Joint Publications Research Service, "Possible Voting 
Preferences of Military Personnel Examined," Mi/ita,y Affairs, 2 July 1995, ppl-2, in lzvestiya, 21 April 1995, 
n-p-, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547. . · 
10 "Possible Voting Preferences," ppl-2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p547. 
106 Simon Saradzhyan, "Communists Assail Yeltsin's Wooing Of Military," RFEIRL Features, 8 May 1996, 
available from http://www.rferl.org/rus/features/F.RU.96050812503934.html., Internet, accessed 20 June 1996, 
pl of 2; Marshall Ingwerson, "Russia's Army: A Loose Cannon In Power Transfer," CSM, 12 June 1996, 
available from http://plweb.csmonitor.com/plweb-turbo/c ... 1 +archives+ 172528+ 1 0++Russian%20military, 
Internet, accessed 14 March 1998, p3 of 3. 
107 Saradzhyan, "Sample"; and Saradzhyan, "Lebed Gambit." 
108 Personnel were deployed from various regions see Grachev, "Defence Minister on Storming Of White 
House," interview by Kholodov. 
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treatment. 109 For instance, the elite Taman and Kantemirov divisions received advanced 
equipment and largely escaped the hardships other divisions suffered. 110 Nor were many of 
the best Moscow personnel sent to Chechnya. 111 In line with this, rather than seeking a 
medical certificate exempting their sons from service, many parents in Moscow sought to 
bribe an official to allow their sons to stay in the capital. In 1995 Moscow actually slightly 
over-fulfilled its conscription quota in the autumn of 1995, in stark contrast to the rampant 
draft evasion elsewhere. 112 
Effectively trained and armed 
To successfully seize power in the modem state those personnel involved in the execution of 
the coup must be effectively trained and armed. To reiterate, expertise is an important 
detenninant of the operation's outcome because the quality influences the ability of personnel 
to surprise, and to swiftly overpower, those forces loyal to the civilian leadership within the 
proximity of strategic sites. Similarly, the successful seizure or isolating of key figures of the 
regime requires much skill, given their security entourages and, at least with regard to the 
President, frequent travelling. The geographic vastness of the case study, the nature of the 
strategic sites that needed to be seized, and the likelihood that at least some personnel would 
actively oppose intervention reinforce the need for skill. With regard to weaponry, coup 
forces require an adequate level of firepower at their disposal to successfully defeat opponents 
or to intimidate them into submission. Of particular importance here is the availability of land 
based firepower, like that from tanks, given the potential need to accurately dislodge 
opponents located close to civilians. Such weapons also are very intimidating. Similarly, 
airlift capabilities are vital so that equipment and personnel can be swiftly moved to achieve 
maximum surprise and impact. 
I have already argued that military expertise and the procurement of weaponry declined 
substantially as a result of the transition. However I shall stress two points of particular 
relevance here. First, the expertise shown by the military during this period is not of the high 
level I believe would be necessary to successfully stage a coup in a large modem state. 
109 Sergey Ovisyenko, "Arbat Military District' May Become Autonomous," Rossiyskiye vesti, 16 September 
1994, n.p., carried by "Grachev Trip Linked to Military District," FBIS Central Eurasia, 16 September 1994, 
n-f-, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p538. 
11 Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," p51. 
111 The Observer, 15 January 1995, p 19, quoted in Victoria Clark, "Yeltsin Keeps Top Troops For Himself," in 
Reuters, 15 January 1995. 
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Expertise was inadequate both in terms of general combat skill and, more specifically, in 
areas such as urban combat relevant to the successful seizure of power. The 1991 coup and 
the military's performance under Yeltsin clearly show this inadequacy. Second, I believe that 
the type and quantity of weaponry available to potential coup leaders hindered the effective 
arming of personnel to overthrow the new regime. This is illustrated by the performance of 
key pieces of equipment in urban areas, and the overall decline in the quantity available of the 
pieces critical to a successful intervention. 
First and most importantly, the military lacked the experience of staging coups, its only recent 
attempt ending in failure. This lack of the relevant expertise was compounded by the decline 
in overall expertise during the transition. Of key importance here is the inadequacy shown by 
personnel in operating within urban areas, as 74 percent of the population resided here. 113 The 
military fundamentally lacked experience in staging coups and thus the expertise to intervene 
successfully. This is a serious weakness given the difficulties of seizing power in a large state 
with various strategic sites. Historically the military had been politically active, as I have 
already argued, given the military operated under a penetration model of control. The military 
on several occasions during the past three centuries decided the fate of political leaders, 
climaxing this century with the military's involvement in the seizure of power by the 
Bolsheviks in 1917, and the resultant civil war. 
However after the civil war and the consolidation of Communist rule the military did not play 
a decisive political role, hence denying the military the expertise such interventions require. 
Rouben Azizian, a former Sov.iet and Russian diplomat, told me in Febrnary 1998, "the 
reluctance of the Russian military to stage a coup can be partly explained by tradition. The 
military in Russia have been always powerful but have never assumed an independent 
political role." 114 Developments during the Soviet period are likely to have further hindered 
the obtaining of those skills required to successfully intervene. For instance, I have already 
argued that Soviet training did not take into_ account the uncertain nature of combat and thus 
discouraged initiative. This is an important quality given the need to act swiftly and decisively 
when staging a coup. Indeed 79.4 percent of soldiers told Gabriel (1980) that their officers 
112 V. Litovkin, "Conscripts Explain Their Refusal To Serve," Izvestia, 5 April 1996, p2, quoted in Orr, The 
Current State, p3. 
113 Moshe Brawer, Atlas Of Russia And The Independent Republics, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 
f.1~ouben Azizian, Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland (r.azizian@auckland.ac.nz). E-mail 
to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz), 12 February 1998. 
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failed to exercise initiative, and 92.3 percent believed that their officers were inflexible. 115 
Yeltsin himself wrote that the 1991 coup leaders were "affected by their lack of experience in 
making independent decisions." 116 More specifically, the coup participants showed an 
inability to swiftly seize key figures like Yeltsin, a major failure given his ability to rally 
opposition. Likewise, the coup leaders were unable to seize control of communications. For 
example, Yeltsin was able to contact Grachev shortly after the coup's launch. Even elite 
personnel of the airborne forces showed little skill in their attempts to overcome barricades. 117 
This inadequacy is again evident under the new regime. During the 1993 revolt personnel 
were unable to effectively manoeuvre their tanks in urban areas. 118 Similarly, the military was 
unable to operate effectively in the urban fighting which ravaged Chechnya, as I have already 
argued. More specifically, the military lacked the skills to effectively police and control 
crowds. This inadequacy is shown by its lack of expertise in 'peacekeeping' and the use of 
Ministry of Interior forces for domestic policing. 119 The obstacle this posed was strengthened 
by the fact that Yeltsin ensured loyal divisions like the Dzherzhinsky were well trained in 
urban combat and deployed in Moscow. I20 Such a lack of expertise was apparent to potential 
coup plotters. For instance, at the 1992 All-Army Officers' Assembly where many officers 
publicly attacked Yeltsin, 90 percent said that combat readiness was in disrepair. 121 Moreover, 
it is unlikely that Zhirinovsky, or Zyuganov had the necessary skills to stage a coup given 
their limited military service, and Rutskoi showed poor judgement during the 1993 revolt, 
apparently losing his nerve during the bombardment of the White House. I22 
It is also debatable whether Gromov or Lebed would have had the skills required to 
successfully lead a coup. Gromov had much combat experience but this was primarily in 
.. 
fighting guerrillas in Afghanistan, experience of limited value in staging a coup. The number 
of personnel under his control, he was the senior military officer in Afghanistan from 1987 to 
1989, also peaked at 115,000, not even enough to seize Moscow, as I argue later. I23 Lebed's 
limitations as a leader were derived from hi~ lack of experience conducting large-scale multi-
115 Gabriel, Red legions, pp92, 102. 
116 Yeltsin, The View, p52. 
117 The Independent, 22 August 1991, p2, quoted in Bellamy, "Soviet Army Showed How Not To Breach." 
118 See Rona! Lewis, "Assault on the Russian Parliament," AFM Ai1forces Monthly no.73, April 1994, pp45, 48. 
119 With regard to the Interior Ministry's policing units see Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," pp52-3. 
12° Clark, "Yeltsin Keeps Top Troops." 
121 A. Putko, "Moods in the Army Worry the Military Themselves," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 Febraury 1992, p2, 
iuoted in Crisis In The Former Soviet Militmy, pl 5. 
1 2 "Red October," Time, 142 no.42, 18 October 1993, p22. 
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service operations, as a successful coup would involve. His combat experience under Yeltsin 
consisted of commanding the 14th Army whose ground forces peaked in 1992 at one army 
headquarters, two motor rifle divisions, two artillery brigades, and two Scud brigades. 124 To 
place this in perspective, the 1991 coup involved an estimated 15 divisions. 125 Le bed's ability 
to co-ordinate the various services was also questionable given his predominantly airborne 
background. 
Contrasting this, Yeltsin showed himself capable of defeating direct challenges, both during 
the 1991 coup, as I have already argued, and the 1993 revolt. Here I believe that the delay in 
putting down the revolt is attributable to the military's reluctance rather than its neglect or 
Yeltsin's indecisiveness. For instance, Yeltsin courted the military immediately before its 
deployment and ordered two decrees declaring a state of emergency to prompt the military to 
act, in his second decree accepting full responsibility for the consequences. 126 Grachev 
described Yeltsin as having "quite confidently" taken charge. 127 
The successful seizure of strategic sites like Moscow would also require much skill. The 
Russian capital has numerous routes to the Kremlin, which would need to be blockaded to 
prevent the civilian leadership from escaping or red::iving reinforcements. 128 During the 1991 
coup Yeltsin was able to drive from his dacha into Moscow, and personnel experienced 
difficulties in navigating through the capital. Moreover, much skill would be required to 
successfully seize key strnctures. The Kremlin is a strong fortress with walls as thick as 6.5 
metres and each of the eighteen towers can defend themselves and cover the approaches to the 
walls. It also has various secur-e escape routes. 129 Likewise, the White House has a secure 
bunker, which Yeltsin used during the 1991 coup, and various escape routes._ In addition, 
there are at least 19 other strategic sites spread throughout Moscow ranging from the First 
123 The lvfilitaiy Balance 1987-1988 (London: IISS, 1988), p45. 
124 With regard to those forces under Lebed in 1992 see The !vfi/ita,y Balance 1992-1993, pl 00. 
125 Tyler, pA14. 
126 For an overview of Yeltsin's actions see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pp7- l 3; and Bruss tar and 
Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," ppl-4. For his personal account see Yeltsin, The View, pp241-
83. , 
127 Kholodov, "The Khaki October." 
128 For a detailed map of Moscow see Brawer, p39. For a map showing the deployment of the military in the 
capital during the 1991 coup see George Church, "Anatomy of A Coup," Time, 138, no.35, 2 September 1991, 
f.29. 
29 Suvorov, inside The Soviet Army, pp235-8. 
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House of the Ministry of Defence, within which the General Staff reside, to the Ostankino 
Television Tower. 130 
Even if the coup were staged when key members of the civilian leadership were not residing 
in Moscow, it would have taken much skill to seize them. This is best illustrated by the failure 
of the 1991 coup, despite neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin being in Moscow when the 
intervention was launched. Security around Yeltsin, who was at his Arkhangelskoye dacha, 
was tight and alert security staff prevented his arrest. 131 Such security also existed when the 
civilian leaders were in transit. The 1991 coup leaders rejected a plan to seize Yeltsin en 
transit because of his armed entourage. The planned kidnapping of Yeltsin while in a 
motorcade, which I have already mentioned, was similarly discouraged by the realisation his 
security would kill anyone before they came too close. Yeltsin wrote that his security men 
"are particularly careful to watch my back" and "walk along very close behind me, in my 
footsteps, almost stepping on my heels."132 Likewise, the civilian leadership ensured that if 
the need arose they could swiftly reach Moscow. This is illustrated by Yeltsin's swift return 
by helicopter from Barvikh to use force against the 1993 revolt. The level of security during 
such flights is shown by the anti-aircraft defence system maintaining an 'air corridor' for the . 
helicopter, and the President and Prime Minister did not fly together. Even if their return to 
Moscow was prevented, the leaders had other secure sites which could act as their 
headquarters. 133 
Second, both the type and the quantity of equipment available to coup forces would have 
complicated intervention. This is less important, given the ability to use equipment rather than 
the actual equipment is often the decisive factor in determining the outcome of combat. This 
is shown by the military's experiences in Chechnya. Although at least some pieces of 
equipment showed inadequacies, here the key problem was the lack of expertise. The rebels 
themselves were poorly equipped relative to the Russians but continued to inflict casualties 
because of their superior tactics. 134 With regard to the type of equipment, it is doubtful 
whether key pieces in the Russian arsenal were suitable for operation in urban areas, and thus 
a coup. For instance, the firepower of Russian tanks is restricted by the depression and 
130 See Schofield, pp224-5. See also Galeotti, "Moscow's armed forces," p53. 
131 See Yeltsin, The View, pp62-3. 
132 Ibid., p142. 
133 See Suvorov, Inside The Soviet Army, pp238-40. 
134 See Orr, The Current State, pl 2. 
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elevation limitations of their guns. This prevents them from attacking coup opponents in 
basements or in the upper floors of buildings, a problem tank crews faced during the assault 
on the White House. In addition, the quantity of weaponry available declined, making it more 
difficult to effectively arm coup forces. This is best shown by the Chechnyan campaign, 
which further reduced military stocks due to heavy Russian losses. During the campaign the 
equipping of one regiment required the 'cannibalisation' of a division, and shortages of even 
the most basic weapons occurred. For instance, some personnel in Chechnya were forced to 
pay for their own rifles. 
More specifically, the equipment required to swiftly execute a coup through the seizure of 
strategic sites became increasingly unavailable. For instance, the military's airlift capability 
declined. The number of Military Transport Aviation aircraft fell by nearly 50 percent from 
1992 to 1996. 135 Thus, by early 1995 it was reported that it required all of Russia's airlift 
capability to move just one airborne division in two sorties. 136 To put this in perspective, the 
1991 coup involved 15 divisions. This would have reduced the ability of coup leaders to 
swiftly transport their forces to staging points, and is particularly important given the reduced 
availability of equipment near strategic sites. For instance, the number of main battle tanks in 
, 
the Moscow MD declined from 1993 to 1996, likewise with the Leningrad (then Northern) 
MD whose headquarters are in St Petersburg. 137 
However I do not believe that weaknesses with regard to expertise and equipment would 
alone have discouraged a coup. Although the military's expertise and thus capacity declined, 
the capabilities of at least some of the forces close to Yeltsin were limited. Doubts have been 
expressed over the combat capabilities of those personnel based in Moscow, .who I have 
already argued were unlikely to actively support a coup. 138 Similarly, those forces not under 
the Ministry of Defence would not have been able to effectively repulse a united military. 
These forces lacked the military's firepower. Although the Border Troops had artillery and 
aircraft they were well out-numbered by the-military. Neither did the MVD rival the military 
IJ5 The 11;/i/itmy Balance 1992-1993, p98; and The Milita,y Balance 1996-/997, pl 19. 
136 Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," p90. 
137 The Militmy Balance 1993-1994, pl04; and The Military Balance 1996-1997, pl 15. 
138 For such doubts see Pavel Felgengauer, "Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh ministerstv 
orgranicheny," Segodnia no.4, 16 March 1993, p71, quoted in Mendeloff, p228. 
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in terms of equipment. 139 The capabilities of such forces is also doubtful given they proved 
unable to effectively contain the protests during the 1993 revolt. 140 
Had these forces been deployed against better-equipped military personnel it is doubtful 
whether they would have steadfastly defended Yeltsin. For instance, the November 1994 
attack organised by the security forces on Grozny failed miserably, and during the Chechnyan 
campaign anger grew among Special Designation Police Unit (OMON) personnel at their 
deployment without adequate equipment. 141 Moreover, the loyalty of these forces cannot be 
taken for granted. MVD personnel deployed in Chechnya rapidly became disillusioned and 
resentful of the new regime. 142 An elite Interior Ministry unit actually mutinied in early 
1995. 143 Apart from Chechnya, in May 1994 Border Troops in the Far East intercepted 
Chinese naval craft without authorisation from Moscow. 144 More dramatically, Yeltsin 
apparently contemplated using troops to close parliament in March 1996 after it renounced the 
treaty which dissolved the Soviet Union. However, Yeltsin refrained from doing so after 
Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov told him that he could not guarantee the loyalty of his 
personnel. 145 
Cohesion 
I have already argued that military cohesion declined after 1985; however, of special interest 
here is the impact of this on the capacity to intervene. I believe that two main factors emerged 
from this fall in cohesion that discouraged intervention. First and most importantly, poor 
cohesion meant that if a coup was staged the threat arose of a civil war. Such a war could 
occur if different military factions came into conflict. This is an important disincentive given 
personnel feared that a civil war could occur. Second, poor cohesion made it more difficult to 
139 The Militmy Balance /992-1993, pp97-8, 101; The Milita,y Balance 1993-/994, pp99-100, 106; The Militmy 
Balance /994-1995, ppll2-3, 119; The ivfilitmy Balance /995-/996, ppl 14-5, 120; and The Militmy Balance 
l996-!997,ppll4, 119. 
140 See Buzgalin and Kolganov, pp69-76. 
141 With regard to the November 1994 attack see Gall and Waal, ppl55-7, 163. With regard to the OMON see 
The Moscow Times, IO January 1995, n.p., in Gall and Waal, p209. 
142 Sovset, 13 December 1994, in Vladimir Socor, RFEIRL Daily Report, no no., 13 December 1994, quoted in 
Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," p262. With regard to the expression of discontent 
see Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p540. 
143 The Independent, 11 January 1995, pl2, quoted in Tony Barber, "Top Russian Unit Quits Over The Cold And 
Chaos," Reuters, 11 January 1995. 
144 See Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," pp20-21. From 1994 Border troops were termed 
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successfully stage a coup, as coup leaders needed to take into account the real possibility of 
personnel remaining loyal to the new regime. However this decline is less important because 
personnel were united on key issues, and because poor cohesion also impacted upon the 
ability of the new regime to counter intervention. The limited impact of the fall of cohesion on 
the capacity to intervene is shown by the 1991 coup, which occurred despite the serious 
internal divisions that the military suffered. Moreover, had a coup appeared likely to succeed1 
many personnel might have united behind it. 
First, the fall in cohesion meant that the threat of instability and civil war was a possible 
outcome of a coup, a threat the military recognised and was determined to avoid. The military 
knew first-hand that intervention could lead to internal conflict from its experiences in 
Afghanistan. Here the regime, which took power in April 1978 via a Soviet assisted coup, 
became increasingly unstable and hostile. This led to a long and bloody conflict after the 
Soviet invasion in 1979. The presence of this threat perception is shown by the 1991 coup 
where there existed a real potential for internal military conflict. Shaposhnikov later claimed 
that he was prepared to launch an air attack on the coup leaders, and when a submarine of the 
Pacific Fleet declared its allegiance to Gorbachev, pro-coup vessels hunted it. 146 The 
reluctance of personnel to support the coup was encouraged by the threat of a resultant civil 
war, or at least the threat of instability. Illustrative of this is Lebed's stance, which other 
personnel shared. 147 Likewise, the alleged refusal of the Alpha KGB unit to stom1 the 
parliament was influenced by the fear that such an act would encourage a civil war. 148 This 
anxiety remained under the new regime, as is shown by the 1993 revolt. Here Grachev, prior 
to the military's deployment, aceused the parliamentary leaders of courting a civil war and the 
threat posed to cohesion encouraged the military to support Yeltsin. 149 Moreover, officers 
during this period believed that a coup would result in a civil war, and would ultimately 
t-1i, With regard to Shaposhnikov's claim see Fred Hi~tt, "Soviet Generals Feared each Other During Coup," The 
Washington Post 13 September 1991, n.p. 
147 With regard to Lebed see pp2 l l-2. More generally see Meyer, "How the Threat," p30; and Zhong, "The 
Transformation," p66. The threat of a civil war because of the military's poor cohesion was also recognised 
outside of the Soviet Union. See Don Oberdorfer and David Hoffman, "U.S Officials See Major Chance 
Takeover Will Be Unsuccessful," The Washington Post 21 August 1991, pA15. 
148 Dobbs, "KGB Officers Tell of Key Unit Disobeying Order." 
149 "[Grachev] Reaffirms Support for Yeltsin," FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, 22 September 1993, p16, quoted in 
Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p337. With regard to the impact of the perceived threat to military cohesion 
posed by the revolt see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," pl 3. 
228 
destroy the military. 150 Thus, poor cohesion discouraged personnel from supporting direct 
challenges against Yeltsin. 151 
The second key impact of the fall in cohesion was the reduction of the military's ability to 
effectively intervene. This is shown by the failure of the 1991 coup, where the lack of unity 
played a key role. As I have already noted, the military was split on the coup. Yeltsin wrote 
that the military was in "chaos--real chaos," and Lebed wrote that "aircraft were suddenly 
showing up and landing at the wrong bases. Divisions of regiments were intermingled and the 
chain of command partially disrupted."152 Similarly, numerous scholars identified the role of 
the military's poor cohesion in influencing the coup's outcome. 153 Likewise, I have already 
mentioned that scholars have attributed the military's political quiescence after the coup to its 
disunity. 
However, although the threat of instability arising from the lack of cohesion is important, 
poor cohesion alone did not deny the military the capability to intervene. First and most 
importantly, although overall cohesion did fall, personnel were united on key issues. For 
instance,personnel were united in decrying the state ofliving conditions and the decline of the 
military. 154 Yet this was countered by an overwhelming reluctance to intervene. Second, 
disunity does not prevent a coup from being staged, though it reduces the possibility of 
success and thus the probability of intervention. For example, the 1991 coup occurred despite 
cohesion having fallen under Gorbachev. Indeed some commentators wrote of the military's 
poor cohesion when they dismissed the likelihood of a coup prior to the 1991 coup. 155 
Likewise, this fall in cohesion· may have influenced the decision to intervene. The coup 
leaders had promised in late July 1991 that "no one will succeed in turning the armed forces 
into an amorphous mass, disintegrating from within." 156 
Third, the fall in cohesion was universal, its impact being felt throughout the military and thus 
reducing the likelihood of the military swiftly uniting in defence of the new regime. The 
150 See Nichols, "An Impending Coup?" p 1; and Arnett, "Russia After the crisis," p54 
151 See Lepingwell, "Soviet civil-military relations," p569. 
152 Yeltsin, The View, p89. 
153 See Desch, p466; Zhong, "The Transformation," p66; Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p564; 
and Miller, "The Soviet Coup," pp72-3. Journalists also expressed similar views. See "Yeltsin's army," The 
Economist, 320, no.7721, 24 August 1991, pl2. 
154 See Mendeloff, pp228-9. 
155 See Richard Pipes, "Soviet Army Coup? Not Likely," NYT, 20 November 1990, pA21. 
156 Jonathan Lyons, "Soviet Hardliners Suggest Only The Army Can Save The Day," Reuters, 23 July 1991. 
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impact of poor cohesion on the ability of the regime to defend itself is shown by the apparent 
unwillingness of the majority of personnel to actively oppose the 1991 coup. The divisions 
that emerged when the military was deployed against the 1993 revolt also show this poor 
cohesion. The revolt shows that although few personnel actively supported the revolt, neither 
did the military unite swiftly behind Yeltsin. Yeltsin wrote that Chemomyrdin' s call for 
suggestions from the Ministry of Defence on the taking of the White House was "received by 
a heavy, morose silence." He further wrote that the army failed to act swiftly because it was 
being "pulled into pieces and everyone was jerking on his part." 157 Similarly, James Brusstar 
and Ellen Jones argued that Grachev's reluctance to act was encouraged by anxiety over the 
reliability of personnel. 158 In addition, those forces not under the Ministry of Defence showed 
an inability to act cohesively, as they competed for funding and fought over who was to blame 
for the failures in Chechnya. 159 
Finally, though an overall decline in cohesion did occur, had a coup appeared likely to 
succeed many personnel might have united behind it. This argument is supported by the 
actions of personnel during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. With regard to the 1991 coup, it is 
evident that many remained neutral. For example, Colonel General Novozhilov, Commander 
of the Far East MD, commented that it was difficult to argue that the am1y supported either 
the coup or Yeltsin. 160 More specifically, officers like Colonel General Viktor Pavlovich, 
Commander of Naval Air Forces, were not active during the attempt. But when the coup's 
outcome was decided they expressed loyalty to the winning authorities. 161 Indeed Porter wrote 
that the coup was defeated too quickly to estimate how the majority of officers would have 
acted if its success appeared likely. 162 Similarly, during the 1993 revolt Yegor Gaidar, the 
First Deputy Prime Minister, appealed to Muscovites to publicly support Yeltsin to convince 
the military that the new regime had popular support. 163 Sergei Stankevich, a presidential 
advisor, also commented after the revolt that the military might have played a game of 'wait 
157 Yeltsin, The View, p277. 
158 Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p3. 
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and see.' 164 Finally, non-Ministry of Defence personnel might have shared this perception. 
For instance, a Deputy Chief of a Moscow Police District claimed that his superiors were 
'just waiting to see who will gain the upper hand."165 
Number 
The number of personnel is the final factor likely to have influenced the perception personnel 
had of their capacity to intervene. The number of personnel available to coup leaders is 
ultimately a coup determinant. This is because the seizure of power requires human resources 
to take key members or supporters of the new regime, and structures from which power is 
exercised. Both were likely to have security or at least be near armed personnel whose support 
of the intervention could not be guaranteed. More generally, the enforcement of a state of 
emergency or of curfews aimed at consolidating the position of the coup leaders requires 
human resources. It has been argued by some that a minimal number of personnel could 
successfully stage a coup. Gorbachev claimed after the 1991 coup that three planeloads of 
paratroopers could overthrow the government. 166 Had a leader capable of uniting the armed 
forces behind a coup been present, a successful coup might have been possible in terms of the 
number of personnel. They numbered 2,720,000 ·.in 1992, before falling to 1,270,000 in 
1996. 167 
However I have already argued that such a leader did not emerge and neither did many 
personnel support the use of force against the civilian leadership. Assuming that lower-
ranking personnel share a similar perception to officers with regard to a coup, I believe that 
the number who might have been willing to participate in a coup was inadequate. This is 
because of the complexity of staging a successful intervention in Russia. The difficulty of 
seizing power would have been evident to potential coup plotters given the minimal number 
of personnel who actively supported the 1993 revolt. 
I believe that three key factors necessitated a large number of active coup participants, a 
number I believe was not present. First, the large size of Russia, both in terms of its 
164 The Observer IO October 1993, p 17, quoted in Mark Urban, "Army Suspected Of Playing A Game Of 'Wait 
And See," Reuters, 10 October 1993. 
165 The Independent, 8 October 1993, pl2, quoted in Andrew Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into 
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166 Jerry Hough, "Assessing the Coup," Current Histo,y 90, no.558 (October 1991): p305. 
167 The Military Balance /992-/993, p92; and The Military Balance /996-/997, pl 13. 
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geography and population, would require the seizure and control of numerous strategic sites. 
Second, the large number of armed personnel not under the Ministry of Defence who might 
have opposed a coup would necessitate a large force capable of defeating opponents. The 
loyalty of at least some of these personnel to the new regime is clearly shown by their actions 
during the 1993 revolt. Countering such opposition with a large-scale military intervention in 
tum would require much time and make it difficult to keep secrecy. Third, it would have been 
clear to personnel that a coup ran the real risk of meeting civilian opposition. I have already 
argued that personnel believed that civilians did not support the military, and the failure of the 
military to win political support is examined when I assess the opportunity to intervene. 168 
Thus, I shall focus on the recognition among personnel that civilian opposition to a coup 
would likely have been widespread. 
A high number of personnel would be required to successfully seize power given the Russian 
population in 1993 numbered over 150 million, and the Federation covers one-eighth of the 
earth's land surface. 169 Although the Russian population declined during this period it still 
was 149,120,800 in 1996. 170 More specifically, in 1993 it was calculated that 125,000 
personnel would be needed just to control Moscow in an emergency, the capital's population 
that year was 9 million. However the total number· of armed personnel in Moscow was only 
15,000 to 20,000. 171 Moreover this number would probably need to be higher to stage a coup 
so as to repel anti-coup forces. This would be a demanding task given the capital's size, the 
strength and number of key structures, and its numerous entry points. Similarly, the military 
would need to seize other key locations, like St. Petersburg with 5 million people in 1993. 172 
The combined population of Russia's six main cities in 1993 was 19.7 million and thus, based 
on the need for 125,000 to control 9 million people (Moscow's population), would alone 
require over 250,000 personnel. 173 
The realisation of personnel that their intervention was likely to be widely opposed would 
have further encouraged them to doubt whether a coup was a realistic option. Throughout 
1992 and 1993 the military press was filled with commentary over the potential for civil war 
168 See chapter 7, pp325-30. 
169 The Mi/if(lly Balance J 993-1994, p98. With regard to the size of Russia see Sakwa, p3 l. 
170 The Militcuy Balance 1996-/997, pl 13. 
171 See Pavel Felgengauer, 'Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh ministerstv ogranicheny," 
Segodnia 4, 16 March 1993, p2, quoted in Mendeloff, p241. See also Farcau, pp209-10. With regard to 
Moscow's population see Brawer, p24. 
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and mass social unrest if the army acted "illegally." It was on these grounds that many 
officers argued against "pulling the military into politics."174 Similarly, one officer stated in 
1992 that the military was no longer feared by the civilian population, a fact that he believed 
would doom any attempt to establish a military dictatorship. 175 Officers also told Nichols in 
1996 that civilians would oppose an intervention and that the degree of opposition would 
destroy the military .176 This realisation would have been encouraged by the view that society 
held little respect for the military and by the minimal support for the 1991 coup. Similarly, the 
lack of electoral success for military politicians and the many surveys that indicated military 
rule was not supported would have discouraged the view that a coup would be welcomed. 177 
This constitutes an important barrier to intervention, as personnel showed a clear 
unwillingness to use force against civilians, as I later argue. 
Successfully defeating coup opponents placed further strains on human resources, especially 
the an11y personnel whose participation was very important. Such resources would be strained 
by the need to intimidate potential opponents into submission. Assuming that officers and 
lower-ranked personnel shared the same opinions on the role of the military in politics, and 
evidence indicates that personnel from all ranks w~re reluctant to intervene, in 1995 at least 
314,900 army personnel could have been willing to protect the President. 178 This compares 
with a maximum of 140,000 army personnel, barely enough to impose a state of emergency in 
Moscow, and an average of only 93,400 from 1992 to 1996, who could have been willing to 
actively participate in a coup. 179 Moreover, this figure includes those serving outside of 
Russia and thus unable to partic\pate decisively, at least initially, in a coup. Another challenge 
was posed by those personnel not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. This is 
particularly important as though paramilitary forces declined from 520,000 in 1992, they still 
173 Ibid., p24. 
174 Aleksandr Golts, "Mozhet byt', khavtit dergat' armiiu?" KZ, 27 March 1993, p2; Golts, "Skol'ko mozhno 
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numbered 352,000 in 1996 compared to 460,000 army personnel. 180 Although I have argued 
that the capabilities and loyalty of some of these forces was debatable, neither were they 
likely to actively support a coup. This was encouraged by their preferential treatment by the 
new regime. 
The loyalty of key security officers is best shown by the actions ofKorzhakov, the President's 
close bodyguard. Korzhakov headed the Presidential Security Services from December 1993 
to June 1996. This service by mid-1994 numbered over 20,000 personnel. 181 Korzhakov 
actively supported Yeltsin during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Yeltsin himself wrote 
"Many times I turned to him [Korzhakov] for help."182 Apart from Korzhakov, personnel of 
the Interior Ministry played a key role in protecting the Ostankino Television Tower during 
the 1993 revolt. Such personnel also remained loyal to Yeltsin despite their losses during the 
revolt. For instance, many of the non-Ministry of Defence personnel blamed their casualties 
on the revolt leaders, not Yeltsin. 183 Though these personnel lacked key pieces of heavy 
equipment, they did have the equipment to ensure coup participants suffered casualties. For 
example, both the MVD and Border Guards or Frontier Forces had armoured personnel 
carriers (APCs). The MVD alone in 1992 had 1,200 APCs and this number increased to 1,700 
in 1996. 184 The potential use of these forces agai,~st a coup was recognised by personnel. 
Colonel General Gennady Borzhenkov commented in mid-1995 that they provided the 
civilian leaders a system of checks and balances. 185 Similarly, scholars argued that such forces 
prevented a coup. Lester Grau wrote that Yeltsin had "surrounded himself with layers of 
security--and the Ministry of Defense is the outside layer. They would have a tough time 
getting to him now." 186 
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The difficulty of seizing and controlling Russia was even more draining on manpower given 
the decline in the number of vital ground force personnel. I have already argued that the 
seizure of strategic sites would have been difficult, however potential coup leaders faced a 
further problem. This related to the decline in the number of personnel whose skills were most 
relevant. For instance, whereas in 1992 ground personnel numbered 1.4 million, by 1996 they 
numbered only 460,000. 187 More specifically, taking urban areas requires a large number of 
personnel, given the difficulty of dislodging defenders. Indicative of this is the Soviet doctrine 
that called for a four to one advantage over urban defenders. However in Grozny even a five 
to one advantage was sometimes not adequate, as personnel had to guard every seized 
building. I88 Though opposition to a coup might not have been as determined as that shown by 
the Chechnyan rebels, there is no doubt that urban combat would be demanding. This is 
shown by the 1993 revolt. Here over 7,000 personnel alone participated in the assault on the 
White House. 189 Furthermore, Moscow is much larger than Grozny. 190 
Finally, to plan and deploy a large number of personnel would require much time and secrecy. 
Given its complex nature much time would be required to organise a coup. To put these 
requirements into perspective, plam1ing for the Chechnyan campaign started over six months 
prior to the actual invasion by 40,000 personnel. 191 -'.fhis was not even half the number needed 
to control Moscow. Moreover the willingness of officers to put their time into this planning 
was doubtful, given their heavy workloads. 192 With regard to secrecy, this would be very 
difficult to maintain. Other than the size of the operation, numerous security agencies 
operated, and political officers and the secret police remained active. 193 Even US President 
George Bush appeared to have qad knowledge of the impending coup and warned Gorbachev 
in June 1991 of an attempt. 194 I believe too that the new regime was more likely to act on 
rumours of a coup, given the 1991 coup. The regime established a direct line of 
communication with the commanders of all army units, which facilitated surveillance and a 
187 The Militmy balance /992-/993, p97; and The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, pl 14. By 1996 the term 'ground 
forces' had been replaced by the term 'army.' The figure for the army is thus used. 
188 Grau, Russian Urban Tactics, p3. : 
189 , Mark, "Army Suspected Of Playmg A Game." 
190 For a map ofGrozny see Gall and Waal, p384. 
191 See Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," pp259-61, 264-5. 
192 With regard to the additional work many officers undertook to supplement their income see Orr, The Current 
State, p7. 
193 Amy Knight, "ls the Old KGB Still in Power?" The Washington Quarterly 20, no. l (Winter 1997): pp63-5. 
194 See David Remnick, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, 1993), 
p436; and Gorbachev, "Russia: Interview With Gorbachev-"Five Years Ago, We All Lost," interview by 
RFE/RL, RFEIRL Features, 19 August 1996, available from 
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swift response to any conspiring. Yeltsin also instructed Grachev to immediately report any 
meetings personnel had with political groups. 
In summary, it is unlikely that the military perceived itself capable of staging a coup. This is 
because the military lacked the necessary leadership, support of strategically placed 
personnel, the relevant expertise, and cohesion. These inadequacies outweighed the military's 
continued access to much firepower and the weaknesses of potential coup opponents. As one 
Lieutenant Colonel in October 1994 commented: "We don't want to get into politics. We have 
so many unresolved problems of our own."195 Therefore, hypothesis three, a regime transition 
affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the 
three factors, is valid. This is because the transition influenced the capacity to intervene; 
however, hypothesis four is inaccurate as the transition actually reduced this capacity. 
Mood 
The military's mood influences both the perceptions of its capacity and its disposition. 
Though this is more difficult to establish, Finer argued that one element is always present, the 
military's awareness of its special and separate identity. According to Finer, to this only two 
•, 
factors need be added to encourage intervention, the sense that nothing can stop the military 
from having whatever it wishes, and a grievance. 196 These grievances are examined in the 
following chapter when disposition is assessed. Finer identified two moods that might 
encourage intervention: 
1. The "self-important" military. Here personnel have a good, though not excessive, opinion 
of themselves relative to that they hold of the government or civilians and may take action 
when they feel humiliated by the government. 197 
2. Annies with a "morbidly high self-esteem." This is more extreme as personnel believe 
they are inherently superior to civilians. Again, perceived affronts to their pride are likely to 
create resentment, though in this case they are more likely to motivate intervention. 198 
195 Boris Soldatenko, "Tak khochetsya spokoino zhit,' spokoino delat'svoye delo," KZ, 1 October 1994, n.p., 
~uoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p287. 
1 6 Finer, p61. 
197 Ibid., p.63. 
198 Ibid., p67. 
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The two mood types are examined here together. This is because they are essentially based 
upon the perception that the military is superior to civilian institutions. I have already argued 
that personnel did not have high self-perceptions, so I shall only briefly outline their mood 
before attempting to explain their lack of an interventionist mood. A lack of confidence was 
very unlikely to encourage personnel to believe that they could overcome the problems 
associated with seizing power in Russia. Poor confidence also reduced the likelihood of the 
new regime being accused of violating the high level of prestige enjoyed by the military, and 
failing to recognise the military's power. Similarly, poor confidence reduced the likelihood of 
personnel believing that they could perform better than the new regime's leaders, regardless 
of their mistakes and their lack of strong support. Apart from the military's expertise and 
capacity to intervene, I believe that three key factors can encourage an interventionist mood. 
First and most basically, officers expect their orders will be swiftly executed, and have an 
overly positive assessment of the utility of force. Second, personnel hold a negative view of 
the current method of leadership transferral. This is relative to the military's formal and 
proper procedures. Third, personnel hold a negative view of civilian politicians, particularly 
those in government. 
I do not believe that personnel had an intervention~st mood. This is because they lacked the 
qualities likely to encourage a sense of superiority relative to the new regime and to civilians 
in general. The lack of morale and confidence among personnel does not indicate that there 
was a sense of "self-importance" or "morbidly high self-esteem." As I have already noted, 
one 1993 survey found that 51 percent of officers feared "taunts and degradation" by 
civilians. 199 More specifically, !T!-orale was low among potential coup supporters. For instance, 
at the February 1992 All-Army Officers' Assembly where many officers attacked Yeltsin, 95 
percent said that they were demoralised. 200 This lack of confidence would have been 
particularly influential because of their realisation that a coup was likely to be widely 
opposed. 
I shall now explain why the military did not have an interventionist mood. First and most 
importantly, I believe that many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly 
executed nor held an overly positive assessment of the utility of force. This was encouraged 
by the belief that the military would be unable to provide effective governance by swiftly 
199 Vladimir Dudnik, "Genshtab preduprezhdaet," Moskovskiye novosti no.15, 11 April 1993, pA4, quoted in 
Mendeloff, p239. 
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solving the state's problems. After I argue this I assess the second and closely inter-linked 
factor. I believe that although many personnel wanted strong state leadership they wanted this 
to be provided through, rather than in violation of, the democratic electoral system. They 
ultimately were not confident that they knew of a viable alternative. Finally I shall argue that 
although Yeltsin was not strongly supported by many personnel, his support relative to that 
for his main opponents and for the military leadership, could be high. This also reduced the 
likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present. These all contributed to an 
acceptance of civilian supremacy among most personnel. 
Military perception of loyalty and the utility of force 
With regard to the first factor, many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly 
executed or had an overly positive assessment of the domestic utility of force. The acceptance 
that orders would not necessarily be swiftly implemented, and the reluctance to use force 
against civilians is shown by the reluctance of the military leadership to intervene during the 
1993 revolt. Here Grachev's reluctance was encouraged by his fear that orders would not be 
followed. Yeltsin recalled that by seeking support from the military against the revolt he was 
"trying to bring my combat generals out of their state of stress and paralysis." 201 Indicative of 
Grachev's concern over the military's reliability ,are his moves to ensure its unity. For 
instance, he invited the press to meetings of his deputies and his service commanders to 
ensure that the military provided a united front to the media. Grachev also stipulated that 
special authorisation was required to communicate with units to hinder attempts by the 
parliament to court personnel. Moreover when personnel were deployed they were from 
various units, a move encourag~d by the desire to spread responsibility.202 Anxiety over the 
willingness of personnel to take an active political stance appears to have been founded. This 
is because 51 percent of all officers in 1995 indicated that they would have disobeyed orders 
to attack the parliament (see table 16). 
Similarly, the actions of officers in Chechnya showed that orders would not necessarily be 
followed, and would have reinforced concerns over the swift execution of orders. The 
reluctance of officers to follow orders in Chechnya, at least during the initial offensive, has 
been well documented. This shows that it could not be guaranteed that personnel would 
200 A. Putko, p2, quoted in Crisis In The Former Soviet Military, pl 5. 
201 Boris Yeltsin, Zapiski prezidenta (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ogonyek, 1994), pp381, 383, quoted in Brusstar and 
Jones, "The Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p2. 
202 The Independent, 8 October 1993, pl 2, quoted in Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into Line." 
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follow orders. Indeed Gromov announced "It seems to me that. .. a general who receives 
orders in this specific situation has a duty to ponder and to decide whether or not the order 
issued meets certain basic rules, certain human principles."203 Personnel defended the 
insubordination of officers too. Members of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office asserted 
that "no court will be able to prove the guilt of those who have refused to get themselves 
mixed up in a dubious operation."204 These developments encouraged Goldstein to write of a 
new liberalism among officers, based on a willingness to question the orders of their 
superiors. 205 
With regard to the military's negative perception of the utility of force, soldiers were reluctant 
to both have an internal role and, more specifically, to violate the democratic processes. Many 
personnel opposed their growing internal role. In 1995, 39 percent of officers stated that they 
would not obey orders to attack separatists (see table 16). Much discontent also arose against 
the military's deployment in Chechnya, as I have already mentioned. Indeed even 
Varennikov, a leader of the 1991 coup, called in February 1995 for a law to be passed to 
prevent the use of the military in internal conflicts.206 Focusing on the military's political role, 
at the most general level it is apparent that personnel willingly participated in the democratic 
processes, hardly a sign that they would violate them by staging a coup. This is clear from the 
high electoral turnout of personnel, and from an unwillingness to have their voting 
preferences detern1ined by their superiors. With regard to the military turnout, according to 
Ministry of Defence estimates, 95 percent of personnel voted during the 1993 elections, 97.6 
percent voted in the 1995 elections, and over 80 percent voted in the first round of the 1996 
presidential elections.207 This was high relative to civilians. The military turnout was 40.2 
percent higher than the general turnout of registered voters in 1993, 33.2 percent higher in 
203 "Gromov Interviewed on Army Role in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-020, 31 January 1995, p13 quoted in 
Goldstein, p 114. See also Goldstein, pp 109-119. 
204 "Legality of Actions Against Generals Doubted," FBIS-SOV-95-012, 19 January 1995, p22 quoted in 
Goldstein, pl 13. 
205 Goldstein, pl22-3. .. 
206 Interfax, Moscow, in English, 1259 gmt, 18 February 1995, carried by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
quoted in "Varennikov Calls For Law To Forbid The Use Of Army In Internal Conflicts," 22 February 1995. 
207 Lepingwell, "Yeltsin On Military Vote." With regard to the 1995 elections see Anatoliy Madarov, "Ordered 
to Vote. Military Observer's Opinion of Elections in Army Units," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 December 1995, p5, 
carried by FBIS-SOV-95-245, 21 December 1995, p16, quoted in Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 
Duma Elections," p532. With regard to the 1996 election see Interfax, 16 June 1996, quoted in "The Military 
Vote," Jamestown Monitor 2, no.114, 17 June 1996, available from 
http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_002_1 l4_000.htm#002, Internet, accessed. IO June 1998. Please note 
that it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of these statistics but it has been recognised by scholars that the 
military turnout was high. See Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," pl. 
239 
1995, and over 10.2 percent higher in 1996.208 Personnel also showed a willingness to 
determine their vote independently. This is best illustrated by Grachev's failure to unite the 
military behind the 'Our Home is Russia' party. 
More specifically, the military was reluctant to act against the new regime. I have already 
argued that few personnel were actively involved in seeking political redress, and this is 
further supported by their reluctance to go outside the accepted channels. In 1993, only 16 
percent indicated that they had articulated their grievances through the mass media, and 22 
percent had participated in organisations which sought to address their concerns.209 Similarly, 
from 1992 to 1996 on average only 12 percent of officers believed that the use of force to 
meet their demands was permissible. This compared with 43 percent believing that acting in 
compliance with existing regulations was most acceptable (see table 10). Even here ~t should 
be noted that indicating that the use of force is permissible is a lot different that actually using 
force. This is shown by the 1993 revolt. Although 4 percent of officers said that year the use 
of force was permissible, according to figures from the revolt leaders likely to over-estimate 
the level of support, only 0.01 percent of officers participated.210 Personnel also put forward 
their grievances through the legal avenues. For example, members of the Space Forces sued 
their commanders instead of protesting. Moreover, many of the reported protests within the 
military involved the families of personnel rather ·than the personnel themselves.211 In line 
with this, a willingness to defend the legitimate regime remained, as 47 percent of officers in 
1995 approved of the military's use·to protect the President (see table 17). 
I believe that there are two key explanations for the uncertainty over the loyalty of personnel 
when deployed domestically and the negative perception of such deployments: the recognition 
that playing a major political role would be very difficult, and the reluctance to cause civilian 
casualties and to violate the law. Assessing the military's perception of politics first, most 
personnel were well aware of the many problems that politicians faced, and the difficulties 
they would experience if they were to exercise power. This is important because I have 
already argued that personnel did not unite behind a civilian opponent of the new regime, who 
they could have transferred power to after overthrowing Yeltsin. I argue later that personnel 
208 Sakwa, Appendix 2.5-2.7, pp391-3. 
209 S. Solovev and S. Ianin, "Rossiiskaia armiia god spustia: problem ne ubavliaetsia," Armiia no.10, May 1993, 
~32, quoted in Mendeloff, p234. 
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held their leaders in poor esteem so I shall focus here on arguing that the military was 
generally realistic in its appraisal of its ability to take and exercise power. I believe that the 
majority of personnel did not have optimistic attitudes, but were rather dismissive of its 
ability. This reduced the likelihood that the military believed its own leaders, or civilians 
popular among personnel, would have the ability to provide the strong leadership sought. 
Though personnel expressed discontent in the actions of politicians, many recognised the 
problems they faced and the difficult nature of exercising power. Grachev stated in May 1993 
that the army must stay out of politics in the name of those who fought in Afghanistan and 
thus knew the costs that political actions could incur.212 Later that year retired Major General 
Aleksandr Vladimirov commented that "Everybody understands the difficulties he [Yeltsin] 
faces."213 The following year a survey found that nearly two-thirds of officers believed that 
Russia was so unstable and economically weak that even its military potential could not 
guarantee its security. 214 Likewise, personnel did not under-estimate the problems facing 
Russia, problems that they would confront if they seized power. In 1994, only 13 percent of 
officers expected that the economy would improve over the next year. However, 82 percent 
believed that unemployment would increase, and another 78 percent believed that crime 
would increase. 215 Although officers were more opt~_mistic in the 1995 Ball survey, only 26.9 
percent believed that the economy would improve in 1996.216 
Neither did personnel have over-optimistic beliefs that military figures could solve such 
problems better than civilian politicians. In July 1994 the military leadership replied to 
Lebed's praising of Pinochet by __ stating that such a figure was probably not suitable because 
of his methods, and "problems of a military character."217 Gromov in early 1995 said that only 
those experienced in politics should be politically active.218 Lebed similarly exclaimed in June 
1996 that he sought close relations with many professionals, such as economists, as one 
expert was not sufficient. This was because "[Russia's] too big, too diverse, and its problems 
212 Yasiliy Fatigarov and Anatoliy Stasovskiy, "Mobilize the Combat and Life Experience of Afghan Veterans 
for Military Reform," KZ, 6 May 1993, n.p., carriecf by BBC MS: FUSSR, 10 May 1993, quoted in Reuters, 
"Grachev-Army Cannot Be Blamed For Mistakes Of Politicians," 10 May 1993. 
213 "Do Not Make Us Into a Bogeyman: A Specialist's Opinion," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p63 
214 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, pl. 
215 Ibid., p2. 
216 Ball and Gerber, Table 5, pl 71. 
217 "Kremlin Disowns General's Praise For Pinochet," Reuters, 21 July 1994. 
218 Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed About Chechnya Operation [corrected]," interview by Aleksandr Lyubimov, 
Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian, 2010 gmt, 27 January 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 31 
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are far too diverse."219 Indeed I have already mentioned that Yazov told the other coup leaders 
in 1991 that he had no desire to govern the Soviet Union. 220 Some evidence also suggests that 
many personnel had not discounted that Russia's problems could be solved by the new 
regime, at least in the long term. Ball found that 62.2 percent of officers did not believe that a 
return to authoritarianism would solve Russia's problems, and 63 percent disagreed that an 
'iron hand' rather than democracy was required to restore order (see table 18). Thus, when 
C.J. Dick asked "Is it really fanciful to predict [that personnel will see themselves] as 
somehow superior to ignorant, often corrupt politicians who are seen not to understand, or 
care for those [Russia's] interests?" I believe the answer must be that yes, such a sense of 
superiority was unlikely.221 
Table 18: Russian Officers' Views on Domestic Political Issues Mid-1995 
Russian officers were asked to what extent do you agree with the following? 
1. "Russia will need authoritarian mle to solve her problems?" 
2. "An 'iron hand' is needed to restore order in our country-not democracy." 
3. "Russia could not defend herself from foreign attack due to domestic instability." 
4. "Democracy does not suit the peoples of Russia." 
5. "It is important that Russia protect human rights.'.' 
6. "It is necessary to prohibit dangerous ideas in any society." 
Question Valid Fully agree Somewhat Somewhat Fully 




1 593 5.2 32.5 43.5 18.7 
2 588 8.3 28.6 40.6 22.4 
- --
3 593 4.4 28.5 55.6 11.5 
4 589 4.1 16.5 44.8 34.6 
5 594 50.3 42.1 5.6 2.0 
6 587 23.0 31.9 32.7 12.4 
For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 
2, pl64. 
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Likewise, opponents of the new regime recognised that the military's capabilities had 
declined, and it is unlikely they foresaw the military using force to assist their quest for 
power. Rutskoi said in mid-1993 that the military was in a disastrous state and was not fit for 
battle, hardly the qualities that would enable the staging of a coup. 222 Likewise, Zhirinovsky 
acknowledged that the military's strength had declined.223 Zyuganov also wrote that military 
power was threatened. 224 The Generals held similar views. Le bed in 1994 exclaimed that the 
military was increasingly comprised of low-quality personnel "who have porridge in their 
heads. "225 
I believe that the primary factor behind the perception among personnel that the military was 
incapable of intervening was their many negative perceptions of the military, and more 
specifically, of military politicians. With regard to the military's capabilities, I have already 
argued that personnel believed that the military was negatively changed by the transition, and 
that their morale declined. The Chechnyan campaign is of particular interest here. This is 
because the reluctance of officers to follow orders was encouraged by their low opinion of the 
military's capacity. Vorobyev's decision not to command the invasion was influenced by his 
realisation that the military was ill prepared to undertake such an operation. 226 Indeed in early 
January 1995 no fewer than eleven Generals appealed to the Duma, claiming that the military 
was not prepared for the campaign. 
More specifically, many personnel recognised the political limitations of their own comrades, 
which became highly visible after 1985 as their political activities increased. Personnel 
doubted the military's ability to become an effective political actor. For example, one officer 
exclaimed that he had "never seen such a mess" when he described the military's moves to 
win political support in 1995.227 Similarly, personnel often doubted the suitability of military 
politicians. This is shown by Grachev's disastrous attempt to unite them behind military 
222 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17 June 1993, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Rutskoi Hits Yeltsin On State Of Army," 
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candidates·: In a 1995 survey of Leningrad (Northern) .MD personnel, only 12 percent of 
soldiers said that they would vote for military candidates.228 The political performance of 
many former and active personnel provided little to encourage confidence in the military's 
political abilities. Rutskoi' s actions clearly showed personnel that military experience and 
achievement did not necessarily deter extreme and dangerous acts. Many officers also judged 
Lebed to be a "good general, bad politician."229 Indeed the official military press in December 
1995 interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Tsarev, a former parliamentarian, who argued 
that he had been ill prepared for politics by his military service and had found politics very 
difficult.230 Thus, many personnel realised that military skill did not necessarily equate with 
political skill. Likewise, the military's plight showed personnel that military politicians would 
not necessarily be able to solve its problems. Many personnel felt that the officers elected to 
the Duma in 1993 had performed poorly and achieved little for the military.231 Zhirinovsky 
also claimed that "All the wars have been lost, all positions have been surrendered, all troops 
have been withdrawn. The generals have nothing left to do but to go to parliament to get 
immunity for four years. " 232 
Turning to the second key explanation, a reluctance to act against civilians and to violate the 
law is evident. In 1995, 39 percent of officers disc.lpproved of their use against separatists (see 
table 16), and opposition to the Chechnyan invasion was encouraged by a reluctance to use 
force against civilians. For instance, Babichev justified his initial reluctance to advance on 
Grozny by claiming "They can condemn us, but we are not going to use tanks against 
civilians."233 Lebed, another vocal opponent of the campaign, commented that "It is 
absolutely unclear to me \Vhy ~t _is necessary to kill people."234 Vorobyev was also encouraged 
to resign because the reaction··of civilians to the invasion had not been contemplated.235 
Another "well placed army officer" commented that "many [personnel] feel only aversion for 
the slaughter of fellow countrymen, which their government has forced upon them in 
228 Zhilin, "Which Political Parties Will Win," p4. 
229 Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p 1. 
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Chechnya." 236 Similarly, lower-ranked personnel were reluctant to fight civilians. One 
Captain commented "We are fighting civilians, it would be better ifwe left."237 
More specifically, the military was reluctant to act against Russian civilians. This is best 
shown by the 1991 coup. Yazov opposed the use of force against the civilian opposition. He 
told his General Staff "Please, don't do anything stupid, because you'll certainly face some 
people who will throw themselves under tanks ... and I don't want any blood."238 Likewise, 
Varennikov apparently opposed the use of force, and officers in Moscow expressed an 
unwillingness to act against the protesters.239 Nor were coup opponents willing to risk civilian 
casualties. Lebed wrote "People were swarming round the [military] vehicles, begging the 
soldiers not to shoot them." He also addressed the crowd around the White House "giving 
them my word, as an officer, that no one in my battalion would open fire on them."240 
Immediately after the coup Major General Nikolai Stolyarov further declared that "The army 
will never tum its bayonets against its own people."241 Lower-ranked personnel were 
unwilling to use force too, as already noted. Soldiers showed the crowds that their weapons 
were not loaded, and even personnel stationed in Germany said that they would refuse orders 
to shoot civilians.242 Other armed personnel shared such attitudes. Of particular importance 
here is the alleged reluctat].ce of the KGB Alpha u~it to seize the White House, as this would 
have "led to horrible bloodshed."243 
A similar reluctance is evident under the new regime. This is best shown by the military's 
actions during the 1993 revolt. High-ranking officers urged the parliamentary leaders to 
accept political defeat rather than risk bloodshed, and Grachev was reluctant to act. During a 
Security Council meeting Grachev argued against the use of troops to seize the White House 
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while a large crowd remained. During this meeting he exclaimed, "I am not going to crush a 
crowd."244 He further ordered personnel not to fire if civilians were in their way, and 
commented afterwards that the storming of the White House could have been executed earlier 
but crowds around the building increased the risk of civilian casualties. 245 Yeltsin 
acknowledged this reluctance. He wrote after the revolt "I recall Grachev's look. It was a hard 
look because the decision was a hard one for him. To use weapons of battle in peacetime is a 
most arduous test for soldiers and officers."246 Similarly, members of the airborne forces were 
reluctant to open fire on the White House, even when they came under attack. The new 
regime also stressed the need to gain civilian support so as to win military support. For 
example, Gaidar appealed for Muscovites to publicly support Yeltsin. 
An increasing willingness among personnel to ensure that their orders were legal is also 
evident. This strengthened the aversion to domestic operations and intervention. This 
willingness is apparent during the Chechnyan war. Georgy Kondratyev, a General once close 
to Grachev, described Dudayev as a legitimate leader and Vorobyev doubted the legality of 
the operation. 247 Similarly, Babichev justified his reluctance to advance on Grozny by 
claiming that "This [ operation] contradicted the constitution. It is forbidden to use the army 
against civilians. "248 However most relevant is the reluctance to break the law and intervene. 
This is shown by the 1991 coup. Grachev before the coup had told Yeltsin that he would 
remain loyal to the civilian leaders "if our lawfully elected government in Russia were ever 
threatened--a terrorist act, a coup, [and there were] efforts to arrest the leaders," and _he 
ultimately did.249 During the coup Yeltsin also followed Lebed's advice that to win military 
support he should legitimise his orders and assume the office of Commander-in-Chief.250 
Even the coup leaders sought to legitimise their actions. Vice-President Gelllladii Yanaev 
announced that he was taking the President's powers "in accordance with Article 127(7) of 
the USSR Constitution."251 A state of emergency was similarly claimed to be in accordance 
244 Pavel Fel'gengauer, "Army's Role: Less Than Certain," The Moscow Times, 12 October 1993, ppl-2, quoted 
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with the Constitution and Law on the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency.252 
Conservatives like Colonel Viktor Alksnis also expressed reservations that the civilian 
leadership was not being challenged within the legislative framework. 253 
The military remained committed to the law under the new regime as it related to politics. 
Prior to the climax of the 1993 revolt when Yeltsin attempted to bypass the legislature, 
Grachev did not support him but rather the Constitution. That May Grachev said, "The 
political stmggle [between Yeltsin and the parliament] must be conducted strictly within 
constitutional bounds, within the bounds of the law."254 Such actions led one senior Western 
diplomat to comment that "they [personnel] are apparently not at the disposal of the President, 
unless they decide that what he asks them to do is constitutional."255 Moreover when the 
military was called on to act against the revolt, Yeltsin was forced to issue a decree 
authorising the Ministry of Defence to act, as it doubted the legality of its internal use.256 
When the military was deployed, Grachev justified its actions by referring to the law on the 
state of emergency. 257 Lower-ranked personnel shared similar attitudes. One paratrooper who 
participated in the storming of the White House commented that as Yeltsin had been voted in 
as President "they [the rebels] had no right to defy him."258 
The military's reluctance to cause civilian casualties and to violate the law by intervening was 
the result of three key factors. First, the military had no tradition of being deployed against 
fellow citizens. This meant that personnel were not accustomed to confronting Russian 
civilians and being deployed to maintain domestic order. Second, on those occasions when the 
military was deployed, the military was negatively affected. For instance, its actions caused 
civilian casualties which resulted in much criticism and encouraged negative perceptions of 
the military. Third, there was no strong division between civilians and military personnel, 
hence the military found it very difficult to use force against them. This was especially the 
case when civilians pleaded with them not to use force. 
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With regard to the first point, I have already argued that the military was externally oriented 
before 1985. The influence of this tradition is evident during the 1991 coup. For instance, 
Commander Vladimir Lopatine, Vice-President of a special defence committee established by 
Yeltsin, stated "There is a very old tradition in the Russian army that says the army should not 
tum its weapons against its own people."259 This tradition was strengthened by the second 
factor, the military's negative domestic experiences. The first such experience was the 
military's 1962 deployment in Novocherkassk, as its actions resulted in the deaths of 24 
civilians. One Major committed suicide after seeing the casualties, and the continuing impact 
of the incident is shown by Lebed's memory of the killings. Moreover the soldiers initially 
deployed in Novocherkassk were from the local garrison and they fraternised with the 
protesters despite their orders. Similarly, soldiers ordered to stop the protesters from marching 
actually helped them. 260 
The more recent deployment of personnel against civilians had additional negative 
repercussions. The April 1989 deployment in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, had a negative 
impact as the military was widely criticised. Criticism arose as nearly 20 civilians were killed 
as the military broke up a demonstration. This criticism was resented and personnel believed 
that they were being unfairly blamed. An outcome of this was a reluctance to being 
domestically deployed, termed the 'Tbilisi Syndrome. '261 This was reinforced by the use of 
the military in Balcu in January 1990 and Vilnius in January 1991, where, together with 
Tbilisi, civilian casualties numbered around 300 and led to an outcry.262 Such experiences, 
along with uncertainty over the legality of its domestic use, encouraged the military to 
intervene during the 1993 revolt only after Yeltsin issued a decree authorising it to disarm 
illegally am1ed groups. Grachev also directly asked Yeltsin whether he was sa11ctioning the 
use of force. 263 
This reluctance to fight Russian civilians remained strong after the 1993 revolt. Officer cadets 
at Russia's first officer cadet school said that they would not shoot Russian people. Moreover, 
when a cadet was asked whether he would act against protesting Russians he replied that "I . 
will stand by my people. If they [the Russian people] get desperate I will protect them, even if 
259 Pagani, "Lack of Support." See also Brian Moynahan, "The Soviet Coup." 
26° For an account of the event see Piotr Suda, The Novocherkassk Tragedy, June 1-3 1962, 1 July 1988, 
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it means I have to go to a tribunal and execution afterwards."264 Likewise, Lebed in early 
1995 commented that "No such force exists which would compel me" to shoot at Russian 
civilians. 265 
Finally, there was no strong division between civilians and personnel. Personnel strongly 
related to civilians. One 1995 survey found that 88 percent of officers believed that the 
interests of the Russian people were their first priority.266 Personnel also acknowledged that 
civilians had rights. In 1995, 78.5 percent supported the right of civilians to criticise the 
government (see table 19). Neither does there appear to have been a major difference between 
civilian and military political attitudes. In 1993, 74 percent of military personnel and 58.43 
percent of civilians voted for the Constitution in the referendum.267 Likewise, civilian and 
military support for politicians was often similar. Whereas in 1995 an estimated 20 percent of 
military personnel voted for the Communist party, it received 22.30 percent of the vote 
nationwide.268 That same year a survey of civilians and officers found that attitudes toward 
the presidential candidates on average differed by 5.8 percent (see table 13). Another survey 
in December 199 5 found that the level of support from all Russians for parties and the level of 
military support for parties differed on average by 6.2 percent.269 Similarly, during the second 
round of the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin wa·s the most popular candidate among both 
personnel and civilians.270 However Lebed's military background might have won him 
stronger support from personnel in the first round of the 1996 elections, winning perhaps 
32.48 percent more military than civilian votes. 271 
Apart from the military's domestic roles, I believe that civilian-military interaction 
encouraged their similar attitudes. Even under Communism, 54 percent of soldiers told 
264 Yevgenia Borisova, "Soldiers of the motherland look to the future," St Petersburg Press, n.d., available from 
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Gabriel (1980) that they were allowed a pass or leave from their bases every month. Another 
72.6 percent of soldiers said they had been allowed to leave alone, or in groups not 
accompanied by a supervising officer. 272 Similarly, though the Soviet army strove to control 
the entry of information, surveys of personnel before Gorbachev indicated that they failed. 
Surveys indicated that on average they were exposed to the mass media for an hour and a half 
per day, and had a high level of awareness of current events.273 Furthermore, the draft ensured 
that civilians constantly entered the military. In 1992, 71.4 percent of the ground forces were 
conscripts, and in 1996, 31.3 percent of army personnel were still conscripts.274 
Table 19: Russian Officers' Views of Democratic Characteristics Mid-1995 
Officers were asked: "How useful are the following characteristics of democratic society for 
Russia?" 
1. "Freedom of citizens to choose where to reside within Russia." 
2. "Freedom of citizens to travel abroad." 
3. "Freedom of citizens to criticize the government." 
4. "Freedom of the press to criticize the government." 
5. "Freedom of citizens to join social organizations." 
6. "A strong system of political parties." 
Question Valid Fully useful Somewhat Rather not Fully not 
number of (percentage) useful useful useful 
responses 
1 598 22.4 34.4 30.6 12.5 
-
2 591 17.4 57.5 24.0 1.0 
3 599 11.9 66.6 18.0 3.5 
4 598 15.4 66.6 16.9 1.2 
5 597 37.7 56.8 4.9 0.7 
6 594 3.4 36.7 49.8 10.1 
For information on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 
2, p164. 
272 Gabriel, Red Legions, p58. 
273 V.N. Kovalev, Sotsialisticheskiy voinskiy kollektiv. Sotsiologicheskiy ocherk (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1980), 
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In summary, many officers neither believed that orders would be swiftly executed nor had an 
overly positive assessment of the domestic utility of force. There are two key explanations for 
the uncertainty over the loyalty of personnel when deployed domestically and for the negative 
perception of such deployments. First, personnel recognised that intervening would be very 
difficult. Second, personnel were reluctant to risk civilian casualties and to violate the law. 
Military perception of the method of power transferral 
It is clear that many personnel had a preference for strong leadership, but I believe that this 
was within the constraints of democracy. With regard to the desire for strong leadership, the 
most vocal military supporter appears to have been Lebed. Support for strong leadership is 
evident among other personnel too. Two-thirds of officers in a November 1992 survey 
supported an authoritarian style of government, and the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey found 
that 61.9 percent of officers agreed that Russia "needs a iron hand." 275 The 1994 survey also 
found that 64 percent dismissed Western-type democracy as being unsuitable for Russia. 276 
Moreover Grachev in November 1993 ostensibly joked that if the new parliament amended 
the military doctrine "We shall amend the parliament."277 Earlier that year a poll also found 
that 73 percent of Moscow officers said that they were "crazy to decide against storming the 
[Yeltsin held) White House" during the 1991 coup. 278 Such evidence encouraged analysts like 
Ilana Kass to argue that the officer corps was unlikely to either tolerate or be compatible with 
an unstable democracy.279 
However although personnel sought strong leadership, most did not support a militaty regime 
or coup. First, the above evidence needs to be assessed with care. With regard to Lebed, I 
have already argued that he was unlikely to lead a coup and his views on authe>ritarian, and 
more specifically military rule, should not be over-stressed. Most importantly, Lebed did not 
support the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Similarly, despite his above comments, Grachev had 
been very reluctant to use military force against the revolt the previous month, and remained 
loyal to Yeltsin throughout his tenure. This loyalty helped ensure that he held his position for 
275 The Moscow News no.7, 14 February 1993, pl lB, quoted in Alexander Konovalov, "Russia: security in 
transition," in Karp, p210; and Ball and Gerber, pl 63. 
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so long.280 The evaluations of some scholars need to be treated with care too. For instance, 
Kass wrote immediately before the climax of the 1993 revolt when there were doubts over the 
military' s loyalty to Yeltsin, doubts that ultimately were disproved by its action against the 
parliament. I also believe that Kass's evaluation of the officer corps is at odds with the 
military' s clear reluctance to intervene. 
Turning to the survey findings, it is important to note that authoritarian rule does not 
necessarily mean military rule or a coup. Very few personnel were either politically active, 
apart from voting, or supportive of a coup. The same year as the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey, 
only 6 percent of officers said that it was permissible to use force to achieve their demands 
(see table 10). Nor does sympathy for strong leadership necessarily equate with the high level 
of discontent one would associate with the staging of a coup. Indicative of this is a 1995 
survey of 3,000 personnel stationed in Novosibirsk. In this survey, 81 percent said that the 
President must have the ability to impose order in the country. 281 This survey was taken the 
same year that Ball found officers had more confidence in Chemomyrdin than either Rutskoi 
or Zhirinovsky, and Chemomyrdin's confidence rating was only 2.9 percent less than 
Zyuganov's. Yeltsin also retained the confidence of 30.8 percent of officers, nearly double the 
level of confidence expressed in Zhirinovsky (see table 12). More specifically, there is a stark 
difference between expressing authoritarian views and moving to seize power. The 1993 
survey of Moscow officers is particularly relevant here. This is because very few supported 
the revolt later that year, despite their earlier comments. As one Russian army commentator in 
1993 wrote, "[I]t is one thing to be unsatisfied with something ... and completely another--God 
forbid--to snap a magazine into· a machine gun or to load a shot into a gun barrel. "282 The 
1993 survey is also quoted by Nichols, a scholar I believe over-emphasised civil-military 
conflict. For instance, he argued that the military voted overwhelmingly for Zhirinovsky in 
1993 and its growing influence posed a serious threat to civilian authority, both points I 
dispute. 283 
More specifically, the Friedrich Ebert survey findings need to be used with caution. First, the 
findings appear to be conflicting. Although the survey found that democracy was not widely 
280 See chapter 6, pp267-8. 
281 "Military personnel live in hopes of a "Strong Hand," Vecherniy Novosibirsk, 1 September 1995, p5, carried 
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Elections," p525. 
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supported, it found that Grigory Y avlinsky, a liberal democrat, was the most popular 
politician with 44 percent support. Contrasting this, Rutskoi received 29 percent support (the 
same as Yeltsin).284 Nor did many believe that Lebed's outspokenness was necessarily a 
positive attribute, as I have already mentioned that only 9 percent believed that he was a 
"model contemporary military figure. "285 Second, the wording of questions asked is dubious. 
Most relevant here is the finding that 64 percent dismissed Western-type democracy as being 
unsuitable. This is a 'loaded' question given that the West had traditionally been the main 
adversary of the military and that suspicions of the West remained. 286 The survey also used 
generalised terms like an "iron hand" when asking personnel to indicate the style of rule they 
sought. Though Ball used the same term, she asked personnel to decide between this and 
democracy. Third, the survey had structural weaknesses. For instance, Ball argued that it did 
not adequately assess the level of support for authoritarianism by directly making such 
evaluations relative to other forms of rule. 287 This is important as it allows one to assess 
whether personnel were confident that a viable alternative to the new regime existed. Fourth, 
the findings did not correspond with the actions of personnel. Statistics that I have already 
presented indicate that the voting turnout among personnel was very high, despite their 
supposedly strong opposition to democracy. Neither did many support the 1993 revolt or unite 
behind Zhirinovsky, despite his authoritarian views: Indeed 74 percent of the personnel who 
voted in 1993 supported the 1993 Constitution. This formally asserted "the immutability of its 
[Russia's] democratic foundations," and recognised the electoral process and individual and 
civil rights.288 
Apart from their actions, when ·personnel were specifically asked to evaluate regime types 
relative to others they often showed little enthusiasm for a move away fro1!1 the current 
electoral system to more authoritarian types. Therefore, though personnel sought strong 
leadership, and this encouraged at least some to support authoritarian rule, when asked more 
specifically and in the context of other systems many appear to have moved away from such a 
stance. I believe that a lack of support for .a move away from the new regime is primarily 
derived from the support for democracy among many personnel. I believe that most personnel 
sought strong state leadership within the context of a democratic framework. Apart from the 
284 Argumenty i Fakty, Moskovskii Komsomolets, quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434. 
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reluctance of personnel to break the law and to intervene, democratic sympathises are 
apparent both before and after the new regime took power. These sympathises are shown most 
generally by the willingness of personnel to exercise their democratic right to vote, as I have 
already argued. More specifically, many personnel supported democracy relative to other 
regime types. Similarly, many personnel supported democratic politicians. 
It is clear that democratic sympathises were held by many personnel, particularly after the 
new regime took power. Even during the 1991 coup Yazov is reported to have been ready to 
give up on the second day of the coup, as he believed that there were too many democrats 
within the military.289 Democratic sympathies are evident after the coup too. In November 
1991, Defence Minister Shaposhnikov claimed that the democratisation of the military was 
irreversible.290 Under the new regime scholars labelled personnel like General Major Vladimir 
Dudnik as "democratic advocates."291 Likewise, at least some military groups had democratic 
sympathises. For instance, a reformist military association called the 'Soldiers for 
Democracy' urged personnel to vote for Yeltsin in 1996.292 Surveys also indicated that many 
personnel supported democracy. A survey of officers in 1994 found that 77 percent supported 
the statement that Russia "should more resolutely than before uphold the values of democracy 
and human rights. "293 Similarly, the Ball survey found that 63 percent did not agree with the 
statement that an 'iron hand' was needed to rule Russia rather than democracy. Another 79.4 
percent disagreed with the statement that democracy did not suit Russians (see table 18). 
Many thus did not feel confident that another regime type was a more viable alternative. 
In line with the survey findings; many personnel supported liberal and democratic politicians. 
Indicative of this is the support Yavlinsky and his Yabloko political party received. Apart 
from the Friedrich Ebert survey that found Yavlinsky was the most popular politician among 
officers, in 1995 Yavlinsky was the second most popular presidential candidate surveyed 
among personnel (see table 13), and in another survey the second most trusted. 294 That year 
54.9 percent of officers indicated to Ball th~t they had a lot or some confidence in him. This 
compared with 49.7 percent for Zyuganov, 40 percent for Rutskoi, and 15.9 percent for 
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Zhirinovsky (see table 12).295 Likewise, support for Yavlinsky's party could be high relative 
to others. In a 1995 survey of Leningrad MD personnel the party ranked third in popularity 
among junior officers with 10 percent expressing support. Among warrant officers it was the 
second most popular party, again with 10 percent of their support.296 Indeed in the 1995 
'elections an independent source in Moscow calculated that Lebed's party received only 2 
percent more support than Yabloko from personnel.297 Brusstar and Jones also argued that 
mid-level and senior officers gave their support to liberal politicians rather than 
conservatives. 298 Such sympathises are likely to have been further encouraged by democrats 
actively courting the military. For instance, Yavlinsky in August 1995 said that the Yabloko 
party was "pro-military," and that "Russia needs a strong modem army. "299 
Most personnel did not advocate military rule or a coup, and neither should support of 
authoritarianism be equated with this. Apart from the strong reluctance of personnel to 
become actively involved in politics outside of voting, personnel sought strong leadership 
within a democratic framework. This became evident when personnel were asked to evaluate 
regime types relative to others, and whether they would support a move to authoritarianism at 
the expense of democracy. This reluctance to support the establishment for a regime at the 
expense of democracy was primarily motivated 'by the military's general reluctance to 
intervene. More specifically, I believe that the military's fondness of freedoms associated 
with democracy encouraged it to seek the retention of democracy. Likewise, personnel 
indicated that they supported of at least some of the reforms undertaken by the new regime. 
Military support of principals associated with democracy is apparent. Ball's 1995 survey is 
particularly relevant. This found that 92.4 percent of officers believed that it was important to 
protect human rights, and the freedoms of citizens were favourably received by' the majority 
(see table 19). For instance, most officers supported the freedom of citizens to choose where 
they lived, their right to criticise the government, and their right to join social organisations 
(see table 19). Moreover, even opponents of the new regime who were popular among 
personnel publicly accepted that individual rights were important. Zyuganov accepted that 
294 With regard to trust in Yavlinsky see Belin, "Support For Zhirinovsky." 
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Stalin "committed no few violations of legality," and that condemnation for such violations 
was "quite right."300 Zhirinovsky also spoke in 1992 of the importance of individual rights. 301 
Similarly, Lebed said "Fascists [and] national extremists" were "unacceptable."302 
I believe that a determination to retain the greater political freedoms allowed under the new 
regime, and recognition that at least some liberal reforms were required, encouraged this 
support. Indicative of this is the determination of many personnel to exercise their voting 
rights and to vote according to their own preferences. One army Captain said in 1995 that at 
least now "no one can tell us who to vote for."303 Similarly, a Lieutenant after the 1996 
elections commented after voting for Yeltsin that "As they say, I chose freedom."304 In line 
with the support of democratic principals, at least some liberal reforms were supported. In a 
1992 survey, 75 percent of officers favoured the sale and privatisation of land, and though 
most officers favoured the slowing down of economic reform, only 20 percent in the Ball 
survey wished them to stop (see table 20).305 This 1995 survey found too that 58.2 percent of 
Table 20: Russian Officers and Economic Reforms Mid-1995 
Officers were asked: 
"What are your views regarding economic reforms-should they be ... " 
Valid number More radical The same Slower 
of responses (percentage) 
585 12.8 8.1 58.4 
Stopped 
20.7 
For infmmation on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 
5, pl 71. 
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officers believed that a market economy for Russia was "useful."306 Even Lebed commented 
that privatisation was "an irreversible process" that must be completed.307 
Military perception of politicians 
It is clear that many personnel held negative opinions of the civilian leadership. According to 
the CMSPLR survey, from 1992 to 1996 Yeltsin's level of sympathy among officers averaged 
25.3 percent (see table 11). In a November 1992 survey Yeltsin's rating was under 30 
percent.308 This level of support was similar to that among civilians, at least according to 
some surveys. Survey findings published in May 1992 indicated that 30 percent of 
Muscovites said that Yeltsin' s actions corresponded with their own positions. 309 The August 
1994 Friedrich Ebert survey estimated Yeltsin's approval rate to be a little over 25 percent.310 
A survey in September 1994 likewise found that 28 percent of civilians were satisfied with 
Yeltsin's performance.311 In another report published in January 1995, only 17 percent of 
officers approved of Yeltsin's performance, and one in four trusted him.312 That same month a 
survey found that 17 percent of civilians were satisfied with Yeltsin's performance.313 
Surveys also found that officers and civilians shared a lack of confidence in Yeltsin. The May 
to July 1995 Ball survey found that 69.2 percent of officers had not much or no confidence in 
Yeltsin (see table 12). This is comparable to a survey in September 1994 that found 57 
percent of civilians did not have any confidence in Yeltsin. 314 I believe that the primary 
source behind the negative opinions of the new regime's leadership among personnel is the 
detrimental impact of the transition on the military. This impact has already been examined 
in-depth and is further assessed in the context of the military' s disposition during the next 
chapter. 
306 Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p 171. 
307 "Lebed Advocates Authoritarian Path To Democracy," Jamestown Monitor, 1 no.133, 14 November 1995, 
available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/133_011 .htm, Internet, accessed 31 August 1998. 
308 The Moscow News, (7), in Konovalov, p209. 
309 Central TV, 17 May 1992, quoted in Kathy Mihalisko, "Poll Of Moscow And Kiev Residents," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 18 May 1992, accessed 13 August 1998. 
310 John Lloyd, "Russian Military In Troubled Mood," The Financial Times, 8 September 1994, p2. See also 
Izvestia, 21 April 1995, n.p., quoted in Meyer, "The Devolution," p327. 
311 Russian TV, "Vesti," 12 January 1995, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Yeltsin's Approval Rating," 13 January 
1995, RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, accessed 13 August 1998. 
312 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, p3. 
313 Russian TV, "Vesti," 12 January 1995, quoted in Wishnevsky, "Yeltsin's Approval Rating." 
314 ITAR-TASS, 26 September 1994, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Poll Findings On Most Influential Russian 
Politicians," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 27 September 1994, accessed 13 August 1998. 
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However I believe that for an accurate assessment of the level of support for the new regime's 
leaders the attitudes of personnel must be compared to those for other figures. This allows an 
assessment of whether the level of support for the new regime's leaders is high or low relative 
to that for military figures and potential coup leaders. First, I believe that it is not a simple 
case of personnel having a negative perception of civilian politicians. This is clear from the 
salient divisions among personnel, particularly between senior officers and their subordinates. 
Evidence suggests that attitudes toward key military figures were more negative compared to 
those of the new regime's leaders. This is important because it discouraged the belief that 
military personnel were superior to civilians, and thus would be able to govern better. After 
putting forward this argument I shall then contend that, second, the perception of the new 
regime's leadership could be high relative to its most popular opponents among personnel. 
This is important too because it reduced the likelihood that the military would feel that these 
opponents could provide superior leadership if they were brought to power. 
First, personnel often did not hold their superiors in high regard. As this should already be 
apparent from my assessment of cohesion, I shall focus on assessing the attitudes that 
personnel had of military figures relative to the new regime's leaders. Many personnel held 
negative perceptions of the military leadership given the military's state and its poor 
perfonnance. The clearest indicator of this is the opinion many personnel held of Grachev, a 
perception that could be worse than that of the new regime's leaders. Although the Friedrich 
Ebert survey found that fewer than 30 percent of officers trusted Yeltsin, less than 20 percent 
had any faith in Grachev.315 Similarly, Ball's survey found that 46.8 percent of officers had 
confidence in Chemomyrdin and 30.8 percent of officers had confidence in Yeltsin. However 
only 19.1 percent had any confidence in Grachev (see table 12). Timothy Th.omas wrote 
"Rightly or wrongly, the military rank and file fix the blame for their degradation on 
Grachev."316 
Relative to his opponents, Yeltsin's support.could be high, as I indicated when assessing the 
popularity of potential coup leaders. Whereas the CMSPLR survey found that the level of 
sympathy for Yeltsin from officers between 1992 and 1996 averaged 25.3 percent, Rutskoi's 
average was 19.3 percent, Zhirinovsky's 17.5 percent, Zyuganov's 15.4 percent, and Lebed's 
12.2 percent (see table 11). Similarly, the 1994 Friedrich Ebert survey found that Yeltsin was 
315 Bellamy, "Disgruntled military poses constant threat," pl 1. 
316 Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p542. 
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supported by 29 percent of officers, one percent less than the support for Zyuganov and the 
same as Rutskoi.317 The following year, Yeltsin was the preferred presidential candidate 
among officers, beating Zhirinovsky, Rutskoi, and Lebed (see table 13). Other members of the 
new regime were also widely supported, at least relative to the opponents most popular among 
personnel. The Friedrich Ebert survey found that Chemomyrdin outranked Zyuganov by 5 
percent, Rutskoi by 6 percent, and was only 10 percent behind Gromov.318 The following 
year, Ball's survey found that Chemomyrdin had the confidence of 46.8 percent of officers. 
This was only slightly lower than the confidence in Zyuganov and higher than the confidence 
in Rutskoi and Zhirinovsky (see table 12). Moreover Chemomyrdin won electoral support. It 
is estimated that Lebed's KRO party received only 5 percent more of the military vote than 
his party, 'Our Home is Russia,' in 1995.319 
Even when support for the new regime's opponents was high relative to the support for the 
new regime, its strength should not be over-emphasised. This is illustrated by the support for 
Rutskoi in 1993. Although about 40 percent of officers supported Rutskoi in 1993, compared 
to about 27.5 percent support for Yeltsin (see table 11), only 0.01 percent of officers actively 
supported his revolt against Yeltsin in October 1993. Nor did support for opponents 
necessarily equate with strong anti-Yeltsin attitudes·. In 1993, only 13 percent ofLDPR voters 
said they voted for Zhirinovsky because he was the main opposition to Yeltsin. 320 More 
specifically, though sympathy among officers for Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Lebed 
peaked in 199 5 at 73 percent, only 18 percent indicated that they were willing to use force to 
have their demands met ( see tables 10 and 11 ). 
I believe that the level of support for the regime leaders relative to their opponents is 
primarily because of three factors; the weaknesses of the opponents, military disunity over 
who was to blame for negative developments, and the regime's courting of personnel. As I 
have already examined the new regime's opponents, I shall focus on the other two factors. 
First, many personnel believed that there W?S no viable alternative to Yeltsin. After the 1993 
revolt, Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov, the former Chief of Staff of the 28th Army, 
317 Argumenty i Fakty, Moskovskii Komsomolets, in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434 
318 Argumenty i Fakty, October 1994, n.p.; and Moskovskii Komsomolets, 26 October and 11 November 1994, 
n'f', both quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 21, p434. See also Shlapentokh, p431. 
31 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p532. 
320 A. Oslon and Ye. Petrenk.o, Parlamentskiye vybmy I oprosy obshchestvennogo mneniyo vrossii vo vtoroy 
polovine 1993 goda (Moscow: publisher not known, 1994), n.p., quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of 
The October Crisis," p2. 
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commented that the military trusted Yeltsin before admitting "There is nobody else to trust 
anyway."321 Similarly, in a 1994 survey, 49 percent of personnel said that no state institution 
expressed an interest in the army and its personnel. 322 The absence of an alternative figure to 
Yeltsin is further illustrated by the reaction of an officer in mid-1996 when asked whether a 
coup was possible. The officer exclaimed "Against whom? For what?" and was emphatic that 
replacing one President for another would not change anything.323 Colonel Viktor Baranets, a 
member of the General Staff and head of the Ministry of Defence press service, also indicated 
that a viable alternative to Yeltsin was absent. Baranets wrote that he had contemplated 
assassinating Yeltsin, but did not because another 'scoundrel' wouid only replace him.324 As 
Mark Galeotti wrote in November 1994, "For all his many flaws, Yeltsin remains the only 
figure currently capable of holding together the ramshackle coalition of individuals and 
interests running Russia. "325 
Second, personnel did not necessarily blame the new regime's leaders for the negative impact 
of the transition on the military, thus diverting at least some of their discontent. When officers 
were asked in 1994 who was responsible for the mistakes in military policy since 1985, 70 
percent did not name Yeltsin.326 Nor did critics of the Chechnyan campaign necessarily blame 
the civilian leaders. Vorobyev blamed Grachev rather than the civilian leadership for the 
poorly organised campaign. He claimed in early 1995 that it had been up to the Defence 
Minister to inform the President that more time was needed to organise the campaign. 327 This 
diverting of blame was encouraged by the new regime, as I have already mentioned that 
Yeltsin made public attacks on the military leaders. 
It is clear that the new regime, despite its many destructive actions, did court personnel. This 
included moves to make service more bearable. For instance, pay was continually increased, 
though such increases did not keep up with inflation. It was increased six times in 1992 alone 
and the following January increased again by 170 percent.328 Similarly, attempts were made to 
321 "Do Not Make Us Into a Bogyman: A Specialist's Opinion," FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p63. 
322 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, pl. 
323 Nichols, "An Impending Russian Coup?" p 1. 
324 Viktor Baranets, "At Whom Will a Hungry Army Shoot?" Sovershenno sekret'no no.2, February 1997, n.p. 
quoted in Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The Dilemma Of Russian Military Professionalism," p25. 
325 Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall- Who Needs Another Coup?" JIR 6, no.11, November 1994, p482. 
326 Brusstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, p3. 
327 "Vorobyev Blames Grachev for "Mistakes" in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 27 January 1995, p13, quoted 
in Goldstein, pl 12. 
328 "Pavel Grachev: Armii segonya trudno, kak i vse mu narodu," KZ, 23 February 1993, n.p., quoted in 
Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," p 172. 
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ensure that at least some aspects of service were satisfactory. For example, in 1995 only 10.5 
percent of officers complained that their medical care was poor or very poor.329 Yeltsin also 
could align himself with personnel. In 1992 he agreed that personnel in the 'near abroad' 
could use force to defend themselves, and vowed that Russia would maintain an army 
commensurate with its status as a great nuclear power. The following year he also 
acknowledged that personnel faced hardships.330 Indeed Yelena Agapova, the Ministry of 
Defence Press Secretary, publicly accepted in mid-1992 that Yeltsin appeared to be 
committed to addressing the military's problems.331 Particularly indicative of Yeltsin's 
responsiveness to military opinion, at least when he needed its help, are his actions prior to 
the climax of the 1993 revolt. In September 1993 he appealed to personnel to remain calm and 
to concentrate on their training rather than becoming politically active, a move which won 
him support. 332 
In summary, I do not believe that the military had an interventionist mood. I believe that three 
factors are behind this. First and most importantly, many officers neither believed that orders 
would be swiftly executed nor held an overly positive assessment of the utility of force. This 
was encouraged by the belief that the military would be unable to effectively exercise power 
by swiftly solving the state's problems. Second, although many personnel wanted strong state 
leadership they wanted this to be provided through, rather than in violation of, the democratic 
electoral system. Finally, although Yeltsin was not strongly supported by many personnel his 
support relative to that of his main opponents and of the military leadership could be high. 
This reduced the likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present. 
Conclusions 
This chapter argues it is unlikely that the Russian military perceived itself capable of staging a 
coup. I believe that six key factors contributed to this incapacity. First, a potential coup leader 
was absent. This is because there was no opponent of Yeltsin capable of uniting the military 
329 Ball and Gerber, Table 6, pl 73. 
330 With regard to Yeltsin's courtship of the military see Zisk, ppll-18. More specifically, see Stephen Foye, 
"Yeltsin On Role Of Russian Military," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 11 June 1992, accessed 18 March 
1998; and ITAR-TASS, n.d., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Yeltsin Aware Of Army's Social Problems," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 11 August 1993, accessed 18 March 1998. 
331 Yelena Agapova, "Servicemen and Their Families Should Not Be Victims of Unsettled Lives," KZ, 23 July 
1992, n.p., carried by FBIS-SOV, 23 July 1992, pl 7, quoted in Zisk, p12. 
332 Boris Yeltsin, "Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii-Glavnokomanduyushchego Vooruzhennymi 
Silami Rossii," KZ, 24 September (no year), pl, quoted in Taylor, "Russian Civil-Milita1y Relations," p8. 
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behind their position or willing to lead a coup. My assessment of military attitudes toward 
Rutskoi, Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Lebed, and Gromov illustrated this. Second, strategically 
located personnel showed an unwillingness to actively support a coup, as is shown by their 
actions during the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. Third, the military lacked the expertise required 
to swiftly and successfully stage a coup, though it remained equipped to intervene. Most 
relevant here is the military's lack of experience in intervening and the inadequate level of 
expertise evident during the 1991 coup, 1993 revolt, and the Chechnyan war. Fourth, poor 
cohesion meant that the threat of instability and a civil war was a possible outcome of a coup. 
Many personnel recognised this threat. However I do not believe that poor cohesion prevented 
a coup. This is because disunity also affected those personnel the new regime would call upon 
for protection and disunity did not prevent the 1991 coup. Fifth, I doubt whether a coup leader 
would have been able to both recruit enough active supporters and effectively lead them. 
Although the number of participants is not necessarily an important determinant, given the 
complexity of taking power in a modern state like Russia it did influence the decision not to 
intervene. 
With regard to the military's mood, this is closely related to the capacity to intervene as the 
level of self-confidence is vital given the difficult hature of seizing power in Russia. I have 
already argued that personnel did not have high self-perceptions so only briefly outlined their 
mood before focusing on the key factors that influenced this feeling. The military did not have 
an interventionist mood because personnel essentially did not believe that they were superior 
to civilians. The view among officers that orders to intervene would not be swiftly executed, 
and their negative assessment of the utility of force further discouraged an interventionist 
mood. This view was reinforced by the belief that the military would be unable to effectively 
exercise power over the state. Similarly, although many personnel wanted strong state 
leadership they wanted this to be provided within the confines of democracy. This is because 
of the military's fondness of freedoms associated with democracy. Likewise, personnel were 
supportive of at least some of the new regjme's reforms. Finally the new regime's support 
needs to be put into perspective. This is because Yeltsin and other key members of the new 
regime often enjoyed a high level of support relative to their opponents and the military 
hierarchy. This reduced the likelihood that personnel believed a viable alternative was present 
and encouraged them to accept the new regime's supremacy. 
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Overall then, I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage 
a coup and their importance can vary, is valid. To be more precise, the presence of potential 
coup leaders, the participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites, 
the participation of effectively armed and trained personnel, the cohesion of the coup forces, 
the number of personnel, and the military's mood all influenced the decision not to intervene. 
This is because they influenced the military's perception of its capacity to intervene. 
Hypotheses three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to 
stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, is also valid. The transition did impact 
upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The transition impacted upon the 
loyalty of strategically located personnel as discontent did emerge, on the military' s expertise 
and cohesion, on the number of personnel available to stage such an intervention, and on the 
mood of personnel. However strong potential coup leaders did not emerge during this period. 
Turing to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, 
disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup. The 
validity of the hypothesis is thus doubtful. Although the transition did encourage discontent, 
this was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. The transition actually 
reduced the level of military expertise and cohesion, along with the prospective number of 
participants. Moreover, the transition's negative impact on the military ensured that personnel 
did not develop an interventionist mood. The poor morale of personnel hindered the 
development of a sense of supremacy over civilians and hindered a high level of confidence. 
The following chapter examines whether the Russian military had the disposition to intervene 
from 1992 to 1996. This examination is carried out by categorising factors into primary or 
secondary factors according to their importance. The factors are the same as those presented 
in my theoretical framework that appears in chapter 2 apart from the military's mood, which 
has been examined here. Thus, the military's sectional interests, the manifest destiny and 
national interest, external actors, and 'mixed motives,' are examined to judge whether an 




THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996: 
THE DISPOSITION TO INTERVENE 
This chapter examines whether the Russian military under the new regime had the disposition 
to stage a coup. The military' s sectional interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, 
external actors, and 'mixed motives' are examined to judge whether an interventionist 
disposition was present. First, I examine those factors that I argued in my theoretical 
framework are the most important and are thus termed 'primary' factors. The primary factors 
are the potential coup grievances derived from the violation of corporate and individual self-
interests. More specifically, grievances derived from violations of the military's autonomy, 
the presence of functional rivals, changes to the level of budgetary support, and individual 
grievances are examined. After these factors are assessed I shall examine those factors that I 
believe are less influential and are thus termed 'secondary' factors. Here class and 
particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors are 
examined. Finally, I shall assess the presence of 'mixed motives.' 
This chapter again examines hypothesis two, three, and four. I have already argued that 
hypothesis one, regime transitions have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is 
valid. With regard to hypothesis two, three, and four I have already examined their validity 
with regard to the capacity to intervene. In this chapter I examine the validity of hypothesis 
two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, 
and hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a 
coup. These hypotheses are examined according to the factors that influence-whether the 
military has the disposition to intervene. These factors are corporate, individual, class, and 
particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national interest, and external actors. 
Similarly, hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, 
disposition, and opportunity to intervene; is also examined within the context of the 
disposition. Thus, I evaluate here the impact of the transition on the disposition and whether 
this impact encouraged an interventionist disposition to emerge, thereby increasing the 





The military' s autonomy increased in some areas under the new regime. However it remained 
restricted in other areas, and this encouraged resentment over the perceived civilian 
interference in internal military matters. The potential influence of this grievance is shown by 
the 1991 coup where the violation of institutional autonomy influenced the decision to 
intervene. Although some personnel might have been placated by increases in autonomy, 
among other personnel discontent arose over the perceived civilian interference. Therefore, 
Russia is not a clear case of the military' s autonomy either increasing or decreasing with the 
transition, but one where its impact varied according to the specific matter of concern to the 
military, the attitude of personnel varying accordingly. In line with this, after examining the 
1991 coup I shall argue that the military's overall autonomy increased under Yeltsin before 
arguing that violations did occur, which led to discontent. This casts doubt on the argument 
that a key factor behind the military's political quiescence was its greater autonomy, but also 
whether the violation of autonomy was serious enough to motivate intervention. 
The potential influence that violations to institutional autonomy can have is shown 'by their 
role in motivating the 1991 coup. Whereas the military had enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy under Brezlmev, the·transition led to a decline. Military control over its doctrine 
fell as civilians played an increasingly active role in determining the institution's roles, as I 
have already noted. This occurred against a background of much debate and opposition from 
officers. Indicative of this is Yazov's expression in 1987 that the military rather than civilians 
should determine the level of armaments needed to counter external threats. 1 Similarly, 
Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, Yazoy's First Deputy of Defence and a leader of the 
1991 coup, complained in 1990 that "irresponsible" and "incompetent" politicians were 
meddling in military affairs. 2 More specifically, the planned signing of the Union Treaty on 
the 20th of August which loosened the central government's control over the Soviet republics, 
and control over resources in the republics, such as the draft pool, encouraged intervention. 
1 D.T. Yazov, "Voennaya doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora-doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma," KZ, 28 July 
1987, n.p., quoted in Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations, p80. See also pp75-92. 
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This violated the military's autonomy, as defined by Finer, by threatening the military's 
control over recruitment and hence the size of the military. The growing sovereignty of the 
republics that occurred under Gorbachev encouraged the military hierarchy to become 
increasingly involved in politics as they moved to oppose the perceived threat to their 
authority. For instance, military bases were closed and weaponry stolen from armouries. 3 
Varennikov in March 1991 warned that only direct participation of the hierarchy in the union 
treaty process would ensure that defence issues were resolved properly. Similarly, Kryuchkov 
that August warned Grachev "after the Union Treaty is signed it will be too late to institute a 
state of emergency. "4 
In some areas institutional autonomy increased, as influence over key security issues grew. 
This represents the provision of a positive incentive to remain loyal. Evidence of this includes 
Yeltsin's moves to align at least some policies more closely with the military to win its 
support. This is shown by the policy change towards the Kurile Islands, the return of these to 
the Japanese a contentious issue. Yeltsin's 1992 proposal to withdraw from the islands led the 
military to immediately reinforce its island forces. Yeltsin then adopted the military' s 
position.5 That this move corresponded with the military's stance is further shown by 98 
percent of officers telling Ball that they would defend the islands from Japanese attack. 6 
Moreover, institutional autonomy increased in other areas after the 1993 revolt as Yeltsin 
rewarded the military for its support. For example, Yeltsin supported the new draft of the 
military doctrine in 1993.7 At least some senior officers like Grachev were pleased with the 
greater influence that they enjoyed in areas such as foreign and security policy-making. 8 
However, although autonomy in some areas increased, and this might have placated some 
personnel, I believe that it was not a major determinant of the military's quiescence. Potential 
coup grievances derived from the violation of institutional autonomy developed. First, serious 
violations of the military's autonomy continued under the new regime. This is illustrated by 
2 Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, KZ, 6 September 1990, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, pp77-8. 
3 Meyer, "How the Threat," pp23-6. 
4 Varennikov, interview by Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network, 1200 GMT, 23 March 1991, quoted in 
Brusstar and Jones, "The Military And The Union Treaty," McNair Paper 34, p2. With regard to Kryuchkov see 
Rernnik, p448. 
5 See Desch, p468; and Zisk, ppl5-6. 
6 Ball, "How Reliable Are Russia's Officers?" Table 2, p205. 
7 With regard to the aftermath of the revolt see Desch, pp472-4; Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," 
pplS-20; and Alexander MacLeod, "Why Military Backed The President," CSM, 6 October 1993, available from 
http://plweb.csmonitor.com/plweb-turbo/c ... 1 +archives+ 148802+ 32++Russian%20military, Internet, accessed 
14 March 1998, ppl-4 of 4. 
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the lack of military input in the decision to invade Chechnya, and by the civilian interference 
in the promotion of officers. After arguing this, I shall express my doubts over whether many 
personnel would have been placated by greater autonomy in some areas of security policy. 
Apart from the overwhelmingly negative impact of the transition on the military, many 
personnel opposed the role of the military in these areas. This is demonstrated by the active 
role of the military in the 'near abroad.' Members of the military hierarchy supported this role 
but many lower-ranked personnel opposed it, particularly those involved in 'peacekeeping' 
operations. 
It is clear that institutional autonomy continued to be violated in many areas. Even when the 
military's role in the formulating of security policy increased in some areas, violations 
occurred. This is shown by the limited input that the military appears to have had in the 
decision-making process regarding the invasion of Chechnya, the largest military operation 
during this period. Here participants at the Security Council meeting where the vote was taken 
to invade recalled that the President would not tolerate any discussion, and was determined 
that the vote support the use of force. Members unanimously did vote for the use of force 
despite some misgivings.9 This episode is especially important because it indicates that at 
least some of the speculation regarding Yeltsin's tenuous hold on power was exaggerated. It 
occun-ed shortly after Yeltsin's highly publicised failure to disembark from his aircraft on the 
30th of September 1994 to meet the Irish Prime Minister, a failure that encouraged much talk 
about his ability to govern. This is relevant because the increase of military influence was 
supposedly one of the outcomes ofYeltsin's frailty. Apart from Yeltsin, after the ultimatum to 
Chechnya in mid-December 1994, a secret headquarters for coordinating all action in 
Chechnya was secretly set up and was headed by Chernomyrdin. Likewise, Nikolay Yegorov, 
Russian Nationalities Minister, coordinated the actions of the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service in Chechnya. 
More specifically, the role of senior officer.s was often limited. Grachev does not appear to 
have been closely involved in planning the invasion, nor did he support such action until after 
November 26th 1994, the invasion being launched on December 11th· Grachev did not lead the 
attempt to seize Grozny on November 26th, and after it's failure commented that he had "no 
8 See Umbach, p468. 
9 Gall and Waal, pp158-60, 167. 
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interest" in the republic. 10 He further complained in January 1995 that "I could have ended 
this war faster and with fewer casualties and less damage but I am being interfered with and 
am not allowed to fight in a manner that I know would have been more successful."11 Other 
senior officers apparently were even less involved. Though Gromov was Deputy Defence 
Minister, he only found out about the November attack via the press. 12 When Gromov was 
asked about the high losses he complained that "the whole trouble is that the major decisions 
are not being taken by military people."13 Similarly, Babichev, First Deputy of the Ground 
Forces, only learnt about the December invasion from the press despite being expected to take 
command of the operation and he lamented this poor communication. 14 This supports 
Tsypkin's argument that civil-military relations were characterised by a contradiction between 
the military' s crucial political importance in some areas, and its lack of power in other policy 
areas. 15 
Likewise, civilian interference in the promotion process caused discontent as political loyalty 
was stressed. The 1993 Constitution gave the President the power to appoint and remove any 
officer and this power was frequently exercised. Lebed complained that officers were 
promoted according to their ability to say "Yessir [sic]!"16 Gromov also commented that the 
failure of officers to oppose the invasion of Chechnya was encouraged by the fear that they 
would be fired. 17 More specifically, Grachev' s promotion and continued service because of 
his political loyalty rather than military skill caused discontent. Grachev' s loyalty to Yeltsin is 
shown by his support during the 1991 coup and this facilitated his swift promotion over other 
more senior officers. He became the Defence Minister in May 1992 at the age of only 44. He 
further supported Yeltsin, however reluctantly, during the 1993 revolt and is said to have 
reminded Yeltsin after the revolt that "I have twice saved you."18 This loyalty encouraged 
officers to nickname him "the President's shooting crutch."19 Another "well-placed" army 
officer in early 1995 stated that many officers resented the promotion of the incapable 
Grachev over those more experienced because of his "loyalty to his patron." He also accused 
10 Ibid., pp 164, 157. 
11 KZ, 12 January 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p318. 
12 Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Vorobyov, interview by Gall and Waal, ppl 77-8. 
15 Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p36. 
16 Lambeth, "Aleksandr I. Lebed," p554. See also p555. 
17 Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov. 
18 "Letter From Officer X," pl 9. 
19 Ibid. 
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Grachev of "surrounding himself with an entourage of loyal but dull military hacks."20 In line 
with this, the likelihood of promotion was influenced by the officer's loyalty to a patron who 
in tum was loyal to his superiors, and ultimately to Yeltsin. This meant that problems could 
arise if a patron was not available. Nearly one quarter of officers in the Ball survey believed 
that their opportunity for promotion was poor or very poor (see table 21). 
Table 21: Russian Officers' Views of Corporate Interests Mid-1995 
Officers were asked: 
"How would you evaluate the following aspects of your personal and professional life?" 
1. "Opportunities for promotion within the military" 
2. "Your salary" 




1 587 3.7 21.1 56.9 17.9 0.3 
2 595 30.4 41.2 25.5 2.4 0.5 
For infom1ation on the survey see Table 12. Source: ROMIR survey. Deborah Ball and Theodore Gerber, Table 
6, p173. 
Finally, despite the greater influence of the military hierarchy over some policies this did not 
mean that many personnel endorsed their decisions, thereby casting doubts over whether such 
influence placated them. This is illustrated by the lack of enthusiasm among many personnel 
towards their use in the 'near abroad,' despite the influence that their superiors had over this. I 
have already mentioned that most personnel appear to have pragmatically accepted the post-
Soviet borders of Russia, however, more sp·ecifically, many personnel deployed in the 'near 
abroad' lacked morale and enthusiasm. By March 1994, 107 soldiers had been killed and a 
further 193 wounded in 'peacekeeping operations.' 21 It was within this context that discontent 
arose. As previously mentioned, a survey of personnel in Tajikistan during 1994 found that 43 
20 Ibid., pl 8. See also Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp540-3. 
21 Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, p 1. 
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percent did not wish to serve. 22 Many other units experienced a lack of officers, as many were 
reluctant to serve in the 'near abroad' given its hazardous nature and the high workload. In 
1994, one regiment deployed in Moldavia was short of 10 company or platoon level officers 
and 17 warrant officers. 23 
Functional rivals and the survival of the military 
This interest was violated by the new regime, though it did not actually seek to replace the 
military. The presence of armed forces not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence 
was not a new phenomenon. However, the importance of such forces relative to the army 
grew with the transition. Whereas para-military personnel numbered 675,000 in 1985, by 
1996 they numbered 352,000. This equates to a decline of 47.9 percent, but the military 
ground forces declined by 76.9 percent.24 This trend had negative consequences for the 
military that were a source of discontent, and ultimately a potential coup grievance. I shall 
first argue that the expansion of non-Ministry of Defence forces stretched already limited 
resources and deprived the military of urgently needed resources. Thus, equipment 
procurement and conditions of service were affected. Second, the expansion led to rivalry 
between the Ministry of Defence and non-ministry forces over the control of these forces. 
It is evident that military discontent emerged from the expansion of non-ministry forces. The 
head of the OMON accused military personnel of preparing and coordinating attacks on the 
police during the 1993 May Day rally. 25 Additional inter-ministry rivalries became visible 
during the Chechnyan campaign. Here conflict occurred from the start as the leaders of other 
armed forces were often more -supportive of the invasion than the military. 26 During the 
campaign coordination and cooperation was inadequate. One military General even accused 
the security forces of orchestrating an attack on his personnel.27 Similarly, the disastrous 
nature of the campaign led to much 'passing of the buck' between the various ministries. In 
22 Armiya no. 8 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, p7. 
23 Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, p6. 
24 The Military Balance 1985-1986, pp22, 30; and The Military Balance 1996-1997, pl14. The 1996 figure 
refers to the army rather than ground forces as this term was no longer used by the IISS. 
25 See AFP 3 May 1993, quoted in Lepingwell, "Riot Police Head Blames KGB, MVD, Army For Riot," 
RFE/RL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 4 May 1993, accessed 6 July 1998. 
26 Dmitriy Muratov, "The Country's Incumbent leadership will be put on trial for the Reckless Adventure in 
Chechnya," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 14 December 1994, pl, carried by FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 
1994, p40, quoted in Timothy Thomas, The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: I. Military-Political 
Aspects 11-31 December 1994," JSMS 8, no. 2 (June 1995): p236. 
27 Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL 13 December 1994, carried by Sovset, 19 December 1994, quoted in Thomas, "The 
Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II," p263. More generally, see Gall and Waal, pp207-8. 
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fact a 1996 counter-intelligence report that listed twelve key grievances among personnel 
against Yeltsin noted that one was the development of a "parallel army. "28 
Much of the hostility between the various forces resulted from their rivalry over resources and 
power. With regard to resources, many military personnel resented the loss of resources to 
other forces, especially given the other forces already received preferential treatment. Mikhail 
Kolenikov, Chief of the General Staff, complained in 1994 that armies were appearing 
throughout Russia, and he expressed concern over funding all of them. 29 Le bed commented 
the following year that the Interior forces received a higher level of pay than military 
personnel did, and "to put it mildly, this upsets many army officers. "30 In addition, rivalry 
over power grew. Rivalry between Grachev and the other ministries apparently encouraged 
him to finally support the Chechnyan invasion in an attempt to strengthen his political 
position. 31 Furthermore, Grachev struggled to have the border troops placed under his 
jurisdiction, a move resisted by their commander Colonel General Andrei Nikolaev. 32 
Budgetary support 
Discontent derived from an inadequate level of budgetary support was a possible coup 
grievance. I have already argued that in real terms budgetary support declined during this 
period, so here will assess the attitudes of personnel to this trend. The majority of officers 
believed that budgetary support was too low. The influence that the level of this support could 
have on political loyalty is shown by the new regime's moves to increase expenditure when it 
deemed the military's support essential. The resentment of personnel was derived from the 
negative impact the fall of support had on the military, especially on the service conditions 
and the prompt payment of personnel. Thus, although I support to some extent Zisk's 
28 The grievances listed were: 1. His [Yeltsin's] role in the break-up of the Soviet Union; 2. his arms control 
concessions to the US; 3. his lack of concern about military living conditions; 4. his use of the army in 1993 
against the Supreme Soviet; 5. his toleration of corruption and his favouritism in military appointments; 6. his 
"passivity" on the military budget; 7. his "impulsive" military-industrial policies on privatization and financing; 
8. his formation of a "parallel army"; 8. his lack of involvement in military reform; 10. his "inadequate reaction" 
to the withdrawal of Russian forces from abroad; 11. his "weakness" in the face of NATO and other CIS 
countries and in Yugoslavia; 12. and the war in Chechnya. Viktor Baranets, "At Whom Will a Hungry Army 
Shoot?" Sovershenno sekret'no no.2, February 1997, n.p., quoted in Kipp, "Military Pluralism And The 
Dilemma Of Russian Military Professionalism," p25. The 'parallel army' referred to was not stipulated. 
29 Alexander Rahr, "Five Armies," RFE/RL e-mail Bulletin, no no., 25 May 1994, quoted in Thomas, "Fault 
Lines and Factions," p536. 
30 Lebed, interview by Alexander Zhilin, "Interview: General Lebed on the Army & the Kremlin," p 1 of 4. 
31 Gall and Waal, pl 63. 
32 Richard Woff, "The Border troops of the Russian Federation," JJR 7, no.2 (February 1995): pp70-3, quoted in 
Stefanie Babst and Heribert Schaller, "The Future of the Russian Military," Brassey 's Defence Yearbook 1996, 
ed. Michael Clark (London: The Centre for Defence Studies, 1996), p 177. 
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assertion that "Yeltsin appears to be doing his best to ensure that socio-economic policy for 
servicemen is fair and generous," I believe that such actions were not adequate to prevent 
discontent. 33 
Military discontent over the increasingly harsh service standards and lack of pay was 
widespread. Whereas before the transition at least officers enjoyed material comforts, service 
conditions fell during the transition. The growing perception among officers that their 
superiors were ignoring or unable to rectify these problems facilitated the emergence of 
various political groups.34 However, the potential influence of this grievance is best illustrated 
by its role in motivating the 1991 coup: Yazov repeatedly spoke out against budgetary cuts 
prior to the intervention. With regard to the new regime, 82.5 percent of officers in the 1995 
Ball survey believed that the military budget was "too little." Another 71.6 percent believed 
that their salary was very poor or poor (see table 21).35 In extreme, though relatively rare, 
instances this grievance motivated action. Personnel at the Baykonur Cosmodrome mutinied 
in early 1992 because of poor living conditions, and a submarine crew in August 1995 refused 
to sail without receiving overdue pay. The following year officers involved in the alleged plot 
to seize Yeltsin hoped to force him to provide them with their pay.36 In late 1994 Grachev, 
after describing the problems the military faced, -such as unpaid salaries and its lack of 
resources, said to politicians that "Not a single army in the world is in such a catastrophic 
state" and that "this should be taken as a waming."37 
The importance of this grievance is further shown by the role that budgetary support had in 
detem1ining the military's support of the civilian leaders. During the 1991 coup a detachment 
of paratroopers asked for a pledge to improve their housing situation before they would 
support Yeltsin. 38 Likewise, the military let it be known after the 1993 r~~olt that the 
parliament's dissolution meant that the executive branch now bore full responsibility for 
ensuring that the pay and benefits of personnel increased. 39 This grievance is also shown by 
the new regime's recognition that it needed to address discontent over inadequate financial 
33 Zisk, pl 1. See also ppl 1-2. 
34 Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," pp554-5; and Meyer, "How the Threat," pp19-20. 
35 With regard to the budget see Ball and Gerber, Table Six, pl 73. 
36 With regard to the plot see Fedarko, "Giving the Big Kiss-Off," p26. More generally, see Koliev, "Russia's 
Army," p3. 
37 Fedarko, "The Red-Army Blues," p24. 
38 Mikhail Sokolov, "Slovo protiv broni," Sobesednik, no.35, (August 1991): np., quoted in Tsypkin, "Will the 
Military," p45. 
39 KZ, 12 October 1993, n.p., quoted in Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," p48. 
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support. The new regime sought to win military support when this was deemed vital through 
actual or promised increases in support. For instance, Chemomyrdin sought to win electoral 
support by disbursing back pay to personnel a few weeks before the 1995 elections.40 The 
following year Yeltsin ordered that pay be promptly provided before the presidential 
elections.41 
Individual interest 
Individual grievances arose during this period that could have encouraged intervention. 
Individual grievances were encouraged by the transition's overwhelmingly negative impact 
upon the military, an impact that has already been assessed. Thus, I shall focus here upon a 
key individual interest, which could be threatened and has yet to be examined, the safety of 
personnel both in terms of their life and their military positions under the new regime. 
However the protection and promotion of the interests of key personnel accompanied the 
violation of these individual interests. I argue this after my initial focus on the violation of 
interests. In addition, more negative means were used to ensure loyalty. These discouraged 
the growth of grievances among those whose actions would be most important in determining 
the success of a coup. Therefore, positive and negative incentives were used by the new 
regime to limit the impact of individual grievances. · 
At the extreme, the lives of personnel were threatened by the new regime. Although Zisk 
argued that Yeltsin showed a concern for the safety of personnel, and that this encouraged 
positive opinions of the President, the lives of personnel were threatened. 42 This threat 
resulted from developments originating from the Gorbachev era, and by the new regime's 
actions. Prior to the new regime taking power discontent had grown as casualties grew from 
internal operations aimed at countering the increasing security threat posed by instability. 
Before the 1991 coup discontent even arose among elite airborne personnel as they suffered 
losses and were accused of brutality.43 The continued deployment of personnel in hazardous 
conditions under the new regime caused fyrther discontent, as I have argued above with 
regard to personnel serving in the 'near abroad.' 
40 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p539. 
41 Interfax and ORT and Russian TV, "Vremya," 23 May 1996, quoted in "Yeltsin Marks Military Anniversary, 
Promises Defense Funding," Jamestown Monitor 2, no.101, 24 May 1996, available from 
http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/002/101_011.htm, Internet, accessed 2 September 1998. 
42 Zisk, pl2. 
43 See Schofield, pp191-7, 202-6. 
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Howevei; the most graphic indicator of the threat the new regime's decisions posed to the lives 
of personnel is the Chechnyan war. The military suffered heavy losses during the war, the 
initial battle for Grozny alone resulting in the deaths of an estimated 2,000 soldiers.44 To put 
this in perspective, the 40th army in Afghanistan suffered 2,227 deaths throughout 1984, their 
worst year.45 These losses encouraged much discontent. Gromov publicly complained in 
January 1995 that the high losses "could have been avoided and they should have been 
avoided."46 Lebed the same month declared that he was prepared to go to Grozny "not to 
participate in this murderous war, of course, but simply to get the army out of the meat 
grinder."47 Other personnel likewise attacked what they perceived was the unnecessarily high 
level of casualties. Vorobyev claimed in January 1995 that "if the operation had been planned 
correctly, the human, economic, and political losses could have been far smaller." 48 
Less dramatically, concern arose over the safety of individual positions within the military. 
Whereas during the 1970s and early 1980s on average 10 top commanders were replaced 
annually, this increased to 15 from 1985 to 1986, and to 20 from 1987 to 1988. 49 It was 
within this context that leaders of the 1991 coup came to fear that they would be dismissed. 
After the coup it became known that the KGB taped the July 30th 1991 meeting between 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin where it was decided that-Valentin Pavlov, Yazov and Kryuchkov 
would be replaced. These figures were key instigators of the coup and they used the KGB 
recording to win support for the coup.50 Thus, during the August 19th meeting of coup 
conspirators many expressed fears that they would shortly lose their positions.51 This concern 
remained under the new regime. This is illustrated by the military's extraction from Yeltsin of 
a promise not to demobilise several units prior to its support for the President during the 1993 
revolt.52 There is also evidence that discontent arose among personnel closely associated with 
44 Gall and Waal, pl 6. 
45 Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1731 gmt, 14 February 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 16 
February 1996, quoted in "Commander Of Soviet Army In Afghanistan-Losses Are Worse In Chechnya," 
Reuters, 16 February 1996. 
46 Gromov, "Gromov Interviewed," interview by Lyubimov. 
47 "Lebed Calls for Negotiated Chechnya Solution," FBIS-SOV-95-009, 13 January 1995, p35, quoted in 
Goldstein, pl 15. 
48 "Vorobyev Blames Grachev for "Mistakes" in Chechnya," FBIS-SOV-95-018, 27 January 1995, p13, quoted 
in Goldstein, p 112. 
49 Alexander Alexiev and Robert Nurick, The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev: Report on a RAND Workshop 
~Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1990), n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p48. 
0 Gorbachev, "Interview With Gorbachev-"Five Years Ago, We All Lost," ppl-2. 
51 Remnik, p472. 
52 See MacLeod, "Why Military Backed The President," p2. 
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Grachev after his sacking in mid-1996. It is plausible that officers close to him resented his 
removal and thus the threat to their own positions. They were removed shortly afterwards. 53 
Nevertheless, the new regime sought to limit such grievances among senior officers, 
particularly when their continued service and loyalty was deemed vital. This is shown by the 
continued service, and indeed promotion, of officers whose positions meant that they had 
much firepower under their control, were strategically placed, or who were both critical of the 
new regime and popular among personnel. Therefore, individual grievances are less likely to 
have been held among an elite few because of the use of positive incentives. 54 The positions 
of senior personnel were generally safe if the new regime and, to a lesser extent, the Minister 
of Defence, deemed it preferable that they continue to hold high positions. This meant that 
senior officers could remain on active duty despite their poor performance, violation of the 
law, and insubordination. This was as long as the civilian leaders believed that it was in their 
best interests not to violate the individual interests of officers. The regime's actions here were 
influenced by two key factors. First, officers loyal to the civilian leaders were retained and 
promoted despite their poor military performance. This has already been shown by my 
description of Grachev's promotion and continued service despite his many failures. 
Associated with this, I have already argued that loyal but unpopular officers diverted hostility 
away from the new regime. Second, those personnel whose loyalty was debatable continued 
to serve and receive promotions if the civilian leaders felt that the possible negative effects of 
their removal, such as their increased political activism, outweighed the benefits gained from 
their removal. Therefore, strengthening the position of the new regime was of utmost 
importance to the civilian leaders where promotion was concerned. Apart from positive 
53 With regard to this alleged resentment see Lebed, "Lebed Expounds On Alleged Coup," interview by NVT, 
Moscow. For information on the dismissal of personnel see NTV, Moscow, in Russian, 1535 gmt, 25 June 1996 
carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 28 June 1996, quoted in "Military Expert Analyses Dismissals At Defence 
Ministry," Reuters, 28 June 1996. 
54 Though lower ranking officers like Colonels often lead coups, I focus here on the new regime's moves to 
placate officers from the rank of General, particularly those popular among personnel. This is because of three 
reasons. First, I have already argued that to intervene successfully in Russia would require the coup leaders 
command, and have experience in commanding, a large number of personnel. Second, officers from the rank of 
General were the most popular among personnel. For instance, 61.5 percent of the military officers elected by 
districts to the Duma in 1995 were Generals (Thomas, "The Russian Military And The 1995 Elections," pp541-
2), and the two military figures most popular among personnel from 1992 to 1996 were Lieutenant General 
Lebed and Colonel General Gromov. Third, officers from the rank of General appear to have been most likely to 
intervene. Senior officers like Defence Minister Yazov and General Varennikov played a key role in deploying 
the military in support of the 1991 coup. Similarly, Lebed and Gromov were the most willing to publicly criticise 
the new regime, and it was Rutskoi, a Brigadier General not in active command, who played a leading role in the 
1993 revolt. Contrasting this, the officers surveyed by Ball in 1995 ranged from Colonel/First Captain to 
Major/Third Captain (Ball and Gerber, Table 1, p161), and I used this survey extensively in the last chapter to 
argue that there was no strong interventionist mood. 
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incentives, more negative incentives were also used and these are examined last. However 
their effectiveness should not be over-emphasised, as the new regime was reluctant to act 
against popular officers and punishments were often minimal. 
The individual interests of senior officers were generally not threatened. The new regime was 
generally reluctant to remove senior officers, and loyal officers were treated well even after 
their removal. With regard to the reluctance to remove senior officers, the disproportionate 
number of officers illustrates this. In 1980 there were 500,000 officers, in 1993 there were 
690,000, twice as many as the international standard, despite the military having declined.55 
Similarly, in 1993, there were 2,218 Russian Generals for a military of 1,894,000 personnel 
compared to 1,008 Generals for the US active armed forces numbering 1,729,700.56 In line 
with the retention of many Generals were their financial rewards. At the start of 1995 
Generals received $180-200 a month and Colonels $160-180. State sector managers received 
$80-125. This was much more than lower-ranked officers, Lieutenants receiving $70-80 (see 
table 22). Many senior officers also appear to have been immune from criminal proceedings. 
Sources close to Yeltsin said they were instructed not to take action over "improper activities" 
as the officers would then "fall on the hook of the security services," and become "more 
Table 22: Russian Military and Civilian Pay Early 1995 
Military personnel Monthly pay ($) Civilians Monthly pay ($) Monthly pay in 
State-sector ($) Non-state 
sector 
General 180-200 High school 44-65 From 300 
teacher 
Colonel 160-180 Worker-builder 90-110 From 320 
Lieutenant 70-80 Manager 80-125 From 300 
Source: Chernavin, "The Status of the Army," pp736-7 
55 Gabriel, The Red Legions, p81; and Barylski, The Soldier, p278. 
56 Barylski, The Soldier, p278; and The Militmy Balance 1993-1994, pp20, 99-101. 
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devoted to the master of the Kremlin."57 Moreover, promotions often occurred when military 
loyalty was vital. Prior to the 1993 revolt Yeltsin promoted eighty officers, and immediately 
before the 1996 elections the commanders of all five services received promotions. Even after 
their removal, loyal officers were treated well. Grachev remained loyal to Yeltsin despite his 
removal and was employed by a state-owned arms exporter from late 1997.58 Shaposhnikov, 
Grachev' s predecessor, also supported Yeltsin after his removal and became a presidential 
. d s9 representative at a state-owne arms exporter. 
Apaii from the retention of loyal officers, the new regime was reluctant to antagonise popular 
officers. This is illustrated by the treatment of Lebed and Gromov. The reluctance to act 
against Lebed is shown by Grachev backing down from removing him in August 1994 after 
Yeltsin disavowed plans to reduce the 14th army and to remove Lebed. Yeltsin's reluctance to 
act was reputedly encouraged by security and counter-intelligence officials arguing that 
Lebed's removal would severely damage Yeltsin's political standing, and that the 14th army 
might refuse to obey Moscow. 6° Fmihermore, Lebed signalled to the new regime that his 
removal could lead him to become a political rival. In August 1994 when asked about the 
possibility of mnning for the presidency he said "We shall talk about it in detail if they force 
me to take off my epaulettes."61 That Lebed only resigned in 1995 after years of protesting 
against the new regime may indicate that positive incentives had some influence. Nor was the 
new regime willing to take action against Gromov. Despite his insubordination he was merely 
transferred to a largely honorary position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1995. 
The Kommersant Daily speculated that "The probability of Gromov ... entering the political 
arena is too high, which would b·e very unwelcome to the authorities."62 
Accompanying such moves were negative incentives aimed at undermining the positions of 
dissident Generals through reducing their support. These incentives were aimed at creating 
fear among officers that challenging the new regime would have harmful consequences. 
57 Zhilin, "Corruption Keeps Generals In Line," p7. 
58 Interfax new agency, Moscow, in English 1122 gmt, 3 July 1996, can-ied by BBC MS: FUSSR, 4 July 1996, 
quoted in "Dismissed Russian Defence Minister Still Loyal To Yeltsin, Wishes Lebed Success," Reuters, 4 July 
1996. 
59 See Michael Nakoryakov, "Former Russian Defense Minister Recalls Past, Ponders Future," The Salt lake 
Tribune, 16 October 1994, pD3. 
60 Nezavisimaya gazeta 30 August 1994, n.p., quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Why Has Yeltsin Supported Lebed," 
RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 1 September 1994, accessed 18 March 1998. 
61 Moskovskie novosti no.33, 14-21 August 1994, n.p., quoted in Vladimir Socor, " ... And Hints He May Run For 
President," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 22 August 1994, accessed 18 March 1998. 
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Negative incentives were used after both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. With regard to the 
1991 coup, 376 personnel were relieved of their posts and the coup leaders were imprisoned 
until their release in 1993.63 Leaders of the 1993 revolt were also arrested and Rutskoi was 
stripped of his rank. More specifically, the new regime moved to reduce Lebed's popularity 
and thus make it easier to discipline him. According to a fonner counterintelligence officer, 
the decision to appoint him Commander of the 14th Army was influenced by a desire to see 
him fail, as it was felt to be a pa1iicularly difficult assignment. Likewise, the Defence 
Ministry initially decided that Deputy Defence Minister Matvei Burlakov, a General accused 
by Lebed of corruption, was to inspect the 14th Almy. This was to place Lebed in the difficult 
position of paying respect to a superior he had previously attacked, thereby losing credibility. 
However,Lebed refused to allow the inspection and Grachev backed down. 64 
However, the negative incentives should not be over-emphasised given the new regime's 
reluctance to act against popular officers. The punishments that were handed out were often 
minimal. Yazov, Varem1ikov, and Achalov were not even court martialled after the 1991 
coup. It was also decided in September 1991 that formal compliance with orders issued by the 
coup leaders did not deserve punislm1ent. Leaders of both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt were 
amnestied in February 1994 with Varennikov, the only coup leader to stand trial, being 
acquitted in August 1994. Gorbachev exclaimed that this meant, "Future coup and putsch 
leaders can be sure ahead of time that they will be acquitted."65 Nor did involvement in the 
coup and revolt prevent leaders from returning to military and political activities. Varennikov 
was elected to the Duma in 1995, and it was announced in June 1998 that Yazov was to 
become adviser to the head of the Defence Ministry's Main Directorate for International 
Military Cooperation. Similarly, Rutskoi was elected the Governor of Kursk in October 1996. 
Even the Major who attempted to assassinate Yeltsin in Januaiy 1993 was freed in May 1993 
due to insufficient evidence. 
In summary, primary grievances derived from the negative impact on the military of the 
transition arose that could have encouraged support for a coup. Such grievances emerged 
from the violation of institutional autonomy, the growth of functional rivals, the fall in 
62 "Gromov's New Job Seen as Way to Isolate Him From Politics," FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995, p20, 
~uoted in Goldstein, pl 14. 
6 "On the Military Leadership's Participation," p24, quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p 140. 
64 Zhilin, "Battle For the Soul," pp5-6. 
65 Oliver Wates, "Three Years On, War Of Words Over Soviet Coup," Reuters, 19 August 1994. See also 
Brusstar and Jones, "Aftermath Of The October Crisis," p3. 
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budgetary support, and the violation of individual interests. However, I doubt whether these 
grievances would have motivated intervention. This is because at least some personnel were 
placated by increases in military autonomy, and the individual interests of senior officers, 
especially those popular within the military, were often protected. Negative incentives 
accompanied these positive incentives but their strength is questionable. 
Secondary Factors 
Class interest 
I have already argued that the class interest is not often a major coup dete1minant and this 
argument appears to apply to the Russian case study. I have been able to compile material on 
the class composition of the military and believe that the class interest was not strong enough 
to motivate intervention. Although the class origins of personnel could differ from those of 
members of the new regime, these origins did not play a major role in determining their 
actions and attitudes. This is illustrated by the military's actions during the 1991 coup and 
under Yeltsin. I shall then argue that the class position of personnel in monetary te1111s did not 
have a decisive impact on their actions or attitudes. 
The class composition of the militaiy and the new regime did differ, though not dramatically. 
Evidence indicates that personnel before and during the transition were generally from 
working class origins, rather than the middle class often associated with officers. In 1970, 78 
percent of Generals and Admii-als had peasant or worker origins. 66 Similarly, during the 
transition Colonel General A. Golonov, Head of Ground Forces' Training Directorate, said 
that the an11y was largely comprised of "illiterate workers and peasants," and at least 59 
percent of those voluntarily serving were of working class origins.67 My brief survey of key 
officers on active duty in early 1993, all of whom were serving before 1985, also indicates 
that 65.6 percent remained of working class.origins. More specifically, my sample of airborne 
and Spetsnaz officers active in early 1993 found that 80 percent had working class origins 
(see tables 23 and 24). Moreover Shaposhnikov and Grachev, the Defence Ministers for most 
66 Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, no.4 (no month, 1971): p31, quoted in Colton, Commissars, Table 14, p269. 
67Dick, A Bear, p4. With regard to the make-up of those entering the military, see Chemavin, p740. 
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of the period, were from the working class.68 Turning to the new regime, evidence indicates 
that middle class origins were more common. My brief survey of members of the new regime 
in early 1993 indicates that 47.4 percent were of middle class origins (see table 25). With 
regard to the military, 34.4 percent of military officers and 20 percent of airborne and 
Spetsnaz officers had middle class origins (see tables 23 and 24). It is apparent that this 
difference could be a source of tension. A "high-ranking General Staff officer" said in late 
Table 23: Sample of Key Russian Military Officers in March 1993: Their ethnicity, class, and 
birthplace 
Ethnicity Class ( of father) Most Common 
(Number followed by Birthplace 
percentage) 
Slav: 52 100% * Upper: 0 0% * Moscow: 4 8%* 
Russian: 48 92.3% Middle: 11 34.43% Lipetsk: 3 6% 
Lower (working): 21 65.6% Smolensk: 3 6% 
See appendix 2. All percentages are rounded up to the first decimal point. The table includes Gromov but not 
Rutskoi. * The ethnicity of 52 officers, class of 32, and birthplaces of 50 is known. Source: Longman 
Bibliographical Directo,y Of Decision-makers in Russia and The Successor States ed. Maiiin McCauley 
(Harlow, Essex, Longman Group UK Limited, 1993). 
Table 24: Sample of Active Officers of Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces Serving in Early 
1993: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace 
Ethnicity Class ( of father) Most Common Birthplace 
Slav: 17 100% * Upper Class: 0 0%* No discernible place* 
Russian: 12 70.6% Middle Class: 3 20% 
Lower (working) Class: 12 
80% 
See appendix 3 (includes Lebed). All percentages are rounded up.* The ethnicity of 17 officers, class of 15, and 
birthplace of 16 is known. Source: Schofield, pp264-85 and Longman Bibliographical Direct01y. 
68 For a profile of Shaposhnikov that notes his social origins see McCauley, pp551-2 and appendix 2. With 
regard to Grachev see appendix 2. For a profile ofRodionov see Orr, Rodionov and Reform, pl l and appendix 2. 
Yeltsin himself was interim Defence Minister from March to May 1992 and is also of working class origins. 
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1993 that "The only hope is that our people will be able to acquire a normal government that 
will express the interests of the working people and not a handful of the bourgeoisie."69 
However, the greater prominence of working class origins in the military did not have a major 
impact on how personnel acted. Most basically, the class origin of a person does not 
necessarily mean that they will pursue the interests of this class and support figures with the 
same background. For instance, the greater presence of figures with middle class origins in 
the new regime did not discourage it from courting the military, despite the working class 
origins of many personnel. The military also supported the new regime against the 1993 revolt 
despite this class difference. 
Table 25: Sample of Members of the New Regime in March 1993: Their ethnicity, class, and 
birthplace 
Ethnicity Class ( of father) Most Common Birthplace 
Slav: 63 91.3% * Upper Class:O 0%* Moscow: 25 34.7% * 
Russian: 57 82.6% ** Middle Class: 9 47.4% 
Working Class: 10 52.6% 
See appendix 4. All percentages are rounded up. * The ethnicity of 69 officials, class of 19, and birthplaces of 72 
officials are known. Rutskoi is included. **This figure includes Vladimir Mashits ofBelarusian/Russian origins. 
Source: Longman Bibliographical Direct01y. 
The willingne~s of personnel to support a coup because of a shared class interest is doubtful. 
This is shown by the 1991 coup, where both the regime and coup leaders had similar class 
backgrounds but opposed one another. Y azov shared the peasant origins of Gorbachev, with 
Kryuchkov and Yeltsin having working class origins. Similarly, both military supporters and 
opponents appear to have shared working class origins and theoretically the same class 
interest (see tables 26 A and B). This lack of class attachment is to be expected given the 
emphasis on a classless society during the. Soviet era, and the military's role of promoting 
national integration.70 A lack of class attachment is also evident under the new regime. During 
the 1993 revolt personnel did not swiftly unite behind Achalov, the 'Defence Minister' 
appointed by Rutskoi, or behind Yeltsin despite their working class origins. Likewise, class 
69"Staff Officer on 'Shame' of October Events," FBIS-SOV-93-243, 21 December 1993, pp40-2, quoted in 
Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny," p336. 
70 With regard to the integrative role assigned to the military see Odom, "The "Militarization" of Soviet 
Society," p269. 
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origins do not appear to have played a major role in determining attitudes towards the five 
opponents of the new regime most popular among personnel. Whereas Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, 
and Zyuganov had middle class origins, Lebed and Gromov had working class origins (see 
table 27). Thus, the combined support for Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, and Zyuganov, meant that 
officers from 1992 to 1995 sympathised most with figures from middle class origins. 
However by 1996 they sympathised most with Yeltsin and Lebed of working class origins 
( see table 11 ). 
Table 26: A. Sample of Military Supporters of 1991 Coup: Their ethnicity, class, and 
birthplace * 
Ethnicity Class ( of father) Most Common Birthplace 
Slav: 15 100% Upper: 0 0% Ukraine: 2 '13.3% 
Russian: 15 100% Middle: 4 40% 
Lower (working): 6 60% 
B. Sample of the Background of Military Opponents of 1991 Coup** 
Ethnicity Class Most Common Birthplace 
Slav: 14 100% Upper: 0 0% Rostov: 3 23.1% 
Russian: 13 92.8% Middle: 2 18.2% 
Lower (working): 9 81.8% 
See appendix 1 and 2. All figures are rounded up. *The ethnicity of 15 officers, class of 10, and birthplace of 15 
is known.** The ethnicity of 14 officers, class of 11, and birthplace of 13 is known. Table B, includes Rutskoi 
and Lebed. Source: Longman Bibliographical Direct01y. 
Turning to the class position of personnel, in material terms most personnel under the new 
regime belonged to the working class. Officers before the transition belonged to the middle 
class, at least in material terms. In the mid-1970s Lieutenants on average received 150 rubles 
per month, Captains 160, Majors 220-230, and Lieutenant Colonels 250. This compares with 
the average salary of 145.8 rubles for white and blue-collar workers.71 It was against this 
background that service conditions declined after 1985. This is indicated by the low level of 
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military pay relative to civilian pay, especially relative to the non-state sector (see table 22). 
Indeed a detailed study of the officer corps by Krasnaya Zvezda concluded that it was no 
longer part of the middle class but now the "lumpen proletariat."72 However, though members 
of the new regime in financial terms often belonged to a higher class, the material position of 
figures did not play an important role in dete1mining how personnel acted. This is shown by 
the support Chemomyrdin received from personnel despite his financial position starkly 
contrasting that of most personnel, given he was a millionaire. Personnel thus were similar to 
many civilians whose material position did not play a decisive role in determining their 
political opinions. According to a survey of civilians before and after the 1995 elections, the 
Table 27: Background of Potential Coup Leaders: Their ethnicity, class, and birthplace 
Figure Ethnicity Class ( of father) Birthplace Stance on 1991 
coup 
Rutskoi Russian middle class K.ursk anti 
(officer) 
Zhirinovsky Russian middle class AlmaAta pro 
(lawyer) . Kazakhstan 
Zyuganov Russian middle class Khotynetsky Not active 
(teacher) raion, Orlov 
oblast 
Lebed Russian working class Novocherkassk, anti 
( electrician) Rostov 




Source: Longman Bibliographical Direct01)'. 
71 Harriet Scott, "The military profession in the USSR," Air Force no vol. or no., (March 1976), pp76-8 l; and 
Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. 1922-1982 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982), p405, both quoted in Jones, The 
Red Army, p83. 
72 Orr, The Current State, p14. See also Yefimov, p2. 
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Communist party was the most popular among people of both the low and middle income 
quartiles. 73 
Particularistic interest 
As with the class interest, I believe that loyalties derived from regional or ethnic affiliations 
were not strong enough to have an important role in motivating a coup. Of the two interests 
the regional one is of greater importance, as the attachment of personnel to regions did 
increase at the expense of attachment to the central leadership. However I do not believe that 
this interest would have motivated intervention, particularly a successful one. I shall argue 
this after describing the regional attachment many personnel displayed. There are two types of 
regional interests; those derived from the birthplace of personnel, and their service in a 
particular region. The second of these interests is evident, as shown by the increased 
independence of the MDs, and I thus assess this first. I believe that the new regime's 
weaknesses and inadequacies encouraged this development. 
As I have already briefly noted, regional autonomy grew under the new regime and this is 
indicative of a regional interest among personnel, particularly among those stationed furthest 
from Moscow. Evidence indicates that where personnel were stationed could influence their 
political attitudes. This is shown by the willingness of personnel to attack separatists and 
attack the parliament in 1993 varying according to the region (see table 16), and is a 
significant trend given the importance of MDs. For example, the Siberian MD contained 42 
percent of the military-industrial complex and had troops widely deployed.74 Moreover, 
though I have argued that Lebed's insubordination should not be over-emphasised, it is 
apparent that the 14th Army enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than many others did. 
Lebed criticised moves to withdraw and reorganise the 14th army without removal. Indeed he 
declared in late 1994 that "Theoretically we are under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief 
of Ground Forces in Moscow. In practice, we make decisions here."75 This regional interest 
was at the expense of Moscow's authority, ·and caused alarm even among the Generals that 
enjoyed greater autonomy. Lebed believed that the military might fragment, commenting in 
73 Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Sarah Oates, "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections," 
Europe-Asia Studies 49 no.5, (July 1997): Table 3, p786. 
74 Colonel General Viktor Kopylov, "Region's Colonel-General Interviewed," interview by Vecherniy 
novosibirsk, 1 November 1994, carried by FBIS Report: Central Eurasia, 15 November 1994, p76, quoted in 
Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p538. 
75 Major General Edward Atkenson, "The Russian Armed Forces in Crisis," Army, November 1994, plO, quoted 
in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," p537. See also Simonsen, "Going His Own Way," pp536-9. 
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early 1995 that "every regional "prince" now has his own troops. He pays them, and they are 
ready to unsheathe their swords."76 
This trend accompanied the fall in cohesion and was an outcome of the new regime's 
weaknesses and inadequacies. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union led to the decline of 
central control mechanisms. This was worsened by the discontent among personnel aimed, 
though not exclusively, at civilian leaders and senior officers in Moscow. In addition, 
inadequate support from the new regime encouraged personnel to seek support from regional 
authorities, thus weakening their ties to the central leadership. For instance, officers of the 
Siberian MD signed an agreement that brought together the governor and eight regional 
leaders to support the MD, as the Defence Ministry was unable to provide adequate support.77 
The Russian military correspondent Dmitri Kholodov wrote, "A frightening process has 
begun in the army. District Commanders no longer rely on their minist1y [but instead] tum to 
local authorities directly for help. In this way, the army is becoming tied to regions, 
something that, in the event of a crisis, could break it up into component parts."78 
However, I do not believe that this interest was an influential coup motive. First, regional 
affiliations were not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene that I have already 
discussed in detail. Apart from the surveys of personnel throughout Russia I have referred to 
when assessing the military's mood, this is shown by the reluctance of personnel to unite 
behind a figure despite their service in the same region. Here the actions of personnel during 
both the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt are relevant. Second, the ability of those personnel 
stationed in a particular region to address a regional grievance via a coup was doubtful. I shall 
argue this after examining the influence of shared service experiences on the actions and 
attitudes of personnel. Apart from the doubtful willingness of many personnel stationed 
closest to the Kremlin to actively support intervention, the size and diversity of Russia would 
make it very difficult to unite the military behind a specific regional grievance. This is 
especially because regional grievances by their very nature are divisive. 
76 Lebed, interview by Kohan and Zarakhovich, p25. Scholars also recognised the threat of this trend. See 
Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," pp536-9. Journalists expressed similar fears. See "The Threat that was," 
pp19-21. 
· 77 Discussion between Thomas and Russian officer, Moscow, February 1995, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines 
and Factions," p537. 
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Evidence supports my argument that service in the same regions did not equate with a 
regional interest strong enough to encourage intervention. Although where personnel served 
could influence promotions, as is shown by the promotion of Afghanistan veterans, the bond 
of loyalty derived from service in the same region was not strong enough to overcome the 
reluctance to intervene.79 Officers could not count on political support from personnel where 
they had served. Even personnel stationed in Trans-Dniester did not unite behind Lebed 
during the 1995 Duma and 1996 presidential elections.80 Nor did personnel show a desire to 
fight over a region. The Ball survey found on average 39 percent of officers were willing to 
disobey an order to fight separatists ( see table 16). 
More specifically, shared regional experiences did not equate with a willingness to intervene. 
This is shown by the 1991 coup. Although Yazov had been Deputy Commander of the Far 
East MD from 1976 to 1979 and Commander from 1984 to 1987, the district did not unite 
behind the coup. Indeed the MD Commander was an active opponent of the coup.81 
Likewise, Varennikov received little support from personnel stationed in Germany despite his 
service there as First Deputy Commander, and although he coordinated the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, fellow veterans like Lebed and Grachev opposed him. 82 This reluctance to 
intervene remained under the new regime. Few personnel who had been stationed in the same 
regions as the leaders of the 1993 revolt supported them. Again this is shown by the shared 
service in Afghanistan of two of the key actors: Rutskoi and Grachev. Despite their shared 
service, Grachev used force against his fellow veteran. Nor did Lebed or Gromov actively 
support the revolt, again despite their service in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, the ability to stage a coup motivated by a regional interest was doubtful. The 
diversity and size of Russia made it unlikely that a coup instigated by one MD because of its 
regional interest would win the support of the other MDs. This is because their interests are 
unlikely to have been identical, especially as they incorporated numerous subject components 
78 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 22 March 1994, n.p., in Joint Publications Research Service, "Imminent Collapse of 
Armed Forces Predicted," Militmy Affairs, 27 April 1994, p2, quoted in Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions," 
p537. 
79 With regard to the promotion of Afghanistan veterans see Porter, "The Military Abroad," pp307-16. 
80 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," p533. With regard to the 1996 election see 
Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, quoted in "Mixed Reaction," Reuters. 
81 "General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt," FBIS-SOV, 6 September 1991, p60, quoted in 
Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," p565. 
82 For a profile of Varennikov see McCauley, pp642-3. With regard to the stance of those personnel stationed in 
Germany see Meares, "Westernised" Soviet Troops." 
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of the Russian Federation.83 Neither were military grievances likely to have been identical. 
For instance, the North Caucasus MD was the district most involved with the Chechnyan 
campaign, given its location. It was thus more likely to have grievances derived from this 
campaign relative to others like the remote Far East MD. 84 Furthermore, conditions in the 
MDs varied. Although key divisions based in the Moscow MD enjoyed preferential treatment 
others, like those in the Far East MD suffered particularly harsh conditions. Indeed four 
sailors starved to death in the Far East in March 1993. In line with these conditions, 
grievances appear to have been stronger. That Yeltsin' s would-be assassin in 1993 was from 
the Far East headquarters, and support for Zhirinovsky among Far East personnel was 
reported to have been especially strong in the 1993 elections illustrates this. 85 However those 
MDs with the strongest grievances were often those furthest away from Moscow and least 
able to act. The Far East MD is over 4,500 Kilometres from the capital. 86 Moreove1~ I doubt 
that regions would have united and called for intervention. Surveys indicate that rural people 
were more likely to support parties like the LDPR and Communist party compared to those in 
large cities, who were often supportive of parties associated with the new regime. 87 
Turning to the attachment of personnel to their birthplace, I do not believe that this would 
have motivated intervention either. Apart from the 'influence that the region of service could 
have on personnel, in tum weakening pre-service bonds, two key factors weakened this 
interest. First, evidence suggests that no one region dominated the military either before or 
during the transition. This reduced the likelihood of a strong bond of loyalty to one region. 
Nor does the new regime appear to have been dominated by one region or emphasised one 
region, thereby reducing the prospect of discontent among other regions. Second, the 
proximity of birthplaces did not necessarily equate with a similarity of political attitudes 
among personnel or a willingness to cooperate. Third, shared birthplaces did not necessarily 
equate with a willingness to support intervention. 
83 Within the Russian Federation the basic territorial-administrative unit is the oblast (region). Oblasts cover the 
area of the state where industTial and agricultural activities dominate. There are 49 oblasts. See Thomas, "The 
Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," footnote 48, p547. 
84 With regard to the North Caucasus MD and the Chechnyan campaign see Thomas, "The Russian Armed 
Forces Confront Chechnya: II," pp257-90. 
85 Moscow Interfax, 13 December 1993, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "Notes," available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair34/34afn.htrnl#86, footnote 91, p 1. 
86 This is based on the distance between Khabarovsk, the headquarters of the MD, and Moscow. 
87 Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller, and Paul Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the 
December 1993 Russian Elections," Europe-Asia Studies 47, no.4 (June 1995): Table 3, p599; and White, et al., 
"Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections, Table 3, p786. 
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First, no region appears to have dominated either the military or the new regime. With regard 
to the military, my sampling of key officers indicates that the most common birthplace was 
Moscow, as 8 percent of officers were born here (see table 23). Similarly, the Defence 
Ministers from 1987 to 1996 were all born in different oblasts. No trend is discernible among 
airborne and Spetsnaz officers either (see table 24). Turning to the new regime, Moscow 
appears to have been the most common birthplace. My sampling indicates that 34. 7 percent of 
officials were born here (see table 25). Therefore, Moscow appears to have been the most 
common birthplace among military officers and civilians, but particularly civilians. Despite 
the greater presence of Muscovites, the new regime sought to prevent the perception that it 
was biased against other regions. The rights of Russia's 21 republics, 6 provinces, 49 regions, 
and 2 cities were significantly equalised by the 1993 Constitution. The new regime also 
sought accommodation with many of the republics. By the end of 1995, 9 treaties had been 
made between Moscow and republics providing them generous tax concessions, control over 
natural resources, and other rights.88 
Second, though the military and civilian regional backgrounds differed, this was unlikely to 
motivate intervention. This is because birthplaces appear not to have had a major impact on 
the politi9al attitudes and actions of personnel. Evidence suggests that the birthplace of 
personnel had little influence during the 1991 coup. Supporters and opponents of intervention 
do not appear to have been predominantly drawn from one region. Even the coup opponents 
from Rostov were from different places in the oblast (see tables 26 A and B). Nor do I believe 
that the birthplace of personnel had a major impact on their actions under the new regime. 
This is shown by the support· for Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov, Lebed, and Gromov 
regardless of their diverse birthplaces. Indeed Zhirinovsky won support from personnel 
despite not having been born in Russia (see table 27). This support was primarily determined 
by the actions and views of the figures, as is shown by my assessment of the reasons behind 
their level of support. Similarly, personnel could have divergent stances despite their shared 
backgrounds. Both Lebed and Petr Deinekin, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, were 
born in Rostov but their stances toward the new regime differed because of their political 
opinions. Whereas Lebed openly questioned the new regime, Deinekin, at least during the 
first half of the period, believed that the military should be apolitical and assisted the regime. 
Deinekin reputedly maintained authorised contact with the parliamentary forces in the hope of 
88 Sakwa, pl 89. 
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defusing the 1993 revolt. 89 The conflict between Rutskoi and Grachev also occurred despite 
their birthplaces being less than 300 kilometres apart. Even had grievances derived from the 
violation of such regional interests arisen, it would have been very difficult to unite enough 
personnel behind their intervention, given their diverse origins. 
Finally, I shall assess the likelihood that an ethnic interest would motivate intervention. I 
believe that this interest was even less likely to motivate a coup. A perceived violation of the 
interests of the ethnic group most closely associated with the military, such as through the 
disproportionate influence of minority groups, was unlikely given both the military and new 
regime shared the same ethnicity. Indeed the potential coup leaders, along with the military 
and civilian leaders, shared similar opinions on the key issue of ethnicity: Russians in the 
'near abroad.' As I have already argued that ethnic tension declined within the military as 
other groups achieved independence, I shall only briefly assess this interest. 
Russians dominated the state, the military, and the new regime. Whereas Russians represented 
slightly less than half the Soviet population, they represented around 85 percent of the 
Russian Federation.90 Russians and Slavs dominated the officer corps before the transition, 
but not to the same degree that is apparent under the new regime. For example, 64.3 percent 
of Soviet Marshals in 1974 were Russian. 91 This contrasts my samples that indicate 92.3 
percent of key officers, and 70.6 percent of airborne and Spetsnaz officers were Russian (see 
tables 23 and 24). Likewise, in 1995 a Ministry of Defence survey found that 95.2 percent of 
officers were Slav and 79.7 percent of officers were Russian.92 As Soviet republics moved to 
become independent and were increasingly unwilling to supply men to the Soviet military, 
Slavs, and more specifically Russians, increasingly dominated the lower ranks too. In 1985, 
45.3 percent of draftees were Russian speakers, by the summer of 1990 they accounted for 
66.5 percent of draftees.93 Similarly, my sample of Russian civilian officials indicates that 
91.3 percent were Slav and another 82.6 percent Russian (see table 25). Both Yeltsin and 
Chemomyrdin were Russian. 
89 Grachev, interview by Komsomolskaya pravda, 8 October 1993, p2, quoted in Brusstar and Jones, "The 
Military And The Fall 1993 Crisis," p3. For a profile ofDeinekin see McCauley, pp127-8. 
90 Richard Starr, "Russia's Army in Transition," (paper presented at the Pacific Northwest Colloquium on 
International Security, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 15 April 1994, ppl0-1), quoted in Spence, 
footnote 51, p33. 
91 With regard to the ethnicity of Soviet Marshals see Colton, Commissars, Table 13, p261. 
92 Oleg Falichev, "Navestit' starushku mat'," KZ, 3 June 1995, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, Table 8.1, 
p215. 
93 Crisis in the Former Soviet Militmy, Table 2, p23. 
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More specifically, ethnic origins were unlikely to motivate intervention. The most important 
disincentive was the reluctance of personnel to use force against other Russians. Apart from 
this, potential coup leaders at least broadly supported the new regime's more assertive stance 
on the major issue of ethnicity: the protection of Russians in the 'near abroad.' Zyuganov, 
Zhirinovsky, Lebed, and Gromov believed that the rights of these Russians should be 
forcefully protected.94 The civilian and military leadership recognised that a military presence 
in the 'near abroad' was required. In April 1995, both Grachev and Lebed welcomed Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev's comments that the military could intervene when ethnic Russians 
were threatened. 95 Although many personnel opposed their deployment in the 'near abroad,' 
81.9 percent in the Ball survey believed Russian relations with the region were important.96 
Manifest destiny and national interest 
Some personnel claimed that the manifest destiny of the military was to protect the national 
interest of Russia, but it is very unlikely that this would have motivated intervention. Claims 
that intervention was needed to protect the national interest were made during the 1991 coup. 
It is also apparent that some personnel under the new regime continued to claim that it was the 
military's manifest destiny to protect the national interest. However I believe that such claims 
were merely excuses for intervention rather than actual motives. Indicative of this is the 1991 
coup. Apart from the reluctance to intervene because of the possible negative consequences, 
two key factors discouraged the belief that it was the military's duty to intervene to protect the 
national interest. First, personnel showed little willingness to undertake domestic duties 
regardless of their nature, and recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. 
Second, the 1993 revolt reinforced fears among personnel that intervention could have a 
negative impact. It also again illustrates the reluctance to intervene even when such an act 
could be associated with the national interest. 
94 With regard to Zyuganov see Marian Leighton, "Red Revenge: Zyuganov and the Resurgent Communists," 
Post Soviet Prospects IV, no.3, March 1996, available from http://www.csis.org/html/pspiv3.html, Internet, 
accessed 2 February 1999, p3 of 5. For information on Zhirinovsky see Zhilin, "The Race for the Military Vote 
Heats Up," p7. With regard to Lebed see Simonsen, "Going His Own Way," pp536-7. With regard to Gromov 
see The Sunday Times, 14 November 1993, n.p., quoted in Matthew Campbell, "Russia's Afghan Hero 
Challenges For The Top-General Boris Gromov," Reuters, 14 November 1993. 
95 For more on Grachev's attitude towards the 'near abroad' see John Lough, The Army Enters Politics, 14 July 
1992, available from gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/K12, Internet, accessed 13 March 1996, 
pp3-4 of 6. 
96 Ball and Gerber, Table 4, pl 68. 
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Some personnel claimed that it was their duty to intervene when the national interest was 
threatened. This is apparent during the 1991 coup. Prior to the coup, its leaders had expressed 
support for an intervention in the national interest. Varennikov supported the manifesto 
published in late July 1991 which said that "We are convinced the army and navy ... will 
prevent fratricidal war and the destruction of the Motherland."97 During the meeting of 
conspirators on the 1 ih of August, Pavlov summarised their feelings. He argued that "The 
situation is catastrophic. The country is facing famine. It is in total chaos." He then exclaimed 
that "The only hope is a state of emergency."98 During the coup these claims were repeated. 
Those who arrested Gorbachev claimed that the situation of the state had prompted their 
actions, and that as the state was "heading for catastrophe, steps must be taken, a state of 
emergency is needed--other measures won't save us." 99 These claims persisted after the 
coup's defeat. In 1994 Varennikov declared that he had sworn an oath of loyalty "to my 
Motherland." He believed that as Gorbachev threatened the national interest, a coup was 
necessary. He announced: "The Soviet criminal code describes high treason as an action 
aimed at undermining the Soviet state. We [the coup leaders] on the contrary tried to save the 
state from the attempts on it by the traitor [Gorbachev] who occupied the top." 100 
Claims that it was the military's duty to protect 'the national interest and that this might 
require intervention continued under the new regime. At the 1993 All-Services Officers' 
Assembly a resolution was adopted that "The country is ruined," and that the state's 
disastrous conditions meant that only the military could restore order. 101 Similarly, the Major 
caught attempting to assassinate Yeltsin that year claimed it was his "military and civil duty" 
to kill Yeltsin in the interests of the people. 102 The following year Gromov also defended the 
1991 coup, claiming that the coup leaders' actions were "in line with saving the Soviet Union 
from collapse." 103 Less dramatically, connotations of the manifest destiny and national 
interest are evident in an appeal aimed at "the armed defenders of the country" made by the 
Officers' Union in early 1995. This appeal claimed that the "erosion" of the state had reached 
a crisis point and that its conference sought to "unmask antinational forces which destroyed 
97 Lyons, "Soviet Hardliners." 
98 Remnick, Lenin 's Tomb, p450. 
99 Gorbachev, The August Coup, p20. 
100 The independent, 11 August 1994, plO, quoted in Helen Womack, "Russia's 'Man Of Integrity' Has No 
Regrets Over Coup Attempt," Reuters, 11 August 1994. 
101 Nasha Rossiya no.3 1993, n.p., quoted in Konovalov, p210. 
102 Schmemann, "Russian Major Caught." 
103 See Boulton, "Russian Official Defends General On Gorbachev Coup." 
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the USSR and are completing this process in Russia."104 Indeed Pavel Baev claimed that as 
the power of advisers and bodyguards increased, along with the greater unaccountability of 
bureaucrats and corruption, the prospect of a Russian coup increased. He believed that as this 
occurred "the greater are the incentives for the military leadership to remove it [the new 
regime], before a wide-ranging social explosion tears the country apart."105 
However, I seriously doubt whether a desire to protect the national interest would have 
motivated intervention. This is shown by the 1991 coup. Though leaders of the coup claimed 
that they were intervening in the national interest, and this might have influenced their 
decision, I have already argued that corporate and individual interests were the important 
motives. Apart from these, the coup leaders ignored warnings about the detrimental impact 
intervention could have. Prior to the coup Yeltsin had warned that a coup would aggravate 
economic, social, and political problems. 106 Even an MVD newspaper article had previously 
noted that coups could have a negative impact, and claimed that there were no "good" 
coups. 107 The coup leaders also knew that civilian anxiety would arise from a coup. This was 
apparent from the impact of the deployment of troops in Moscow during September 1990. 108 
The leaders also knew that intervention would be unlikely to reduce instability, given the 
military's problematic internal security role. 
Similarly, the objectives of the coup leaders cast doubt on the validity of their claims, at least 
when the national interest is equated with the interests of civilians. Their objectives included 
the banning of all parties except the Communist party. This was despite the party's failure to 
remedy the disastrous state of the economy and resultant hardships. 109 More specifically, 
despite the coup leaders claiming that they were intervening to avert an economic catastrophe, 
the economy was stable immediately prior to the attempt and there was some optimism over 
104 Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1648 gmt, 19 Febmary 1995, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 
February 1995, quoted in "Russian Officers' Assembly Warns Against "Barbaric Capitalism," Reuters, 22 
February 1995. 
105 Baev, p26. 
106 Boris Yeltsin, "Armiya-eto nashi deti," Syn otechestva no. 1 (January 1991): n.p., quoted in Tsypkin, "Will 
the Military," p52. · 
107 See Julia Wishnevsky, "Some Military Coups Are Better Than Others," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 
30 July 1991, accessed 16 March 1998. 
108 With regard to this impact see Brian Killen, "Soviet Troop Movements Raised Military Coup Fears," Reuters, 
15 September 1990. 
109 With regard to the goals of the coup leaders see Valery Rudnev, "Prosecutors Complete Coup Investigation," 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 44, no.32 (September 9 1992): pl 8, quoted in Milnor-Beard, pp2-3. 
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long-tenn economic prospects. 1I0 A document held by the coup leaders that examined how to 
act during a coup also casts doubt on the desire to solve the Soviet Union's economic 
problems. It stated that immediately after seizing power they should introduce economic 
measures without regard of "economic integrity, the inflation rate, or other consequences." I1I 
The coup leaders had also ordered the printing of 300,000 arrest forms, indicating that they 
threatened the individual interests of many1 112 Indeed some of the coup leaders acknowledged 
that their claims of acting in the national interest were inaccurate. Yazov, referring to the 
manifest destiny claims made at the meeting of conspirators on the 1 i 11 of August, 
acknowledged that "we had no real aim at all." II3 Moreover, Kryuchkov accepted that he had 
"inflicted great hmm on my Fatherland. "114 
To explain this lack of a manifest destiny it is first important to recognise that many personnel 
did not associate their service with the national interest, and disapproved of their domestic 
deployment regardless of its nature. Many personnel did not view their service in te1ms of 
serving the national interest, as is to be expected given their low morale and poor living 
conditions. In a 1993 survey of 'peacekeepers' in Tajikistan only 6 percent indicated that they 
were serving from a "Desire to Defend the Countries Of The CIS Against Penetration By 
Islamic Fundamentalism." This compares with 43 percent indicating that they did not wish to 
serve. 115 The following year, 35 percent of conscripts expressed a readiness to emigrate. I16 
Indeed Grachev exclaimed, "A concept such as the constitutional duty to defend the state that 
was sacred for many generations has in effect turned into an empty sound.'' 117 These attitudes 
were encouraged by the belief that such tasks denied the military training time. A retired 
General in1994 said that "If you want to reform the army, don't send soldiers to pick potatoes, 
build roads or repair buildings" but rather "Give them a real challenge like intensive combat 
training." 118 The following year a Red Star Correspondent wrote, "Can one train a soldier to 
fight well if his "personal weapon" is a spade and the training area is the field of the nearest 
110 See Moscow Home Service, 14 August 1991, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, n.d., quoted in "Economic 
Situation Unaltered In July," Reuters, 16 August 1991; and "Britain's Lamont Optimistic At Soviet Economic 
Prospects," Reuters, 12 August 1991. 
111 Rernnick, Lenin's Tomb, p464. 
112 Ibid., p453. 
113 Ibid., p459. 
114 Robert Eksuzyan, "Russian Coup Leaders Defend Actions Four Years On," Reuters, 20 August 1995. 
115 Armiya, no.8, 1994, n.p., quoted in Orr, The Russian Army And Peacekeeping, p7. 
116 "Obshchestvo bolno bezdukhovnoctyu. Luchsee sredstvo ot etogo-patriotizm," KZ, 12 April 1994, n.p., 
quoted in Herspring, "The Russian Military: Three Years On," pl 74. 
117 Waters, The New Russian Army, p2. 
118 Deborah Seward, "Russia's Army Fights An Internal Battle Despite Political Influence, Forces Lack Money, 
Might," The Salt Lake Tribune, 3 July 1994, pA8. 
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collective farm?" 119 Likewise, officers were even reluctant to undertake domestic tasks that 
could have been associated with the national interest. In the Ball survey 88 percent of officers 
disapproved of their use in public works important to the national economy. This disapproval 
remained 27 percent even when the state faced a nuclear power-plant disaster (see table 28). 
More specifically, many officers recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. 
Lebed commented that "It would be stupid to try to push aside our economic problems by 
Table 28: The Opinion of Russian Officers on the Use of the Military 
Officers were asked "Do you approve or disapprove of Russia's armed forces being called 
upon to help with": 
1. Public works construction important to the national economy 
2. Railroad construction and maintenance 
3. Harvesting crops 
4. Fight organized crime 
5. Cleaning up oil spills 
6. Nuclear power-plant accident 
7. Natural disaster 
Question Number Disapprove Approve 
(percentage) 
1 88 12 
2 85 14 
3 82 17 
4 60 38 
5 52 46 
6 27 72 
7 3 97 
For information on the survey see Table 16. Source:·OMIR survey. Deborah Ball, Table 4, p206. Question 4 is 
from Table 3, p205. 
bringing in the tanks."120 Similarly, Mikhail Malei, Yeltsin's scientific adviser on the military-
119 Dick,A Bear, p7. 
120 ITAR-TASS (world service), Moscow, in Russian 1328 gmt, 26 September 1996, carried by BBC MS: 
FUSSR, 28 September 1998, quoted in "Lebed Rejects Possibility Of Military Coup," 28 September 1996. 
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industrial complex said that the complex did not want a coup because "There would be no 
winners." 121 
Finally, developments under the new regime reinforced fears among personnel that 
intervention would have a negative impact. The costs of intervention were shown by the 1993 
revolt and were recognised by personnel. For instance, Grachev commented after the revolt 
that civil war had been possible. 122 The revolt is also important because it was possible to 
perceive the violence as threatening the national interest, and even personnel with positive 
views of the military's role in society were reluctant to intervene. Indeed Grachev had only 
announced in May 1993 that Russia needed a military which "will unite and revive Russia and 
society like we need the air to breath." 123 
External actors 
I have found no evidence to suggest that the support of external actors for a coup would play 
an impmiant role in motivating intervention. It is likely that at least some external actors 
would welcome a coup and express suppmi for its leaders if they appeared to have more 
favourable policies. The presence of such actors is apparent from the support some expressed 
for the 1991 coup and 1993 revolt. However I believe that the military was not dependent or 
close enough to an external actor to have any discernible influence on it. The military's 
relationship with the US is particularly relevant. This is because the US had the capacity to 
play a decisive role in a coup, and it had been historically involved in the staging of foreign 
coups and been an adversary of the Soviet Union. I shall examine this after outlining whether 
Russia was vulnerable to a foreign-sponsored coup. I conclude however that the US is very 
unlikely to have played a decisive role. This is because of the American support of the new 
regime, and the probable reluctance of Russian personnel to support or oppose a coup because 
of the US stance. 
Overall, Russia was not a 'prime target' for a foreign-sponsored coup. The only factor that 
might have encouraged a foreign-sponsored coup was the new regime's tense relationship 
with external actors like Iraq. This, at least theoretically, made them potential supporters of a 
coup. However it was very unlikely that a foreign-sponsored coup would occur. This was 
121 Ralph Boulton, "Russia's Military Industry Seeks Its Own Way Out Of Disaster," Reuters, 28 January 1994. 
122 John Lepingwell, "Grachev On Elections," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 30 December 1993, accessed 
17 June 1998. 
123 Fatigarov and Stasovskiy, "Mobilize the Combat and Life Experience of Afghan Veterans." 
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because the new regime was not dependent on foreign military aid or protection, which meant 
that the military was not susceptible to foreign influence. The military was not dependent on 
foreign weapons as the Russian military-industrial complex employed 30 million people in 
1995. 124 The complex was able to produce a wide range of both conventional and nuclear 
weapons. Indeed Russia was one of the world's major suppliers of weapons, especially to the 
. Third vVorld. The military also was able to independently assess security threats, and was 
self-sufficient in terms of training and repair facilities. Moreover personnel, at least from the 
hierarchy, doubted the ability of foreigners to understand the military. Grachev responded to 
the Friedrich Ebert survey by stating that "the foreigners, the Germans, who carried out the 
survey must not be believed 100 percent." 125 
Russia did not have the characteristics of those states most prone to coups involving external 
actors. First, I do not believe that Russian society during this period can be accurately 
described as "relatively simple" with a "minimum of meaningful political participation and a 
maximum of political instability," as should become evident when I examine whether the 
military had the opp01iunity to intervene. 126 Second, the new regime realigned itself with 
other states despite the military's sympathy for its traditional allies. This was a potential coup 
grievance and theoretically could have made the military susceptible to the influence of actors 
'out of favour.' However a coup was extremely unlikely given the militaiy's self-sufficiency 
restricted the influence of external actors. Third, Russia was not involved in a war with an 
external actor that might have encouraged intervention on the grounds this would be more 
cost-effective than an invasion. Finally, Russia cannot be accurately classified as a state 
seeking to distance itself from a ·major power able and willing to support a coup. 
The most important external actor, the US, is very unlikely to have played a pivotal role in the 
staging of a coup. There were accusations that the US would support a coup. Kiyuchkov 
claimed before the 1991 coup that CIA agents were plotting a coup so that the democrats 
could seize power. 127 Such claims persisted under Yeltsin. In November 1994, Zhirinovsky 
claimed that "Western special services," sought to stage a "pseudo-coup" led by Lebed and 
124 Interfax, 7 July 1995, quoted in "Military Industrial Complex In Trouble," Jamestown Monitor 1, no.48, 10 
July 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/048_018.htm, Internet, accessed 15 
September 1998. 
125 Socor, "Military Opinion Survey." 
126 David, Third World Coups d' Etat and International Security, pl 45. 
127 See Yeltsin, The View, p55. 
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Gromov to establish a "liberal dictatorship."128 Politicians like Zyuganov promoted anti-
Westem conspiracy theories too. 129 However it is very unlikely that the US would have 
sought or been able to inspire a coup. The US opposed the 1991 coup and the 1993 revolt. 130 
This stance conesponded with the US goal of fostering democracy in the Soviet Union and 
Russia. 131 Nor is it likely that the US would have played a major role in shaping the Russian 
military's stance on a coup. The 1991 coup leaders held strong anti-Western views. 132 
Similarly, potential coup leaders under Yeltsin were at least suspicious of the US. 133 Despite 
the decline of anti-West attitudes, distrust among personnel remained too. In survey findings 
published in 1995, 32 percent of officers believed that the US was an enemy. 134 Civilians 
were unlikely to support a US-sponsored coup either. This is important because of the 
militaiy's reluctance to use violence against civilians. In a 1995 survey, 46 percent of 
civilians believed that the US had a completely or somewhat negative influence on Russia. 135 
Apart from the US, some external actors might actually have supported a coup but would 
have had minimal influence. Although the 1991 coup was widely condemned some actors 
supported it. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Libyan leader Colonel Moamer al-Gaddafi 
both welcomed the coup. 136 The Palestinian Liberation Am1y also supported the coup. 137 Such 
support was encouraged by Gorbachev's foreign policies, as they realigned the Soviet Union 
128 Interfax 12 November 1994, quoted in Vladimir Socor, "Foreign Plot With Domestic Accomplices Seen," 
RFE/Rl Daily Report NSS, Internet, 14 November 1994, accessed 23 July 1998. . 
129 See Evguenii Volk, "Who Are You, Comrade Zyuganov?" F.Y.f. no.108, The Heritage Foundation, 6 June 
1996, available from http://www.cpac.org/heritage/1ibrary/categories/forpol/fyil08.htm1, Internet, accessed 13 
June 1998, p4 of 8. 
130 With regard to the 1991 coup see Yeltsin, The View, pp92-3. With regard to the 1993 revolt see Suzanne 
Crow, "West Supports Use Of Force By Yeltsin," RFE/Rl Daily Report NSS, Internet, 4 October 1993, accessed 
15 July 1998; and Yeltsin, The View, p280. 
DI With regard to the US objectives as they related to the Russian military see McCarthy, pp761-5. 
132 With regard to the views of the coup leaders on the West see The Independent, 28 August 1991, p2, quoted in 
Peter Pringle, "Nuclear Conh·ol-Coup Leaders 'Gave Orders For Arn1s Tests To Warn West," Reuters, 28 
August 1991; and Den' no.9., n.d., n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "Military Officials Cry Betrayal," RFE/Rl 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 11 June 1991, accessed 15 September 1998. For Yazov's views of the US after the 
coup see The Times, 12 February 1992, n.p., quoted in Brnce Clark and Igor Baranovsky, "Coup Plotters Offer 
Verse And Vitriol," Reuters, 12 Febrnary 1992. 
133 With regard to Zhirinovsky see The Financial Times, 14 December 1993, p2, quoted in "The Russian 
Elections-How The Maverick Put His Case," Reuters, 14 December 1993; Rutskoi, see "Rutskoi Says Clinton 
Stance Disappointed Him," Reuters, 22 September 1993; Zyuganov, see Volk, pp4, 6; Lebed, see Lambeth, 
"Aleksandr I. Lebed," pp550-4; and Gromov, see The Sunday Times, 20 March 1994, n.p., quoted in Matthew 
Campbell, "Russian Defence Chiefs Blast NATO Partnership," Reuters, 20 March 1994, n.p. 
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135 US News and World Report press release, 28 April 1995, quoted in "Russians See US as a "Negative" 
Influence on Russia," Jamestown Monitor 1, no.3, 3 May 1995, available from 
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with the \Vest. Similarly, Iraq hoped that the 1993 revolt would succeed. 138 However these 
actors did not have the power to have a decisive role, nor was the military dependent on them. 
In summary, secondary factors are unlikely to have motivated intervention. Sectional interests 
derived from class, regional or ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to overcome the 
reluctance of personnel to intervene. Although some personnel believed that it was the 
military's manifest destiny to intervene in the national interest, their number was small and 
their claims questionable. Finally, the Russian military was not susceptible to external actors. 
Mixed motives 
The above work indicates that a mixture of potential coup motives was present during this 
period. This is to be expected given the size of the Russian military and the dramatic nature of 
the regime transition. Indicative of this is the 1991 coup. Here various motives, such as those 
derived from corporate and individual interests, encouraged intervention. Similarly, I have 
argued that these interests were violated by the new regime, and therefore remained potential 
coup grievances. I ultimately believe that a mixture of motives was present under the new 
regime, but this mixture was not strong enough to provide the disposition to stage a coup. 
Conclusions 
This chapter argues that personnel held potential coup grievances, but that the military did not 
have a strong interventionist disposition. I have reached this conclusion after assessing 
whether strong coup motives arose from the primary and secondary factors. The primary 
factors are grievances derived from the violation of corporate and individual self-interests that 
I argued in my theoretical framework are often influential. More specifically, grievances 
derived from violations of the military's autonomy, the presence of functional rivals, changes 
to the level of budgetary support, and individual grievances were examined. I then examined 
the less influential 'secondary' factors. Here class and particularistic interests, the manifest 
destiny and national interest, and external actors were examined. Finally, I briefly assessed 
the presence of 'mixed motives.' 
137 See The Times, 21 August 1991, n.p., quoted in Richard Beeston, "PLO Enthuses As 'Friend Oflsrael' Falls 
From Power In Soviet Coup," Reuters, 21 August 1991. 
138 "Iraq Says "Russia's Saddam" Will Take Over," Reuters, 2 October 1993. 
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With regard to the primary factors, violations of the military's corporate interests occurred. 
The military's autonomy increased in some areas but remained restricted in others, 
encouraging resentment over the perceived interference in internal military matters. 
Therefore, Russia is not a clear case of the military's autonomy either increasing or 
decreasing with the transition but one where its impact varied. This casts doubt on not only 
the argument that a key factor behind the military's political quiescence was its greater 
autonomy, but also whether the violation of autonomy was serious enough to motivate 
intervention. Similarly, the military's monopoly was threatened by the growth of numerous 
armed forces not under the Ministry of Defence's jurisdiction. Although the new regime did 
not attempt to replace the militaiy, the growth of such forces became a potential coup 
g1ievance. The expansion of non-Ministry of Defence forces stretched resources, deprived the 
military of resources, and led to conflict as the Ministry attempted to win control over these 
forces. It is also clear that the fall of budgetary supp01i in real tenns caused grievances 
derived from the fall in service conditions. 
Apart from corporate interests, individual interests were violated. This violation is closely 
related to the military's corporate interests, given violations hete impacted on the individual 
interests of personnel. The most direct threat to the individual interests of rank-and-file 
personnel was their deployment in combat without adequate preparation, thereby threatening 
their lives. Nevertheless, the new regime actively sought to limit grievances among senior 
officers through the use of positive incentives, particularly when their continued service and 
loyalty were deemed vital. This fa shown by the continued service, and indeed promotion, of 
officers whose positions meant that they had much firepower under their control, were 
strategically placed, or who enjoyed much support among personnel. Therefore, individual 
grievances were less likely to have been held among an elite few. Accompanying such moves 
were those of a negative type. These were aimed at undermining the positions of dissident 
Generals through reducing their support anq thereby discouraging insubordination. However 
negative incentives should not be over-emphasised, given the new regime's reluctance to act 
against popular officers and the minimal punishments often handed out. 
Turning to the secondary factors, the class interest was not a major coup motive. Although the 
class origins of personnel could differ from those of civilian officials, these did not play a 
major role in dete1mining their actions and attitudes. Nor did the class position of personnel in 
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monetary terms have a decisive impact on their actions or attitudes, as shown by their support 
of politicians regardless of their financial position. As with the class interest, loyalties derived 
from regional or ethnic affiliations were not strong enough to have an important role in 
motivating a coup. With regard to regional interests, the attachment of personnel to the 
regions where they were serving did increase. However, this attachment was not strong 
enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. This is shown by the reluctance of personnel 
to unite behind an opponent of the new regime, despite their service in the same region. 
Second, the ability of those personnel stationed in a particular region to address a regional 
grievance via a coup was doubtful, given the size and diversity of Russia made it very 
difficult to unite the military. Neither do I believe that an ethnic interest would motivate 
personnel to intervene. The perceived violation of the interests of the ethnic group most 
closely associated with the military was unlikely. This is because the military and new regime 
shared the same ethnicity and had similar opinions on the key issue of ethnicity: Russians in 
the 'near abroad.' 
Likewise, although some persom1el claimed that the manifest destiny of the military was to 
protect the national interest of Russia, this perception was not widely held by personnel and 
was very unlikely to motivate intervention. Although some personnel claimed that the military 
had the duty to intervene and protect the national interest, their claims were very questionable. 
Under the new regime, three factors played an important role in discouraging the perception. 
First, personnel showed little willingness to undertake domestic duties regardless of their 
nature. Second, they recognised that a coup would not solve Russia's problems. Third, the 
1993 revolt reinforced fears amo"ng personnel that intervention could have a negative impact. 
Finally, external actors would not have played an important role in motivating intervention. 
Though it is likely that some external actors would have supported a coup, the Russian 
militaty was not dependent or close enough to any external actor for it to have a discernible 
influence. The stance of the US is particul~rly important given its historic support of coups 
and its power. However., the US was very unlikely to have played a decisive role. This is 
because it was both very unlikely to support a coup, and Russians were very unlikely to abide 
by US wishes. 
This chapter then indicates that a mixture of potential coup motives was present, but this 
mixture was not strong enough to provide a strong interventionist disposition. Hypothesis 
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two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary, 
is valid as various factors did impact on the military's disposition. These factors were 
corporate, individual, class, and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national 
interest, and external actors. With regard to hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, 
disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, the transition did impact upon factors that shaped 
the military's disposition to intervene. The transition impacted upon both primary and 
secondary coup factors. However, primary factors were not violated drastically enough to 
motivate intervention. Nor would secondary factors and an external actor have played a major 
role in motivating intervention. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive 
as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall 
did not encourage a coup. Although it did encourage discontent, this was not strong enough to 
overcome the reluctance to intervene. Therefore, the validity of this hypothesis is 
questionable. 
The following chapter examines whether the Russian militaiy had the opportunity to intervene 
from 1992 to 1996 within the context of the level of regime attachment. I shall examine the 
level of public support for the new regime and how strong private associations were. This 
examination is undertaken within the context of the case study. I thus initially outline the level 
of attachment before the transition and then the impact of the transition. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S POLITICAL QUIESCENCE, 1992-1996 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE 
This chapter examines the level of civilian dependence on the military to assess whether the 
military had an opportunity to intervene. This opportunity was critical, as military personnel 
were very reluctant to risk civilian casualties. Although instability does not necessarily equate 
with the staging of a coup, the level of civilian dependence on the military influences the ease 
with which the military can seize power as the military's power grows relative to the regime. 
The domestic situation from 1985 to 1991 is first outlined to determine how the transition 
impacted on the situation and whether there was an "overt crisis," a "latent crisis," or a 
"power vacuum." I shall then assess the domestic situation from 1992 to 1996 to determine 
the level of civilian dependence. The opportunity to intervene under both Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin is studied separately because it differed significantly under the two leaders. 
Comparisons of civilian and military attitudes are made throughout this chapter to ascertain if 
their level ofregime attachment differed. Similarly, comparisons are made with other states to 
put the situation and level of regime attachment into perspective. 
'• 
After assessing the domestic situation under Gorbachev and then Yeltsin I shall attempt to 
explain the situation by examining the level of regime attachment. This is through using the 
questions Finer posed during his study of "political culture." First, "Does there exist a wide 
public approval of the procedures for transferring power, and a corresponding belief that no 
exercise of power in breach of these procedures is legitimate?" Second, "Does there exist a 
wide public recognition as to who or what constitutes the sovereign authority, and a 
corresponding belief that no other persons or centre of power is legitimate or duty-worthy?" 
Third, "Is the public proportionately large and well-mobilized into private associations? i.e. 
do we find cohesive churches, industrial associations and firms, labour unions, and political 
parties?" 1 These groups are examined separately because their size and capacity to mobilise 
people varied. Political parties require particular attention because of their close association 
with the new regime. Finally, for each group I shall assess their possible reaction to a coup, as 
1 Finer, pp87-8. 
302 
their strength would not hinder an intervention if they were willing to support one. Thus, the 
depth of commitment to the regime is often most impmiant. 
This chapter again examines hypothesis two, three, and four. I have already argued that 
hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the 
military, is valid. With regard to hypothesis two and three, I have already examined their 
validity with regard to the capacity and disposition to intervene. I concluded that the military 
had neither the capacity nor the strong disposition to intervene. In this chapter I examine the 
validity of hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their 
importance can vary, and hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to stage a coup. These hypotheses are examined according to the factors that 
influence whether the military has the opportunity to intervene. Hence the level of regime 
attachment, the level of civilian dependence on the military, the domestic situation, and the 
military's popularity are assessed. Similarly, hypothesis four, a transition can be coup 
conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, is also 
examined within the context of the opportunity. Thus, I evaluate the impact of the transition 
on the opp01iunity and whether this would have facilitated a coup. 
Civilian Dependence on the Military and the Domestic Situation: 1985-1991 
Civilian dependence on the military increased during the transition. This increase occurred 
primarily because of the domestic situation as first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin became more 
dependent on the military to ensure internal security. Under Gorbachev, I believe that 
characteristics of an "overt crisis" arose. According to Finer, an "overt crisis" entails a: 
fragmentation of opinion into mutually hostile political movements of such pugnacity 
and power that the government is deprived of any coherent body of popular support, and 
to survive at all must tum to relying on overwhelming force: and this means relying on 
the anned forces. 
2 . 
I believe that the Communist regime faced opposition that was, in Finer's terms, "willing and 
able to use violence," and during 1991 the regime's power was "equally matched" and then 
surpassed as republics renounced both Communism and the Soviet Union. 3 The military 
2 Ibid., p77. 
3 Ibid., p75. 
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withdrawal of support from Gorbachev in December 1991 also encouraged both his fall and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Under Gorbachev the military's domestic security role increased because of the domestic 
situation. The Soviet Union was not involved in a major war after its withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in early 1989, but domestic upheaval forced the regime to deploy the military. 
Though open discontent had been rare before Gorbachev, in August 1989, 2 million people in 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia protested together against Soviet rule. From January to March 
1991 alone, over l million demonstrated in Moscow.4 Likewise, whereas strikes were rare 
before 1985, half a million people participated in strikes at some 2,000 enterprises in 1991.5 
Bloody clashes occuned in the republics as their demands for independence grew. By 1991, 
of the 23 borders between the republics, only 3 were not contested and there were 75 border 
disputes.6 To put this in perspective, the combined population of the 14 republics that 
increasingly demanded independence and broke away was over 139 million, much larger than 
the populations of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.7 Demonstrations also grew, 
with a resultant increase in the loss of life. Whereas 24 died in Novocherkassk during 1962, 
apparently the bloodiest action by troops against Soviet demonstrators from 1953 to 1985, in 
three incidents alone from April 1989 to January 1991, 300 people were killed. 8 Indeed a 
February 1992 survey of Russians found that 70 percent believed "almost all" or "the 
majority" of people around them had "an irritable, malevolent or even hostile attitude to each 
other."9 It was in this context that the military hierarchy's confidence in Gorbachev fell and it 
turned to Yeltsin and the CIS, making Gorbachev's position untenable. By December 1991 
relations between Gorbachev ·and the military hierarchy were so poor that Shaposhnikov 
responded to Gorbachev' s queries about talks between the republics and Yeltsin on a unified 
4 Zvi Gitelman, "Nationality and Ethnicity in Russia and the Post-Soviet Republics," quoted in Developments In 
Russian And Post-Soviet Politics, third edition, ed. Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), p242; and Sakwa, Appendix 1, pp380- l. 
5 Keith Bush, "The Disastrous Last Year of the USSR," RFEIRL Research Report 1, no.12, 20 March 1992, 
p4I. • 
6 George Church, "Into The Void," Time, 138, no.36, 9 September 1991, p22. 
7 SSR v tsifrakh v /989 god11 (Moscow: Fimansy i statistika, 1990), pp36, 38; and USSR: Facts and Figures 
Annual ed. Alan Pollard vol 15 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991 ), p504, both quoted in 
Sakwa, Table 1, pl 9. This figure is the 1989 population of the republics. 
8 Elizabeth Teague, "Novocherkassk Anniversary," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 29 May 1992, 
accessed 31 August 1998; and Barylski, The Soldier, p61. 
9 Mir mnenu11 i mneniya o mire no.6 (1992), n.p., quoted in Matthew Wyman, "Russian Political Culture: 
Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys," Journal of Communist Studies 10, no.l (March 1994): Table 31, p52. 
The survey interviewed 1,985 Russians. 
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military by informing him that he was tired of Gorbachev's indecisive leadership, and that 
Yeltsin could provide better leadership. 10 
Discontent was encouraged by a lack of regime attachment, as democracy became a viable 
alternative to Communism. Support for competitive elections was strong under Gorbachev. In 
December 1989, 87 percent of survey respondents throughout the Soviet Union believed that 
elections should involve several candidates. 11 The following year, 61.9 percent of Russians 
agreed that "competition between the Communist party and other parties will improve the 
way authorities work in the Soviet Union." 12 That year only 6 percent of Muscovites in 
another survey said that the Communist party should be able to govern without elections. 13 
This support for democracy translated into the high voting turnout of registered voters during 
the 1991 Russian presidential elections. In Russia over 77.5 percent of eligible voters 
registered to vote, and 74.7 percent of registered voters voted. 14 This is comparable to the 
1992 American presidential elections. In the US, 70.8 percent of eligible voters registered to 
vote and 78 percent of registered voters voted. 15 Moreover in May 1991, 51 percent of 
Russians compared to 64 percent of Americans believed that a democratic form of 
government should be relied on to solve the country's problems rather than a leader with a 
"strong hand." 16 More specifically, growing doubts· over the military appear to have reduced 
support for militaiy rule. From December 1989 to October 1991 the percentage of survey 
respondents who expressed no confidence in the military increased from 14 percent to 36 
percent. 17 In contrast, the percentage of Americans with a "great deal" or "a lot" of confidence 
10 Evgeny Shaposhnikov, Vybor: Zapiski glavkomanduyushchego (Moscow: Nezavisimoe Izdatel'stvo, 1993), 
pp127-8, quoted inBarylski, The Soldier, pl 62. 
11 Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifi·akh, no.7 (1990): n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 5, p41. The survey 
interviewed 2,096 people. 
12 James Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent 
Russian and Ukrainian Democracies," in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia, The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 7 ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, New York, London, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995), Table 3.1, p68. 
13 Kent Tedin, "Popular Support For Competitive Elections In The Soviet Union," Comparative Political 
Studies 27, no.2 (July 1994): Table 1, p249. 
14 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR," Izvestiya, 20 June 1991, 
n.p.; Pravda, 20 June 1991, n.p. both quoted in Sakwa, Appendix 2.3, p390; and The Milita,y Balance 1992-
1993, p92. 
15 Richard Scammon and Alice McGillivray, America Votes 20 (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 
1993), n.p., quoted in Congressional Quarterly Inc. Congressional Quarterly 's Guide to US Elections, third 
edition (Washington DC; Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), p421. 
16 The Pulse of Europe: A Survey of Political and Social Values and Attitudes (Washington DC: Times Mirror 
Centre for the People and the Press, 1991), n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43. 
17 · · Moscow News, no no. March 1989, n.p.; Moscow New no no. August 1989, n.p.; Moscow News no no. 
December 1989, n.p.; Moscow News no no. March 1990, n.p.; Moscow News, no no. 3-10 June,. n.p.; Izvestiia, 
July 1990, n.p.; Izvestiia, 29 November 1990, n.p.; Nezavisimaia gazeta, October 1990, n.p.; Nezavisimaia 
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in the US military increased from 63 percent in 1989, to 69 percent in October 1991. 18 It was 
against this background that a 1990 survey of the Moscow oblast found that supporters of 
cancelling elections and introducing military dictatorship were one of the most disliked 
groups among Muscovites. 19 
The 1991 coup and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union illustrate the influence of the 
democratic alternative. Support for democracy relative to Communism is illustrated by the 
reluctance to support the coup where Communist leaders sought to re-introduce the one-party 
system. As with military personnel, most civilians did not actively support the coup. 
Throughout the Soviet Union 62 percent believed that the coup was illegal, and in Moscow 
the figure was 73 percent.20 A 1992 survey found that only 1.5 percent of people participated 
in pro-coup demonstrations in the former Soviet Union and O percent in Moscow. However, 
2.3 percent participated in anti-coup demonstrations nationwide and 7.5 percent in Moscow 
(see table 29). The survey also found that opposition was encouraged by support for 
democratic institutions and processes, particularly outside Leningrad and Moscow. 21 
Moves by republics to challenge the Communist regime's authority were encouraged by the 
view that democracy provided a viable alternative. -This is shown by the greater support for 
democracy, relative to Russia, in republics that actively sought to win independence after 
years of subjection under Communism. In Lithuania, the republic that declared its 
independence in March 1990 and where 13 were killed by Soviet troops during nationalist 
demonstrations in January 1991, support for democracy was high, relative to Russia. Support 
for rapid political reform in Lithuania averaged 80.5 percent from 1990 to 1991, compared to 
43 percent in Russia. 22 More specifically, in mid-1990, 55 .0 percent of Lithuanians supported 
gazeta, December 1990, n,p.; and Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 January 1991, n.p., all quoted in White, Gill, and 
Slider, Table 10.1, pl 86. 
18 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 
1996), p70. 
19 James Gibson and Raymond Duch, "Political Intolerance In The USSR," Comparative Political Studies 26, 
no.3 (October 1993): Table 1, p299. 
20 VTsIOM, Data Express, 21 August 1991, p2, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, pl 7. 
21 Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic 
Values in the Former Soviet Union," APSR 91, no,3 (September 1997): Tables 2 and 3, pp678, 680. 
22 Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger, "Reassessing Mass Support For Political And Economic 
Change In The Former USSR," APSR 88, no.2 (June 1994): Table 4, p406. 
Table 29: Protest Behaviour During the 1991 Coup 
Respondents were asked whether during the coup did they-
1. Participate in demonstrations 4. Express views to political officials 
2. Stay away from work 5. Express views to the mass media 
3. Sign a petition 6. Distribute leaflets and letters 
Activity Former USSR Moscow Leningrad Former USSR outside 
Pro-coup Anti-coup Pro Anti Pro Anti Moscow and Leningrad 
Pro Anti 
1 1.5 ·2.3 0.0 7.5 1.7 8.5 1.5 1.9 
2 1.1 2.1 4.3 9.6 1.7 7.1 1.1 1.6 
3 2.0 3.8 4.3 6.4 1.7 10.0 2.0 3.5 
4 2.8 3.7 2.3 8.2 6.8 5.6 2.8 3.4 
5 .9 1.3 2.1 .9 1.7 2.7 .8 1.3 
6 .3 1.2 2.1 2.8 1.7 2.7 .2 1.0 
This survey was conducted from February to March 1992 and is representative of the entire territory of the former USSR, as constituted in late 1991, except the Baltics. 
The survey involved 4,309 respondents. Source: Gibson, " Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991, American Political Science Review 91 no.3 
(September 1997): Table 1, p67. 
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multiple political parties compared to 52.5 percent of Russians. 23 Furthermore, in other 
rebellious republics like Georgia and Estonia, support for competitive elections was higher 
than in the Soviet Union overall. 24 The apparent role that this support for democracy had in 
encouraging discontent contrasts the support of Communism and the Soviet Union among the 
1991 coup leaders who sought to return power to the Communist party. 
Apart from the emergence of a viable alternative, public recognition of the Communist party's 
authority fell, and people were increasingly willing to challenge the belief that no other person 
or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy. This decline is most generally shown by an 
increasing awareness that seeking redress from the party achieved little. Whereas from 1976 
to 1981 the Central Committee received 3 million letters, by 1990 only 13,288 arrived. 25 Nor 
did a growing number of people feel the need to publicly support the party. This is illustrated 
by the fall in Communist party membership from 18.1 million in 1984 to some 15 million in 
August 1991.26 This represents a 17.1 percent fall where membership among officers fell 8 
percent from 1985 to July 1991.27 Thus, civilian affiliations to the Communist party appear to 
have fallen more severely than among officers. This is to be expected given the indoctrination 
of personnel and the traditionally high level of support officers received from the party. 
More specifically, the decline of the party's authority is shown in Russia by the move toward 
another centre of power, namely Yeltsin. Yeltsin left the Communist party in July 1990, and 
in March 1991 led a demonstration of 300,000 where he called for a "declaration of war 
against the Soviet leadership." Later that month he led another demonstration of 200,000 that 
encouraged Gorbachev to deploy troops in Moscow. 28 Such challenges to the party's 
authority were inconceivable before 1985, as people would have feared the negative 
repercussions of directly challenging the party. Yeltsin was then elected President of Russia in 
June 1991. This indicates that many civilians and military personnel shared similar opinions 
23 Arthur Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," in Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics 
of Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Arthur Miller, William Reisinger and Vicki Hesli, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), Table 5.1, pl 01. The survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians. 
24 Obshchestvennoe 1/lllenie v tsifrakh, no.7 (1990): n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 5, p41. 
25 XXV!! s" ezd Kolllllll/11isticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet, vol. I (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1986), p124; fzvestiia TsK KPSS, no.9, 1990, p31; Izvestiia TsK KPSS, no.9, 1990, p32; and fzvestiia 
TsK KPSS, no.7, 1991, p88, all quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, p201. 
26 Ian Derbyshire, Politics In The Soviet Union Frolll Brezhnev To Gorbachev (Chambers Political Spotlights, 
Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd, 1987), p7; and Sakwa, pl 1. 
27 Barylski, "The Soviet Military before and after the August Coup," p28. 
28 Sakwa, Appendix 1, p381. 
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of Yeltsin, as many personnel voted for him.29 That month a survey also found that 53 percent 
of civilians favoured this type of direct election. However only 17 percent supported the 
March 1990 election of Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union by the Congress of 
People's Deputies. 30 It was within this context that Yeltsin undermined the Communist 
party's control in Russia, and played a leading role in defeating the 1991 coup leaders. Other 
sources of power developed to rival the Communist party too, as republics sought to establish 
their own governments. In December 1991, 90.3 percent of the people in the Ukraine, 97 
percent in the Trans-Dniester Moldavian republic, and 88 percent in the Gagauz republic 
voted for independence. 31 
Finally, domestic discontent was encouraged by the growmg disillusionment in the 
Communist paiiy. Survey figures published in 1975 indicated that 37 percent of Soviets were 
interested in extending their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. However, by 1992 only 15 
percent had a positive view of the ideology. 32 Gorbachev's attempts to revitalise the economy 
were unsuccessful and the economy performed poorly, as did many other East European 
economies. According to Soviet data, the average level of Soviet GNP growth peaked from 
1986 to 1991 at 2.5 percent before falling 17 percent in 1991.33 By 1991, 65 percent of survey 
respondents said that Soviet rnle entailed "shortages, queues and poverty," and for 28 percent 
it meant "powerlessness, constant insults and humiliation."34 The same year, when Russians 
were asked to rate their 'life as a whole" on a scale of one ( completely dissatisfied) to 7 
(completely satisfied), the mean was 3.70. Thus, nearly 50 percent were dissatisfied. 35 In 
1991, 12 percent of Americans had indicated that they were dissatisfied "with the way things 
29 The Guardian, 15 June 1991, n.p., quoted in Stephen Foye, "The Military Vote For Yeltsin," RFEIRL Daily 
Report NSS, Internet, 17 June 1991, accessed 18 March 1998. 
30 Yas' Valoshka, n.d., n.p., quoted in Kathy Mihalisko, "A President For, By, And Of The Apparat," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 11 June 1991, accessed 15 February 1999. 
31 Sakwa, Appendix 1, p383. 
32 Sotsiologicheskie problemy obshchestvennogo mne.niya I sredstv massovoi informatsii ed. V.S. Korobeinikov 
(Moscow: ISI AN SSR, 1975), pl 03, quoted in Stephen White, "Political Socialization in the USSR: A Study in 
Failure?" Studies in Comparative Communism X, no.3 (Autumn 1977): p336; and Irina Boeva and Viacheslav 
Shironin, Russians between State and Market (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1992), pp30-l, 
quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, Table 1.2, pl 9. 
33 Narodnoe klwzyaistvo SSR v 1985 godu (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1986); pp40, 420; SSR v tsifrakh v 
/990 godu (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p40; and Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic 
Statistics, 1991, (no place of publication: no publisher, no date), pp 62, 64, both quoted in Bush, "The 
Disastrous Last Year," p40. 
34 Argumenty ifakti, 1991, no.11, p6, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, pp14-5. 
35 David Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, "Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: 
Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin," Slavic Review 56, no.4 (winter 1997): Table 1, p702. 
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are going" in their personal life.36 Disillusionment was particularly high in republics where 
discontent was most violent. In 1990, 79.3 percent of Lithuanians said that they had a 
negative view of the Communist paiiy compared with 46.4 percent of Russians. 37 Similarly, 
only 3 .6 percent of Lithuanians in 1990 believed that government policies had helped the 
economy compared to 15 percent ofRussians.38 
In summary, I believe that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is most characteristic of an 
"overt crisis." This crisis arose because of widespread domestic discontent that included 
strong challenges to the Communist regime's authority and led to its fall. The lack of support 
for the Communist regime and the viable alternative provided by democracy were the primary 
factors behind this discontent. This domestic situation facilitated an increase in military 
influence and the 1991 coup. 
Civilian Dependence on the Military and the Domestic Situation: 1992-1996 
Under the new regime civilian dependence on the military remained. This is shown by the 
military's domestic security role. This role arose because of the domestic situation, as is 
illustrated by the new regime's dependence on the military during the parliamentary revolt 
and in Chechnya. As I have already described these in-depth I shall only outline them before 
examining the factors that contributed to the domestic situation. The lack of widespread 
support for democracy and dissatisfaction with developments under the new regime are most 
important here. I shall then argue that the level of discontent was not as serious as that under 
Gorbachev, the domestic situation thus more closely resembling a "latent" rather than "ove1i 
crisis." According to Finer, a "latent crisis" entails: 
A situation wherein a political or social minority rule in a way which the masses hate 
but which they are too weak to overthrow. Faced by a consensus of indifference or 
active hatred, often expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations, murders or jacqueries, 
the ruling oligarchy maintains itself by relying on the army, and, therefore, this (the 
army] becomes its master. 39 · 
36 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion I 99 I, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 
1992), p29. 
37 Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," Table 5.1, in Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, Public Opinion and 
Regime Change, pl 00. The survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians. 
38 John Willerton and Lee Sigelman, "Perestroika and the Public: Citizens' Views of the "Fruits" of Economic 
Reform," Table 9.1, quoted in Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, Public Opinion and Regime Change, p210. The 
survey interviewed 702 Russians and 466 Lithuanians. 
39 Finer, pp77-8. 
310 
The Russian case study had characteristics of a "latent crisis." This is because there were 
demonstrations and the new regime was dependent on the military in some instances, namely 
during the parliamentary revolt and the Chechnyan war. However I do not believe that Russia 
experienced an actual "latent crisis," as very few sought to overthrow the new regime and the 
military did not become the regime's "master." My argument that the domestic situation 
under the new regime cannot be accurately described as either an "overt" or "latent crisis" is 
suppmied by the comparisons I make to show that discontent in Russia often did not differ 
dramatically to other states. The lack of discontent serious enough to force the new regime to 
depend on the military is particularly important given personnel strongly opposed their 
domestic deployment. 
Domestic discontent continued to ensure that the new regime was dependent on the military. 
Under Yeltsin there was an "active hatred" of the regime as demonstrations did occur. For 
instance, the 1993 May Day protest in Moscow was particularly violent.40 Later that year the 
new regime was dependent on the military after protesters overwhelmed the police during the 
parliamentary revolt. Yeltsin acknowledged this dependence when he wrote that he had 
demanded the military act "to save Russia. "41 . Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence 
newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda reflected on the regime's dependence when it claimed that the 
military intervened, because "someone had to save people, the city and the state itself from 
chaos."42 Two General Staff officers also said afterwards that "At present no one doubts that 
it is the a1111y that controls the situation in the country," though I believe that this is an 
overstatement.43 The invasion of Chechnya also illustrates the dependence on the military, as 
the new regime was forced to rely on the military to force the republic back into the Russian 
Federation after other means had failed. Indeed in January 1995 Gaidar claimed that the 
likelihood of a coup had increased because "War in young, unstable democracies decreases 
the power of civil institutions and increases the power of military institutions."44 
40 See Serge Schmemann, "Foes Of Yeltsin Riot In Moscow; Dozens Injured," NYT Ondisc, 2 May 1993, 
Section 1, p 1. 
41 Yeltsin, The View, p287. 
42 The Independent, 8 October 1993, p12, quoted in Andrew Higgins, "Why The Guards Decided To Fall Into 
Line," Reuters, 8 October 1993. 
43 "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-93-221, 18 November 1993, p40, quoted in 
Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" p337. 
44 Sloane, "Yeltsin's Critic." 
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A lack of widespread regime attachment helps to explain this discontent, as support for 
democracy fell. This is especially relevant, as support for democracy was an important motive 
for opponents of the 1991 coup in Leningrad and Moscow.45 In September 1995 only 21 
percent of Russians indicated that they had a positive attitude of democracy.46 This was low 
compared to other countries. A survey of 17 states 5 months earlier found that on average 41. 7 
percent of people were satisfied with the "way democracy works in this country."47 Support 
for elections was also limited. A 1993 survey of 8 East European states and former Soviet 
republics (hereafter referred to as the 1993 regional survey) found that 40 percent of Russians 
believed that there was no point voting, whereas the average for all the countries was 25.9 
percent (see table 30). Voting also fell as 74.7 percent of registered voters voted in the 1991 
Russian presidential elections but the turnout at the following Duma and presidential elections 
averaged 64.5 percent.48 The 1993 regional survey found that 49 percent of Russians 
supported the "aim of introducing democracy in which parties compete for government." The 
average level of support for democracy for all the countries was 54.6 percent (see table 31). 
The following year, 43 percent agreed that "We do not need a Parliament and elections but a 
strong leader who can make decisions and put them into effect fast" compared to 40 percent 
who disagreed. 49 This indicates that support for democracy relative to authoritarianism was 
declining as disillusionment. In 1991, 51 percent of Russians had supported democracy rather 
than "a leader with a strong hand."50 Both civilian and military surveys undertaken during this 
period suggest that there was no significant difference between civilian and military attitudes 
to an alternative authoritarian regime. In 1994, 43 percent of civilians sought strong leadership 
over democracy, and in a 1995 survey, 37 percent had supported rnle by an "iron hand."51 
45 Gibson, "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991," Table 3, p680. 
46 OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in Russia Election Watch no.9, 1 October 1995, available 
from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/csia/sdi/Compendium/watch09.html, Internet, accessed 7 February 1999, p7 
of 9. 
47 Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995, p96. The countries surveyed were: Canada, the US, Iceland, 
Germany, Costa Rica, Thailand, Chile, France, Taiwan, Japan, Domican Republic, Spain, United Kingdom, 
India, Venezuela, Hungary, and Mexico. . 
48 'Soobshchenie tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi Komissii po vyboram Prezidenta RSFSR,' Izvestiya, 20 June 1991, 
n.p.; Pravda, 20 June 1991, n.p.; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 December 1993, pl; Byulleten' Tsentral'noi 
izbiratel.noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1, no.12, 1994, p67; OMRI Daily Digest no.249 Part 1, 27 
December 1995, n.p.; OMRI Daily Digest no.1 Part 1, 2 January 1996, n.p., ITAR-TASS, 22 December 1995; 
Moscow News no.51, 29 December 1995, p2; and Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 June 1996, n.p., all quoted in Sakwa, 
Appendix 2.3-2.7, pp390-3. With regard to the second round of the 1996 elections see Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, 
p393. 
49 Richard Rose, "Getting By Without Government: Everyday Life in Russia," Daedalus 123, no.3 (Summer 
1994): p57. 
50 The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43. 
51 OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in Russia Election Watch no.9, 1 October 1995, p7. 
Table 30: Attitudes of Voting in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993 
Survey participants were asked whether "there is no point voting because the government 
can't make any difference." 
Country Agree with statement Disagree 
(percentage) 
Bulgaria 20 49 
Estonia 27 39 
Hungary 16 58 
Lithuania 22 39 
Poland 30 43 
Romania 12 76 
Russia 40 33 
Ukraine 40 23 
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This survey was undertaken in the Summer of 1993, except in Hungary where the survey was carTied out in early 
1994. In Bulgaria 1932 were interviewed, in Estonia 2,285, Hungary 1,314, Lithuania, 2,000, Poland, 1,729, 
Romania, 1,621, Russia, 2,030, and the Ukraine, 2,537. Source: Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "The 
Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," British 
Journal of Political Science, 25, (October 1995): Table 4, p497. 
Table 31: Attitudes of democracy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and fo1mer Soviet republics 
1993 
Survey participants were asked, "How do you feel about the aim of introducing democracy in 
[the respondent's country], in which parties compete for government? Are you a ... strong 
supporter, suppmier, opponent, strong opponent, neither supporter nor opponent?" 
Country Number of Support Oppose 
respondents (percentage) 
Bulgaria 1,924 56 21 
Estonia 2,029 51 16 
Hungary 1,310 54 13 
Lithuania 2,000 57 18 
Poland 1,729 49 12 
Romania 1,620 81 10 
Russia 2,026 49 21 
Ulaaine 2,537 40 20 
For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 1, p489. 
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With regard to the military, in the 1995 Ball survey 36.9 percent of officers (though only 8.3 
percent fully) agreed that "An 'iron hand' is needed to restore order in our country-not 
democracy" (see table 18).52 This is not a significant difference and concurs with my 
arguments that civilian and military opinions did not differ greatly, and that most personnel 
and civilians sought strong leadership but within the democratic framework. 
Support for democratic freedoms was limited too. In a 1992 survey, 51.4 percent of Russians 
believed that it was very important to protect the freedom of speech, 26.2 percent the freedom 
of association, and 64.4 percent the freedom of information. 53 This support was low relative to 
other countries. A 1988 survey of the European community found that on average 78.4 
percent said that the freedom of speech should always be protected, 64.9 percent the freedom 
of association, and 85 .1 percent the freedom of information. 54 Comparing the civilian attitudes 
to military attitudes, 15.4 percent of officers in the Ball survey believed that the freedom of 
the press to criticise the government was "fully useful," and another 11.9 percent believed that 
the citizen's freedom to criticise the government was "fully useful." On average, 19.2 percent 
of officers from 1992 to 1996 also believed that it was permissible to use the media to protect 
their rights and interests (see table 10). The figures suggest that civilians were more widely in 
favour of the freedom of speech and information relative to officers. This difference is 
perhaps indicative of resentment at the critical coverage the military received after 1985. 
However most officers believed that these rights were "fully useful" or "somewhat useful." 
Thus, the majority of both civilians and officers supported the freedom (see table 19). 
Similarly, it is apparent that ·public recognition of the new regime's authority, and a 
corresponding belief that no other person or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy, 
was limited among some. In March 1992, 43 percent opposed the strengthening of the 
President's powers at the expense of "representative organs at all levels." 55 The willingness 
of people to support the parliamentary revolt also indicates some did not recognise the new 
regime's authority. The 1993 revolt threate~1ed the new regime's authority and represented a 
competing centre of power, as Khasbulatov advocated a new form of Soviet power. 
52 Ball and Gerber, Table 2, pl 64. With regard to military and civilian political opinions see chapter 5, p246. 
53 Gibson, "The Reliance of Mass Support," Table 3.2, pp72, 74. These figures relate to Russian panel 
respondents. 
54 James Gibson, Raymond Duch, and Kent Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet 
Union," Journal of Politics 54, no.2 (May 1992): Table 5, p346. The countries surveyed were France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal. 
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Chechnyan rebels posed another challenge to the new regime's authority by supporting an 
independent government under Dudayev. 
This lack of a widespread regime attachment was encouraged by disillusionment in the new 
regime, which was high relative to other states. The 1993 regional survey found that 21 
percent of Russians believed that the government acted for the benefit of the majority in 
society, whereas the average for all the countries was 34.8 percent (see table 32). This survey 
indicates that disillusionment increased in some areas. For instance, 76 percent of Russians 
Table 32: Attitudes of the government in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 
1993 
Survey participants were asked whether "the government acts for the benefit of the majority 
of society." 
Country In agreement In disagreement 
(percentage) 
Bulgaria 43 40 
Estonia 31 59 
Hungary 44 51 
Lithuania 28 55 
Poland 36 49 
Romania 54 40 
Russia 21 76 
Ukraine 21 70 
For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 4, p497. 
believed that officials did not care compared, to the average of 71.8 percent for all the 
countries (see table 33), and by June 1995, 83 percent did not believe that the government 
cared about their fate. 56 These figures are higher than the 72 percent of Russians in May 1991 
who believed that most elected officials did not "care about what people like me think." 57 
55 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 April 1992, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 12, p44. 
56 Ibid.; and "Moscow Does Not Care About People, Poll Suggests," Jamestown Monitor, 1 no.35, 20 June 
199 5, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/001/03 5 _ 007 .htm, Internet, accessed 31 
August 1998; and The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 6, p42. 
57 The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 6, p42. 
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Likewise, many people believed that the transition had adversely impacted on them. In a 
1994 nationwide survey, 68 percent believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a great 
Table 33: Attitudes of Elected Officials in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet 
republics 1993 
Survey participants were asked whether "elected officials don't care much what people like 
me think." 
Country Agree Disagree 
(percentage) 
Bulgaria 71 7 
Estonia 75 6 
Hungary 61 11 
Lithuania 63 11 
Poland 80 6 
Romania 70 9 
Russia 76 7 
Ukraine 78 6 
For information on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 4, p497. 
misfmiune. 58 The opinion held by officers parallels this, as the 1995 Ball survey found that 
73.6 percent believed the collapse was "catastrophic" (see table 15). A June 1996 survey that 
asked Russians whether they considered themselves winners or losers in the transition also 
found that only 13.7 percent identified themselves as winners.59 In this survey only 9.9 
percent said that the government very often or often "did what is right."60 This pessimism is 
likely to have been encouraged by the new regime's serious mistakes, such as the disastrous 
invasion of Chechnya. As is to be expected, discontent was particularly high in Chechnya and 
reinforced the hostility felt toward Russians because of their historic repression of the 
republic. 61 
Various factors, especially economic conditions, encouraged disillusionment. As with other 
East European states, the Russian economy experienced many difficulties after the fall of 
58 Brusstar and Jones, Attiflldes within the Russian Officer Corps, p4. 
59 Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, Table 3, p703. 
60 Ibid., Table 2, p702. 
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Communism. The Russian GDP fell by almost 50 percent from 1989 to 1994, and by 1995 it 
was reported that 45 million were living below the poverty line. 62 Conditions were 
particularly bad in republics like Chechnya where the new regime had ceased providing 
economic aid.63 The number of registered unemployed also increased from 70,000 in 
February 1992 to 2.2 million, or 3 percent of the labour force, in December 1995.64 Moreover 
the new regime often failed to pay wages promptly. 65 One 1995 survey found that 26 percent 
believed price and wage arrears might cause social unrest in their regions. This increased the 
following year to 40 percent.66 The 1993 regional survey found that 63 percent of Russians 
said that their household living standards had declined over the last five years. On average 
67.8 percent for all the countries believed this (see table 34). Thus, although Russians did not 
perceive that living standards had declined to the same extent as people in other countries, a 
majority perceived that such a decline had occurred. Most Russians blamed the government 
for these problems; in 1994, 73 percent blamed it for Russia's economic problems.67 This 
influenced political attitudes. Supporters of the LDPR in 1993 and supporters of the 
Communist party in 1995 were more likely to have negative views of the economy relative to 
f · 68 supp01iers o pro-government parties. 
Dissatisfaction over living conditions appears to have grown among civilians under the new 
regime with no major difference between civilians and officers. With regard to "life as a 
whole," on a scale of one ( completely dissatisfied) to seven ( completely satisfied) the mean 
was 3.70 in 1991. By 1996 the mean was 3.37. Likewise, satisfaction with the standard of 
living decreased from 3.01 to 2.92. 69 Thus, the majority of Russians were not satisfied with 
their lives. In comparison, the 1995 survey of 17 states found that on average 23 percent of 
61 With regard to the disquiet of Checlmyans see Gall and Waal, pp6-8, 174, 196, 219-22, 235-7. 
62 Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies (World Bank), September-October 1995 and April 
1997, n.p., quoted in Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, p700. With regard to poverty see Radio Ma yak, 24 
April 1995, quoted in Penny Morvant, "Goskomstat Says 45 Million Russians Below Poverty Line," RFEIRL 
Daily Report NSS, Internet, 25 April 1994, accessed 2 October 1998. 
63 See Gall and Waal, ppl24-136. 
64 Biznes-TASS, 19 February 1992, quoted in Keith.Bush, "Unemployment In Russia," RFEIRL Daily Report 
NSS, Internet, 20 February 1992, accessed 13 September 1998; and ITAR-TASS, 25 December 1995, quoted in 
Peter Rutland, "Latest Unemployment Figures," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 27 December 1995, 
accessed 13 September 1998. 
65 See Segodnya, 11 December 1996, quoted in Natalia Gurushina, "Wage Survey Published," RFEIRL Daily 
ReportNSS, Internet, 13 December 1996, accessed 14 June 1998. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Rose, Table 5, p55. 
68 Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian 
Elections," p607; and Richard Rose, Evgeny Tikhomirov, and William Mishler, "Understanding Multi-party 
Choice: The 1995 Duma Election," Europe-Asia Studies 49, no.5 (July 1997): Table 2, p808. 
69 Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, Table 1, p702. 
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Table 34: Attitudes of household living standards and expectations in Russia, Eastern Europe, 
and fonner Soviet republics 1993 
Survey participants were asked: 
1. "Compared with five years ago, has your household's standard of living fallen a great deal, 
fallen a little, stayed the same, risen a little, or risen a lot?" 
2. "Looking ahead over the next five years, do you think that your household's standard of 
living will fall a great deal from its current level, fall a little, stay about the same as it is now, 
rise a little, or rise a lot from its current level?" 
Country Respondents indicating a Respondents expecting a 
decline in the last 5 years decline in the next 5 years 
(percentage) 
Bulgaria 75 34 
Estonia 68 19 
Hungary 61 30 
Lithuania 74 14 
Poland 62 25 
Romania 55 31 
Russia 63 28 
Ukraine 84 37 
For infonnation on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 3, p494. 
people in all the states were not satisfied with "the way things are going" in their personal 
lives.70 Both civilians and officers recognised that there were serious economic problems, but 
civilians, at least in 1995, may have been more inclined to view the situation in more negative 
terms. In February 1995, the greatest concern among civilians (83 percent of respondents) was 
inflation, and the third greatest concern was the economic crisis and fall in output (50 percent 
of respondents). Although parallel surveys could not be found, 92.8 percent of officers 
indicated in the Ball survey that the economy was "bad," but only 35.6 percent felt the 
economy was "very bad."71 Similarly, many civilians and officers did not support the market 
economy. However the Ball survey suggests that officers were more likely to support the 
market economy, as 58.2 percent believed that it was "fully" or "somewhat useful," whereas 
70 Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995, p95. 
71 Penny Morvant, "Russians Worried About Inflation," RFE/RL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 15 February 1995, 
accessed 30 August 1998; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, pl 71. 
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38 percent of civilians supported the market economy in a 1995 survey.72 This suggests that 
although officers faced many hardships, they still enjoyed some advantages and this might 
help to explain the greater political activism of civilians I discuss below. For instance, 13 
percent of civilians in 1994 often or constantly had to go without medical treatment, only 10.5 
percent of officers in 1995 believed their medical care was poor or very poor. 73 
I believe that the domestic situation had characteristics of a "latent crisis" but that it did not 
become this serious. Although there was "active hatred" expressed in sporadic 
demonstrations, very few sought to overthrow the regime and the military did not become its 
"master." When voters might have been able to restore Communism in the second round of 
presidential elections, 53.82 percent supported Yeltsin compared to 40.31 percent for 
Zyuganov.74 People were also intolerant of groups liable to advocate violence. A 1992 survey 
found that suppo1iers of a military dictatorship were among the most disliked groups.75 
Another survey from November to December 1992 found neo-fascists were the most disliked 
group and 88 percent wished to prevent them from demonstrating. 76 This intolerance is higher 
than many other states. A 1988 survey of the European Community found that on average 
21.6 percent suppmied the right of fascists to hold public demonstrations. 77 Reflecting these 
views, 245 leading politicians signed the Civic Accord in April 1994 whereby they promised 
to refrain from using violence to pursue their political goals.78 Civilian intolerance was 
comparable to that in the military as support for organisations that advocated the military play 
a major role in politics received limited support.79 
The majority of Russians said that they would not challenge the new regime's authority. The 
percentage of people who said that they were willing to demonstrate remained low throughout 
this period. In 1993 when Russians were asked what forms of protest or political action they 
would take 68.7 percent replied "none at all." Only 7.8 percent were willing to take part in 
72 Penny Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned About Inflation And Crime," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 
Internet, 3 April 1995, accessed 18 March 1998; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p 171. 
73 Rose, Table 3, p51; and Ball and Gerber, Table 5, p 171. 
74 Sakwa, Appendix 2.7, p394. 
75 Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support," p83. 
76 Donna Bahry, Cynthia Boaz, and Stacy Gordon, "Tolerance, Transition, And Support For Civil Liberties In 
Russia," Comparative Political Studies 30, no.4 (August 1997): Table 1, p494. 
77 Gibson and Duch, Table 4, p303. 
78 ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1994, quoted in Vera Tolz, "Businessmen Sign Civic Accord," RFEIRL Daily Report 
NSS, Internet, 6 May 1994, accessed 30 October 1998. 
79 See chapter 5, pp198-9. 
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pickets or demonstrations and another 6.8 percent in strikes. 80 Although this figure had 
increased sharply by 1995 when 23 percent said they were willing to participate in protests 
and demonstrations, and the following year increased further to 26 percent, they remained a 
minority. 81 These figures suggest that political activism was lower than in other states. For 
instance, in July 1995, 42 percent of Poles did not disapprove of illegal demonstrations 
against civilian authorities and another 43 percent did not disapprove of illegal strikes. 82 
These surveys also indicate that civilians were slightly more willing to protest relative to 
officers, at least after 1994. In the above 1995 and 1996 surveys on average 24.5 percent of 
civilians said that they would participate in protests and demonstrations. According to the 
CMSPLR survey of officers in 1995 and 1996, on average 22.5 percent believed that it was 
pe1missible to participate in the activities of organisations protecting their rights (see table 
10). I believe this difference can be explained by the military's strong reluctance to intervene. 
Most important however is the limited number who actually challenged the new regime's 
authority. It is difficult to argue that opposition to the new regime motivated the killings of 
politicians because deaths were generally attributed to criminals. 83 Few generally participated 
in demonstrations, far fewer than the number who said they would in surveys. This was a 
characteristic of both civilians and military personnel. During the 1993 May Day riots the 
number of protesters was estimated at only 2,000, and outside of the capital active protests 
were minimal. 84 Such demonstrations were limited relative to many of the protests under 
Gorbachev, and whereas strikes hit some 2,000 enterprises in 1991, the number was 264 in 
the tumultuous year of 1993.85 Likewise, it was calculated in 1995 that the strike rate was 
only a tenth of the average for the 25 industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 86 Even with the largest demonstrations the proportion of the 
so Mir mnenii mneniya o mire no.58 (1993): n.p., quoted in Stephen White, "Introduction: From Communism to 
Democracy," in White, Pravda, and Gitelman, p20. 
81 Segodnya, 11 December 1996, n.p. quoted in Gurushina. 
82 Jakub Karpinski, "Opinion Poll Shows What Poles Condemn," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 15 
August 1995, accessed 18 March 1998. . 
83 With regard to the murder of Parliamentarians see "Fourth Duma Deputy Murdered," Jamestown Monitor 1 
no.141, 27 November 1995, available from http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/OO 1/141 _ 006.htm, 
Internet, accessed 20 October 1998. See also Alessandra Stanley, "Moscow Journal; Where Politicians 
Sometimes Tote Assault Rifles," NYT Ondisc, 10 May 1994, pAl. More generally see Victor Yasmann, 
"Contract murders on the rise in Russia," Jamestmvn Prism 1, no.15, 11 August 1995, available from 
http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri/001/015 _ 003 .htm, Internet, accessed 20 October 1998, pp 1-5 of 5. 
84 Schmemann, "Foes Of Yeltsin." 
85 Bush, "The Disastrous Last Year," p41; and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 May 1994, p4, quoted in "Sharp 
Increase In Number Of Strikes During The First Quarter," Reuters, 2 June 1994. 
86 The Financial Times, 10 October 1995, p2, quoted in John Thornhill, "Russian Unions Struggle For Trust Of 
Workers," Reuters, 10 October 1995. 
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population actively involved was comparable to other countries. Nation-wide protests against 
wage anears in late 1994 are estimated to have involved around 2 million people or 1.3 
percent of the population. This was not significantly higher than the Paris demonstrations in 
January 1994 that involved 600,000 people, or 1.0 percent of the population.87 Active support 
for the parliamentary revolt was also very limited, as I have argued was the case among 
personnel. The crowd that attempted to seize the Ostankino Television Tower numbered 
40,000 (0.4 percent of the Moscow population), and those who broke through to the White 
House numbered 10,000 (0.1 percent). 88 This lack of support was evident to the military given 
its deployment, and was unlikely to encourage personnel to believe that another attempt to 
seize power would win widespread support. The death toll of some 146 also was not 
dramatically higher to that of the 1992 Los Angeles riots where 58 are estimated to have 
died.89 The number injured during the riots also appears to be higher, as an estimated 4,000 
were injured compared to an estimated 900 during the revolt. 90 
Nor did the Chechnyan war threaten the new regime's authority to the same degree as the 
threat posed to the Communist party by the break up of the Soviet Union. Though Finer wrote 
that an unpopular war might facilitate an "overt crisis," and the Chechnyan war is certainly 
likely to have contributed to long-tenn centrifugal pressures, the war did not lead to an "overt 
c1isis." The challenge to the new regime's authority was essentially restricted to Chechnya 
rather than the violent challenges against Gorbachev that occtmed throughout the Soviet 
Union. The Caucasian republics adopted an ambivalent position, the exception being 
Ingushetia which publicly condemned the war. Moreover rebel attacks outside Checlmya were 
limited, both in terms of their targets and their participants. The two largest rebel attacks were 
on towns close to the Chechnyan border and involved a total of some 300 fighters. 91 The 
number of casualties also needs to be placed in perspective. The estimated 58,000 to 59,000 
killed is almost 10 percent lower than the number murdered in the US from 1993 to 199 5. 92 
87 Reuters, in "Thousands Go Out On Strike," St Petersburg Press no.78, 1-8 November 1994, available from 
http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/sppress/78/thou.html, _Internet, accessed 4 November 1998, p 1 of 1; Keesing 's 
Record of World Events (KRWE) 40, no. l, January 1994, p3983 l; and The Militmy Balance 1994-1995, pp45, 
111. 
88 The Fina11cial Times, 4 October 1993, n.p., quoted in "Suppression of Moscow Rebellion," KRWE, p39692. 
With regard to the White House crowd see Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations," p 11. 
89 "Los Angeles riots," KRWE 38, no.5, May 1992, p38894. 
90 "Red October," Time, 142, no.16, 18 October 1993, p27; and "Los Angeles riots," KRWE. 
91 Gall and Waal, pp257, 290. 
92 Ibid., p360. With regard to the US murder rate see the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and U11iform Crime Reports for the United States, 1995 (no place of publication, no publisher, n.d.), n.p., all 
quoted in Information Please Almanac, 1998 Information Please Almanac (Boston: Information Please Almanac, 
1997), p854. 
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Likewise, many surveys suggest that most Russians did not fear domestic instability despite 
the magnitude of change. A survey in 1993, a particularly turbulent year, found that only 9.2 
percent believed that they were living in a system of "chaos, anarchy, and rampant 
lawlessness."93 Two years earlier 29 percent believed that the main result of 'perestroika' was 
the "chaos and disorganisation in government."94 Nor did the majority express a great fear 
that Russia would fragment. A survey immediately after the Chechnyan invasion found that a 
quarter believed that it was very likely Russia would break-up.95 Moreover though the number 
of people concerned about ethnic conflict increased with the war, they remained a minority. In 
July 1994, 16 percent were concerned about ethnic conflict; by early 1995 this had increased 
to 32 percent.96 These results compare with 37 percent saying in 1991 that the main result of 
'perestroika' was the "crisis of inter-ethnic relations."97 
Russian fears often were comparable or even lower than those recorded in other states. The 
fears expressed in the above surveys did not surpass American concerns over militias; in April 
1995, 63 percent of Americans believed militias posed "a threat to our way of life."98 Indeed 
Russian fears of ethnic conflict in 1995 were slightly lower than American fears of 
millennium instability; in early 1999, 38 percent feared that when the year 2000 began "riots 
or other social unrest will occur."99 Likewise, the 1995 survey that found 26 percent believed 
price and wage arrears might cause social unrest, increasing to 40 percent by 1996 needs to be 
put in perspective. The percentage of Russians who feared unrest in 1996 was only 6 percent 
above the average percentage of people from all 22 industrialised countries in a late 1986 
survey who believed that strikes and industrial disputes would increase the following year. 
Indeed more people in Denmark, France, Greece, Belgium, and Switzerland believed that 
such unrest would occur. 100 Even when surveys did find that the majority feared instability 
93 O.V. Kryshtanovskaya, Politicheskie partii Rossii (Moscow: unpublished manuscript) summarised in 
Moskovskie novosti December 1993, p9A, quoted in Stephen White, "Public opinion and political science in 
postcommunist Russia," European Journal of Political Research 27, no.4 (June 1995): p517. 
White, "Public opinion and political science," p518. 
94 Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no.8, 1991, pl4, qtioted in White, Gill, and Slider, pl 5. 
95 Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned About Inflation." 
96 Ibid. 
97 Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no.8, 1991, pl 4, quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, pl 5. 
98 Jill Smolowe, "Enemies of The State," Time, no vol., no.18, 8 May 1995, pl6. The survey interviewed 100 
people. 
99 Richard Lacayo, "The End Of The World As We Know It?" Time, no vol., no.3, 18 January 1999, p48. 
100 The countries surveyed were: Denmark, France, Greece, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Australia, Netherlands, 
Canada, Norway, United States, Ireland, Austria, Spain, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxembourg, West Germany, 
Portugal, Finland, Great Britain, and Sweden. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion I 987 
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 1988), p4. 
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this could be comparable to other states. A 1994 survey found that 60 percent of Russians 
believed that "the shelling of Parliament could recur."101 However 69 percent of Americans in 
September 1993 feared the prospect of "social unrest" after the retrial of the police officers 
who beat Rodney King. 102 Military and civilian concerns appear to have been similar. 
Whereas in 1994, 60 percent of civilians feared that the "the shelling of Parliament could 
recur," nearly two-thirds of middle and senior officers in 1994 believed that Russia was so 
unstable and economically weak that the military could not guarantee its security. 103 This 
military view of the domestic situation is likely to have been encouraged by their experiences 
attempting to maintain domestic security, and is unlikely to have encouraged a coup given the 
military's poor morale and lack of an interventionist mood. 
In summary, I believe that the strength of domestic discontent against the new regime meant 
that, although the civilian leaders continued to depend on the military for internal security, 
domestic discontent was lower than during the 1985-1991 period. The strength of this 
discontent has characteristics of a "latent crisis," but I do not believe it was widespread 
enough to constitute a crisis according to Finer's typology. This discontent was encouraged 
by a lack of widespread regime attachment and the many negative developments that occurred 
under Yeltsin. 
Explaining the domestic situation, 1992-1996 
I shall now attempt to explain why the lack of a widespread attachment to the regime did not 
equate with discontent that seriously threatened its survival, or necessitate a degree of 
dependence on the military that .facilitated its intervention. This is very important, as support 
for democracy was low relative to other states, but disillusionment was high. I believe that 
whereas under Gorbachev there was a viable alternative, namely democracy, few people had a 
viable alternative to the new regime. Therefore, although in absolute terms regime attachment 
was low, it was high relative to other regime types. Of particular relevance is the attitude 
toward military rule, given this directly influenced whether the military perceived that it had 
the opportunity to intervene, as personnel were reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties. 
Thus, even when more civilians supported strong leadership relative to democracy, the 
military would still have been reluctant to intervene. Having argued that the lack of a viable 
101 Rose, Table 4, p53. 
102 George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Ltd, 
1994), Appendix, p233. 
103 Bmsstar and Jones, Attitudes within the Russian Officer Corps, pl. 
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alternative was important, I shall then outline the concerns among people, such as over 
instability, that discouraged demonstrations. Finally, I shall argue that although living 
conditions were harsh the majority appears to have coped, and were not desperate for change. 
Most importantly, many Russians recognised that there was no viable alternative to the new 
regime. Whereas under Gorbachev democracy was consistently more popular than 
Communism, thus providing a viable alternative, surveys indicate that under Yeltsin no 
regime provided such an alternative. In May 1993, although the largest number were 
pragmatic about the type of regime they wanted, democracy was the most popular specific 
regime with 63 percent in support (see table 35). A survey in December 1993 also found that 
only 16 percent believed "there is a better alternative" to democracy, and the following month 
only 11.0 percent of survey respondents believed that there was a "better alternative" to 
democracy. 104 The following year although 43 percent compared to 40 percent favoured a 
strong leader over democracy, only 23 percent supported a return to Communism. 105 By way 
of contrast, fully 27 percent of Americans in May 1991 supported a strong leader at the 
expense of democracy, only 16 percent less than Russians in 1994.106 Indeed in July 1992, 27 
percent of Russians had agreed that "the only way out of the current situation is a 
dictatorship"; the same percentage of Americans in. the 1991 survey favoured a strong leader 
rather than democracy. 107 Even when surveys found that support for democracy was minimal, 
the majority did not support alternative regimes. In a 1995 survey only 21 percent said that 
they had a positive view of democracy, and rule by an "iron hand" was supported by 37 
percent. Yet 49 percent opposed rule by an "iron hand" and a return to socialism was 
supported by 38 percent but opposed by 43 percent. 108 As Ball told me in December 1998, 
"Most Russians want a strong leader--in fact, most people probably do which is why we have 
leaders--but they do not want to forsake democracy."109 
104 Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605. The survey interviewed 2,136 people. With regard to 
the January 1994 survey see Robert Grey, William Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, "The Structure 
of Russian political opinion," Coexistence, 32 (1995): Table 1, p190. The survey interviewed 1,032 people. 
105 Rose, pp56-7. 
106 The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 9, p43. 
107 Moskovskie novosti (33), 1992, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 13, p44 
108 OMRI, no vol. or no., 26 September 1995, quoted in Russia Election Watch no.9, 1 October 1995, p7. 
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Table 35: Russian Views of Political Systems 1993 
Russians were asked: "What role in Russia's fate could the following play today?" 
1. "the idea of strong unlimited state power" 
2. "a return to the principles of socialism" 
3. "consolidation of genuine democratic principles" 
4. "calculation of what is the most useful, practical thing" 
5. "flourishing of Russian nationalism" 
6. "a rebirth of Orthodoxy" 
Type of Undoubtedly Mostly Mostly Undoubtedly Can't say 




Strong state 23 21 27 8 21 
power 
Return to 12 23 31 18 17 
socialism 
Genuine 29 34 10 4 23 
democracy 
Pragmatism 77 17 2 0 4 
Russian 6 15 26 32 21 
nationalism 
Orthodoxy 23 38 3 22 14 
This survey was undertaken in May 1993 and involved 1996 people. Source: Vox Populi poll of Russia, Mir 
mnenii I mneniya o mire 8, no.38, (May 1993): up., quoted in Wyman, Table 15, p45. 
109 Deborah Ball, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control 
Program, Livermore, California (dyball@llnl.gov). E-mail to Paul Bellamy (pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz). 
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I further believe that civilian support for strong leadership that could be provided by 
alternative regimes was not absolute but rather depended on variables. Although freedoms 
associated with democracy were not widely supported relative to other states, most Russians 
believed that the regime should be responsive to public opinion. In late 1993, only 11 percent 
believed that "Governments should ignore public opinion if they think it is wrong for the 
country."110 Similarly, the level of support for strong leadership could depend on the domestic 
situation. A mid-1996 survey found that 42.6 percent supported the imposition of martial law 
if there was widespread political disorder. However support for martial law fell to 31.3 
percent if such a law was to be permanent because of continuing unrest; only 11 percent 
opposed the restoration of the right to demonstrate once order was restored. 111 This further 
reduced the viability of an alternative regime, as most people appear not to have held serious 
fears over instability. 
Nor was military mle a viable alternative. This is important given personnel were very 
reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties. Most generally, military politicians were not 
widely supported. This was evident to the military given the electoral perfonnance of its 
candidates was poor. In the 1993 elections only 9 of the 27 active and semiretired personnel 
who ran for office in single member districts and ori party lists were elected, and in 1995 this 
fell to 3 of the 123 personnel officially supported by the Ministry of Defence. 112 Even the 13 
active and retired officers elected in districts during 1995 on average won only 27.3 percent of 
the vote. 113 Lebed's KRO also won only 4.31 percent of the vote in 1995, and he was a distant 
third in the first round of presidential elections with 14.52 percent. 114 As is to be expected, 
military personnel could be more sympathetic to military politicians relative to civilians, but 
the trend remained constant as neither they nor civilians united behind a military figure. In 
1995, 4 percent of civilians supported Lebed as a presidential candidate compared to 11 
percent of officers (see table 13). Similarly, on average 5 percent of Russians supported the 
KRO in a 1995 survey compared to 14.5 percent of military personnel. 115 The lack of 
widespread political support for the military. is comparable to that evident under Gorbachev. 
28 December 1998. 
110 Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605. 
111 James Gibson, "The Struggle between Order and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture," 
Australian Journal of Political Science 32, no.2 (July 1997): p278. 
112 Nichols, "An Electoral Mutiny?" pp329-30; and Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma 
Elections," p536. 
113 Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp541-2. 
114 Sakwa, pp392-3. 
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Although Yeltsin won the 1991 presidential elections in Russia with Colonel Rutskoi as his 
candidate for Vice-President, other military candidates failed to win widespread support. For 
instance, Colonel General Albert Makashov received only 3.7 percent of the vote, and Nikolai 
Ryzhkov won 16.8 percent despite having Gromov as his candidate for Vice-President. 116 Nor 
did personnel under Gorbachev unite behind military politicians. In areas with large numbers 
of military personnel the vote for Makashov averaged 10.8 percent, compared to his 3.7 
percent support throughout Russia. 117 
Likewise, support for a military regime was minimal relative to the new regime. In a 1994 
survey, only 11 percent supported army rule, compared to 40 percent for democracy. 118 A 
survey at the end of the year found that only 1 in 9 were prepared to have the military rule. 119 
Another January 1996 survey of party supporters found few wanted the army to govern. The 
highest level of support for army rule was only 18 percent and was from supporters of the 
K.RO, the party that failed to win widespread support in 1995. The average level of support 
for army rule was only 10.7 percent (see table 36). Although military support for the K.RO 
was 9.5 percent higher than the average for all Russians, this should not be equated with a 
greater willingness to support army rule. 120 The fig~re includes MVD personnel and others in 
military related occupations. Neither did many civilians support the notion of a military figure 
governing. A survey from August to September 1993 found that Pinochet was the ideal 
political figure among only 1 percent of respondents. 121 The lack of support for a military 
regime was derived from the military's unpopularity. I have already examined the fall in 
public support for the military and the awareness of this among personnel, so I shall focus 
here on the political weaknesses the military was thought to suffer. Negative attitudes of the 
military were widespread, and would have encouraged few to believe that it either had the 
right to govern or could govern better than civilians. A survey undertaken in August 1996 
found that only 15 percent of respondents believed that had the coup of 1991 been successful 
115 White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 3, p786. Military personnel are defined as "military, MVD, procuracy." 
The survey had a total of3,l 74 respondents. 
116 KZ, 20 June 1991, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p88. 
117 Y. Urban, "Rossiya: vybor sdelan ... ,"KZ, 14 June 1991, pl; and T. Zamyatina, "Prezident RSFSR 
yudicheski izbran," KZ, 18 June 1991, pl, both quoted in Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations," Table 
1,p557. 
11s R 6 ose, p5 . 
119 Thomas, "The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: I," footnote 27, p254. 
120 White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 3, p786. 
121 I.M. Lkiarnkin, "What Kind of Authoritarian Regime Is Possible in Russia Today?" Russian Politics and 
law 32, no.6 (November/December 1994): p40. 
Table 36: Russian Attitudes to Authoritarian Rule 
People were asked which authoritarian form of government they most preferred. 
Authoritarian Communist Liberal Congress of Women of Agrarian Party of Our Home Yabloko Russia's 
alternative party Democratic Russian Russia party of Workers' is Russia Democratic 
favoured (percentage People's Communities Russia Self- Choice 
in support) Party Government 
Return to 78 45 32 31 26 23 19 12 12 
Communist ,, 
regime 
Tough 43 54 38 37 29 21 23 18 11 
dictatorship .. 
Army rule 14 15 18 10 8 12 9 5 6 
This survey was carried out in January 1996 and involved 1,205 people. Source: Richard Rose, Eveny Tikhomirov, William Mishler," Understanding Multi-party 
Choice: The 1995 Duma Election," Europe-Asia Studies 49 no.5 (July 1997): Table 3, p81 I. 
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their lives would have been better. 122 Furthermore, people were increasingly dismissive of the 
military's ability to seize power. Although 46 percent in mid-1992 believed that a coup was 
possible, in a February 1995 survey only 5 percent feared military dictatorship. 123 Nor is the 
military's political role during the transition likely to have won sympathy. In 1994 a poll 
found that only 21 percent supported the Duma's decision to grant an amnesty to the coup 
leaders, whereas 57 percent opposed the move. 124 Similarly, the military's actions during the 
1993 revolt were unpopular, a March 1994 survey finding that only 6 percent supported the 
military. 125 Negative attitudes also arose when the military used 'scare tactics' and 
intimidation in its failed attempt to win support during the 1995 Volgograd local elections. 126 
Military personnel were attributed negative characteristics too. In February 1996, only 2 
percent of Moscow and St Petersburg survey respondents said that the "intellectual potential" 
of the army leadership was superior to that of other armies, but 16 percent believed that it was 
inferior. 127 Generals seeking election were nicknamed "wedding generals," a term derived 
from a story in which a General is invited to a wedding, gets drunk, and then turns out to be 
an impostor. 128 At least some civilians also came to the same conclusion as personnel; 
military skill does not necessarily equate with political skill. Anatoly Sobchak, the St 
Petersburg Mayor, commented in October 1995 that "I do not think that generals can make 
good politicians. They usually know how to take power, but not what to do with it afterward. 
This is why countries that are governed by generals are usually in fact ruled by rogues." 129 
Likewise, few people trusted military figures. This is important because whom people trusted 
influenced their vote. 13° Few civilians trusted senior officers; this is similar to the hostility 
among military personnel toward their superiors. In October 1994, only 0.5 percent of survey 
122 Ibid. 
123 Teague, "Russian Poll." With regard to the 1995 survey see Morvant, "Russians Worried." 
124 See Justin Burke, "Marking Reform's Fragile Victory," CSM, 19 August 1992, available from 
http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/getasciiarchive?tape/92/aug/day 19/19081, Internet, accessed 19 August 
1998, p8. With regard to the 1994 survey see !TAR-JASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian 
1431 gmt 19 August 1996, carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 21 August 1996, quoted in "Moscow Poll Shows 
Current Attitudes To August Coup Of 1991," Reuters, 21 August 1996. The survey interviewed over 1,000 
people. 
125 Interfax, 28 April 1994, quoted in Julia Wishnevsky, "Polls Shows Steep Drop In Yeltsin's Popularity," 
RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, accessed 18 March 1998. 
120 See Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Duma Elections," pp524-5. 
127 The Army Through Civilian Eyes," Moscow News, p4. 
128 Alan Cooperman, "Russia's Colin Powell?" US News and World Report, 10 September 1995, available from 
http://www.netaxs.com/-bluejack/lebed/pubs/misc/usnwp 100995.html, Internet, accessed 30 August 1998, p 1 
of 3. 
129David Hoffman, "Russian Lebed Roars Into Political Ring," The Washington Post, 21 October 1995, pA21. 
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respondents trusted Grachev, whereas 9.6 percent trusted Yeltsin, and the following month 72 
percent believed that corruption accusations against Grachev were plausible. 131 Apart from 
Grachev, a December 1995 poll found that of the Generals running for the Duma, Lebed was 
the most trusted, but by only 30 percent. 132 Similarly, though a February 1996 survey found 
Lebed to be the most trusted General, he was only trusted by 20 percent in St Petersburg and 
18 percent in Moscow. With regard to Gromov, in 1995, 15 percent said they trusted him and 
in 1996, 13 percent of St Petersburg residents and 17 percent in Moscow trusted him. 133 These 
figures indicate that officers were often less trusted than the regime. Some 21.2 percent of 
survey respondents from August to September 1993 had complete or substantial trust in the 
government. 134 
Even when more people supported strong leadership rather than democracy the military 
would have been discouraged from intervening. Survey results should be placed within the 
context of Russia's large population. The 1994 survey mentioned above that found only 40 
percent supported democracy over a strong leader still meant that the µiilitary could face 
opposition from over 59 million people. 135 It would be a major task for a military that peaked 
under Yeltsin at 2,520,000 personnel, and by 1994 numbered 1,564,000, to subdue these 
people even if only a minority opposed a coup (see "table 9). Even more importantly however, 
I hav~ already argued that personnel were very reluctant to risk causing civilian casualties, 
and that they perceived their prestige had declined. Thus, the prospect of civilian opposition, 
regardless of the exact number, discouraged intervention. 
Apart from the lack of a viabie alternative, people feared instability could threaten their 
personal interests and this discouraged serious discontent. Many people were willing to 
support drastic measures to prevent serious instability, as is shown by my assessment of 
attitudes towards martial law. Support for Yeltsin rose in February and March 1996 when he 
stressed the threat that a civil war might result from a Communist victory in the forthcoming 
130 See VTsIOM survey, December 1995, quoted in White, Wyman, and Oates, Table 6, p791. 
131 Shlapentokh, "The Enfeebled Army," p43 l. With regard to the November survey see Moskovskii 
Komsomolets, 17 November 1994, n.p., quoted in Shlapentokh, footnote 29, p435. For information on the view 
of senior officers among personnel see chapter 5, pp267-8. 
132 Peter Rutland, "Lebed Is The Most Popular General," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, 12 December 1995, 
Internet, accessed 27 May 1998. The survey interviewed 1,360 people. 
133 Rutland, "Lebed Is The Most Popular General''; and "The Army Through Civilian Eyes," Moscow News, p4. 
The survey interviewed 1,058 people in St Petersburg and 1016 people in Moscow. 
134 White, Figure 2, p518. 
135 The Military Balance /994-1995, pll 1. 
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elections. 136 The influence of personal interests is apparent under Gorbachev too. James 
Gibson found that Moscow and Leningrad residents who perceived a higher degree of 
physical danger were more likely to oppose the 1991 coup, as they "felt it imperative to resist 
those creating the danger--the plotters. " 137 This reflects the reluctance of personnel to support 
intervention under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin because they feared that a civil war could 
occur. Nor is the collapse of the Soviet Union after the 1991 coup likely to have encouraged 
support for another intervention given their fear of instability. 
This unwillingness to risk personal interests was enhanced by the awareness that political 
activism might have negative repercussions. Participating in demonstrations could threaten 
personal interests, and this was shown by the use of military firepower against the 
parliamentary revolt, which also showed that the regime could successfully defeat direct 
challenges. That such fears discouraged activism is shown by the low turnout to 1993 
commemorations of the 1917 revolution after Moscow and St Petersburg authorities banned 
demonstrations. 138 The influence of these fears would have been further enhanced by a feeling 
that political activism was not helpful. Only 24 percent of respondents in a 1995 survey 
believed that mass demonstrations would improve matters. 139 
Nor do I believe that many experienced living conditions harsh enough to demonstrate 
regardless of the lack of a viable alternative and the negative perceptions of unrest. Most 
importantly, at least some surveys indicate that many felt conditions were bearable despite 
widespread dissatisfaction. From 1992 to 1994 the percentage not "getting by" peaked at 29 
percent before falling to 18 percent (see table 37). This is virtually the same as the figure in 
Great Britain. 140 The survey further found that in 1994 the majority were not deprived of 
necessities, and the proportion constantly without essentials is as low as in the US (see table 
38). 141 Indeed one-quarter of households had cars and three-quarters had colour televisions. 
This is comparable to Western Europe in the 1960s. 142 Though homelessness by the late 
136 Daniel Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): p66. 
137 Gibson, "Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991," p677. 
138 ITAR-TASS, 7 November 1993, quoted in Alexander Rahr, "No Violence At October Revolution 
Anniversary Demonstrations," RFEIRL Daily Report NSS, Internet, 8 November 1993, accessed 31 October 
1998. 
139 Morvant, "Russians Most Concerned." The survey interviewed 2,000 people. 
140 R 4. . ose, p 9. 
141 Ibid., p51. 
142 Stephen Shenfield, On The Threshold Of Disaster: The Socio-Economic Situation In Russia, n.d., available 
from http://www.tmd.org/index7-4.htm, Internet, accessed 7 February 1999, p6 of 15; and "Comparing Welfare 
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1990s reached between 1 to 2 million, this needs to be placed in perspective too. In the early 
1990s between 1 and 3 million Americans were homeless. 143 Many Russians also had 
alternative sources of food and income. By 1996 at least 60 percent produced food from their 
land and these plots on average provided 20 percent of the income for urban families, and 
over 50 percent for provincial areas. Conditions were also eased by the state's continued 
provision of highly subsidised housing, and municipal services like heating. 144 In a 1995 
survey only 8 percent claimed that they lived in poverty. I45 
Table 37: Russians "Getting By" Under the New Regime 1992-1994 
Survey participants were asked whether they were "getting by" with one job or various jobs 
Percentage who are 1992 1993 1994 
getting by 
With one job 28 31 13 
Wi!h a portfolio of 43 49 69 
activities 
Total 71 80 82 
Percentage not 29 20 18 
getting by 
The 1992 survey was conducted from.January to February 1992 and involved 2106 respondents with the 1993 
survey being conducted from June to July 1993 and involving 1975 respondents. The 1994 survey involved 3535 
respondents and was taken from March to April 1994. Source: Irina Boeva and Viachyslav Shironin, Russians 
Between State and market: The Generations Compared, Studies in Public Policy 205, Glasgow, University of 
Strathclyde, 1992; Richard Rose, Irina Boeva, and Viachyslav Shironin, How Russians are Coping with 
Transition: New Russia Barometer II, Studies in Public Policy 216, and Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, 
New Russia Barometer III: The Results, Studies in Public Policy 228, Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, 1993, 
1994, all quoted in Rose, "Getting By Without Government," Table 2, p49 
Across Time and Space," Welfare in a Civil Society, Annex II (Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare 
Policy and Research, 1993), quoted in Rose, p50. 
143 James Patterson, "Wealth And Poverty," in Encyclopedia of the United States In The Twentieth Century Ill, 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Macmillan publishing company, 1996), pl 085. 
144 Igor Birman, "Gloomy Prospects for the Russian Economy," Europe-Asia Studies 48, no.5 (July 1996): 
p743; and Shenfield, pp6-7. 
145 See Russian TV, 24 October 1995, quoted in Penny Morvant, "Living Standards: Half Empty Or Half Full," 
RFE/Rl Daily Report NSS, Internet, 25 October 1995, accessed 2 October 1995. 
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Table 38: Russian Household Living Conditions 1994 
Russian Respondents were asked if their households had to do without the following: 
Households that Never Rarely Often Constantly 
had to do (percentage who 
without the go without) 
following: 
Heating 91 6 2 1 
Food 43 35 21 1 
Medical 68 18 9 4 
treatment 
Clothing 22 37 34 7 
Car gasoline 76 7 6 11 
Household 18 34 35 13 
goods 
Newspapers 35 21 19 24 
Households 29 22 23 26 
repairs 
Cinema, theatre 16 12 16 43 
These figures are from the New Russian Barometer, 1994. For information on the survey see Table 37. Source: 
Rose, Table 3, p51 
Finally, most people did not have high expectations that the new regime could not meet, but 
nor did they believe that the new regime could not, at least eventually, improve conditions. 
The absence of high expectations is important because it discouraged a 'revolutionary gap' 
from emerging where the new regime was unable to met expectations. The 1993 regional 
survey fotmd that 28 percent of Russians believed that their living conditions would fall 
during the next 5 years, slightly higher than the 27.2 percent average for all the countries (see 
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table 34). By July 1995, 40 percent of survey respondents believed that the economy would 
worsen in the next 2 to 3 years, compared to 20 percent who expected an improvement. 146 
This suggests that officers were slightly more optimistic about the economy, as in the 1995 
Ball survey 26.9 percent believed that the economy would improve the following year. 147 
However few believed that the situation would never improve, this being likely to discourage 
people from believing that drastic action against the new regime was their only hope. In 1994 
only 18 percent said that they would never be satisfied with the economic system, and 12 
percent with the political system. 148 
In summary, I believe that the domestic situation under the new regime had characteristics of 
a "latent crisis." However the situation cannot be accurately defined as a "latent crisis." This 
is because the masses did not seek to overthrow the regime, and the military did not become 
its "master." This is primarily because there was no viable alternative, there was concern that 
challenging the new regime could threaten personal interests, and the majority appears to have 
coped with living conditions. Finally, there were no high expectations that the new regime 
could not meet, and most believed that at least in the long te1m conditions would improve. 
Therefore, I do not believe that the domestic situation provided the militaiy an opp01iunity to 
intervene. 
Civilian Participation in Private Associations 
I shall now outline the extent to which the general public was politically mobilised. This 
entails an examination of political parties and groups, the church, industrial associations, and 
labour unions. To assess their strength I shall focus on their resources and their ability to 
mobilise people. I shall first focus on the strength of political paiiies, as they are most 
imp01iant in detennining the level of regime attachment. Following this, I shall examine the 
strength of labour unions because their strikes and demonstrations could pose an obstacle to a 
coup. The strength of industrial associations and the church is finally examined. The 
Orthodox Church is the focus because it was the strongest church in both the Soviet Union 
and Russia in terms of its resources and followers. Apart from assessing their strength, I shall 
briefly assess the potential response of each to a coup, as Finer makes a questionable 
assumption when he assumes that the stronger the organisation the less opportunity the 
146 The Financial Times, 29 September 1995, n.p., quoted in Russia Election Watch, p6. 
147 Ball and Gerber, p 171. 
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military has to intervene. This is primarily because organisations, regardless of their strength, 
might actually support a coup if their depth of attachment to the regime is weak. · 
Political parties 
During the transition many political parties developed. Although parties were not very strong, 
at least some evidence indicates that their strength was comparable to parties in other states. 
As I have already argued that support for the Communist party declined during the transition, 
I shall focus on the development of rival parties. I shall first argue that although the level of 
attachment to parties was weak, it was comparable to other states and occasionally higher. 
This is shown by the extent of electoral support for parties, by party affiliation, and by 
attitudes toward the parties. With regard to explaining the strength of parties, four factors are 
most important and I shall next examine these. First, the diversity of Russia and the political 
system did not facilitate the development of strong parties. Second, there was an overall lack 
of interest in politics. Third, many people held negative perceptions of the parties. Fourth, 
parties often were unable to campaign well or to maintain cohesion. Finally, I shall argue that 
few parties were likely to have supported intervention, because it was not in their interests. 
During the transition many political parties and organisations developed that challenged the 
authority of the Communist party. Before the transition rival political parties had not been 
tolerated and attempts to establish parties were opposed. This was in line with Article 6 of the 
1977 Constitution stipulating that the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the 
nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the 
Communist party." 149 However'°the greater freedoms permitted under Gorbachev allowed the 
development of voluntary groups. In February 1988, there were an estimated 30,000 groups; 
within a year they numbered 60,000. 150 To put this in perspective, there were 2,000 general 
associations operating at the national level in Poland by April 1989. 151 Various political 
parties developed along with these groups with the abolition of Article 6 in March 1990. In 
' October 1990 political parties were placed on a legal footing. Thus, by late 1990 there were at 
148 New Russian Barometer Ill, quoted in Rose, Table 6, p58. 
149 David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Martin Robertson and Co Ltd, 1978), Appendix C/2, 
p555. 
150 Pravda, 5 February 1988, n.p.; and Pravda, IO February 1989, n.p., both quoted in White, Gill, and Slider, 
~143. 
51 M. Dehnel-Szyc and J. Stachura, G,y Polityczne (Warsaw: Volumen, 1991), pl5, quoted in Paul Lewis, 
"Poland's New Parties in the Post-communist Political System," p33, in Party Formation In East-Central 
Europe: Post-Communist Politics in Czechoslovakia, Hunga,y, Poland and Bulgaria, Studies of Communism 
in Transition, ed. Gordon Wightman (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1995), p33. 
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least 457 political or politicised organisations, and by early 1991 some 100 could be 
recognised as parties. 152 A May 1991 survey found that 56 percent of Russians were interested 
in "following politics in my local community" compared with 45 percent of Americans. 153 
Therefore, the Communist party's monopoly over power was increasingly threatened. This 
growth of parties followed a similar trend in the region. For instance, 66 parties were 
registered in Czechoslovakia in 1990, 65 in Hungary the same year, over 100 in Poland in 
1991, and around 50 in Bulgaria at the end of 1989.154 
After the collapse of Communism, political parties and organisations continued to develop. 
As the new regime permitted the development of a multi-party system and competitive 
elections, parties became closely associated with the new regime because they facilitated 
political representation. Thus, as parties developed it became more difficult to seize power 
through force, particularly as most parties were likely to oppose intervention. The majority of 
Russians supported the multi-party system. A 1992 survey found that 5 5 .1 percent did not 
believe that the abolishment of parties would make the system of government "work better," 
compared to 50.3 percent of Ukrainians. 155 In late 1993, only 25 percent agreed that "there 
should be a one-party system/no parties at all." 156 In line with this the number of parties 
increased. In February 1992, 38 political organisations had been registered. 157 However by 
April 1996, there were 40,544 registered political parties and public organisations. The Justice 
Minister claimed that of these, 2,846 organisations and 85 parties could have a decisive 
impact on politics. 158 These public organisations included groups like the Committee of 
Soldiers' Mothers that campaigned for greater military openness and better service 
conditions. 159 The presence of s~1ch groups and their opposition to the military was recognised 
152 Y.N. Berezovskii et al, Partii, assotsiatsii, soy11zy, kluby: spravochnik vol. 1, no. l (Moscow: RAU Press, 
1991 ), p3; and Vladimir Pribylovskii, Slovar 'oppozitsii: novye politicheskie partii i organizatsii Ross ii, 
Analiticheskie vestniki i11formatsio1111ogo agenstva Postfactum, no.4/5 (April 1991): n.p., both quoted in Sawka, 
p79. 
153 The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 2, p40. 
154 New Political Parties of Eastern E11rope and the _Soviet Union ed. Bogdan Szajkowski (London: Longman, 
1991), pp59, 133; and no author, Partie Polityczne }V Po/see (warsaw: Polska Agencja Informacjna, 1991), np, 
both quoted in Gordon Wightman, "Conclusions," in Wightman, p240; and John Bell, "Bulgaria," in 
Developments in East European Politics ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul Lewis, (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993), p87. 
155 Gibson, "The Resilience of Mass Support," Table 3.1, pp66-7. 
156 Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 5, p605. 
157 Narvdnyi deputat, no.8, 1992, p96, quoted in Sakwa, p79. 
158 "More News From Russia," Worldwide Media Relations, n.d., available from 
http://www.west.net/~wwmr/russia2.htm, Internet, accessed 9 September 1998, pl of 7. For more information 
on the development of parties during the final years of Communist rule and under the new regime see Sakwa, 
pp77-100. 
159 See Vallance, "Shaping Society's Demands." 
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by officers. Indeed the Leningrad MD Commander called the head of the Soldiers• Mothers 
Organisation of St. Petersburg his "enemy."160 Many of the parties successfully competed in 
electoral politics. In 1993, 12 parties and political blocs won seats in the elections, and 14 
won seats in 1995. 161 This was similar to the 1992 Czech and Slovak federal assembly 
elections where 12 parties won seats, and more than the 1993 Polish parliamentary elections 
where 7 parties and coalitions won seats. 162 
Despite support for the multi-party system and the growth of parties, many were unable to 
mobilise supporters. The 1993 regional survey .found that 13 .3 percent of Russians supported 
a party compared to the average of 30.7 percent for all the countries (see table 39). However 
by early 1994, 23 percent of Russians supported a party and this indicates that more Russians 
supported parties than Estonians, Poles, and Ukrainians in 1993 .163 Surveys suggest that 
civilians were more likely to become active supporters of parties relative to personnel. This is 
because a 1993 survey of military cadets found that 12 percent followed the opinions of a 
particular socio-political movement or party; this had fallen to 8 percent by 1994. 164 This I 
believe was encouraged by the military's general reluctance to play an active role in politics. 
Nor did civilians, like personnel, unite behind a single party. The LDPR and Communist 
parties were the most successful parties, but their ~ombined electoral support reached 35.32 
percent in 1993 and 33.48 percent in 1995. 165 Support for an individual party peaked in 1993, 
with 22.92 percent voting for the LDPR. 166 This is slightly higher than in the 1993 Polish 
parliamentary elections where the most popular party won 20.41 percent of the vote, but much 
lower than states like Moldavia. 167 Here the Democratic Agrarian party won 43.18 percent in 
the 1994 parliamentary elections·: 168 
160 "Soldiers'Mothers lead the way," St Petersburg Press, no day or month, 1996, n.p., available from 
http://www.sptimes.rn/archive/sppress/149/sm.html, Internet, accessed 1 September 1998, pl of 4. 
161 Sakwa, Appendix 2.5 and 2.6, pp391-2. 
162 Gordon Wightman, "The Development of the Party System and the Break-up of Czechoslovakia," in 
Wightman, Table 4.3, p70; and Stanislaw Gebethner, "Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland," in Party 
Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe, Studies of Communism in Transition ed Paul Lewis 
(Cheltenham, Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1996), Table 6.1, pl 27. 
163 Rose, Table 4, p53; and Evans and Whitefield, Table 5, p500. 
164 Chernavin, p738. 
16s Sakwa, Appendix 2.5 and 2.6, pp391-2. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Gebethner, in Lewis, Table 6.1, p127. 
168 Electora/a '94: Document si Cifi·e (Chisinau: no publisher, 1994), n.p., quoted in Willian Crowther, "The 
politics of democratisation in postcommunist Moldova," in Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Democratization and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies: 3, 
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Table 39: Party Affiliation in Russia, Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics 1993 
Survey participants were asked: "Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any particular 
party?" 










For infom1ation on the survey see Table 30. Source: Evans and Whitefield, Table 5, p500. 
Another indicator of party strength is membership. The majority of Russians did not belong to 
parties. Whereas under Gorbachev the largest non-Communist party in Russia was the 
Democratic Party of Russia with around 50,000 members, the largest party other than the 
Communist party under Yeltsin was the LDPR with about 80,000 in 1995. 169 The Communist 
party was the largest party with 550,000 members in 1995 (0.37 percent of the population). 170 
This compares with 190,000 Poles (0.49 percent of the population) belonging to the Polish 
Peasant party, the largest Polish paiiy in 1995, and compares with the National party, the 
largest New Zealand party, witl{ 40,000 members in 1996 (1.12 percent of the population). 171 
Thus, although fewer Russians belonged to parties their membership often did not differ 
widely from other states. Similarly, by 1994, 3 percent of Russian adults belonged to parties, 
ed. Karen Dawisha and Bmce Parrott (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), in Dawisha 
and Pauott, Table 7.14, p312. 
169 Michael Urban, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chapter 9, 
n.p., quoted in Michael Urban and Vladimir Gel'man, "The development of political parties in Russia," in 
Dawisha and Pauott, pl82; and M. Fish, "The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the 
December 1995 Parliamentary Elections," Europe-Asia Studies 49, no.2 (March 1997): p202. 
170 Sakwa, p88; and The lvfilitary Balance 1995-/996, pl 13. 
171 Gebethner, in Lewis, Table 6.2, pl30; The Militmy Balance 1995-/996, p92; Richard Mulgan, Politics In 
New Zealand, second edition, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), p249; and The Military Balance 
1996-/997, pl 92. 
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movements, and associations. 172 To put this in perspective, around 4 percent of people in the 
Czech Republic belonged to parties in 1993, and 2 percent of Hungarians. 173 
The failures of the political system and the weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread 
support. Most basically, the size and diversity of Russia made it difficult to produce policies 
of mass appeal. Neither did the political system encourage strong parties. The absence of an 
election until December 1993 meant that during the first two years after Communism there 
was little incentive to organise strong parties. Nor did the establishment of a party-list system 
for the election of half the Parliamentarians to the Duma make it easy to establish strong 
parties. The 1995 electoral rules allowed only 12 Moscow politicians on the party list, 
encouraging those lower down to establish their own parties. 174 Many parties exacerbated the 
situation by their poor campaigning and their lack of cohesion. The unimaginative campaigns 
run by the liberal parties in the lead up to the 1995 election illustrate a lack of campaigning 
skills. 175 Nor did the lack of talent and assistance provided by politicians to their supporters 
help. For example, many of the most able democrats entered the bureaucracy, and Yeltsin 
showed little interest in consolidating a 'party of power' around him, placing greater emphasis 
on his own team of advisers. 176 Similarly, the Communist Party's presidential campaign was 
poorly organised with the party providing inadequate support to its activists. 177 Many parties 
like the LDPR also lacked cohesion. In 1994 alone its Chief of Staff left after fighting with 
Zhirinovsky, and six members announced later that year they were establishing a separate 
Duma faction. Disunity was facilitated by many of the Duma deputies elected on party lists 
not belonging to the parties they officially represented, and the increased importance of 
parliamentary factions comprised of various parties. 178 
Further problems were caused by negative opm1ons of parties, though these were not 
restricted to Russia. This helps to explain the lack of major differences in the level of party 
support relative to other states. A common complaint was that parties complicated matters. A 
1992 survey found that only 15 .9 percent djsagreed with the statement that "political parties 
172 Obshchaya gazeta no.4 (1994): p8, quoted in Sakwa, p94. 
173 Ales Kroipa and Tomas Kostelecky, "Party Organization and Structure at National and Local Level in the 
Czech Republic Since 1989," in Lewis, ppl 12-3; and Bill Lomax, "The Structure and Organization of 
Hungary's Political Parties," in Lewis, p23. 
174 Sakwa, p92. 
175 Fish, pp20l-8. 
116 k Sa wa, pp91-2, 94. 
177 See Boris Kagarlitsky, "Russia Chooses-and Loses," Current Hist01y 95, no.603 (October 1996): p309. 
11s k Sa wa, pp92-3. 
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complicate questions more than they help clear them up." This is essentially the same as in the 
Ukraine where 17.1 percent did not believe parties complicated questions. 179 Many Russians 
also questioned the motives of politicians. At the end of 1992, a survey found that 52.3 
percent of Russians believed that all the new parties had been "founded by people that are 
greedy for power."180 This appears to be slightly more positive than in the Ukraine, where 60 
percent in a 1994 survey believed that Communists and Socialists were primarily seeking to 
satisfy "personal ambitions."181 Another Russian survey in late 1993 and early 1994 found 
that on average only 30.5 percent disagreed with the statement that "no party represents the 
interests and views of people like me." 182 This though was better than the 6 percent in the 
Ukraine who believed that parties provided support for people. 183 
Nor would parties have been helped by widespread political apathy. Interest in politics had 
been high under Gorbachev as people for the first time enjoyed greater political freedom. In 
May 1991, 61 percent of Russians said that they were interested in local politics compared to 
45 percent in the US, and 48 percent in the United Kingdom. 184 However apathy grew as 
disillusionment in the new regime grew. A survey in late 1993 and early 1994 found that on 
average only 32 percent were very or quite interested in politics. 185 Indeed Yeltsin admitted in 
November 1994 that popular interest in politics had declined. 186 Similarly, in January 1996, 
35 percent of survey respondents expressed an interest in politics. 187 After the presidential 
elections, 32 percent of those who voted for Yeltsin were "indifferent" to his victory. 188 This 
apathy appears to have been even higher than in nations like the US. In May 1991, 50 percent 
of Americans said they were not "generally bored with what goes on in Washington." 189 
179 Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support," Table 3.1, p67. 
180 0.V. Kryshtanovskaya, Politicheskie partii Rossii (Moscow: unpublished manuscript) summarised in 
Moskovskie novosti December 1993, p9A, quoted in Stephen White, "Public opinion and political science in 
fiostcommunist Russia," Eumpean Journal of Political Research 27, no.4 (June 1995): p517. 
81 "A Political Portrait of Ukraine: Results of a Public Opinion Survey of Citizens in the South and East of 
Ukraine," (Democratic Initiatives Centre, Kiev, May-June 1994), p6, quoted in Zenovia Sochor, "Political 
Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine 1994," in Vladimir Tismaneanu, p214. 
182 Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood, Table 4, p603. 
183 Ilya Prize!, "Ukraine between pro-democracy and "soft" authoritarianism," in Dawisha and Parrott, p355. 
184 The Pulse of Europe, n.p., quoted in Wyman, Table 2, p40. 
185 Wyman, White, and Heywood, Table 2, p597. 
186 "Steven Erlinger, "Dire Warnings For Parliament On State Of Russian Army," NYT Ondisc, 19 November 
1994, p7. 
187 Michael Kramer, "The People Choose," Time, no vol., no.22 27 May 1996, p48. The survey interviewed 
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Finally, I believe that the main political parties are not likely to have supported a coup. This is 
very important because it further indicates their close association with the new regime and the 
obstacle to a coup they posed. The reluctance of Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov, the leaders of the 
two most popular parties, to support a coup already suggests this. However in addition, 
'Russia's Choice,' the second most popular party in the 1993 elections, and 'Our Home is 
Russia,' the third most popular party in 1995, were closely associated with Yeltsin and also 
unlikely to support intervention. Nor were party supporters likely to support military rule (see 
table 36). Apart from the lack of a viable alternative and the negative perceptions of the 
military, this stance would have been encouraged by the potentially negative consequences of 
a coup. Leaders willing to use force to seize power are unlikely to have foreseen an important 
and independent policy-making role for parties. For instance, the 1991 coup leaders intended 
to ban all parties except for the Communist party. 190 
Labour unions 
Many independent labour unions developed during the transition. Union membership was 
high and they were able to mobilise many workers. I shall first outline the growth of labour 
unions during the transition before assessing their strength. In numerical terms labour unions 
were very strong and this mass membership allowed them to mobilise large numbers of 
workers. The historic role of unions, the benefits of membership, and the support they 
received relative to other groups would have encouraged this mass membership. Finally, I 
shall argue that most unions are likely to have opposed intervention. Apart from the lack of a 
viable alternative and negative perceptions of the military, a coup threatened their interests, 
such as their independence. 
Numerous independent umons developed under the new regime. Under Communism 
membership of labour unions was theoretically voluntary, but in 1972, 97.5 percent of the 
employed were union members in 25 unions. 191 This no doubt was encouraged by their 
administration of the social welfare system. However unions were not independent and their 
tasks included promoting a "high political consciousness" and combating "anti-social 
tendencies." 192 It is difficult to ascertain the level of attachment to unions because 
190 See Rudnev, pl 8, quoted in Milnor-Beard, p3. 
191 I. Smirnov, Profsoyuzy SSR. Sta voprosov, sto otvetov (Moscow: no publisher, 1972), pl 96, quoted in Lane, 
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192 Ustav professional'nykh soyuzov SSR," in Spravochnik profsoyuznogo rabotnika (Moscow: no publisher, 
1968), n.p., quoted in Lane, Politics and Society, pp308-9. 
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independent unions were not allowed. This changed with the transition as greater freedom 
was allowed and Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. The first independent 
workers' organisations developed during 1987. In March 1990 the Federation of Independent 
· Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), the largest grouping of unions with affiliated members 
representing 82.8 percent of the labour force, was established. 193 Unions in other post-
Communist states enjoyed high membership rates too. The National Association of Hungarian 
Independent Unions claimed that 70 percent of workers were members. 194 In October 1990 
unions were placed on a legal footing and the Independent Miners' Union was established that 
same month. Workers also became increasingly militant and challenged the Communist 
regime's authority, thereby contributing to the "overt crisis." For example, the nation-wide 
strike of the mining industry in July 1989 by a total of some 500,000 workers forced 
Gorbachev to make major concessions. The miners were encouraged to rebel by their 
disillusionment with Communist labour unions they felt were not promoting their interests. 
Consequently they organised their own workers' committees. 195 
Under the new regime, unions continued to enjoy mass membership and remained capable of 
mobilising large numbers of people. In 1995 it was calculated that 87.5 percent of enterprises 
had functioning unions, and 75 percent of the work force belonged to unions. 196 This was a 
decline of 22.5 percent since 1972, but was still very high compared to many ·western states. 
In 1995, 14.9 percent of the American civilian labour force belonged to unions. 197 Though 
strikes were limited relative to the Gorbachev period and to other countries, unions could 
mobilise large numbers and that could contribute to the discontent the new regime faced. 
Statistics supplied by the FNPR {and thus likely to over-estimate participation) indicate that in 
October 1994 over 8 million people participated in a nation-wide protest action. 198 This 
represented 11.4 percent of the labour force. 199 The following year another strike by coal 
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workers closed 215 of Russia's 235 mines.200 Similarly, strike action by coal miners in early 
1996 involved nearly 75 percent of Russia's coal concerns. 201 These actions were important as 
coal was vital to many industries and provided heat for 60 percent of homes. 202 The new 
regime was thus forced to compromise with the strikers. This victory contrasts the defeat of 
the British miner's strike from 1984 to 1985 by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. No 
military demonstrations come close to rivalling these strikes and they further indicate that 
personnel were much more reluctant to become active in protests compared to civilians. 
The strength of unions reflects their historic role and the working conditions. Unions had 
traditionally played a major role under Communism and administered the social welfare 
system until late 1993, whereas in nations like the US employers actively sought to reduce 
their power. Although most people were able to overcome harsh living conditions, workers 
who were particularly militant faced more pressing challenges. For instance, the ability to 
mobilise miners was facilitated by the new regime's moves to close many of the inefficient 
mines, thereby threatening workers with mass unemployment. In addition, although many 
Russians had negative perceptions of unions, and this helps to explain the decline of union 
membership, they were relatively well supported. Even though in 1995 only 16 percent of 
union members trnsted their leaders to look after their interests, this was higher than the 9.6 
percent of civilians who trusted Yeltsin in late 1994.203 Likewise, although on average only 
17.9 percent of party supporters trusted unions in January 1996, this was higher than the 15.8 
percent of people who trusted the courts, police, and civil servants.204 Union support was also 
high relative to other countries. In 1994, 36 percent of Russians said that they distrusted 
unions. 205 However that year, 43 percent of Americans had a low or very low opinion of the 
honesty and ethnical standards of union leaders.206 
Despite their demonstrations against the new regime, umons were likely to oppose 
intervention. Unions like the Russian Independent Trade Union of Coal Miners opposed the 
200 Alessandra Stanley, "Russian Miners Strike, Defying Yeltsin," NYTOndisc, 2 February 1996, pA3. 
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1991 coup, the FNPR and General Confederation of Trade Unions ultimately supported 
Yeltsin during the 1993 revolt, and few union sympathisers supported army rule. This is 
shown by a 1995 survey that found the parties most supported by people who trusted unions 
were the Communist, KRO, and Agrarian parties. Of these party supporters, only 13.3 percent 
on average wanted army rule. 207 Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, and other factors I 
mentioned when I explained why people were reluctant to challenge the new regime, 
intervention could have had negative repercussions for unions. For instance, the 1991 coup 
leaders sought to ban strikes. Contrasting this, the new regime actively sought to work with 
unions. This is shown by the partnership of the new regime and the FNPR being formalised in 
January 1992. Also, the regime often compromised with workers. For example, after the 
October 1994 protest, moves were made to pay back wages. Finally, it is clear that the new 
regime would retaliate if union members supported direct challenges to its authority. This is 
evident during the aften11ath of the parliamentary revolt, when Yeltsin removed the right of 
unions to administer the social security system after the FNPR Chairperson's initial support 
for the revolt. 
Industrial associations and fim1s 
Many industrial associations and fim1s developed with the transition as the Communist 
party's control over the economy declined. I shall first outline their development before 
assessing their strength under the new regime. To assess their strength I shall examine their 
resources and political influence, which I believe indicate that major associations and fin11s 
were strong. Of particular interest here is their ability to mobilise their own security forces, as 
they could play a key role in determining the level of opposition that the military could face if 
it were to intervene. After examining their strength, I shall argue that economic refom1s and 
their 'courting' of politicians facilitated their growth. Finally, I shall argue that associations 
and firms even within the military-industrial complex (MIC) are not likely to have supported 
intervention, as a coup had the potential to h~ve an adverse effect on their interests. 
Many industrial associations and finns enjoyed little autonomy and power before Gorbachev. 
Under the Communist regime "production associations" were emphasised from the mid-1970s 
whereby business enterprises were merged into groups according to their location and line of 
207 New Russian barometer V, in Rose, Tikhomirov, Mishler, Table 3, p81 l. The survey involved 1,205 people. 
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products.208 These associations enjoyed some autonomy and industrial managers could 
influence economic policy. However though managers might have controlled the process of 
production they had little power over its proceeds; and the economy was state controlled.209 It 
is difficult to ascertain the level of attachment to these associations, but it is apparent that a 
large black market existed that included networks of private firms circumventing state 
control. 210 This suggests that many firms did not support Communist regulations. 
The decline of the Communist regime's control over the economy after 1985 and Gorbachev's 
willingness to institutionalise contact with industrial associations facilitated their growth. In 
1991, alone some 80,000 companies were created and associations developed to represent 
firms both for and against free-market reforms.211 One of the first groups to represent free-
market entrepreneurs was the Association of Joint Ventures formed in 1988. The Union of 
Associated Cooperatives began the first coordinated national lobbying effort to promote their 
interests the following year; This indicates that associations and firms increasingly resembled 
those in the West that lobbied policy-makers. Associations and firms also developed that 
opposed free-market reforms. By September 1991, over 1500 large state enterprises belonged 
to the anti-refonn Scientific-Industrial Union.212 Members of such groups were elected to the 
Congress in 1989 and to republic parliaments and focal Soviets in 1990. More specifically, 
associations like the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs promoted MIC 
interests. The right of associations to attend sessions of the Council of Ministers, its 
presidium, and other government bodies in July 1990 indicates their growing strength. Later 
that year a Council of Managers of State Enterprises, Associations, and Organisations was 
established, and in October 19g1 a Council of Entrepreneurship attached to the President's 
office was created. 213 
Under the new regime industrial associations and firms remained active. The 'Most' financial 
group illustrates the immense strength that businesses could achieve. The group was able to 
effectively mobilise its resources so as to qave diverse business interests, ranging from the 
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financial and construction sectors to mass media organisations. The group was able to 
mobilise well-equipped security forces that in Moscow alone might have numbered over 
2,500 personnel, making it more powerful in military terms than associations under 
Gorbachev.214 Individual firms had similarly well-equipped forces. Indeed Gazprom, a large 
oil company, had a 20,000 strong 'Security Service' headed by a former KGB and State Tax 
Service official. 215 Firms also exercised political influence because of their vast resources. For 
example, the new regime made concessions to MIC lobbyists that ensured it continued to 
receive large subsidies. This influence was recognised by personnel. A Ministry of Defence 
employee in March 1995 wrote, "the Army needs its own people in parliament just like the 
agrarians and Gazprom, the banks, and the others."216 Businessmen also enjoyed greater 
popular support than other groups. In 1993, 9.2 percent of Russians associated their hopes 
with the business community compared to just over 3 percent with politicians.217 That year, 
23 percent of Americans expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in "big 
business" compared to 19 percent in Congress. 218 This suggests that both Russians and 
Americans were more supportive of businesses than politicians. A 1994 survey also found 
that businessmen were one of the groups least blamed for Russia's economic problems, 38 
percent blaming businessmen compared to 73 percent blaming the government and 64 percent 
Yeltsin.219 Finally, 'Our Home is Russia,' the party led by Chemomyrdin, the head of 
Gazprom from 1989 to 1992, won 10.13 percent of the vote in 1995 and became the third 
largest party in the Duma. Likewise, the first vice-chairperson of the Russian Union of 
Entrepreneurs and Industrialists also competed in the 1995 elections. His party 'Forward 
Russia' became the ninth largest party in the Duma by winning 1.94 percent of the vote. 220 
The growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the economic reforms that reduced 
state control of the economy, by their 'courting' of politicians, and by their resources. 
Business resources increased as speculative dealers exploited their insider knowledge to 
purchase the best shares. They were helped by the ineffectiveness of anti-monopoly 
214 "A selection of Russia's security forces," J!R 9, no.2 (February 1997): p54. 
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legislation.221 Associations and firms were also able to amass large fortunes without paying 
taxes. In April 1995 the Labour Ministry estimated that 40 percent of incomes were not 
taxed.222 Many businessmen also 'courted' politicians. The 'Most' group was closely 
associated with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and several associations endorsed Yeltsin prior 
to the 1996 elections. Other business interests were closely associated with the new regime. 
This is best illustrated by Chemomyrdin's position as Prime Minister. Finally, the appeal of 
industrial associations and fim1s among the population is likely to have been encouraged by 
them owning much of the media. 
Evidence indicates that few associations and firms would have supported intervention. 
Vladimir Tikhonov, the President of the Union of United Co-operatives, actively opposed the 
1991 coup. 223 Nor were all MIC plants behind the coup, plant leaders in Novosibirsk 
condemning the action. Likewise, in the 1993 election, managers were most supportive of 
Russia's Choice, the party closely associated with Yeltsin, and the pro-reform Yabloko 
party. 224 The following year over 100 businessmen and bankers signed the Civic Accord and 
Mild1ail Malei, Yeltsin's scientific adviser on the MIC, said the complex did not want a 
coup.225 Businesses also addressed grievances within the law. For instance, when the Enisei 
Chemical Combine lost 112.3 billion rubles because of reforms, its response was to sue the 
regime. 226 
The potentially negative consequences of a coup encouraged this opposition. A coup could 
reduce consumer and investor confidence as uncertainty spread. This threat was very serious 
as the volume of investment in Russia fell in 1995 by 15 percent.227 Another potential threat 
was to the provision of economic aid. For example, in 1991 Western aid was suspended. 
Controls on the economy could also be established that violated business interests. 
Tikhonov's opposition to the 1991 coup was encouraged by the need to protect private 
enterprises. Indeed Malei explained the MIC's reluctance to support a coup by commenting 
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that "There would be no winners. "228 Apart from these fears, the new regime sought to satisfy 
business interests. The MIC illustrates this. Although it was hit by cuts in defence 
expenditure, the regime's concessions won support. The new regime provided large subsidies, 
publicly endorsed the MIC, and promoted weapon exports.229 Thus, an MIC spokesperson in 
early 1993 exclaimed, "Thank God there are currently people among the powers that be" who 
understood the complex. 230 In 1996 MIC leaders endorsed Yeltsin. 
Church 
The strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, increased 
with the transition as the greater freedom allowed it to expand. I shall first outline the growth 
of the church under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as its worshippers increased and parishes 
expanded, before examining the factors that facilitated this growth. I believe that a key factor 
is the ideological void left by the fall of Communism as people sought to find another belief 
system, particularly given the uncertainties of the period. The church also became closely 
associated with national self-identification, given its guardianship of Russian traditions. 
However active participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of the 
religion and the various problems the church experienced. Finally, I shall argue that the 
church was likely to oppose an intervention, as a coup violated its religious teachings and its 
interests. 
The strength of the Orthodox Church increased with the transition, as people returned to the 
church after Communist restrictions were lifted. Under the Communist regime, religion was 
closely associated with class, and moves were made to reduce its influence. For example, 
church property was nationalised and campaigns against religion were undertaken. However 
in the 1970s, an estimated 25 percent of Russians still were committed to a religious 
organisation or faith. 231 More specifically, the Orthodox Church was closely associated with 
the Tsar and thus many of its churches were closed. From 1953 through to the late 1980s there 
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were 7,500 Orthodox churches open.232 To put this in perspective Greece, another 
predominantly Orthodox country, had twice as many churches for a population of less than 9 
million. However with the transition, the church was able to operate more freely. In 1988 the 
Orthodox Church celebrated the millennium of Christianity in Russia and from 1989 to 1991, 
over 6,000 churches reopened. 233 A 1991 survey also found that almost 1 out of 3 Russians 
said that they were affiliated with the Orthodox Church, despite only 1 out of 1 O having been 
raised in the church. 234 
Under the new regime the Orthodox Church continued to grow. By the 1990s the Russian 
electorate, like most of Western Europe, had largely become secular, with a quarter 
identifying themselves as atheists. 235 This is comparable to the US where a 1992 survey found 
that 18.5 percent were non-religious.236 In a 1992 survey, 47 percent of Russians said that 
they were Orthodox believers, and by 1994 the church had an estimated 60 million believers. 
This suggests that the number of Orthodox believers was similar to the number of Americans 
belonging to the Roman Catholic Church in 1995, but greater than in Germany where almost 
three-quarters said that they did not even have formal church ties. 237 In Moscow alone the 
number of parishes increased from 50 in 1990, to 200 by 1994, and that year an estimated 30 
percent of Russians under 25 years old moved frcim atheism to a belief in God. 238 Though 
active participation in church affairs was limited, the number of worshippers was large. In 
1992 one-tenth of survey respondents said that they regularly attended church and other 
surveys found that 9 percent went to church as often as once a month. 239 This was low 
compared to the US, where 59 percent of people in September 1992 said that they went to 
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church at least once a month, but still meant that there were over 14 million active church 
worshippers in Russia.240 Military personnel turned to religion too. A 1994 survey found that 
38 percent of personnel classified themselves as religious compared to 22-25 percent at the 
end of 1992.241 Grachev said in 1994 "the younger generation's spiritual education has never 
been so important. "242 The stance of the Orthodox Church was thus important to coup leaders, 
given both the number of worshippers and the close military relations with the church. 
Politicians likewise recognised the growing importance of the church, seeking its support 
before the 1995 elections and before the presidential elections.243 
The ideological void left by the collapse of Communism encouraged the church's growth. As 
disillusionment in Communism grew, many people searched for a belief-system to provide 
them direction in a rapidly changing society. This move from Marxism-Leninism to 
Christianity is shown by a 1992 survey that found 73 percent of Russians had a positive 
feeling toward Christianity compared to 15 percent toward Marxism-Leninism.244 The church 
also became closely associated with national self-identification, given its guardianship of 
Russian traditions. In June 1994 a senior cleric commented that many people were identifying 
with the church as "to consider yourself Orthodox ... is a sign of being Russian."245 That year 
Grachev signed an agreement to facilitate greater cooperation between the Orthodox Church 
and the military so as to encourage patriotic traditions. The church also had many resources, 
which facilitated its expansion. The church founded banks, imported goods like tobacco, and 
was involved in the oil industry. However active participation in the church was discouraged 
by the difficult nature of the religion. Many people found it difficult to understand the 
services, because they were conducted in old Slavonic rather than Russian. They also had 
little knowledge of the religion because of the Communist past. One brother c9.mmented in 
late 1994 that many people did not become active!y involved with the church because "this 
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faith is hard work. "246 This problem was probably increased by the preoccupation of many 
priests, as they sought to raise money, train new priests, and reclaim lost property.247 
Evidence indicates that the Orthodox Church would have opposed intervention. This is shown 
by the church's reaction to the 1991 coup. Patriarch Aleksii II reputedly excommunicated all 
those who participated in the coup, an act that caused much concern to Gennadi Yanayev.248 
The unwillingness to support the seizure of power remained under the new regime, as the 
church attempted to mediate between Yeltsin and the parliament during the revolt. The church 
also publicly endorsed the new regime. Aleksii II in May 1996 endorsed Yeltsin and said, "the 
country will suffer new tremors" if Communism retumed.249 This opposition was primarily 
derived from the church's religious teachings, and from the transition's positive impact on the 
church. First, the use of force against Russian citizens to seize power would violate church 
principles as it publicly stood for peace and stability within Russia. Second, the church 
prospered during the transition, enjoying much greater freedom and some political influence. 
Accompanying this greater freedom were the financial benefits gained from the economic 
reforms. 
In summary, I believe that civilian participation in private associations is generally 
comparable to other European states and that the level of public mobilisation would have 
discouraged intervention. Although most Russians did not have strong ties with political 
parties, the majority supported the multi-party system. Their party affiliations were often 
comparable to other states. With regard to labour unions, membership was very high 
compared to many other states, ·and they could mobilise large numbers of workers. Industrial 
associations and firms also grew stronger under the new regime as they accumulated immense 
wealth and enjoyed more support than other groups. Finally, the Orthodox Church grew as 
many people returned to the church after the removal of Communist restrictions. Therefore, 
many Russians were politically active in these groups. This reduced the military's opportunity 
to intervene, as evidence indicates that the groups would have opposed a coup . 
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Conclusions 
This chapter argues that the military did not have the opportunity to intervene against the new 
regime. I have reached this conclusion after assessing the domestic situation and the level of 
regime attachment. I first assessed the impact of the transition on the domestic situation under 
Gorbachev and argued that the situation is characteristic of an "overt crisis." I then assessed 
the domestic situation under the new regime, and argued that, although some discontent 
developed that is characteristic of a "latent crisis," it was not serious enough to facilitate a 
coup. Finally, I examined the private organisations that developed with the transition and 
argued that their strength discouraged intervention. 
With regard to the domestic situation under Gorbachev, this is most characteristic of an "overt 
crisis" and developed primarily because of the weak level of attachment to the Communist 
regime. Domestic discontent increased under Gorbachev, along with civilian dependence on 
the military to uphold security. Discontent manifested itself in demonstrations and violence 
throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the republics that sought independence. This 
discontent led to the collapse of both the Communist regime and the Soviet Union, as 
republics broke away and the military withdrew its ·support from the regime. Such ~iscontent 
primarily resulted from democracy becoming a viable alternative to Communism. This 
provided the population, particularly in the republics, an alternative to the Communist regime 
under which they enjoyed limited political freedom. Apart from this, public recognition of the 
Communist party's authority fell, and people were increasingly willing to challenge the belief 
that no other person or centre of power was legitimate or duty-worthy. This is shown by the 
decline in Communist party membership, especially among civilians compared to military 
personnel. More specifically, the decline of the party's authority is shown in Russia by the 
growing reluctance to accept its authority and by the move toward another centre of power, 
namely Yeltsin. Finally, domestic discontent was encouraged by the growing disillusionment 
with the Communist party. The party was .\lnable to promote economic growth and prevent 
people from becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their lives. Disillusionment was 
particularly high in the republics where discontent was most violent. 
Under the new regime civilian dependence on the military remained because of the domestic 
situation. The discontent evident under the new regime has characteristics of a "latent crisis" 
as there were demonstrations and the new regime was dependent on the military in some 
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instances, namely during the parliamentary revolt and Chechnyan war. This discontent was 
primarily encouraged by the limited support for democracy in absolute terms. Similarly, 
support for democratic freedoms was limited. The freedom of speech, association, and 
information all were not very important to many civilians. It is also apparent from the 
parliamentary revolt that public recognition of the new regime's authority was limited among 
some. Widespread regime attachment was discouraged by disillusionment in the new regime. 
Many Russians believed that the regime did not act for the benefit of society or care about 
their fate. Likewise, many people believed that the transition had adversely impacted on them. 
Dissatisfaction over living conditions appears to have grown among civilians under the new 
regime with no major difference between civilians and officers. This pessimism is likely to 
have been encouraged by the new regime's serious mistakes, such as the disastrous invasion 
of Chechnya. 
However though the domestic situation had characteristics of a "latent crisis," I do not believe 
that the domestic discontent was serious enough to actually become a crisis. Most Russians 
neither supported the overthrow of the new regime nor actively challenged its authority. The 
reluctance to actively challenge the new regime is shown by the low turnout at many 
demonstrations and the lack of active support for the parliamentary revolt. This lack of 
support was evident to the military given its deployment, and is unlikely to have encouraged 
personnel to believe that another attempt to seize power would win widespread support. Nor 
did the Chechnyan war seriously threaten the new regime's authority. Apart from Yeltsin's 
dominance over the decision-making process, the war was essentially restricted to Chechnya, 
and rebel attacks outside Chechnya were limited, both in terms of their targets and their 
participants. Likewise, many surveys suggest that most Russians did not fear domestic 
instability despite the magnitude of change. Russian fears were often comparable or even 
lower than those recorded in other states. Similarly, relative to the military, civilian concerns 
do not appear to have been as serious. 
To explain this is very important because support for democracy was low relative to other 
states but disillusionment was high. I believe that whereas under Gorbachev there was a 
viable alternative, namely democracy, few people had a viable alternative to the new regime. 
Therefore, although in absolute terms regime attachment was low, it was high relative to other 
regime types, particularly relative to military rule. The lack of support for a military regime 
was derived from the military's unpopularity. This discouraged people from believing that it 
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could govern better than civilians. This lack of support is important, given personnel were 
reluctant to injure Russian civilians. Nor was support for strong leadership absolute but rather 
depended on variables. Support of martial law depended on the level of domestic unrest. 
Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, people feared instability could threaten their 
personal interests and this discouraged political activism. Similarly, people were aware that 
demonstrating could threaten personal interests. Nor do I believe that many experienced living 
conditions harsh enough to demonstrate. Finally, most people did not have high expectations 
that the new regime could not meet. This discouraged a 'revolutionary gap' from emerging 
whereby the new regime was unable to meet expectations. Moreover few believed that the 
situation would never improve. This is likely to have discouraged people from believing that 
drastic action against the new regime was their only hope. 
Turning to private associations, their presence helped to deny the military an opportunity to 
intervene, especially because evidence suggests that they were likely to have opposed a coup. 
Most impo1iantly, during the transition many political parties developed. Although parties did 
not receive widespread support, at least some evidence indicates that their strength was 
comparable to other states. Before the transition rivals to the Communist party were not 
tolerated, but under Gorbachev they increasingly diallenged its monopoly over power as his 
reforms allowed greater political freedom. As the new regime permitted the development of a 
multi-party system and competitive elections, parties became closely associated with the new 
regime. Thus, parties made it more difficult to seize power through force. Though the 
majority of Russians supported the multi-party system, many parties were unable to mobilise 
many supporters. Surveys found that party affiliations were limited, and the overwhelming 
majority of Russians did not belong to parties. Thus, neither civilians nor personnel were very 
active in politics. However Russian support of parties often did not differ greatly to other 
states. 
The failures of the political system and th~ weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread 
support. The size and diversity of Russia made it difficult to produce policies of mass appeal. 
Neither did the political system encourage strong parties. The absence of an election until two 
years after the fall of Communism provided little incentive to organise strong parties, and nor 
did the party-list system for election to the Duma. Many parties did not improve the situation 
by their poor campaigning and lack of cohesion. Further problems were caused by negative 
opinions of parties, though these were not restricted to Russia, and this helps to explain the 
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lack of major differences in the level of party support relative to other states. Nor would 
parties have been helped by widespread political apathy. Finally, the main political parties 
were not likely to have supported a coup because it could have directly threatened their 
interests. 
Like parties, independent labour unions developed with the transition as greater freedom was 
allowed and as Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. Unions were soon able 
to mobilise large numbers of workers and this remained the case under the new regime. The 
strength of unions reflected their historic role and the working conditions. Unions had 
traditionally played a major role under Communism, administering the social welfare system 
until late 1993, whereas in nations like the US, employers actively sought to reduce their 
power. Similarly, although most Russians were able to overcome the harsh living conditions, 
workers that were particularly militant faced more pressing threats to their livelihood. Despite 
their demonstrations against the new regime, unions were not likely to support intervention. 
This is because of a coup's potentially negative effects, the new regime's moves to win over 
unions, and the threat of retaliation if union members supported direct challenges against the 
regime. 
Many industrial associations and firms also developed with the transition, as the Communist 
party's control over the economy declined. During Gorbachev's rnle associations developed 
to support various businesses and to influence economic policy. Under the new regime 
industrial associations and fim1s remained active. The 'Most' financial group illustrates the 
immense strength that businesses could achieve, given its diverse business interests. The 
growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the economic reforms that reduced state 
control of the economy and by their 'courting' of politicians. Businessmen were also able to 
win more public support than other groups; this is likely to have been encouraged by their 
ownership of much of the media. Evidence indicates that few associations and firms would 
have supported intervention. The potentially_ negative consequences of a coup encouraged this 
opposition. For example, a coup could reduce consumer and investor confidence. Contrasting 
the potentially negative consequences, the new regime sought to satisfy business interests and 
at least occasionally achieved this. 
Finally, the strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, 
increased with the greater freedom permitted under Gorbachev and the new regime. Civilians 
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md military personnel returned to the church after Communist restrictions were lifted. 
~eligious beliefs became increasingly widespread and the number of churches and parishes 
grew. In line with this there was a large number of active worshippers. The ideological void 
left by the collapse of Communism was a key factor that encouraged the church's growth. As 
disillusionment in Communism grew many people searched for an alternative belief-system to 
provide them direction in a rapidly changing society. The Orthodox Church also became 
closely associated with national self-identification. Furthermore, the church increasingly had 
the resources to expand. However active participation in the church was discouraged by the 
difficult nature of understanding the religion. This problem was increased by the 
preoccupation of many priests with other issues like the reclaiming of lost property. Evidence 
indicates that the church would have opposed intervention because of its religious teachings 
and because of the transition's positive impact on the church. 
This chapter then indicates that the military did not have an opportunity to intervene. Overall, 
I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and 
their importance can vary, is valid as various factors did impact on the military's opportunity 
to intervene. These factors were the level of regime attachment, the domestic situation, the 
level of civilian dependence on the military, and the level of the military's popularity. With 
regard to hypothesis three, a transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to 
stage a coup, I also believe that this is valid because the transition did impact upon the 
military's opportunity to intervene. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup 
conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the 
transition overall did not encourage a coup. Although it did encourage discontent, this was not 
strong enough to equate with either an "overt crisis" or a "latent crisis." The transition also 
encouraged the development of private associations that were comparable to other states. 
These further hindered a coup as evidence suggests that the associations would have opposed 




This thesis examines how regime transitions impact on the military; and more specifically 
how this impact influences the likelihood of a military intervention in politics, primarily 
through a coup. Regime transitions involve fundamental changes in the composition of the 
civilian leaders and the structures that determine how the state is governed, and how policy is 
made and implemented. With regard to coups, these involve the removal or attempted 
removal of a state's chief executive by the use of or threat of violence, during which active 
service regular military personnel play a leading role in the planning and execution of the 
operation. To examine the impact of a transition on the military, key areas were assessed. 
These relate to the structure of the civil-military relationship and the military' s roles, support, 
morale, cohesion and size, and expertise. To examine the likelihood of a coup I examined 
various factors that might influence whether or not the military intervenes. Here I argued that 
the capacity, disposition, and the opportunity to intervene play a key role in influencing the 
military's decision-making. This approach was applied to a case study, the Soviet and post-
Soviet state. I first provided a brief history of civil-military relations and examined the 
military on the eve of Gorbachev's accession, before arguing that various changes occurred to 
the military during the fall of Communism from 1985 to 1991. I then examined the military 
under the new regime from 1992 to 1996 and argued that further changes occurred. Having 
assessed the impact of the transition on the military I argued that the threat of a Russian coup 
did exist, but that the military did not intervene because it lacked the capacity, disposition, 
and opportunity. 
I shall now examine the conclusions that have been made and will relate them directly to my 
hypotheses to judge their validity. This thesis assesses the validity of four hypotheses: 
1. A regime transition can have the potential: to negatively impact upon the military. 
This impact can change the: 




Military cohesion and size 
Military expertise 
(See model 1) 
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2. Various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and their importance can vary. 
In order of their importance these factors are: 
The capacity to intervene: 
Presence of potential coup leaders 
Participation of officers commanding personnel located near strategic sites 
Participation of effectively armed and trained personnel 
Cohesion of the coup forces 
Number of personnel 
Military' s mood 





Manifest destiny and national interest 
External actors ·. 
The Opportunity to intervene: 
Regime attachment 
Civilian dependence on the ~ilitary and the domestic situation 
Military popularity 
Intervention inhibitors are essentially derived from these three factors: 
Acceptance of civilian supremacy 
Lack of capacity to intervene 
Lack of disposition to intervene 
Lack of opportunity to intervene 
Professionalism 
3. A regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. 
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4. A regime transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to intervene. 
With regard to regime transitions and the military, I focused on key areas where they can 
impact on the military. The structure of the civil-military relationship and how this changed 
was assessed first. This structure provides the framework within which the civilian and 
military leaders inter-act. Second and also important, the roles that the military performs and 
the impact of the transition on the allocation of these were examined. Third, transitional 
changes to institutional suppoti with regard to the military's level of budgetary support and 
popular support were examined. Fourth and closely related, the impact of transitional changes 
on the morale of personnel was assessed. Fifth, transitional changes to the military's cohesion 
and size were examined. Finally, a transition's imp·act on the level of military expertise was 
studied. 
To explain why the military intervenes and the impact of a regime transition on the likelihood 
of intervention, I used a modified version of Finer's approach to the study of the military in 
politics. This is based on three main determinants influencing whether the military will 
intervene, though these are not mutually exclusive. First, I assessed whether the military had 
the capacity to intervene. Second, I assessed whether the military had the disposition to 
intervene. Third, I assessed whether the military had the opportunity to intervene. These three 
determinants are in tum comprised of numerous factors that can both encourage and 
discourage a coup. These factors were covered in-depth during both my study of coups and 
the case study. They range from whether there are figures able and willing to lead a coup, to 
the strength of potential coup grievances among personnel, to the level of attachment to the 
regime. 
I then studied why the military might intervene, and concluded that the capacity and 
disposition of the military, along with the opportunity, could influence whether or not a coup 
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is staged. With regard to the capacity to intervene, the military must believe itself capable of 
defeating, or successfully intimidating, the regime's leaders and supporters, of seizing 
strategic sites, and of acting swiftly to guarantee surprise and to minimise organised 
opposition. The likelihood of success is enhanced by the active participation of personnel who 
have leadership skills, are strategically located, and are effectively armed and trained. 
Similarly, the cohesion and number of active coup participants, relative to the regime's forces 
and the size of the state, influences whether or not the military perceives itself capable of 
intervening. Transitions are especially relevant because their impact can influence whether or 
not the military can intervene. For instance, the level of military cohesion might change given 
the potential divisive nature of a transition. 
Closely associated with the military's capacity, and indeed disposition, is the military's mood. 
The self-perceptions of personnel will determine whether they believe that they have the 
attributes to stage a coup. Threats to the military's prestige have the potential to create 
discontent. For instance, a new regime may be perceived as failing to properly recognise the 
military. However Finer's work needs to be expanded to better take into account the influence 
that negative self-perceptions among personnel have in discouraging coups. This is because 
when the self-perceptions of personnel decline to the extent that they doubt their own 
capabilities, the threat of a coup can decline. This is the result of perso1mel lacking the 
confidence that they can successfully stage such a risky and complex operation. 
Another vital determinant is the military' s disposition. There are two main types of factors that 
motivate intervention: primary factors that are often influential in encouraging intervention, 
and secondary factors that are generally less influential. Assessing the primary factors first, the 
violation of military corporate self-interests is the most influential coup grievance. This is 
chiefly because such a violation directly impacts upon the military's ability to successfully 
ensure national security, upon its ability to operate in the manner it wishes, and upon the 
conditions under which personnel operate. Actions by a regime that may be perceived as 
threatening the military range from grievances arising over the level of autonomy to the 
presence of a rival armed force. Given the probability that a new regime will seek to ensure its 
supremacy, and will make decisions in accordance with its own perceptions rather than those 
of the previous regime, the potential for corporate grievances is real. Individual interests are 
also very important and are closely associated with corporate interests. These again are likely 
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to be influenced by a transition because of its consequences. Perceived threats range from the 
'lack of promotion opportunities to the threat of execution. 
Apart from these factors are those that often have a limited influence, the secondary factors. 
First, I doubt whether class interests are important. Theoretically, intervention may result from 
the military's class interests being threatened, and thus by a transition's impact on the class 
interests. At one level clearly identifying the class of the officer corps is not necessarily 
simple; they might not be of one dominant origin. Associated with this, the approach assumes 
that classes are united and thus can be the focus of coup grievances whereas in reality this is 
unlikely. The approach also assumes that personnel will place a priority upon loyalties 
established before they joined the military, rather than those built up among personnel and 
their loyalty to the military. Indeed class or particularistic grievances may hinder the staging of 
a coup through denying its leaders broad support. Second, particularistic interests are unlikely 
to be influential. According to this approach coups are motivated by a regime threatening the 
regional and or ethnic interests of the conspirators. However the influence of these interests is 
likely to be reduced by the development of internal loyalties. Nor do I believe that the manifest 
destiny and national interest, are important. Statistical evidence indicates that corporate and 
individual grievances are more influential. Even when coup leaders claim to be intervening in 
the national interest they often renege on their promises and military regimes are often little 
better than the regimes they replace. Finally, though external actors might influence whether a 
coup occurs, their role is unlikely to be significant. A lack of military dependence on an 
external actor reduces the influence that an external actor might have, and the limited role of 
these actors is evident when past-'coups are examined. 
The opportunity to intervene is another important coup determinant, but its influence does not 
match that of the capacity or disposition to intervene. If the military is capable and determined 
to intervene, civilian opposition will not deter it. When the military is wary of causing civilian 
casualties, I believe that the level of regime ?ttachment is the most important determinant of 
the opportunity. The level of regime attachment is important because the hazards associated 
with intervening against a popular regime will influence coup leaders. This is primarily 
because the leaders must be sure that the military will obey their orders, and that personnel 
will be willing to use violence against civilians. With regard to war and the domestic situation, 
both can facilitate intervention, though the influence of a war will be largely determined by its 
domestic impact, especially by increased civilian dependence. The level of support for the 
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military is closely associated with the above two factors, as the level of regime attachment and 
the regime's performance directly influences the military's popularity. Support of the military 
is important because of its close relationship to the military' s mood. All three factors are likely 
to be influenced by a transition. 
Finally, intervention might not occur if the above factors are countered by what I term 
intervention inhibitors. The acceptance of civilian supremacy is primarily derived from a 
military's lack of the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene. Various methods 
might be used by a regime to ensure that a coup is not staged. For instance, a regime might 
ensure that loyal commanders control highly capable forces located close to strategic sites, 
utilise positive and negative incentives, and ensure that the level of regime attachment is 
strong. These factors then contribute to the high risk of intervening. This is important because 
officers are often averse to taking risks. An external actor can play an important role, but this 
is rare. It is unlikely that an external actor will detem1ine the actions of a self-sufficient and 
independent military. I do not believe that professionalism, as defined by Huntington, is an 
effective inhibitor. Huntington was incorrect when he argued that the professional military was 
apolitical, as no military is completely isolated from societal attitudes. Thus, the military is 
aware of political developments and it will take a -stance on such developments, particularly 
vvhen personnel believe that the issues are of direct concern. Indeed the qualities Huntington 
attributed to professionals might actually encourage intervention. 
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Case Study and the Transition 
The Soviet militmy before the transition 
I first provided a brief overview of the dominant theoretical models used by Western scholars 
to examine the Soviet civil-military relationship. Here three models were most important. 
First, Kolkowicz's conflict model stressed_ the conflict prone nature of the civil-military 
relationship and the military's potential threat to the party. Second, the symbiotic model put 
forward by Odom emphasised civil-military cooperation and the strength of the party's 
supremacy. Finally, according to Colton's participatory model the relationship was one of 
conflict and cooperation but party supremacy was not threatened. I believe that the 
participatory model was most useful in assessing the Soviet civil-military relationship from 
1917 to 1985. This is primarily because Colton wrote of the various degrees of military 
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involvement in politics and those factors that influenced its political quiescence. Second, I 
believe that many of his arguments were particularly relevant in light of the transition. For 
instance, he envisaged military intervention if the regime initiated reforms that alarmed the 
military hierarchy. Third, the relationship was not one of inevitable conflict or cooperation. 
Finally, various scholars who examined Soviet civil-military relations in greater depth 
concluded that the model was the most valid. 
I then examined the characteristics of the Soviet military on the eve of the transition. The 
Soviet civil-military structure best resembled Nordlinger's penetration model and revolved 
around the Communist party's authority. This model was used to examine the Soviet civil-
military structure because it was not confined to the case study, and avoided at least some of 
the problems of the three previous models. Soviet civil-military relations were characteristic 
of a penetration model. This was shown by the penetration of the military by the Communist 
party that ensured the party's supremacy. The military did not directly threaten this 
supremacy until the 1991 coup. Apati from the civil-military structure, the military's primary 
role was to protect and to promote the interests of the Communist party. This involved the 
military being externally focused and countering the perceived security threat posed by the 
West. With regard to the level of budgetary support and official support of the military, both 
of these were high, although perceptions of personnel differed according to their rank. Thus, 
officers had a higher level of morale relative to soldiers. Turning to cohesion, this was not 
defective to the point of threatening the central command structure. Here I examined five key 
institutional relationships and found that except for a salient division between officers and 
soldiers, cohesion appears to ·have been adequate. Finally, the military's expertise was 
inadequate. Most indicative of this were the military's experiences in the Afghanistan war. 
Overall, the military held a privileged position in Soviet society and it was a powerful 
institution. 
The Soviet military and the transition 1985-1991 
I next examined how the transition from Communism affected the military. Changes to the 
structure of the civil-military relationship had a significant impact. The fundamental change 
here was the weakening of the Communist party, and changes to the control methods that had 
characterised the penetration model. For instance, the role of the MPA was reduced and then 
abolished. Similarly, Communist party membership became less important and then was 
discouraged. These changes occurred as Gorbachev sought to strengthen his position and to 
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implement policy changes. A key indicator of the decline of the party's authority was the 
military's greater political role during this period. However characteristics of the penetration 
model remained when Gorbachev deemed them useful to his quest for greater control. For 
example, politics continued to influence promotions and the secret police remained operative. 
The three Soviet models were problematic, but the participatory model appeared to remain 
most valid. This was primarily because Colton had argued that military intervention was 
possible if the regime initiated reforms that alarmed the military hierarchy. 
With regard to the military's roles, these did not change in the sense that the General 
Secretary retained the power to deploy the military. However the orientation of the military 
changed from an external anti-West focus to an internal role. This change corresponded with 
Gorbachev' s greater emphasis on Soviet-West cooperation. More specifically, domestic 
developments were increasingly seen as posing serious threats. The fall of the Communist 
party's authority and the policy of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' facilitated nationalism, and 
ethnic tensions and separatist aspirations. These led to the deployment of the military. 
Reductions to budgetary support, in popular support, and in military morale occurred under 
Gorbachev. The level of budgetary support changed in accordance with the re-orientation of 
the military. Various factors discouraged defence expenditure. These included the poor 
performance of the economy and Gorbachev's perceptions that the military's global role 
should be reduced. The perception of the military, officers, and military service also declined. 
This decline was evident at the highest level and among the civilian population, as fewer were 
willing to serve, and personnel were attacked. Two key factors discouraged support. First and 
most importantly, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev discouraged a high level of support for 
the military. Second, it became evident that the military was failing to perform its allocated 
roles. The roles themselves were unpopular among many. In line with this, and the harsh 
conditions personnel faced, morale declined. For instance, opinion surveys indicated that 
pessimism among personnel increased. This equated with problems like desertion. More 
graphically, the frequency of suicide increased. 
The military's cohesion and size changed under Gorbachev, but expertise remained 
inadequate. Changes occurred because of the repercussions of Gorbachev's reforms. 
Examining the military's cohesion, the emergence of salient divisions clearly indicated that a 
decline occurred, and this is reflective of the divisions that emerged throughout the Soviet 
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Union. More specifically, the relationship between the services, officers, political officers and 
military personnel, officers and soldiers, and various ethnic groups was assessed. Here further 
tensions emerged, as divergent views were held of the transitional changes, of the actions of 
one another, and over who was responsible for problems that personnel experienced. With 
regard to size, the numerical decline of personnel reflected the different priorities of the party 
leaders and the impact of the refom1s. Finally, the military continued to lack the expertise that 
was needed to successfully execute the operations that its roles entailed. This was shown by 
the military's performance in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Three factors best explained 
this inadequacy. First, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. 
Second, personnel of a high quality left without being replaced by similarly qualified 
perso1mel. Third, the quality and quantity of training fell. 
Therefore, I believe that in the context of the Soviet transition from Communism hypotheses 
one, regime transitions can have the potential to negatively impact upon the military, is valid. 
This is because the transition changed the structure of the civil-military relationship, the 
military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, military morale, and cohesion and 
size. Likewise, the expertise of personnel was changed. These changes were of a negative 
nature for the military. 
The Russian military, the transition, and the threat of a coup 1992-1996 
As with the 1985 to 1991 period, I concluded that major changes occurred under the new 
regime that impacted upon the military. Most importantly, the structure of the civil-military 
relationship changed, as the main actors became the new regime and the Russian military 
rather than the Communist party and the Soviet military. Penetration methods of control were 
thus realigned to enhance Yeltsin's authority. Indicative of this was the continued monitoring 
of pers01mel by the new regime. An outcome of the decline of the Communist party, and 
continued use of penetration control methods, was the military's increased political activity. 
The three Soviet models became ever 1:11ore redundant during this period. This was 
fundamentally because all three revolved around the relationship between the now defunct 
Communist party and the also defunct Soviet military. 
Apart from the structure of the civil-military relationship, institutional roles and budgetary 
support changed. The roles allocated to the military continued to differ from those before 
1985. Further changes were made by the new regime because of its commitment to Russia 
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rather than the Soviet Union, and because of the new regime's security perceptions. With 
regard to budgetary support, this continued to be limited relative to the pre-transitional period. 
This was illustrated by the decline of the military's budget in real terms. These changes 
occurred in accordance with the continued downplaying of the military's traditional external 
role, the lack of economic growth, and the increased competition for resources. 
Nor was popular support for the military, along with the morale of personnel and military 
cohesion isolated from change. Although the military had enjoyed much support before the 
transition, under Yeltsin the perception of the military, officers, and military service was 
negative. Limited support can be attributed to the same two key factors that encouraged 
negative perceptions under Gorbachev. First, the reforms instigated by Gorbachev meant that 
the military's problems continued to be publicised. Second, the new roles allocated to the 
military, and its inability to perform them reinforced negative perceptions. 
Given these negative developments, morale among personnel was low. To assess the level of 
cohesion I again examined the relationship between the services, officers, political officers 
and military personnel, and officers and soldiers. I did not examine ethnic relations as these 
were examined when I assessed secondary motives. The Chechnyan war was graphically 
illustrative of the lack of cohesion. The military was bitterly divided over the invasion's 
merits, and cohesion was so poor that casualties from 'friendly fire' were high. Additional 
divisions grew because of divergent opinions over restructuring the military, over service 
conditions, and the continued debate concerning the place of politics in the military. 
Finally, both the military's size and expertise changed. The transition led to a drastic decline 
in the number of personnel. This accompanied the decline of the military's traditional external 
role, and the fall in budgetary support that occurred as a result of the poor performance of the 
economy. In addition, it became increasingly difficult to find those willing and able to serve. 
Turning to military expertise, the inadequate level of expertise evident under Gorbachev 
remained and probably worsened given the military's performance in Chechnya. Most 
importantly, the military was allocated roles for which it was not properly prepared. Other 
factors that contributed to this inadequacy included the loss of experienced personnel and the 
lack of quality training. 
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Although a militaiy coup was not staged in Russia the threat of one was taken seriously. This 
threat was shown by the threats made by military personnel against the new regime, and by 
the various opinions that were held with regard to a coup. The willingness of some personnel 
to intervene against the civilian leadership was most clearly shown by the 1991 coup and by 
the 1993 revolt. Two broad opinions on the potential for such an intervention were 
discernible. First, the threat of a coup was taken seriously and anxiety was expressed over this 
potential development. Second, others downplayed the likelihood of a coup, though this did 
not mean the military's loyalty was taken for granted. However I have doubts with regard to 
many of the explanations put forward for the military's political quiescence, which was often 
explained in terms of its poor cohesion and professionalism. This was because the military 
was united on some issues, and the other armed forces that the new regime could have sought 
assistance from experienced poor cohesion too. With regard to professionalism, this declined, 
and professional attributes did not prevent personnel from intervening. 
Therefore, I believe that in the context of the second period of the transition hypotheses one is 
again valid. According to hypothesis one, regime transitions can have the potential to 
negatively impact upon the military. This is because the transition affected the structure of the 
civil-military relationship, the military's roles, the level of budgetary and popular support, and 
the militaiy morale. Similarly, institutional cohesion and size along with expertise changed. It 
is equally clear that these changes were of an overwhelmingly negative nature. The brief 
outlining of the coup threat also provides the context within which hypotheses two to four 
were evaluated. According to hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to 
stage a coup and their imp011ance can vary. With regard to hypothesis three, a transition 
affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup. Finally, according to 
hypothesis four a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, disposition, 
and opportunity to intervene. 
The Russian Militaiy's Political Quiescence, 1992-1996 
Acceptance of civilian supremacy 
The Russian military accepted civilian supremacy in tern1s of the civilian right to govern, and 
was unwilling to directly challenge this by staging a coup. Apart from the new regime's right 
to govern, the relationship was not indicative of absolute civilian supremacy. The military 
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became increasingly influential in some policy-making areas, such as in the areas of foreign 
and security affairs, and was willing to express opposition to the new regime's policies. 
However despite the presence of civil-military tensions, the right of the new regime to govern 
was not directly challenged or questioned by the overwhelming majority of personnel. 
The acceptance of civilian supremacy was primarily encouraged by three factors: 
Lack of capacity 
The military lacked the capacity to intervene and was aware of this. More specifically, I 
presented five key arguments. First, a potential coup leader was absent. There was no 
opponent of Yeltsin able to either unite the military behind their position or who was 
supp01iive of a coup. Second, strategically located personnel did not show any propensity to 
actively support a coup. Third, the military lacked the expertise required to swiftly and 
successfully stage a coup, though it remained equipped to intervene. Fomih, the fall in 
cohesion meant that the threat of instability, and indeed a civil war, was a possible outcome of 
a coup, a threat recognised by many personnel. However a lack of cohesion did not rule-out a 
coup, given this disunity also characterised those forces the new regime would call upon for 
protection. Finally, it was unlikely that a coup lead€r would have been able to recruit enough 
active supporters. The importance of these weaknesses was strongly reinforced by three 
factors. First, the lack of self-confidence meant that personnel were unlikely to believe that 
they could successfully overcome these weaknesses. Second, the military lacked a strong 
interventionist disposition that might have outweighed anxiety over the military's 
inadequacies. Third, the incapacity of the military was evident and was recognised by the 
personnel. 
I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and 
their importance can vary, is valid within the context of the capacity to intervene. This is 
because many factors influenced the military's perception of its capacity to intervene. More 
specifically, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and 
opportunity to stage a coup, according to the first of the three factors, is valid. I believe that 
the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The 
transition impacted upon the loyalty of strategically located personnel as discontent did 
emerge, on the military's expertise and cohesion, on the number of personnel available to 
stage such an intervention, and on the mood of personnel. However strong potential coup 
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leaders did not emerge. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it 
strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did 
not encourage a coup, and the validity of the hypothesis is doubtful. Although it did encourage 
discontent this was not strong enough to overcome the reluctance to intervene. The transition 
actually reduced the level of institutional expertise and cohesion along with the prospective 
number of participants. Moreover the transition's negative impact on the military ensured that 
personnel did not develop an interventionist mood. The poor morale of personnel hindered the 
development of a sense of supremacy over civilians and of a high level of confidence. 
Lack of disposition 
Although personnel held grievances, a strong interventionist disposition did not arise. I made 
two key conclusions. First, primary grievances derived from the negative impact on the 
military of transitional events developed under the new regime, which were conducive to the 
staging of a coup. Such grievances emerged from the violation of the military's corporate self-
interests as military autonomy was violated, functional rivals grew, and budgetary support in 
real tenns declined. Reinforcing these grievances was the violation of individual self-interests. 
However those interests of officers strategically placed and popular with personnel were often 
protected and promoted by the new regime. Thus, the importance of these grievances declined. 
Moreover military influence in some policy areas increased. Of less importance were negative 
incentives. This was because the negative repercussions for those leading challenges against 
the new regime were often weak. Further restraining an interventionist disposition was the 
absence of a coup-conducive mood, which encouraged few to have the confidence to 
intervene. Although the new regime occasionally endorsed the military, the military was 
generally poorly regarded, and was aware of the difficult nature of seizing power. 
Second, it was highly unlikely that secondary factors would play a discernible role in 
motivating a coup. Secondary factors are those that I believe are less likely to be important in 
motivating intervention. This was because coup grievances arising from the violation of 
sectional interests derived from class, regional, and ethnic affiliations were not strong enough 
to counter the reluctance to intervene. Similarly, it was most unlikely that the manifest destiny 
and the national interest would have motivated a coup. This was because the military showed 
little inclination that it would intervene in politics, or indeed play any domestic role, despite 
the situation. Many personnel also recognised that a coup would not help solve Russia's 
problems. Finally, although there were some external actors that might have supported a coup, 
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it was very unlikely that they would have been influential in determining a coup. This was 
because the military was self-sufficient and was not dependent on an external actor. I 
ultimately believe that a mixture of motives was present under the new regime, but this 
mixture was not strong enough to provide the disposition to intervene. 
I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and 
their importance can vary, is valid within the context of the disposition to intervene. This is 
because many factors influenced the military's disposition to intervene. More specifically, 
hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage 
a coup, according to the second of the three factors, is valid. I believe that the transition did 
impact upon factors that shaped the military's capacity to intervene. The transition affected 
corporate, individual, class and particularistic interests, the manifest destiny and national 
interest, and external actors. Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as 
it strengthens the capacity, disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did 
not encourage a coup and the validity of the hypothesis is doubtful. Although it did encourage 
discontent, this was not strong enough for a strong interventionist disposition to develop that 
overcame the reluctance to intervene. 
Lack of opportunity 
The military had a greater opportunity to intervene under Gorbachev than under Yeltsin. The 
situation in the Soviet Union can be most accurately described as an "overt crisis" because of 
the widespread discontent. This discontent was motivated by a lack of attachment to the 
Communist regime, and led to a crisis because a viable alternative developed. Under the new 
regime, however, although discontent did occur and characteristics of a "latent crisis" were 
evident, it did not become serious enough to force the new regime to become overly 
dependent on the military for its survival. Support for democracy was low relative to other 
states and disillusionment was high. Whereas under Gorbachev there was a viable alternative, 
namely democracy, few people had a viable alternative to the new regime. Therefore, 
although in absolute terms regime attachment was low, it was high relative to other regime 
types, particularly relative to military rule. The lack of support for a military regime was 
derived from the military's unpopularity. This discouraged people from believing that it could 
govern better than civilians. This lack of support was important, given personnel were 
reluctant to injure Russian civilians. Apart from the lack of a viable alternative, people feared 
instability could threaten their personal interests, few experienced living conditions harsh 
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enough to demonstrate despite the lack of a viable alternative, and most people did not have 
high expectations that the new regime could not meet. 
Turning to private associations, their presence helped to deny the military an opportunity to 
intervene. Most importantly, during the transition many political parties developed. Although 
parties did not receive widespread support, at least some evidence indicates that their strength 
was comparable to other states. As the new regime permitted the development of a multi-party 
system, and competitive elections, parties became closely associated with the new regime and 
their strength made it more difficult to seize power through force. Though the majority of 
Russians supported the multi-party system, parties were often unable to mobilise many 
supporters. For instance, surveys found that party affiliations were limited and the 
overwhelming majority of Russians did not belong to parties. The failures of the political 
system and the weaknesses of parties discouraged widespread support. Support, though, was 
often comparable to other countries. Evidence suggested that parties would have opposed 
intervention, as a coup would have been detrimental to the interests of parties. For example, 
leaders who used force to seize power were unlikely to have foreseen an important and 
independent policy-making role for parties 
Like parties, independent labour unions developed with the transition as greater freedom was 
allowed, and as Gorbachev sought to mobilise support for his reforms. Labour unions were 
soon able to mobilise large numbers of workers; this remained the case under the new regime. 
The strength of unions reflected their historic role, the positive opinions of unions relative to 
other groups, and the poor working conditions. Despite their demonstrations against the new 
regime, unions were likely to have opposed intervention. This was because of a coup's 
potentially negative effects, the new regime's moves to win over unions, and the threat of 
retaliation if union members supported direct challenges against the regime. 
Many industrial associations and firms also developed with the transition as the Communist 
party's control over the economy declined. Under the new regime, industrial associations and 
firms remained active. The 'Most' financial group illustrated the immense strength that 
businesses could achieve. The growth of associations and firms was facilitated by the 
economic reforms that reduced state control of the economy, and by their 'courting' of 
politicians. Businessmen were also able to win greater public support than other groups; this 
was likely to have been encouraged by their ownership of much of the media. Evidence 
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suggested that few associations and firms would have supported intervention. The potential 
negative consequences of a coup, such as the threat to consumer and investor confidence, and 
the new regime's moves to satisfy business interests discouraged support. 
Finally, the strength of the Russian Orthodox Church, the most powerful church in Russia, 
increased after 1985. The strength of the Orthodox Church increased with the transition and 
people returned to the church after Communist restrictions were lifted. The ideological void 
left by the collapse of Communism was probably a key factor that encouraged the church's 
growth. The church was also closely associated with Russian nationalism. However active 
participation in the church was discouraged by the difficult nature of understanding the 
religion. I believe that the church would have opposed intervention because of its religious 
teachings and because of the transition's positive impact on the church. Apart from the lifting 
of religious restrictions, the transition allowed the church to reclaim property and to acquire 
businesses. 
I believe that hypothesis two, various factors can influence the decision to stage a coup and 
their impo1iance can vary, is valid within the context of the opportunity to intervene. This is 
because the level of regime attachment, the level of civilian dependence on the military and 
the domestic situation, and the military's popularity all influenced the military's perception of 
its oppo1iunity to intervene. More specifically, hypothesis three, a regime transition affects the 
capacity, disposition, and opportunity to stage a coup, according to the last of the three 
factors, is valid. I believe that the transition did impact upon factors that shaped the military's 
opportunity to intervene. The transition affected the level of regime attachment, the level of 
civilian dependence on the military and the domestic situation, and the military's popularity. 
Turning to hypothesis four, a transition can be coup conducive as it strengthens the capacity, 
disposition, and opportunity to intervene, the transition overall did not encourage a coup and 
the validity of the hypothesis is doubtfuL Although discontent did occur and characteristics of 
a "latent crisis" were evident, it did not become serious enough to force the new regime to 
become overly dependent on the military for its survival. The transition also encouraged the 
growth of private associations that were comparable to other states. The development of 
private associations further reduced the opportunity to intervene, as evidence suggested that 
the associations would have opposed a coup. 
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I believe that the risk of intervention was too high for the military given its lack of capacity 
and opportunity. The military was aware that the risks involved in intervening were high 
because of its lack of capacity, and because of the likelihood that civilians would oppose a 
coup. This is important because the military was reluctant to use violence against Russian 
civilians. A lack of self-confidence and the absence of a strong interventionist disposition 
reinforced this. 
A number of broad conclusions can be drawn from this thesis. Most importantly, regime 
transitions have a major impact that should be studied. This impact is not restricted to the 
country that experiences the transition, as the global economy and security system can be 
dramatically altered by a transition, especially if the transition occurs in a large state. The 
importance of studying transitions is reinforced by the many challenges they pose to scholars. 
This should be apparent, as I have found that theoretical models produced before a transition 
might not be able to satisfactorily explain transitional developments. The relevance of 
theoretical models can decline, as the factors on which they are premised change and factors 
arise that are not included in the model. This ultimately poses the question as to whether 
models are able to accurately explain developments in periods of exceptional change. Scholars 
face the problem of attempting to build accurate frameworks while change continues, often at 
a rapid pace. This increases the likelihood that theories will swiftly become out-dated and 
inaccurate. Hence, scholars might be faced with the challenge of finding new ways to explain 
the changes and their impact. This might involve looking at the theories that have been used to 
study past case studies that experienced dramatic change. 
However the case study indicates that theoretical models can remain helpful, regardless of a 
transition. Although transitions are periods of exceptional change, they do not necessarily lead 
to a complete change; some features of the pre-transitional period often remain. This 
continuity might occur because it is easier for the new regime to retain pre-transitional 
strnctures relative to building new structures, particularly as the new regime will be seeking to 
swiftly consolidate itself. The structures might also be retained because of their historic 
traditions, and because they are deemed the best way of achieving the new regime's goals, 
despite their pre-transitional origins. When this continuity occurs, the arguments associated 
with theoretical models that pre-date the transition can remain valid, can provide some insight 
into future trends, and can provide the foundations from which new theories can be developed. 
This is shown by the continued relevance of the penetration model, despite its development 
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over 20 years ago. The usefulness of such models is further increased when the period within 
which the model was developed is recognised. This is because the recognition of the context 
within which the model was developed helps one to identify those models that might remain 
most relevant when a transition occurs. 
More specifically, although Finer's approach to the study of civil-military relations remains 
useful, as it provides a broadly acceptable framework by which coups can be studied, it 
requires revision. The approach's weaknesses include its failure to adequately cover the 
capacity to intervene, particularly with regard to the incapacity to intervene, and to clearly 
rank the factors that might encourage intervention. Finer's study of the opportunity to 
intervene also was based on questionable assumptions. Apart from the use of the controversial 
term "political culture," Finer's arguments were based on the questionable premise that the 
stronger private associations were, the less opportunity the military had to intervene. I also 
believe that he failed to adequately examine why a coup does not occur. 
The case study is indicative of how the status of an institution can change dramatically in a 
sho1i period. It can thus move swiftly from an elite to an inferior position, and I expect the 
opposite, dming a transition. With regard to a Russian coup, the most important conclusion is 
that grievances among personnel do not necessarily mean that they will intervene. This 
reinforces the need to examine why coups do not occur, rather than solely focusing on why 
they do occur. Nor does the case study support many explanations of intervention. For 
instance, the manifest destiny, the national interest, and external actors, were unlikely to play a 
significant role. Neither were the shared backgrounds and experiences of personnel influential 
in determining their willingness to cooperate during a coup. Turning to civilians, although the 
popularity of a regime might be low and living conditions for many harsh, this does not 
necessarily mean that there is a willingness to move to another regime, paiiicularly through 
violence. This is because the level of support for the regime needs to be examined within the 
context of whether there is a viable alternative that people feel could provide better 
governance. The case study also supports my argument that no military is isolated from 
civilian society, as the attitudes of Soviet and post-Soviet personnel appear to have been 
similar to civilians. 
With regard to the approach I utilised, I believe that it allows an accurate study of the Soviet 
and post-Soviet case study to be undertaken. I first provided an historic outline of the case 
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study and examined the models that have been used to assess Soviet civil-military relations. 
This not only provided a background, it put into perspective the changes that occurred with the 
transition. Turning to the actual transition, I believe that my approach examined the most 
important aspects of the military, and provided compelling evidence to support my arguments. 
Dividing the transition into three periods facilitated comparisons, and hence facilitated a 
clearer understanding of how the military changed. Comparisons of the case study with other 
countries also put changes into perspective. With regard to the assessment of coups, I believe 
that my approach is valid. The approach examined the key factors that evidence indicates 
might influence the decision to intervene. However the approach went beyond merely listing 
factors; it categorised them and then critically assessed their influence so that their importance 
could be ranked. This was also undertaken when I examined the Russian military, after clearly 
identifying the threat of a coup and the weaknesses of current literature on the topic. 
There is room for a more comprehensive study of the Russian military's political quiescence. 
The very complexity of studying why a coup does not occur, particularly when there is much 
conflicting evidence, ensures that the arguments will not escape critique. This in tum should 
lead to alternative approaches that might provide a more comprehensive explanation for the 
military's political quiescence. One area of possible improvement relates to the interviewing 
of key actors. A more comprehensive study of the Russian military would certainly be assisted 
by access to key figures like Grachev and Yeltsin. This is because of their important roles 
during this period. Surveys were also problematic. I have already mentioned that the structure 
of the surveys and the questions asked influences how personnel respond. Likewise, there can 
be a major difference between -what personnel say in a survey and how they act. Another 
problem has been the lack of surveys that specifically asked whether personnel would support 
a coup. Avenues of research could include a study of the impact of General Lev Rokhlin's 
'Movement for Support to the Army, the Defence Industry and Military Research.' This 
movement is not examined in-depth, as it was formed after my period of analysis. However it 
won support from personnel and Rokhlin was identified as a potential coup leader. Another 
avenue of research could include a survey of attitudes among Soviet and post-Soviet military 
personnel, relative to attitudes in the East European militaries. This could indicate how a 
transition can impact on different militaries, and put into perceptive the attitudes expressed by 
personnel. Likewise, a study of both the transitions to Communism and from Communism in 
Russia would be useful. This would help explain how the transitions to and from the same 
ideology can impact on the society, and more specifically the military. There is also much 
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room for examining in greater depth the level of regime attachment among groups. For 
example, I have not examined the mobilisation of Russian tertiary students and their potential 
reaction to a coup. 
Epilogue 
Yeltsin remained at the head of the civil-military relationship after August 1996. In October 
1996, Yeltsin replaced Lebed with Ivan Rybkin, a former parliamentary speaker, and sacked 6 
Generals. The following May, Yeltsin replaced Rodionov as Defence Minister during a 
meeting of the Defence Council. Yeltsin accused Rodionov of failing to reform the military 
and replaced him with Igor Sergeyev, the Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Yeltsin 
re-emphasised his control by commenting that "I really, you could say, dropped back a 
little ... due to certain circumstances [his poor health] but now that's over. I have everything in 
hand." 1 Yeltsin also removed General Viktor Samsonov, the Chief of the General Staff, the 
following day. In December 1997 Yeltsin approved the 'national security concept' and this, 
along with the 'Fundamentals of Russian Federation State Policy for Military Development up 
to the Year 2005' published in August 1998, outlined Russia's national security interests. 
These documents concluded that the principal threat to national security for the next 10 to 15 
years was posed by domestic economic, social, and ethnic problems rather than large-scale 
external aggression.2 However concerns about Yeltsin's health intensified and his ability to 
govern increased, especially after he dramatically sacked his entire cabinet in March 1998, 
though he re-appointed Sergeyev. 
Despite Yeltsin's continued hold on power, the threat of a coup remained and might have 
become more serious. Yeltsin in late August 1996 commented that he "did not rule out that 
under certain circumstances such [coup] attempts are possible, although their probability is 
low."3 The following month Lebed warned, "the army is on the verge of a mutiny, however in 
Russia there is no tradition of military coups."4 In October 1996 a group of officers claimed 
1 Paul Quinn-Judge, "A Bold and Brutal Firing," Time, no vol. no.22, 2 June 1997, p41. 
2 The Militmy Balance 1998-1999, plOl. 
3 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 21 August 1996, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 22 August 1996, quoted in 
"Yeltsin Appeals For An End To Divisions In Society Five Years After August Coup Attempt," Reuters, 22 
August 1996. 
4 ITAR-TASS (world service), 26 September 1996, quoted in "Lebed Rejects Possibility Of Military Coup," 
Reuters, 28 September 1996. 
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that the military had enough force to make the new regime increase its support. 5 In April 1997 
it was reported that Russian defence specialists, including the deputy chair of the Duma 
Defence Committee, estimated that the odds of military chaos, disintegration, or a coup were 
higher than 60 percent. That same month American intelligence officials put the odds at 
between 30 to 40 percent.6 Later that year Josiah Beeman, the US Ambassador to New 
Zealand, told me that he feared another coup could occur in Russia.7 More recently, in July 
1998 rumours that a coup had been staged forced the Kremlin to issue a denial, and in 
September Chernomyrdin warned that a coup could occur. That month Lebed also warned of a 
coup. Lebed claimed that "there is a danger of the mood in the army turning aggressive."8 
However after briefly assessing the period from August 1996 until late 1998, I doubt whether 
the military had the capacity to intervene. No figure willing and able to lead a coup appears to 
have emerged. For instance, Rutskoi, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov, Lebed, and Gromov continued 
to show little inclination to lead a coup. Although military experts in July 1997 estimated that 
Lebed was supported by 28 percent of officers, 6 percent less than in May 1996, he showed 
little willingness to use force to take power.9 Indeed he was elected Governor of the 
Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia in May 1998, and indicated that he was aiming to compete in 
the 2000 presidential elections. One possible exception was General Lev Rokhlin, the General 
who led the successful assault on Grozny. Rokhlin formed the Movement for Support to the 
Arn1y, the Defence Industry and Military Research in 1997. This included leaders of the 1991 
coup and Rodionov. Military experts in July 1997 estimated that he was supported by 39 
percent of officers. 10 Rokhlin that month said that if army officers "rise in rebellion and march 
to Moscow" he would support. them. l t However Rokhlin that September said that Yeltsin 
5 Uli Schmetzer, "Though No Coup Is Expected, Russian Army Sees Kremlin As Its Enemy," The Chicago 
Tribune, 20 October 1996, available from http://www.nd.edu/~astrouni/zhiwriter/spool96/96 l02412.htm, 
Internet, accessed 19 April 1998, p 1 of3. 
6 US News and World Report 122 no.14, 1997, n.p., quoted in "Behind Closed Doors" (Russian And US Defence 
Experts Differ Sharply Over The Possibility Of A Coup)," Reuters, 10 April 1997, accessed 29 April 1997. 
Please note that the date I accessed articles from R~uters after 1996 is provided as they might be corrected or 
changed by Reuters. The articles accessed before 1997 had been available for at least one year before I accessed 
them, and are thus unlikely to have been since corrected or changed. 
7 Josiah Beeman, US Ambassador to New Zealand. Conversation with Paul Bellamy, 11 December 1997. In 
Christchurch after a meeting of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch Branch. 
8 The Sunday Times, 13 September 1998, n.p., quoted in Mark Franchetti, "Lebed Warns Russia Of Coup," 
Reuters, 13 September 1998, accessed 15 March 1999. 
9 See chapter 5, Table 11 and Graph 4, pp202-3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Segodnya, 10 July 1997, p3, carried by Russian Press Digest, 10 July 1997, quoted in Lyubov Poleshanina, 
"Movement In Support For The A1n1y Or A New Coup?" Reuters, 10 July 1997, accessed 12 June 1998. 
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should be removed by legal and constitutional means. 12 He died from a gunshot wound in July 
1998. As Azizian told me in February 1998, "After 1991 no political group or institution in 
Russia has been able to incite the military to stage a coup. Without such political leadership 
the military (the dissatisfied elements) seem to be reluctant or incapable of staging a coup."13 
The military capacity was further eroded by serious weaknesses. The number of personnel the 
military could deploy fell as restructuring continued. The number of personnel in the army, the 
strategic missile defence troops, the navy, and the integrated air force and air defence forces 
was 910,000 in 1998.14 In 1996 the army, SRF, the air force, the air defence, and the navy had 
1,070,000 personnel. 15 More specifically, by 1998 the number of army personnel had fallen to 
420,000, compared to 460,000 in 1996. 16 In fact in October 1998 it was estimated that there 
were only 200,000 genuinely operational troops within the army, whereas in 1993 it was 
calculated that 125,000 personnel would be needed just to control Moscow in an emergency. 17 
Contrasting this, the number of armed personnel not under the Ministry of Defence increased. 
The number of paramilitary personnel, such as members of the MVD, increased from 352,000 
in 1996, to 543,000 in 1998.18 Another serious problem continued to be a lack of morale. Only 
44 percent of officers in a survey of three MDs and one army corps from September to 
October 1997 indicated that they were proud to defend Russia. Similarly, cohesion remained 
problematic. The 1997 survey found 27 percent of officers were dissatisfied with their 
relations with others, and two-thirds reported that conflicts between commanders and their 
subordinates occurred. 19 
Turning to the military's disposition, this might have increased after Yeltsin's second 
inauguration. By July 1997 Russian experts estimated that only 9 percent of officers supported 
Yeltsin, compared to 18 percent for Zhirinovsky, 24 percent for Zyuganov, and 28 percent for 
Lebed. More dramatically, experts estimated that 31 percent of officers could resort to the use 
12 Vremya, 9 July 1997, n.p., quoted in Barylski, The Soldier, p483. 
13 Azizian, E-mail to Paul Bellamy. 12 February 1998. 
14 The Militmy Balance 1998-1999, pp108-112. 
15 The Militmy Balance 1996-1997, ppl 13-119. 
16 The Militmy Balance /998-1999, p109. With regard to the number of personnel in 1996 see chapter 4, Table 
9,p178. 
17 JIR, October 1998, p3, quoted in Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Shrinking Military," Reuters, 1 October 1998, 
accessed 10 March 1999; and Pavel Felgengauer, "Balans sil vokrug Kremlia: Vozmozhnosti silovykh 
ministerstv ogranicheny," Segodnia 4, 16 March 1993, p2, quoted in Mendeloff, p241. 
18 The Military Balance 1996-1997, pl 19; and The Military Balance 1998-1999, pl 14. 
19 Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 June 1998, n.p., carried by BBC MS: FUSSR, 27 August 1998, quoted in "Survey 
Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied With Pay, Housing But Proud To Serve," Reuters, 27 August 1998, accessed 
10 March 1999. 
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of force if their demands were not met, a 5 percent increase over 1996.20 The military 
continued to experience many problems after 1996; and these are likely to have encouraged 
opposition to the new regime. A June 1998 survey of 1,500 officers found that over 70 percent 
were not content with their positions.21 This indicates that dissatisfaction had increased since 
the 1995 Ball survey found that 67.8 percent were dissatisfied.22 The 1998 survey also found 
that 31.3 percent believed that the lack of money for maintaining combat readiness was the 
military's main problem. The second and third problems (each identified by 23.7 percent) 
were bad social conditions and the poor discipline of troops. 23 The level of budgetary support 
encouraged this concern over resources. Although the official defence budget increased from 
80,185 million roubles in 1996 to 104,300 million in 1997, it then fell to 81,765 million in 
1998. Even though the budget increased in 1997, military expenditure still fell from $US 73 
billion in 1996, to $US 64 billion in 1997.24 
However the disposition was not strong enough to motivate intervention. Nor was there an 
interventionist mood, as there remained strong opposition to domestic security roles. In the 
1997 survey, only 30 percent said that they were willing to participate in combat activities 
aimed at restoring constitutional order within Russia.25 More specifically, polls of officers and 
warrant officers the following year found that only 8 percent participated, or would like to 
participate, in the activities of parties and movements opposing the new regime.26 Similarly, 
no officers turned up at protest meetings held by Rokhlin's movement in April 1998. Both the 
1997 and 1998 surveys help to explain this. They found that most officers were content with 
staying in the military despite the conditions. The 1997 survey found that 81 percent wished to 
continue to serve and although this fell rather dramatically, 55.1 percent in the 1998 survey 
indicated this too.27 Indeed when I asked a Russian official in July 1998 whether a coup was 
likely he responded that "the reason of such must be only more than 6 month's unpayment of 
20 See chapter 4, Table 10 and Graph 3 pp185-6 and chapter 5, Table 11 and Graph 4, pp202-3. 
21 Izvestia, July 14 1998, pl, carried by 'What the papers say,' 14 July 1998, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy 
With Their Life, But Are Not In A Hurry To Leave The Armed Forces," Reuters, 14 July 1998, accessed 10 
March 1999. 
22 Ball and Gerber, Table 6, p 173. 
23 Izvestia, July 14 1998, p 1, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy With Their Life." 
24 The Milita,y Balance 1998-1999, Tables 12 and 14, pp104-5. 
25 Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 June 1998, quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied With Pay." 
26 Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie no.25, 1998, p3, carried by 'What The Papers Say,' 14 July 1998, quoted in 
Andrei Korbut, "Lev: Rokhlin Was The Most Popular Politician In The Armed Forces," Reuters, 14 July 1998, 
accessed 15 March 1999. 
21 Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 June 1998, n.p., quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied"; and Izvestia, 
July 14 1998, pl, quoted in "Officers Are Not Happy With Their Life." 
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salaries, serious starvation among officers and men."28 Support for the new regime's reforms 
also increased according to the 1997 survey. In 1997, 25 percent supported the military and 
economic reforms compared to 16 percent in 1996.29 Nor have I found any evidence that 
indicates secondary factors would have motivated a coup. 
Finally, I do not believe that the military had the opportunity to intervene. Although 
demonstrations continued, they were not strong enough to force the new regime to become 
dependent on the military for survival. Disillusionment among Russians remained widespread. 
A March 1997 survey found that only 14 percent believed that "things in Russia" were "going 
in the right direction. "30 However the willingness to challenge the new regime was limited. 
This is shown by the nationwide protests in October 1998 that were expected to involve up to 
25 million people, and had encouraged talk that there would be a revolution. An estimated 
615,000 people participated nationwide, and in Moscow there were 13,000 police for 30,000 
protesters.31 Moreover, although disillusionment in the new regime increased, the majority still 
did not believe that there was a viable alternative. A January 1997 survey found that 38 
percent supported a return to Communist rule, compared to 23 percent in 1994, and only 15 
percent supported military rule, a 4 percent increase over 1994.32 Similarly, the majority of 
Russians were able to survive living conditions, at least in early 1998. A March to April 1998 
nationwide survey found that the vast majority of Russians said that they did not go without 
necessities like heat and electricity, and were seldom short of food or clothing.33 More 
specifically, public support of the military remained limited. In July 1997, only 48 percent of 
those surveyed trusted the military. 34 
Assessing the situation today and making predictions is very difficult because of the dynamic 
nature of Russian politics. Overall, I believe that a coup is not likely in the near future because 
28 Averyanov, E-mail to Paul Bellamy. 6 July 1998. 
29 Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 June 1998, n.p., quoted in "Survey Shows Army Officers Dissatisfied." 
30 "Two-thirds Of Russians Gloomy Over Future-Poll," Reuters, 30 March 1997, available from 
http://www.nd.edu/-astrouni/zhiwriter/97/97040301.htm, accessed 2 October 1998, pl of 2. 
31 Scotsman, 8 October 1998, p13, quoted in Owen Matthews, "Anti-Yeltsin Protest Fails To Attract Large 
Crowds," Reuters, 8 October 1998, accessed 15 March 1999. 
32 "Russians Long For Strong Hand," Associated Press, 17 February 1997, available from 
http://www.nd.edu/-astrouni/zhiwriter/97/97022008.htm, Internet, accessed 30 August 1998, pl of 1; and Rose, 
p56-7. The survey interviewed 2406 people. 
33 "Can't Pay, Don't Need To Pay": How Russians View Taxation," available from 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/CSPP/nrb7pr.htrnl, n.d., accessed 2 October 1998, pl of 2. The survey 
interviewed 2002 people. 
34 Mneniye, n.p., quoted in "Russian thoughts on war and peace," The Economist, 344, no.8028, 2 August 1997, 
p38 
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of the military's disastrous state and its strong reluctance to intervene. Other scholars concur 
with this conclusion. Lester Grau in June 1998 said to me that "I don't categorically discount 
any future coup attempt by the military, but I would be very surprised. The time is past."35 
Indeed a US State Department report publicised in March 1999 concluded, "there are no 
indicators that the military has, or aims to become, a viable political element."36 This is 
supported by a survey undertaken in the Moscow MD in early 1999. This survey found that 
personnel most respected Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov was an opponent of the 
1991 coup and 1993 revolt who announced in April 1999 that "The nation cannot withstand 
one more coup. "37 The second most respected politician was Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov, another opponent of the 1991 coup (Primakov was suddenly sacked in May 1999 as 
Yeltsin moved against an attempt by the Duma to impeach him). Lebed, Yavlinsky, Zyuganov, 
and Zhirinovsky all followed Luzhkov and Primakov.38 
However the domestic situation has become increasingly unpredictable. Yeltsin's poor health 
and increasingly unpredictable behaviour threatens stability, particularly with presidential 
elections scheduled for the year 2000. The military might feel obliged to act, or it might 
realise that it has the opportunity to intervene. The new regime might also fall if the military 
refuses to protect it from serious challenges to its .'authority. This scenario should not been 
ruled out. This is because the above 1997 survey suggests that people were gradually 
becoming more supportive of other regime types. Moreover economic conditions have 
worsened since the Asian downturn, a development that could make at least some people 
desperate enough to support a coup. However Sergeyev reiterated the military's loyalty to the 
President after the sudden removal of Primakov. Likewise, most people appear to remain 
reluctant to support a coup. Survey figures published in April 1999 indicated that although the 
Communist party was the most popular party with 35.4 percent support, the liberal Yabloko 
party was second with 27 .2 percent support. Nor were potential coup leaders well supported. 
Zyuganov was the most popular candidate for President but he was supported by only 23.6 
percent, Zhirinovsky by 5.7 percent and Lebed by 5.3 percent. To put these figures into 
35 Grau, e-mail to Paul Bellamy, 29 June 1998; and Timothy Thomas, Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies 
Office, US Army Combined Arms Center,.Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (THOMAS@LEAV-EMHl.ARMY.MIL) 
E-mail to Paul Bellamy (Pab71@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 29 June 1998. 
36 Janes Defence Weekly 31, no.9, 3 March 1999, n.p, quoted in Greg Seigle, "US Report Details Russia's 
Decaying Military Readiness," Reuters, 3 March 1999, accessed 15 March 1999. 
37 Interfax News Agency Daily News Bulletin, 8 April 1999, quoted in "Luzhkov-Political Hysteria Must Not Be 
Incited In Russia," Reuters, 8 April 1999. 
38 Vremya MN, 21 April 1999, p2, carried by Defence and Security, 23 April 1999, quoted in Aleksei Karelov, 
"Multi-Party Armed Forces," Reuters, 23 April 1999. 
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perspective, Yavlinsky, the leader of the Yabloko party, was supported by 18.7 percent.39 
These figures are similar to the results of a March 1999 survey. This survey found that 
Zyuganov was supported by 21 percent, and Lebed by 10 percent. Yavlinsky was supported 
by 1 7 percent. 40 In conclusion, I believe a military coup within the next five years is possible, 
especially if the 2000 presidential elections cause instability, but is unlikely. 
39 Novae Vremya, no.12, March 1999, pl 9, carried by 'What The Papers Say,' 6 April 1999, quoted in "A Rough 





























APPENDIX 1: Soviet and Post-Soviet History: 1917-1999 
October, revolution leads to the Bolsheviks taking power. 
January, Russian Workers and Peasants Red Army is established by decree. 
The Russian civil war. 
January, Vladimir Lenin dies and this facilitates Stalin's rise to power. 
Purge of military officers. 
June, Germany invades the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet military advances on Berlin and defeats Germany. 
The Demotion of Marshall Georgii Zhukov. 
March, Stalin dies and this facilitates the rise of Nikita Khrushchev. 
Zhukov becomes the first career officer to sit on the Presidium or Politburo. 
June, Zhukov actively supports Khrushchev against his opponents. 
January, Khrushchev announces military cuts and civil-military tensions 
mcrease. 
October, Khrushchev is removed and Leonid Brezhnev's gradually takes 
power. 
Civil-military accommodation, the 'golden age' for the military. 
The conflict model is published. . 
The symbiotic model is published. 
Drnitry Ustionov is appointed Minister of Defence. 
Brezhnev defends detente against military opposition and civil-military 
tensions increase. 
Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov is appointed Chief of the General Staff. 
September, Orgakov is increasingly outspoken and is re-assigned. 
The participatory model is published. 
December, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
November, Brezhnev dies and is succeeded by Iurii Andropov. 
Andropov dies and is succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko. 
March, Chernenko dies arid is succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Moves by Gorbachev to reform the military lead to civil-military tensions. 
Marshal Dmitrii Yazov is appointed Minister of Defence. 
December, Gorbachev announces major unilateral military cuts. 
Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, Chief of the General Staff, resigns. 













March, Article 6 of the Constitution that enshrines the Communist party's 
'leading role' in society is removed. 
Civil-military tensions climax under Gorbachev. 
August, the coup is staged and fails. 
December, Gorbachev resigns and the Soviet Union collapses. 
March, the fom1ation of the Russian Ministry of Defence. 
May, the fom1al establishment of the Russian Ministry of Defence 
Pavel Grachev is named Defence Minister. 
October, the climax of the parliamentary revolt. 
November, The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation are approved. 
December, Duma elections. The LDPR wins the most support from voters. 
In the elections 25 active duty servicemen and officers, along with 2 semi-
retired officers, who stood for office in single member districts or on party 
lists, and 9 were elected. 
December, the invasion of Chechnya, causes increased civil-military 
tensions. 
December, Duma elections. The C0mmunist party wins the most support. In 
total, 19 military officers (8 active and 11 retired) entered the Duma, with 
13 winning districts and 6 entering the Duma through party lists. 
June and July, presidential elections are held. Yeltsin wins re-election. 
June, Alexander Le bed is appointed secretary of the Security Council. 
Grachev is fired and Igor Rodionov is named Defence Minister. 
October, Alexander Lebed is fired. 
May, Rodionov is fired and Igor Sergeyev is named Defence Minister. 
March, Yeltsin sacks his cabinet. 
July, 16 fonner generals sit in the Duma. 
August, Fundamentals of R~1ssian Federation State Policy for Military 
Development up to the Year 2005' are published. 
September, Viktor Primakov is appointed Prime Minister. 
March, the US State Department concludes that a coup in Russia is unlikely. 
May, Yeltsin removes Primakov as he moves to defeat an attempt to 
' 
impeach him. Sergeyev announces that the military remains loyal to the 
President. 
APPENDIX 2: Key Military Officers in March 1993 
Name Position (as at Birthplace Class ( of father) Ethnicity 1991 Coup stance 
March 1993) (pro-coup/anti-coup) 
Achalov, Vladislav Military adviser of Atamysh, Arsk raion, working class Russian pro 
the speaker of the Tatar ASSR (farmer) 
Supreme Soviet. (now Tatarstan) 
Colonel General in 
reserve 
Alekseev, Anatoly Deputy head of the · · not known not known Russian anti 
inter-departmental 
commission on social 
problems of military 
.. men and members of 
their families of the 
government. Captain 
3rd class 
Baltin, Eduard Commander-in-Chief Smolensk middle class Russian not known 
of the Black Sea ( civil-servant) 
Fleet. Vice-Admiral 
Barannikov, Viktor Minister of State Fedosevka, working class Russian anti 
Security until July Pozharsky raion, (specific occupation 
1993. Army General Maritime krai of father not known) 
since 1992 
384 
B ukreev, Yury Chief of the Main not known not known Russian pro 
Headquarters of the 
Land Forces. Colonel 
General since 1991 
Chemavin, Vladimir Commander of the Mykolaiv working class Russian not known 
Navy, Deputy (Nikolaev in ( specific occupation 
Commander-in-Chief Russian), Ukraine not known) 
of the unified armed 
forces of the CIS. 
Admiral of the Fleet . 
since 1983 
Churanov, Vladimir Head of Rear Nevinnomysk, not known Russian not known 
Services of the Stavropol krai 
Armed Forces. Major 
General 
Deinekin, Petr Commander-in-Chief Morozovsk, .. not known Russian anti 
of the Air Forces. Air Rostov oblast (military pilot but 
Force Colonel rank not known) 
General 
Egorov, Vladimir Commander-in-Chief Moscow not known Russian not known 
of the Red Banner 
Baltic Fleet. Admiral 
since 1992 
385 
Erofeev, Oleg Commander-in-Chief Petropavlovsk- middle class Russian not known 
of the Red Banner Kamchatsky ( officer) 
Northern Fleet. 
Admiral since 1992 
Fuzhenko, Ivan Chief of Rear Subbotsy Znamensky working class Ukrainian not known 
Services, first deputy raion, Kirovograd (farmer) 
Commander-in-Chief oblast 
of the Unified Armed 
Forces of the CIS. 
Colonel General 
Golovnev, Anatoly Head of Chief Medvedovka, working class Russian pro 
Combat Training Smolensk oblast (farmer) 
Administration, 
deputy Commander-
: in-Chief of land 
forces. Lieutenant 
General 
Grachev, Pavel Defence Minister, Tula oblast working class Russian anti (though initially 
May 1992-July 1996 (specific occupation pro) 
not known) 
Gromov, Feliks Commander-in-Chief Vladivostok not known Russian pro 
of the Navy. Admiral (serviceman but rank 
since 1988 not known) 
Ivanov, Vitaly Head of the Admiral Poltava, Ukraine middle class Russian pro 
N.G. Kuznetsov ( civil servant) 




Ivanov, Vladimir Head of Space Kamenka- not known Russian neutral 
Weapons of the Dneprovskaya, 
Strategic Forces of Zaporozhskaya 
the Unified Armed oblast, Ukraine 
Forces of the CIS. 
Colonel General 
Kasatonov, Igor First deputy Vladivostok middle class Russian neutral 
Commander-in-Chief (officer) 
of the navy. Admiral 
since 1992 
K.hvatov, Gennady Commander-in-Chief Myshkono, not known Russian pro 
of the Red Banner Yaroslavl ob last 
Pacific Fleet. Admiral 
since 1987 
Kobets, Konstantin Chief military Kiev not known Russian anti 
inspector of the 
armed forces, 
chairman of the 
military legislative 
commission of the 
Ministry of Defence. 
Army General 
Kokoshin, Andrei, First deputy of Moscow middle class Russian not known 
Defence, (officer) 
Corresponding 
member of the 
Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
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Kolesnikov, Mikhail Chief of the General Eysk, not known Russian pro 
Staff of the Armed Krasnodar krai 
Forces. Colonel 
General 
Kondratev, Georgy Deputy Minister of Klintsy, not known Russian neutral 
Defence. Colonel Bryansk oblast 
General since 1992 
Kopysov, Viktor Commander of the Zavitaya, working class Russian not known 
Siberian Military Amursk oblast ( specific occupation 
District. Colonel unknown) 
General since 1991 
Komukov, Anatoly Air Defence Stakhanov, working class Russian pro 
Commander-in-Chief Lugansk oblast, ( specific occupation 
of the Moscow Ukraine not known) 
district. Colonel 
General of the Air 
Forces 
Korovnikov, Chairman of the Gryazi, not known Russian not known 
Aleksandr Russian Supreme Lipetsk oblast (serviceman but rank 
Soviet committee on not known) 
invalids, war and 
labour veterans, 
social protection of 




Kuzmin, Anatoly Deputy Commander- Leningrad not known Russian not known 
in-Chief of the navy 
for combat training, 
chief of combat 
training in the navy. 
Vice Admiral since 
1984 
Lyashenko, Vladimir First Deputy of the Moscow not known Ukrainian not known 
main Headquarters of 
the Navy. Vice 
Admiral since 1990 ,, 
Maiorov, Leonid Commander of the Georgievsk, working class Russian not known 
~orth-Westem group Stavropol krai (specific occupation 
of troops. Colonel not known) 
General 
t .. 
Maksimov, Yury Commander of Kryukovka, working class Russian anti · 
Strategic Forces of Michurinsk raion, (peasants) 
the Unified Armed Tambov oblast 
Forces of the CIS. 
Army General since 
1982 




Mochaikin, Chairman of Co- Pushkovo, middle class Ukrainian neutral 
Aleksandr ordinating Council of Golovanevsky raion, ( civil servants) 
Officers' Assemblies, Kirovograd oblast, 
Chaimrnn of the Ukraine 
Committee on the 
rights of military men 
with the Commander-
in-Chief of the 
Unified Armed 
Forces of the CIS. 
Rear Admiral since 
October 1992 
Panin, Vasily President of the Naval Borovoe, middle class Russian pro 
Fraternity, the Usmansky raion, ( office worker) 
Russian Fund for Lipetsk oblast 
., 
Naval Exhibits and 
Traditions. Admiral 
since 1989 .. 
Potapov, Viktor Commander of Naval Muratovka, not known Russian neutral 
Air Forces. Air Force Makshansky raion, 
Colonel General since Penza oblast 
1985 
Prudnikov, Viktor Air Defence Rostov-on-Don middle class Russian neutral 
Commander-in-Chief ( civil servant) 
Air Force Colonel 
General 
390 
Pyankov, Boris Deputy Commander- Sverdlovsk working class Russian pro 
in-Chief of the (Ekaterinburg) (specific occupation , 
Unified Armed not known) 
Forces of the CIS. 
Colonel General since 
1987 
Rodionov, Igor Head of the General Kurakino, Penza middle class Russian anti 
Staff Academy, Oblast (high-ranking officer) 
Colonel General. 
Defence Minister July 
1996-May 1997 
Samsonov, Viktor Chief of Staff, first Dukhovnitsky raion, working class Russian anti (though initially 
deputy Commander- Smolensk oblast (specific occupation pro) 
in-Chief of the not known) 
Unified Armed 
Forces of the CIS. 
Colonel General .. 
Selivanov, Valentin Chief of the main Stanovaya, not known Russian pro 
headquarters of the Stanovlyansky raion, 
Navy, first deputy Lipetsk oblast 
Commander-in-Chief 
of the navy. Admiral 
since 1992 
Semenov, Vladimir Commander-in-Chief Karachaevo raion, not known not known pro 
of Land Forces. Karachaevo-Cherkess 
Colonel General autonomous oblast, 
Karachai 
391 
Sergeev, Anatoly Commander of the Ivanovka, working class Russian pro 
Volga military Bolsherechinsky (specific occupation 
district. Colonel raion, Omsk oblast not known) 
General since 1991 
Sergeev, Igor Commander-in-Chief Verkhny, working class Russian anti 
of Strategic missile Voroshilovgrad (miner) 
troops. Colonel oblast, Ukraine 
General. Defence 
Minister from May 
1997 
Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief . Aksaisky raion, working class Russian anti 
Evgeny of the Unified Armed Rostov oblast ( specific occupation 
Forces of the CIS, not known) 
Defence Minister 
.. August 1991-
Febraury 1992. Air 
Force Marshall since 
1991 .. 
Smimov, Vladimir Adviser on military Babaevo, Vologda working class Russian not known 
issues to the Russian oblast (specific occupation 
government. Colonel not known) 
Sorokin, Viktor Commander of the not known not known Russian not known 
Operative Group of 
the Armed Forces of 
the Russian 
Federation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia, to 
March 1993 
392 
Stolyarov, Nikolai Chairman of the Aleksandrovka, working class Belarusian anti 
committee for Kalinkovichesky (specific occupation 
personnel of the raion, Gomel oblast, not known) 
general headquarters Belarus 
of the Unified Armed 
Forces of the CIS, 
Adviser of Speaker of 
the Russian Supreme 
Soviet. Air Force 
Major General since 
1991 . 
Toporov, Vladimir Deputy Minister of Baranovichi, Belarus not known Russian not active 
Defence. Colonel 
General 
Tretyakov, Valery Commander of the Syzran, .. not known Russian not active 
Baikal Military Kuibyshev (Samara) 
District. Colonel oblast 
General since 1991 
Vorobev, Eduard First deputy Voronezh middle class Russian pro 
Commander-in-Chief (civil servant) 
of the Land Forces. 
Colonel General since 
1988 
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Vorobev, Vasily Head of the Chief Gidrotorf, Balakninsk working class Russian not known 
Military Budget and raion, Gorky (specific occupation 
Finance (Nizhny Novgorod) not known) 
Administration of the oblast 
Ministry of Defence. 
Lieutenant General 
Vysotsky, Evgeny Head of the Chief Belyov, middle class Russian neutral 
Administration for Tula oblast ( civil-servant) 
Personnel Training 
and Assignment of 
·. 
the Ministry of 
Defence. Lieutenant 
General 
Zaitsev, Vitaly Deputy Commander- Kupalishi, working class Russian not known 
'in-Chief of the navy Pestyaovsky raion, (farmer) 
for maintenance, head Ivanovo oblast 
of the chief '• 
maintenance 
administration of the 
Navy. Admiral since 
1990 
Zazulin, Nikolai Head of Chief Sebrovo, working class Russian pro 
Automobile Mikhailovsky raion, (farmer) 
Administration of the Volgograd (formally 
Ministry of Defence. Stalingrad) 
Colonel General since 
1992 
Source: Longman Bibliographical Directory of Decision-makers. 
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APPENDIX 3: Officers of the Airborne and Spetsnaz forces in early 1993 
Name Position Birthplace Class Ethnicity 1991 Coup stance 
Babichev, Ivan Divisional commander, Orsha, Yitebsk oblast not known Ukrainian not known 
Pskov. 
Colonel 
Borisov, Gennadi Academy of the Byelorussia working class Belarusian not known 
General Staff (driver) 
I Colonel 
Budyko, Georgii, Chief of the medical Bobruisk, . middle class Russian not known 
service. Mogilev oblast ( officer in the reserve 
Major and engineer-
designer) 
Fedotov, Aleksandr Head of the military Cherkessk, middle class Russian not known 
department of the Stavropol Krai (accountant) 
Institute of Physical 
Culture 
395 
Kazunin, Sergei Commander of the 5m Roslyspino, working class Russian not known 
training parachute Vologodsk oblast (farrier) 
landing company, unit 
number 11929. 
Captain 
Kolmakov, Aleksandr Academy of the Kalin in grad, working class Russian anti 
General Staff. Moscow oblast (worker) 
Major General 
Naumov, Yuri Deputy division Tambovskaya, working class Russian not known 
commander, 104 Tokaryovka (farmer) 
Division. 
Colonel 
Podkolzin, Evgeni Commander in Chief Kazakhstan middle class Russian pro 
of Airborne Troops. (hydrologist) 
Colonel General 
Popov, Aleksandr Chief of staff of Zhdanov, not known Russian not known 
division. Donetskaya oblast 
Colonel 
Shcherbak, Valery Academy of the Donetsk working class Ukrainian not known 




Shkirkov, Vladimir Deputy chief of the Krasnoyarsk working class Russian not known 
division's political (railway worker) 
department. 
Colonel 
Solonin, Igor Regimental Livov working dass Russian not known 
commander. (milling-machine 
Lieutenant Colonel worker) 
Solyuyanov, Commander of Orenburg oblast working class Russian not known ,, 




Divisional Borisov, working class Belarusian not known 
propagandist. Minsk oblast, (driver) 
Major Byelorussia 
Tanenya, Stepan Commander of 13 Brest oblast working class Belarusian not known 
Airborne Brigade. ( agriculture brigade 
Colonel leader in Zhitkovich) 
Zuev Aleksandr Deputy regimental Ufa working class Russian not known 
commander of the (serviceman) 
rear. Lieutenant 
General 
Source: Schofield, pp206-85 
397 
APPENDIX 4: Officials occupying key positions in the new regime: March 1993 
Name Position Birthplace Class Ethnicity 
Alekseev, Sergei Member of the not known not known Russian 
Presidential Council 
Ambartsumov, Evgeny Member of the Council of Moscow not known Armenian 
the President 
.. 
Anisimov, Stanislav Minister of Trade and Berezansky raion, not known not known 
Material Resources Nikolaev (Mykolaiv in 
Ukrainian) oblast, Ukraine 
Arbatov, Georgy · · Director of the Institute for Kherson, not known Russian 
the Study of the USA and Ukraine 
Canada, Russian Academy 
of Sciences 
.. 
Barchuk, Vasily Minister of Finance to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, not known Russian 
March 1993 Siberia 
Basin, Efim Chairman of the State Khislovichi, Rzhaksinsky not known Russian 




Belyaev, Evgeny Chairman of the State Peskovka, not known Russian 
Committee on Sanitary Kirov oblast 
Epidemiological 
Inspection and Chief 
Medical Officer. Minister 
Bochin, Leonid Chairman of the State Zhitomir not known Ukrainian 
Committee on Anti- (Zhytomyr) oblast 
Monopoly Policy and 
Support of New Economic 
Structures. Minister 
Boldyrev, Yury Chief State Inspector to Leningrad not known Russian 
March 1993 
Bulgak, Vladimir Minister of Moscow not known Russian 
Communications 
·. 
Bunich, Pavel Member of the Council of Moscow not known Russian 
the President 
Burkov, Valery Adviser of the President Shadrinsk, not known Russian 
on invalids Kurgan oblast 
Chemomyrdin, Viktor Prime Minister Cherny Otrog, middle class Russian 
Saraktashsky raion, (head of a motor tractor 
Orenburg oblast station) 
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Chubais, Anatoly Deputy Prime Minister Borisov, not known Russian 
and Chairman of the State Belarus (military family but rank 
Committee on the not known) 
Administration of State 
Property 
Danilov-Danilyan Minister of Ecology and Moscow not known Russian 
Natural Resources 
Efimov, Vitaly Minister of Transport Malinsky raion, not known Russian 
Moscow 
Oblast .. 
Emelyanov, Aleksei Member of the Council of Vydrankom working class Russian 
the President Smolensk oblast (peasant) 
Erin, Viktor Minister of Internal Kazan, not known Russian .. 
Affairs Tatarstan 
Ermolenko, Vitaly Director of the federal Garlovsky raion, not known Ukrainian 
centre for land and Donets oblast, Ukraine 
agroindustrial reform. 
Minister 
Fadeev, Gennady Minister of Railways Shimanovska, not known Russian 
Amur 
oblast 
Fedorov, Boris Deputy Prime Minister Moscow not known Russian 
Fedorov, Nikolai Minister of Justice Marinsko-Posadsky raion, working class Chuvash 
Chuvash republic (peasant) 
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Fedotov, Mikhail Minister of the Press and Moscow not known Russian 
Information 
Filatov, Sergei Chief of Staff, Head of the Moscow not known Russian 
Administration of the 
President 
Filippov, Petr Head of the Analytical not known not known not known 
Centre on Socio-Economic 
Policy of the President 
Gaidar, Egor Member of the Moscow middle class (high-ranking Russian 
Presidential Council officer) 
Gefter, Mikhail . Member of the Council of Simferopol not known not known 
the President 
Glazev, Sergei Minister of Foreign Zaporozhe, not known not known 
Economic Relations Ukraine 
Granberg,· AI eksandr Adviser of the President not known not known not known 
on Economic and Social 
Questions in the CIS 
Grushin, Boris Member of the Council of not known not known not known 
the President 
Ignatev, Kirill Member of the Council of not known not known not known 
the President 
Ilyushin, Viktor First Assistant of the Nizhny Tagil middle class not known 
President, Head of the (metallurgist) 
Secretariat of the President 
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Kadannikov, Vladimir Member of the Council of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) not known Russian 
the President 
Karaganov, Sergei Member of the Council of not known not known not known 
the President 
Karyakin, Yury Member of the Council of not known not known Russian 
the President 
Kazannik, Aleksei Member of the Council of Chemigov (Chemihiv) working class Ukrainian 
the President ob last, (peasant) 
.. Ukraine 
Khizha, Georgy Deputy Prime Minister Ashkhaba1, Turkmenistan not known Russian 
· Khlystun, Viktor Minister of Agriculture Shchuchinsky raion, working class Russian 
and Food Kokchetav oblast, (peasant) 
Kazakhstan 
Kostikov, Vyacheslav Head of the Press Office not known working class Ryazan 
of the President (news vendor) 
Kotenkov, Aleksandr Head of the state and legal not known working class (specific Russian 
administration of the occupation not known) 
President. Major General 
Kozyrev, Andrei Minister of Foreign Brussels, middle class Russian 
Affairs Belgium (engineer) 
Kovalev, Sergei Member of the Council of not known not known Russian 
the President 
Krasikov, Anatoly Head of the Press Office not known not known not known 
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